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JOURNAL

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NO. 1.

An Examination of the Lachelier Expansion

By

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I

The Lachelier expansion consists in developing *subalternation*, *contraposition* and *conversion* into arguments in the first, second and third figures of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Let us consider *subalternation* first.

From $S \text{ a } P$ it is required to *deduce* $S \text{ i } P$.

Consider the case where $S \text{ a } P$ is taken predicatively, and S distributively. In other words $S \text{ a } P$ is a *law*.

$S \text{ a } P$ is now applied to a specific case S_1 and it is found that S_1 has P .

Hence we infer $S \text{ i } S$.

This is not tautological, since $S \text{ i } S$ is to be interpreted predicatively.

But P has the relation of *inherence* to S .

$\therefore S \text{ i } P$

Summing up we get,

$$\begin{array}{c} S \text{ a } P \\ S \text{ i } S \\ \hline \therefore S \text{ i } P \end{array}$$

Fig. I *Darii*.

Subalternation of the A proposition has thus been expanded into an argument in *Darii*.

Similarly we get *Ferio* for E. .

$$\begin{array}{c} S e P \\ S i S \\ \hline \therefore S o P \end{array}$$

Fig. I *Ferio*.

Let us now take up *contraposition*.

Let us consider S a P again.

The problem now is to deduce $\overline{P} e S$ from S a P.

S a P is again to be viewed predicatively, and S distributively.

An English exponent of Lachelier's views describes the process in the following manner :

"If we consider S a P as the expression of a law, we may well assert that this law involves its reciprocal. If P is a necessary consequence or quality of S, then by removing P we also eliminate S. But then we may apply this inverse law to all the subjects which are not-P and assert that because No not-P is P, therefore no not-P is S.¹

$$\begin{array}{c} S a P \\ \overline{P} e P \\ \hline \therefore \overline{P} e S \end{array}$$

Fig. II *Camestres*

Contraposition of A is thus expanded into an argument in *Camestres*. E cannot be handled in the same way, because it would land us in the fallacy of double negative premises.

(In this connection Lachelier introduces the *Conversion* of E.)

$$\begin{array}{c} S e P \\ P a P \\ \hline P e S \end{array}$$

Fig. II *Camestres*.

1. Greenwood, in the Proceedings of Aristotelian Society for 1934-35.

Conversion of A and I may be expanded thus :

A
S a S
S a P

P i S

Fig. III *Darii*

S a S
S i P

Fig. III *Datisi*.

∴ S i P

Obversion and *Inversion* cannot be dealt with in this manner. They are, in Lachelier's opinion, 'meaningless word games adding nothing to the interpretation of judgments.'

II

Let us glance at the theoretical foundations for the Lachelier expansion. The *dictum de omni et nullo* is at the basis of the first figure and *subalternation*, the *dictum de diverso* of the second figure and *contraposition*, and the *dictum de exemplo* of the third figure and *conversion*. Hence it is natural to develop the latter into the former in each case. There is, of course, a difference between the structure of the original syllogistic figures and that developed from immediate inference. For example, in the first figure, the minor and middle terms are symbolised differently as S and M, while in the developed *subalternation* they are both S. Similarly in *Conversion* the major and middle terms are S. Apart from this there is no difference in principle. This is how Lachelier argues.

But the real justification for this extraordinary logical process is psychological. Lachelier is keen on preserving the structural and functional individuality of the several figures and moods of the syllogism. But the very constitution of the moods, and even their very names point unmistakably to the first figure as their natural fulfilment.² The process of reduction was employed by the Aristotelians to prove this; and as reduction depends on eduction, the most convenient way of

2. It is possible to reduce both *Darii* and *Ferio* to *Celarent* by the indirect method, and *Celarent* itself may be reduced to *Barbara* by obverting the major. All moods, therefore, may be reduced to *Barbara*, which is the example *per excellence* of the *dictum de omni et nullo*.

preserving the individuality of the figures is to deny the validity of education by proving that it is only a kind of deduction.

But, even so, does Lachelier succeed? The futility of the attempt is shown up by the fact that *obversion* and *conversion* cannot be expanded. Whatever we might say of Inversion³, we must admit that obversion is an important type of inference. Moreover the expansion of the converse of E into a conclusion in *Camestres* is inconsistent with the general method of procedure which develops A and I into *Darapti* and *Datisi*.

There is another vein of inconsistency in the Lachelier expansion. Opposition and eduction are grouped together and treated as though they were identical. In structure as well as in function, they are different, each ranking independently of the other in a logical scheme of inference. They represent two different types of immediate inference.

No attention is devoted to *contraposition* and *contrareity*.

The entire demonstration proceeds on a wrong assumption. In stating the problem, Lachelier uses the expression, 'it is required to deduce.' This is obviously a case of *petito principi*. In opposition and eduction we apprehend the relationship between the premise and the conclusion immediately, without any mediating proposition.

The premise S a P, both in *subalternation* and *contraposition*, is taken as the case of a *law*, which means that the other cases, where the proposition is interpreted according to the class view and the attributive view, are neglected. As these are important interpretations made use of by the natural and physical sciences, their neglect is regrettable.

If S a P be an instance of a law, it is clearly an inductive generalisation. That it is not meant to be an *a priori* principle is made clear by the fact that Lachelier speaks of applying it to a special case S₁. The proof for the general law from induction is to be sought outside deduction. But Lachelier holds that syllogistic inference is the origin of all types of inference, inductive inference not excluded. So there is no means of establishing a law in the Lachelier scheme.

In *subalternation* we are shown that

$$\begin{array}{c} S \text{ i } S \\ \therefore S_1 \text{ has } P \end{array}$$

3. In this connection we might remind ourselves of the classic example of the puzzle of *inversion*, viz., Some non-women were hanged for theft last year.

This is a proposition of 'inherence'. But it is not at all clear how, on his own basis, Lachelier could distinguish between *inherence* and *relation* in the case of the above proposition. These are intermingled. We need not be surprised at this, since we are familiar with the superposition of the class view over the predicative view in the Aristotelian syllogism.

A more serious defect is this; in $S \text{ a } P$, S is viewed distributively. Then it is applied to a specific case S_1 . This S_1 is either a part of the denotation of S already examined before arriving at the law, in which case the whole process is meaningless, or it is a new instance, in which case we have a full blown syllogistic argument which occupies the second stage of the complete inductive method. The whole process ceases to be a manipulation of propositions expressing inherence, and that hits Lachelier hard.

In the expansions of *subalternation* and *contraposition* the minor and middle terms are the same; in *conversion* the major and middle terms are the same. Lachelier himself stresses this similarity. For the syllogism to be syllogistic, the major must be predicated of the minor by means of the middle, otherwise there is no mediation, and there will certainly be no deduction. Besides, consider, for example, the expansion of subalternation of A .

$S \text{ a } P$

$S \text{ i } S$

$S \text{ i } P$

Here if the premises are to be treated as propositions of *inherence*, then the predicate of the minor has the relation of inherence to S . If so it cannot be the same as the subject of the major. Hence the fallacy of four terms is committed. The same objection may be urged against the other expansions.

III

Lachelier was not a formalist in logic, for he says that 'in spite of the formal character of logic, its meanings must be conditioned by the type of truth it seeks to discover.' If one is to be consistent with this position, one must admit that immediate inference and mediate inference are different from each other, and that to reduce the one to the other is not logical.

The Miquel-Clifford Configuration in the Geometries of Mobius and Laguerre

By

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§ 1 INTRODUCTION

By the term "Mobius Geometry" or "Inversive Geometry" we mean the Geometry associated (in the sense of Klein's Erlanger Programme) with the Mobius Group (or inversion Group of the plane)—the group of continuous one—one transformations between two manifolds of circles in the Euclidean plane which carry each point-circle into another point-circle (1 p.35)† Belonging to this geometry is the configuration associated with the names of Miquel and Clifford, consisting of 2^{n-1} circles and 2^{n-1} points of which n circles pass through each of the points and n of the points lie on each circle (3 § 31). The configuration may be generated from the set of circles concurrent at any of the points of multiple incidence in the configuration.

The Laguerre Group is the group of continuous one-one transformations of oriented circles which carries every oriented line into an oriented line ; and the invariant theory of this group is "Laguerre Geometry". We have here an analogous Miquel-Clifford configuration consisting of 2^{n-1} oriented circles and 2^{n-1} oriented lines of which n circles are properly tangent to each of the oriented lines, and n of the oriented lines have proper contact with each oriented circle. (2 p. 365) The whole configuration may be generated from the set of n circles which touch any one of the oriented lines.

Both the Mobius and Laguerre groups are sub-groups of the Lie group of circle transformations which carry oriented circles into oriented circles and conserve proper contact. The angle at which two circles cut (mod. π) is a Mobius-invariant, while the length of the proper tangential segment between two oriented circles is a Laguerre-invariant. (1 Chapters, 2, 4).

† The thick figures relate to the references at the end of the paper and the figures that follow to the pages or paragraphs.

The main object of this paper is to prove that

- (i) *In the Miquel-Clifford configuration of Mobius Geometry, the angles of which the n circles cut at any of the 2^{n-1} points of the configuration is the same as at any other of the points ;*
.. (1.1)
- (ii) *In the Miquel-Clifford configuration of Laguerre Geometry, the tangential segments marked out on any of the 2^{n-1} oriented lines of the configuration by the n oriented circles which touch it, are the same as on any other of the oriented lines.*

These results are believed to be new. .. (1.2)

§2. A LEMMA IN MOBIUS GEOMETRY

In elementary geometry we have the theorem that the angle in a segment of a circle is constant and is equal to the angle between the tangent and the chord.

When two straight lines meet, they form four angles which are equal in pairs and the measure of the angle may be taken indifferently as $\pm \theta$, $\pm (\pi - \theta) \bmod 2\pi$. This double ambiguity may be removed by two kinds of orientation. By treating the two lines as an ordered pair we remove the ambiguity of sign, while by orienting each line, we may choose between an angle θ and $\pi + \theta$. The latter of those devices is available in Laguerre but not in Mobius geometry, so that here the angle between an ordered pair of lines is known only modulo π . We may hence give the result mentioned in the previous para in more precise terms as follows: If A, B, D are three points on a circle, the angle (mod. π) between the ordered line pair AD, BD is equal to the angle between the tangent to the circle at A and the line BA. It does not matter where D lies on the circle.

By circular inversion, or by interpreting straight lines as circles through an ideal "point at infinity" we may restate the above result as a Lemma in Mobius geometry thus:—

Lemma.—Given three circles $C_1 C_2 C_3$ through a point C, we have three intersections, $C_{12} C_{23}$ and C_{31} other than C and a circle C_{123} through them. The angle at C between the circles C_3 and C_1 (in the order mentioned) is the angle between C_2 and C_{123} at the point C_{23} both angles being taken mod. π . .. (2.)*

* Throughout this paper the order of the suffixes, or of figures in a bracket is a matter of indifference.




Fig. 1.

The notation has been changed, the points A B D and the "point at infinity" being rechristened C , C_{13} , C_{23} and C_{12} . Now the angle between the circles C_2 , C_{123} taken in that order at C_{23} is the negative of the angle between them at their other intersection C_{12} i.e., it is the angle C_{123} , C_2 at C_{12} . Hence, if we make the convention that any suffix repeated twice may be omitted altogether, (4 § 1) we get that

the angle between the tangents to the circles C_3 , C_1 at C is equal to the angle between the tangents to the circles C_{123} , $C_{121} = C_2$ at C_{12} . .. (2.2)

We shall hereafter omit the letter C and write down only the suffixes within brackets. C itself will be denoted by the symbol ().

§3. THE MIQUEL CLIFFORD CONFIGURATION IN MOBIUS GEOMETRY

Given two circles (1) and (2) through (), their Miquel point is (12). With a third circle (x) through (), we have a Clifford circle (12 x) through the point (12). If we identify (121) with (2) and (122) with (1) according to our convention, we have a one-one correspondence between the n circles (1) (2) . . . (n) through () and the n circles (121) (122) . . . (12 n) through (12), and (2.2) shows that the angle between (r) and (s) at () is equal to the corresponding angle between (12 r) and (12 s) at (12). Hence,

If a correspondence is established between the n circles through () and the n circles through (12) in which (r) corresponds to (12 r), $r = 1, 2 \dots n$ the angle between any two circles (r) (s) at () taken in the order mentioned, is equal mod π , to the angle between (12 r) and (12 s) taken in that order .. (3.1)

Now we may treat the n circles (12 r) through (12) as the circles generating the configuration, so that (12) has now the same status as

(). A repetition of the previous argument shows that if we take the intersection of two of the circles through (12) say the point (1234), we may establish a correspondence between (12 r) through (12) and (1234 r) through (1234) so that the angle between (12 r) and (12 s) at (12) is equal, mod. π , to the angle between (1234 r) and (1234 s) at (1234). Hence the n circles at (1234) cut at the same angles as at () and (12).

We now treat the n circles through (1234) as generating the configuration and show that the angles at which the circles cut at (say) (123456) is the same as at (1234), the circle (1234 r) corresponding to (123456 r). In this manner we reach all the points of multiple incidence in the configuration and hence (1.1) is seen to be true.

For a more detailed study of this correspondence reference may be made to paper 5.

§4. AN ANALOGOUS LEMMA IN LAGUERRE GEOMETRY.

There is a close analogy between the Mobius and Laguerre geometries in which the point of intersection and the angle between two circles in the former correspond to the common oriented tangent and the tangential segment of two oriented circles in the latter. (3 Chap. X and 1 § 48). Thus two oriented circles have only two common oriented tangents and the two tangential segments are equal. Given three oriented lines, there is only one oriented circle properly tangent to all of them. We may, therefore expect that analogous to (2.1) we should have a lemma which should run as follows :

Lemma.—Given three oriented circles $C_1C_2C_3$ properly tangent to an oriented line C , we have three common oriented tangents other than C , namely, C_{12} , C_{23} , C_{31} and these three have proper contact with a unique circle C_{123} . The tangential segment on C marked out by the circles C_3 and C_1 is equal to that marked out on C_{23} by the circles C_2 and C_{123} .. (4.1)

The lemma is seen to be true, for we may by a transformation of the Laguerre group (which conserves the lengths of tangential segments) transform C_1 and C_2 into point circles on the line C . C_3 is an oriented circle having proper contact with C and C_{23} , C_{31} are properly tangent to C_3 . By passing to the limit when C_1 and C_2 tend to become point circles, we see that C_{12} is the same line as C but with its orientation reversed. The circles C_{123} and C_3 both touch the sides of the triangle formed by the non-oriented lines C , C_{23} , C_{31} , but as one of them touches C and the other C_{12} , one must be the incircle and the other an excircle.

The points of contact are, therefore, equidistant from the extremities C_1 C_2 of the side. Hence the tangential segment of the circles C_1 and C_3 is equal to that of C_2 and C_{123} . The former may be considered to be on C or C_{13} and the latter on C_{23} or C_{12} these being the common tangents. This proves both the lemma and the analogue of (2.2), which may be stated thus :

The common tangential segment on C of the circles C_3 , C_1 is equal to the common tangential segment on C_{12} of C_{123} and $C_{121} = C_2$
 \dots (4.2)

As tangential segments are invariant for the laguerre group, the results holds even when C_1 C_2 are proper and not point-circles.

§ 5. This result (4.2) is our basic result which leads directly to a proof (1.2) and hence we give also a direct proof.

Let us denote the lines C , C_{13} , C_{12} , C_{23} by the letters L , M , N , P and indicate their points of contact with a circle by attaching the symbol of the circle as a suffix. Thus L_3 is the point of contact of L with C_3 and N_{123} of N with C_{123} . We shall also, for convenience, name all tangential segments in the direction of orientation, though this is in no way essential to the proof. We have then from the accompanying figure.

$$P_{123}P_3 = P_{123}P_2 + P_2P_3 = N_2N_{123} + L_3L_2$$




Fig. 2.

Similarly,

$$M_3M_{123} = M_3M_1 + M_1M_{123} = L_1L_3 + N_{123}N_1$$

But $P_{123}P_3 = M_3M_{123}$ being tangential segments of the circles C_{123} and C_3 . Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} N_2N_{123} + L_3L_2 &= L_1L_3 + N_{123}N_1 \\ \therefore L_1L_3 - L_3L_2 &= N_2N_{123} - N_{123}N_1 \\ \text{Also } L_1L_3 + L_3L_2 &= N_2N_{123} + N_{123}N_1 \\ \therefore L_1L_3 &= N_2N_{123} \text{ and } L_3L_2 = N_{123}N_1 \end{aligned} \quad \dots (5.1)$$

that is, the tangential segment of C_1 and C_3 is the same as that of C_2 and C_{123} . Similarly the tangential segment of C_3 and C_2 is equal to that of C_{123} and C_1 .

§6. THE MIQUEL-CLIFFORD CONFIGURATION IN LAGUERRE GEOMETRY.

We are now in a position to prove (1.2). As before we omit the letter C and write down only the suffixes as bracket symbols, C itself being denoted by (). An odd number of digits in a bracket corresponds to a circle and an even number (including zero) to a line. We use the words line, circle, contact in the sense of oriented line, oriented circle and proper contact.

Take two circles (1) (2) touching a line (). They have one other common tangent which we denote by (12); call it their Miquel line. A third circle (3) touching () gives rise to two more common tangents other than () and these three touch the Clifford circle (123). With four circles (1) (2) (3) (4) touching (), we have four circles (123), (234), (341), (412) and it is known that they touch a line (1234)—the Miquel line of the four circles. With five lines we have five such Miquel lines (1234) etc. and these touch a circle (12345), the alternation of circles tangential to the same line and of concyclic tangents persisting indefinitely. With n circles touching (), we have a configuration of 2^{n-1} circles (r), (rst) etc., and 2^{n-1} lines (), (rs), ($rstu$) etc. of which n lines touch a circle and n circles touch a line. All the circles (or lines) touching a line (or a circle) may be obtained by adding to its symbol the letters 1, 2 . . . n in succession with the convention that a figure repeated twice may be omitted altogether, the notation and arguments being the same as for the configuration in Mobius Geometry (vide. 4).

To prove (1.2), we notice that by lemma (4.2), the tangential segment C_1C_r on () is equal to the tangential segment $C_{121}C_{12r}$ on (12). It follows that if we establish a correspondence between the points of contact of the n circles (r) which touch () with the points of con-

tact of the n circles (12 r) which touch (12) in which the points named above correspond, then the distance between any two points of the first set is equal to that of the corresponding point of the second set. Since the n circles touching (12) can be equally regarded as generating the configuration, we repeat the same argument and show that the segments on (12) are congruent with the segments on any other common tangent of two of the circles (12 r) (12 s) say (1234). The n circles (1234 r) touching (1234) may now be considered as generating the configuration and the same argument shows that the segments on (1234) are congruent with those on (123456) and so on till we reach every line of the configuration.

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The Coefficient of Variation and Field Experimentation

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1. Attempts have been made by statistical workers in India and abroad to determine the most suitable sizes for experimental plots for various crops. Many considerations have prevailed in choosing a particular size as 'ideal' and notable among these has been the coefficient of variation of the yields from plot to plot. The size¹ that gives a smaller value for the coefficient than another has usually been assumed, other things being equal, to have a stronger claim to be taken as the ideal than the other. The practice has been to work out the coefficients of variation for the several possible sizes of the elemental plot and to tabulate them for comparative study.² A close examination of these tables will make one wonder whether much labour spent in their construction could not have been saved without affecting the result. It is interesting to find that the coefficient of variation obeys a certain law which will be quite useful in this connection. In section (2) this law is formulated and in section (3) it is applied to the problem on hand.

2. Let x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n be n observations of a variable and let them be divided into k groups X_1, X_2, \dots, X_k where $X_1 = x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_r$, $X_2 = x_{r+1} + x_{r+2} + \dots + x_{2r}, \dots$; let M_r, σ_r, V_r denote the arithmetic mean, standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation of the X 's. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{V_r^2}{100^2} &= \frac{\sigma_r^2}{M_r^2} = \frac{1}{M_r^2} \left[\frac{X_1^2 + X_2^2 + \dots + X_k^2}{k} - M_r^2 \right] \\ &= \frac{X_1^2 + X_2^2 + \dots + X_k^2}{kM_r^2} - 1 \end{aligned} \quad \dots \quad (A)$$

1. The size is limited by the condition that there should be a sufficient number of observations for statistical analysis.

2. See Sayer, Vaidyanathan and Iyer: *Indian Journal of Agricultural Science*: June, 1936.

Similarly if the x 's are grouped r' at a time and if

$$Y_1 = x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_{r'}, \dots,$$

$$\frac{Y_{r'}^2}{100^2} = \frac{o_{r'}^2}{M_{r'}^2} = \frac{Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + \dots + Y_{k'}^2}{k' M_{r'}^2} - 1 \quad \dots \quad (B)$$

It is clear that $M_{r'} = \frac{S_n}{k}$ and $M_{r'} = \frac{S_n}{k'}$, where S_n is the sum of all the x 's. It now follows from (A) and (B) that $V_{r'} > V_r$ if

$$k' (Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + \dots + Y_{k'}^2) > k (X_1^2 + X_2^2 + \dots + X_k^2) \quad \dots \quad (C)$$

The implications of the above results are brought out below :—

(a) Let $r = \lambda r'$ where λ is an integer; then $k' = \lambda k$. There are now k X 's and k' Y 's; that is, for each X there are λ of the Y 's. Suppose $X_1 = Y_1 + Y_2 + \dots + Y_{\lambda}, \dots$

Then

$$\lambda (Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + \dots + Y_{\lambda}^2) > X_1^2$$

$$\lambda (Y_{\lambda+1}^2 + Y_{\lambda+2}^2 + \dots + Y_{2\lambda}^2) > X_2^2$$

and so on by an elementary theorem in inequalities.

$$\text{Hence } \lambda (Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + \dots + Y_{k'}^2) > (X_1^2 + X_2^2 + \dots + X_k^2)$$

Multiplying both sides by k ,

$$k' (Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + \dots + Y_{k'}^2) > k (X_1^2 + X_2^2 + \dots + X_k^2)$$

Now making use of condition (C) it can be said that if every Y is wholly contained in one X or another, the coefficient of variation for Y is greater than that for X .

(b) Let as before $r = \lambda r'$, but let there be some Y 's which are not wholly contained in an X . In this case the argument of subdivision (a) does not apply and as the following case shows, nothing definite can be said unless the actual calculation has been made.

Suppose $X_1 = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4$ and $X_2 = x_5 + x_6 + x_7 + x_8$;
 $Y_1 = x_1 + x_5$, $Y_2 = x_2 + x_6$, $Y_3 = x_3 + x_7$, $Y_4 = x_4 + x_8$.

Now $k = 2$ and $k' = 4$.


If $x_1 = 1$, $x_2 = 2$, $x_3 = 3$, $x_4 = 4$, $x_5 = 5$, $x_6 = 6$, $x_7 = 7$, $x_8 = 8$,
 $k(X_1^2 + X_2^2) = 1552$ and $k'(Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + Y_3^2 + Y_4^2) = 1376$ and hence
 $V_r > V_{r'}$ when $r > r'$.

But if $x_1 = 1$, $x_2 = 2$, $x_3 = 3$, $x_4 = 1$, $x_5 = 2$, $x_6 = 1$, $x_7 = 2$, $x_8 = 2$,
 $k(X_1^2 + X_2^2) = 226$ and $k'(Y_1^2 + Y_2^2 + Y_3^2 + Y_4^2) = 236$ and $V_r < V_{r'}$
 when $r > r'$.

(c) If r/r' is not an integer, no inference can follow from a priori considerations alone.

3. Let an area ABCD be divided into n unit plots which are made up of r rows and k columns where r and k can be factorised in many ways.

Let the yield of the plots be taken as x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n .



We know now that the coefficient of variation of yields for plots made up of $(\lambda \times \mu)$ units (λ along AD and μ along AB) is greater than that for plots of $a\lambda \times b\mu$ units for all integral values of a and b such that $a\lambda \succ k$ and $b\mu \succ r$.

Hence in the quest for the size that gives the least coefficient of variation the case of $(\lambda \times \mu)$ need not be worked out when the calculation is made for the plot $(a\lambda \times b\mu)$.

N.B. It should be observed that it is not enough if the area of the second plot is an integral multiple of that of the first for us to dispense with the latter. For instance, for plots consisting of 1×2 units it cannot be asserted that the coefficient will be greater than for plots of 4×1 units. The truth of this statement can be seen at once on reference to the example worked out in section (2).

An Automatic Recorder of Atmospherics

By

N. S. SUBBA RAO AND M. V. SUBRAMANYAM

(*Annamalai University*)

A systematic study of atmospherics was undertaken in the Physics Laboratories of the University during the year 1935-36. The main object of the work was to try to find out the actual nature of the disturbance caused by atmospherics to wireless reception on the medium waves in the locality for a period of one year.

This study involved the measurement of the number of atmospherics or groups of atmospherics (i.e., number of atmospherics succeeding each other in quick succession) received per minute, as well as the estimation of the average intensities of the atmospherics.

To facilitate this study the atmospherics were recorded for about two minutes at intervals of one hour throughout the day and every day throughout the period of study. An analysis of the records has revealed several interesting facts which will be published separately.

The recording of the atmospherics was carried out in the following manner. A four valve battery receiver consisting of 1 H.F., detector and 2 L.F. stages was employed. The output of this receiver was connected through a condenser choke circuit to a moving coil galvanometer of period one second, and the motion of a spot of light reflected from the mirror of the galvanometer was recorded photographically on a rotating drum carrying bromide paper.




Fig. 1-a.

The general disposition of the recording apparatus is shown in fig. 1-a. Light from a source S after reflection from the galvanometer mirror M was sharply focussed on the bromide paper carried on the drum D. The drum was enclosed in a box provided with an opening in front for admitting the light.




Fig. 1-b.

The recording drum was mounted on a brass axle 36" long, details of which are shown in fig. 1-b. Near the right-hand end of the axle a spiral groove G_2 of pitch 1 cm. was cut out for a distance of 12". Near the left-hand end a groove G_1 parallel to the axis of the rod 12" long and 3 mm. deep was cut out. A section of this end of the rod is also shown in fig.




Fig. 1-c.

The details of the arrangement employed for rotating the drum at the required speed are shown in fig. 1-c. An electric motor running on the mains was coupled by means of a spring belt to the pulley P, through a reduction gear R.G. By changing the coupling any one of three speeds of rotation of the drum could be employed. The axle was mounted on bearings B_1 and B_2 .




Fig. 1-d.

In fig. 1-d are given the details of the mechanism which enables the drum to move forward to the right. P_1 is a view of the pulley from its rim and P_2 a view from a point along the axis. A small metal piece S_2 projecting into the axle moves in the groove G_1 . The length of this projection can be adjusted by means of the screw S_1 . This attachment enables the pulley, when driven by the motor, to rotate the axle and the drum; at the same time it allows the axle to move freely to the right.

B_3 gives a section of the bearing B_1 . G.P. is a guide pin which works in a spiral groove and thus advances the drum forward to the right through a distance of 1 cm. for every complete rotation of the pulley and axle.

The arrangement outlined in detail above, moves the drum forward through a distance of 1 cm. for every complete rotation so that successive curves on the bromide paper appear at a distance of 1 cm. from each other. A sample record of the atmospherics recorded with the arrangement described above is given in *plate I*.

The wireless receiver, the lamp which provided the spot of light and the motor used for driving the drum were all switched on for two minutes at the end of every hour and then switched off automatically with the help of a simple device. During this period the atmospherics received by the receiver which was kept permanently tuned to 400 metres were automatically recorded.




Fig. 2-a.




Fig. 2-b.

All the switching arrangements were carried on with the help of an ordinary time-keeper which was previously adjusted to keep correct time. A small circular ebonite disc ($1\frac{1}{2}$ cm. in diameter and 4 mm. thick) was attached to the minute hand spindle at its back as shown in fig. A strip of brass *A* is embedded on the circumference of this disc and this strip is electrically connected to the spindle which in turn is in electric contact with the body of the time-keeper. Pressing against this disc is another strip of brass *B*, supported vertically and insulated from the body. By means of the spring *C* indicated in the figure the pressure of the strip *B* on the disc is kept constant.

The body of the instrument and the insulated strip are connected to two binding screws *H* and *K*, to the ends of which the circuit shown in the diagram is connected. *E* consists of four Leclanche cells in series. *E.M.* is a small electro-magnet. As the minute hand rotates the disc also rotates. When the brass strip comes into contact with *A*, the electric circuit is closed and the electro-magnet is energised. The position of the disc on the spindle is adjusted so that *A* comes into contact

with B when the minute hand is at 60. Thus this circuit is closed automatically at intervals of one hour. The period for which this circuit is kept closed is adjusted by altering the width of the strip A. In the arrangement actually employed this was adjusted to a little over two minutes (2 minutes and 10 seconds).

In figure 2-b is given a side view of the arrangement. D is the dial of the time keeper and at the back are shown the disc and its attachments. The attachment of the disc to the time-keeper does not in any way interfere with the normal working of the time-keeper and hence the circuits can be connected to any time-keeper without attracting attention and leads taken out to the places at which they are required.

Thus with the help of this device the circuit shown in the figure 2-b can be kept closed for any desired interval of time at the end of every hour.




Fig. 3.

In fig. 3 are given the details of the circuit. A lever about 25 cms. long is pivoted at O from an upright pillar. S is a spring whose tension can be adjusted by means of a screw. I is a soft iron piece carried by the lever above the poles of the electro-magnet. The distance of this piece from the poles of the electro-magnet can be altered by means of a screw not shown in figure. At the free end of the lever, horizontally and at right angles to it, is fixed an ebonite strip which carries at its ends 2 thick copper rods R_1 and R_2 bent into the form indicated. Below these rods are two pairs of cups $\frac{3}{4}$ full of mercury. When the electro-magnet is energised the lever is pulled down and the copper rods R_1 and R_2 plunge into the two pairs of mercury cups, thus closing two electrical circuits. In the apparatus actually used one pair of cups was connected in the L.T. circuit of the receiver and the other in the main-circuit.

Thus R_1 and the pair of mercury cups it connects formed the L.T. switch of the receiver whereas R_2 and its pair of mercury cups formed

a main switch. When the latter was closed, the lamp which provided the spot of light and the motor used for rotating the drum were switched on and the recording of atmospherics was thus carried on automatically. At the end of two minutes, these circuits were all switched off, by the breaking of the contact between A and B in the time-keeper. This process keeps repeating at intervals of one hour.

It is quite easy to distinguish the places where the record for a particular hour commences and where it ends. The motor runs for a short while after the switch is off before it comes to rest. During this interval the lamp is off and therefore there is a blank space indicating the end of the record for that hour. These spaces are clearly visible in the sample record.

This simple arrangement has worked satisfactorily for over a year and can easily be set up without any special pieces of apparatus. The automatic device employed has many possibilities and may well be adapted to suit the requirements of any circuit which needs to be closed at equal intervals of time.

Our thanks are due to Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao, DSc. (Lond.), Head of the Department of Physics for helping us with many valuable suggestions and for providing the necessary facilities for the carrying out of this work.

Derivatives of trans-Decalin

By

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(Annamalai University)

Reduced aromatic rings have assumed considerable importance during recent years, in view of their close relationship to certain biological and physiological products. The experiments recorded in this paper were undertaken with a view to study the changes which the *trans*-decalin ring undergoes, when subjected to the action of different reagents.

The work is incomplete, but it has become necessary to publish it at this stage since it cannot be continued by either of us. The experiments recorded clearly indicate, however, the unusual properties of this ring.

EXPERIMENTAL

iso Nitroso-*trans*- β -Decalone.

Sodium wire (17.5 g.) was immersed in ice-cold absolute ether 500 c.c. in a flask (1000 c.c.) fitted with a condenser and a drying tube and surrounded by ice. *trans*- β Decalone (108 g.) was added in small quantities into the flask in the course of half-an-hour. The contents of the flask turned yellow and the reaction was found to be smooth. Redistilled *iso*amyl nitrite (90 g.) was then added in the course of 3 hours, the flask being well shaken frequently during this period. The contents of the flask had now assumed a brown colour and after another 3 hours in ice, pieces of ice and water were added to the mixture, with thorough shaking.

The pale, yellow, ethereal layer and the aqueous brown layer were separated. The ethereal layer was well washed with water and the washings added to the aqueous portion, which was then thrice extracted with ether, this extract being added to the previous ether solution.

The alkaline solution was then acidified with glacial acetic acid and mations of *isonitroso-trans*- β -*decalone* could not be carried out. The ethereal solution was washed with water and dried over anhydrous sodium sulphate. After removal of ether, the thick reddish brown oil (5 g.) obtained was left in a vacuum desiccator for a week. On trituration with acetone, a solid was obtained, which on crystallisation from

aqueous acetone, decomposed at 203° without melting (Found: N, 7.7. $C_{10}H_{15}O_2N$ requires N, 7.7%).

The yield of the product being very small, the reactions or transformations of *isonitroso-trans- β -decalone* could not be carried out. The ethereal layer containing unreacted decalone was distilled and 52 g. of *trans- β -decalone* were recovered. A small quantity of *trans- β -decalol*, m.p. 75° was also found. *trans- β -Decalone* in methyl alcohol treated with amyl nitrite and concentrated hydrochloric acid gave negative results. No success attended the attempt to prepare the *isonitroso-derivative* by bubbling methyl nitrite gas through a solution of the ketone in glacial acetic acid.

Oxidation with Selenium Dioxide

2 : 3 (1 : 2)-*Diketo-trans-decalin*:—To *trans- β -decalone* (50 g.) dissolved in xylene (100 c.c.), selenium dioxide (45 g.) was added and the mixture heated for 24 hours on a sand-bath. The contents of the flask turned red after six hours and finally black. The product was then distilled in steam, the distillate extracted with ether and the ether-extract washed with a solution of sodium carbonate and water and then dried over anhydrous sodium sulphate. After removal of ether, the resulting brown liquid was distilled and collected in two fractions, (a) b.p. $104-110^{\circ}/6$ mm. (12 g.) and (b) b.p. $126-130^{\circ}/6$ mm. (18 g.). The residue in the flask was a resinified, uncrystallisable, gummy mass.

On redistillation, fraction (a) gave the *diketone* boiling at $106-108^{\circ}/6$ mm. (Found: C, 71.9; H, 8.6. $C_{10}H_{14}O_2$ requires C, 72.3; H, 8.4%). It gave a *semicarbazone* which on purification by boiling with alcohol, melted at 258° . (Found: N, 30.0%; $C_{12}H_{20}O_2N_6$ requires N, 30.0%).

Oxidation of *trans- β -Decalone* with Caro's acid.

trans- β -Decalone (50 g.) was mixed with potassium persulphate (75 g.) in a flask which was cooled in ice and salt for one hour and concentrated sulphuric acid (50 c.c.) was allowed to drop into the flask during the course of the next hour. After another four hours in ice with frequent shaking, ice-cold water (11) was added to the mixture and the brownish layer which separated was thrice extracted with ether. The ether extract was washed with water and dried over anhydrous sulphate and the ether on distillation, left a brown liquid as a residue. On standing, a crystalline substance (3 g.) melting at 132° separated. On crystallisation from petroleum-ether, pure *trans- β -decalone peroxide*

melted at 174° . (Found : C, 71.3 ; H, 9.5. $C_{10}H_{16}O_2$ requires C, 71.4 ; H, 9.5%).

44 g. of *trans*- β -Decalone were recovered unchanged.

Methylation of *trans*- β -Decalone.

1 (3)-*methyl-trans*- β -*decalone*. Finely powdered sodamide (4 g.) was gradually added to a solution of *trans*- β -decalone (10 g.) in absolute ether (50 c.c.) in a flask fitted with a reflux condenser and soda lime tube. Reaction proceeded smoothly and after 7 hours, the mixture was refluxed on the water-bath for 2 hours. After cooling, dry methyl iodide (15 g.) was slowly added during the course of an hour. After the addition of methyl iodide was complete, the flask was refluxed on the water-bath for 4 hours. It was observed that a white substance had been precipitated in the flask. The product was then poured into ice-water and the separated oil thrice extracted with ether. The ethereal liquid was well washed with water, dried over anhydrous sodium sulphate and ether removed. The residual pale yellow liquid distilled in two fractions, (a) b.p. $117^{\circ}/16$ mm. (6 g.) and (b) b.p. $123-126^{\circ}/16$ mm. (2 g.). Fraction (a) was found to be 1(3)-*methyl-trans*- β -*decalone* (Found C, 79.5 ; H, 10.9 ; $C_{11}H_{18}O$ requires C, 79.5 ; H, 10.8%). It gives a *semicarbazone*, m.p. 201° and an *oxime*, m.p. 132° . Fraction (b) was found to be unchanged decalone. Attempts were made to methylate *trans*- β -decalone with methyl iodide in presence of sodium. The yield of the methylated product was, however, very poor.

Monobromination of *trans*- β -Decalone

1 (3)-*Bromo-trans*- β -*decalone* :—Bromine (12 g.) in carbon tetrachloride (20 c.c.) was slowly added to *trans*- β -decalone (10 g.) in carbon tetrachloride (20 c.c.) cooled in ice, in the course of an hour. There was copious evolution of hydrogen bromide and after two hours at the room temperature, the solvent was removed. On trituration of the residue with petroleum-ether, crystalline 1 (3)-*bromo-trans*- β -*decalone*, m.p. 148° was obtained (Found : C, 51.8 ; H, 6.7. $C_{10}H_{15}O$ Br requires C, 51.9 ; H, 6.5%).

The brown residue after the separation of the crystalline substance distilled at $224^{\circ}/20$ mm. (6.3 g.). (Found : C, 51.9 ; H, 6.5%).

Dibromination of *trans*- β -Decalone.

Dibromo-trans- β -*decalone* :—Bromine (84 g.) in glacial acetic acid (50 c.c.) was allowed to drop in the course of an hour into *trans*- β -decalone (40 g.) in acetic acid (60 c.c.) maintained at $16^{\circ}C$. The brown

semi-solid which separated on addition of water, solidified completely on standing and addition of a little petroleum-ether. The substance (15 g.) melted at 120° in the crude state. On crystallisation from petrol ($70-80^{\circ}$), *dibromo-trans- β -decalone* melted at 132° (Found C, 38.7; H, 4.6. $C_{10}H_{14}OBr_2$ requires C, 38.7; H, 4.5%). The residue was found to be unreacted decalone.

The *semicarbazone* of the dibromo-ketone decomposed at 225° without melting.

$\beta\beta$ -Dichloro-*trans*-decalin.

Phosphorus pentachloride (37 g.) was added with shaking, portion-wise, in the course of an hour to dry *trans- β -decalone* (24 g.) in a flask provided with a calcium chloride tube and surrounded by ice. The reaction was vigorous and after three hours, the product was poured into ice and water and the precipitated oil extracted with ether thrice. On washing the extract with a solution of sodium carbonate and water and drying it over anhydrous sodium sulphate, the ether was removed. The residue boiled at $112^{\circ}/18$ mm. and was found to be $\beta\beta$ -*dichloro-trans-decalin* (Found: C, 57.8; H, 7.7. $C_{10}H_{16}Cl_2$ requires C, 58.0; H, 7.7%). The substance does not give a semicarbazone.

The dichloro-compound was recovered unchanged by refluxing (a) with $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ potassium hydroxide for 24 hours (b) for 50 hours with sodium hydroxide solution (c) with sodium methoxide for 10 hours (d) for 24 hours with sodium in xylene (e) with copper bronze in xylene and (f) with quinoline and pyridine for 10 hours.

1 (3)-Bromo-*trans- β -decalol*.

Bromine (20 g.) in chloroform (20 c.c.) was allowed to drop into *trans- β -decalol*, m.p. 75° (20 g.) in chloroform (20 c.c.) in the course of an hour. There was copious evolution of hydrogen bromide and after a period of twelve hours, the solvent was removed and the brown oil obtained distilled. Two fractions (a) b.p. $135^{\circ}/25$ mm. (11 g.) and (b) b.p. $185^{\circ}/25$ mm. (7.9 g.) were obtained and both analysed to a *monobromo-trans- β -decalol*, (Found: (a) C, 51.20; H, 7.6, and (b) C, 51.4; H, 7.3. $C_{10}H_{17}OBr$ requires C, 51.5; H, 7.3%).

β -Chloro-*trans*-decalin.

Phosphorus pentachloride (15 g.) was slowly added to *trans- β -decalol*, m.p. 75° (10 g.) in a flask provided with a calcium chloride tube, when there was a vigorous evolution of hydrogen chloride. The contents of the flask assumed a brown colour and were heated for two hours on

the water-bath. The product was then poured into ice-water and extracted well with ether. The ether layer was well washed with a solution of sodium carbonate and water and dried over anhydrous sodium sulphate. The ether was removed and the residual β -chloro-*trans*-decalin boiled at $126-128^{\circ}/38$ mm. (7 g.) (Found: C, 69.2; H, 10.1. $C_{10}H_{17}Cl$ requires C, 69.5; H, 9.9%).

β -Bromo-*trans*-decalin.

This was prepared by heating for 6 hours a mixture of phosphorus tribromide (30 g.) and *trans*- β -decalol, m.p. 75° (15 g.) on a water-bath. After purifying in the usual way, the bromo-decalin boiled at $143-145^{\circ}/40$ mm. (15.5 g.) (Found: C, 55.1; H, 7.8. $C_{10}H_{17}Br$ requires C, 55.3; H, 7.8%).

Di- β -*trans*-decalyl.

β -Bromo-*trans*-decalin (20 g.) in which sodium (4.2 g.) cut into small pieces was suspended, mixed with dry xylene (30 c.c.) was refluxed on the sand-bath for 24 hours. Sodium bromide was precipitated during the reaction. The oil which separated on pouring the reaction product into water was extracted with ether and the ether solution washed and dried. After removal of ether and xylene, the *didecalyl* distilled at $212^{\circ}/20$ mm. (5 g.) (Found: C, 87.6; H, 12.4. $C_{20}H_{34}$ requires C, 87.6; H, 12.4%).

The hydrocarbon was also formed by refluxing a mixture of β -bromo-*trans*-decalin (20 g.) and dry xylene (40 c.c.) with copper bronze (11.7 g.). Isolated in the usual way, it boiled at $212^{\circ}/20$ mm. (14.5 g.) (Found: C, 87.6; H, 12.4%). It displays beautiful fluorescence.

trans- β -Decalol acetate prepared by the action of acetyl chloride or acetic anhydride on *trans*- β -decalol boils at 250° . Attempts at oxidation with chromic acid or potassium permanganate did not meet with any success.

trans- β -Decalone could not be made to undergo Perkin's reaction nor to condense with malonic acid.

Some Facts about the Tamil Calendar which deserve to be studied

By

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(Annamalai University)

I do not propose in this thesis to canvass the time-old controversy as to whether the names of the months of the year, and of the stars as well as the divisions of the Tamilian Calendar are indigenous or alien to the Tamil language. It would be flogging a dead-horse in the present state of morbid strife. It would be nevertheless of some profit, I think, to investigate the nature, bearing and significance of certain indisputable facts and conceptions evidenced by the Tamil classics and to trace their proper place in the Calendar of the Tamils of yore.

The first patent fact that strikes any student of Tamil studies in this connection is this: all the days of the week, and many months of the year have pure Tamil names. There are also Tamil words to indicate that the early Tamils knew to reckon their week with seven days, and their year with twelve months. Divisions of time such as a day, a week, a month and a year were familiar to the people in the old Tamilaham, as is evidenced by pure Tamil names for all these conceptions Nal (நாள்), Kilamai or Elunal (கிழமை or எழுநாள்), Tingal (திங்கள்) and Andu (ஆண்டு), denoting respectively a day, week, month and year, are all exclusively Tamil names in general vogue from time immemorial in the Tamil language, and are of common occurrence in all the classics of the earliest Sangam era. That they reckoned seven days for a week is proved by the significant name of their week viz. elunal (எழுநாள்) corresponding to the English Sennight. The seven days of the week also have Tamil names not traceable to any foreign source: Tingal (திங்கள் = Moon's day), Sevvay (செவ்வாய் = Mar's day), Pulavan or Narkol (புலவன் or நற்கோள் Mercury's day), Viyalan (வியாழன் = Jupiter's day), Velli (வெள்ளி = Venus's day), Kari (காரி = Saturn's day) and Nayiru (நாயிறு = Sun's day). These names not only prove that the Tamil Calendar had its seven-day-week, but they also suggest that the days of the week were named after the planets and the Sun with whose astronomical and astrological relation the early Tamils were well acquainted. Similarly of the names of the twelve months in the year now extant in the Tamil country viz. Tai (தை), Masi (மாசி), Panguni

(பங்குனி), Chittirai (சித்திரை) Vaikasi (வைகாசி), Ani (ஆனி), Adi (ஆடி), Avani (ஆவணி), Purattasi (புரட்டாசி), Aippasi (ஐப்பசி), Karttigai (கார்த்திகை) and Markali (மார்கழி), nearly two-thirds are Tamil-words. I know that some recent scholars contend that most of these twelve names are of Sanskrit origin. But the significant fact that the greatest and earliest Tamil Grammarian Tolkappiyar by his rules in the Eluttadikaram (எழுத்ததிகாரம்) specially provides for the sandhi of the names of the months and of the daily stars would strongly suggest that such names were treated as Tamil words even in those early times. Whether the Tamils evolved the several names with their relative concepts as part of their culture indigenously, or whether they borrowed the ideas from others inventing and concocting appropriate names for them in their language is a question difficult of a decisive verdict in the paucity of convincing evidence. The general probability however in all such cases is that whenever notions or things entirely exotic are borrowed from another language or people, they are taken along with the names for those notions and things current in the language or among the people from whom they come. The cycle of sixty years from Prabhava (பிரபவ) to Akshaya (அக்ஷய) is such an instance. The entire system has been borrowed from Sanskrit. Hence the names of the sixty years of the cycle now in vogue in Tamil are all Sanskrit words adopted with the system in its entirety. The fact that no Tamil names have been coined for these years or even for the cycle of sixty years only corroborates and confirms the truth of the thesis stated above. And the converse of this thesis is also equally true and would therefore be accepted. Exclusively indigenous names or words for ideas and things in a language would ordinarily warrant the inference that the notions and things they signify are not borrowed from alien sources, but are native to the culture and language to which they owe their genesis and in which they have currency. Hence I desist from entering upon any elaborate discussion of this phase of the question.

The Tamils discovered or knew the difference between the planets and the fixed stars, and have called them by appropriate Tamil names. Kôl (கோள்) in Tamil means always a planet as opposed to nal (நாள்) the generic name for stars. The existence of such exclusive indigenous names for the various astronomical concepts in Tamil from very early times would ordinarily suggest that Tamils were advanced in civilization and culture sufficiently to be acquainted with the phenomena and features of those facts from a time prior to that of even Tolkappiyar whose age is now fairly fixed to be not less than 2,500 years ago.

It is commonly agreed that Varahamihira replaced the older lunar year by the solar year in the calendar in the Non-Dravidian India. If

this were so, it is noteworthy that the Tamils commonly reckoned not only their year but even their days by the annual and daily progress of the Sun in relation to their earth, centuries before Varahamihira started his new system and introduced the solar year or Sauramanam in the Calendar in the Aryan world. Vide:

செஞ்ஞாயிற்றுச் செலவு மஞ்ஞாயிற்றுப்
பரிப்பும் பரிப்புச் சூழ்ந்த மண்டிலமும்
வளிதிரிதரு திசையும்
வறிது நிலைய காயமு மென்றிவை
சென்றளந் தறிந்தோர் போலவென்று
மினைத்தென் போருமுளரே.

புறம். 30. உறையூர் முதுகண்ணன் சாத்தனார்.

(Puram 30. Uraiyur Mudukannan Sattanar).

This and a number of other similar references in the old Tamil classics which are all of them as old as, if not even earlier than the 2nd Century A.D., the age of Senguttuvan and therefore of Silappadikaram, would prove the acquaintance of the early Tamils with the solar year and many solar facts.

One other fact in this connection worthy of notice is this. In the calendar of all the Hindus other than the Tamils, the solar months are now reckoned by the time taken by the Sun to pass through each sign or twelfth part of the Zodiac; and this is borne out by the names of the twelve months corresponding to the names of the Zodiac, viz. Mesham (மேஷம்), Rishapam (ரிஷபம்), Midunam (மிதுனம்), Kadagam (கடகம்), Simham (சிங்கம்), Kanni (கன்னி), Tulam (துலாம்), Vrushikam (விருச்சிகம்), Danur (தனுர்), Makaram (மகரம்), Kumbam (கும்பம்), Meenam (மீனம்), corresponding respectively to the Tamil Chittirai, Vaikasi, Ani, Adi, Avani, Purattasi, Aippasi, Karttigai, Markali, Thai, Masi and Panguni. But in the Tamil country neither the system of reckoning or naming the months by the signs of the Zodiac is in common vogue. On the contrary the twelve months carry severally the names of the stars which coincide with the full-moon day in each month. The need to correlate this lunar reckoning of the month to the solar year entailed uneven periods for each of the months in the different years. For instance, any month in one year may consist of thirty days; but in another year it may be of twenty-nine days or less or of thirty-one or more days, as may be needed by the requirements of annual adjustment.

In all the Aryan and Aryanized Hindu India the new year starts from Mesham, Aries, the first of the twelve signs in the Zodiac which the Sun enters at Vernal Equinox. In the Tamil country to this day the current notion of the common people is that a year begins with the month of

Thai, which generally starts immediately after the winter solstice. The Tamils consider as of greater importance and celebrate the first of Thai more jubilantly and ceremoniously than the first of Mesham (மேஷம்) or Chittirai, which passes almost unnoticed in the unsophisticated rural-Tamilaham. The observance and celebration of the beginning of Thai in all Tamil area may imply the retention of their immemorial reckoning of the new year from the close of the winter solstice, which corresponds with the spring in the western countries.

There is yet another point of difference between the time-reckoning of the Tamils of yore and the Non-Tamils in India, that appears to be of even deeper and more radical significance than the facts referred to above. We are familiar with two ways of reckoning a day in all the calendars governed by the astronomical system evolved in Aryan India and in the civilized Europe. A day is reckoned from sunrise to sunrise or from mid-night to mid-night. A day is of twenty-four hours by the European reckoning, and of eight jamams each of seven and a half naligais or of sixty naligais in all in the Indo-Aryan system. The Tamils in the early age of the Tamil classics divided their day into six divisions as against the eight jamams in the Sanskrit. The six diurnal subdivisions of time are named in the Tamil literature as kalai (காலே = forenoon), nannakal (நண்பகல் = mid-day), erpadu (எற்பாடு = afternoon), malai (மாலே = evening), yamam or Nallira (யாமம் = mid-night) and vaikarai (வைகறை = small hours of the night till dawn). This gives an even period of ten naligais (நாழிகை) for each of the six divisions, three by day starting from the sunrise and three by night commencing from the sunset. But the most startling fact appears to be that the early Tamils reckoned their solar day from midday to midday. They did not take the sunrise as a starting point for the day, as obviously the time of sunrise as that of the sunset varied from month to month and even daily. Naturally there was no positive means of measuring the point of midnight either. The meridian on the contrary is always a constant and certain factor to fix as the starting point for a standard day. And the Tamils seem to have adopted therefore the unvarying meridian as the natural starting point for a standard solar day. Numerous references in the several poems of the classical period bear out this apparent truth.

- I. 1. பெயலான் றவிந்த தூங்கிருள் நடுநாள். (Kapilar—Aham. 158).
2. படுமழையுகுமினுவற்று குரல்
நடுநாள் யாமத்துத் தமிழம் கேட்டே. (Auvai—Narrinai, 129).
3. எல்லுமிழ்த்து
உரவுரு முரறும் அரையிருள் நடு நாள்
(Piran—Sattanar—Narrinai, 68).

4. நடுநாள் வருதலஞ்சுதம் யாமென (Narrinai, 125).
5. பாம்பின்
பையுடையிருந்தலை துமிக்கு மேற்றொடு
நடுநாள் என்னார் வந்து
நெடுமென்பனைத் தோளடைந்திசினோரே.
(Seraman Sattan—Kurunthokai, 268).
6. வெஞ்சினவரவின் பைந்தலைதுமிய
உரவுருமுரறு மரையிருள் நடுநாள்
(Pudampullan—Kurunthokai, 190).
7. ஆர்கலி வானம் தலைஇ நடுநாள்
கனை பெயல் பொழிந்தென (Nalvettanar—Narrinai, 53).
8. அதிர் குரலெழிலி முதிர்கடன் தீரக்
கண்தூர்பு விரிந்த கணையிருள் நடுநாள்
(Mudattirumaram—Narrinai, 228).
9. கடுமா வழங்குதலறிந்தும்
நடுநாள் வருதி நோகோ யானே
(Serumarunkumaranar—Narrinai, 257).
10. மழையமைந்துற்ற மாலிருள் நடுநாள்
(Kiranevyirriyar—Narrinai, 281).
11. அரவிரைதேரும் ஆரிருள் நடுநாள்
இரவில் வருதலன்றியும் (Kollan Vennaganar—Narrinai, 285).
12. நெடுநீர்ப் பொய்கை நடுநாளெய்தித்
தண்கமழ் புதுமலநுதும்
வண்டென மொழிப (Marudan Ilanaganar—Narrinai, 290).
13. அணங்கு கால்களரும்
மயங்கிருள் நடுநாள் (Sokiranar—Narrinai, 319).
14. மாரி நின்ற ஆரிருள் நடுநாள் (Aiyur Mudavanar—Narrinai, 334).
15. உருமிசையுரறு முட்குவரு நடுநாள்
அருவினைபோலு மருளாயன்றே
கணையிருள் புதைத்த அஞ்சவரு மீயலில்
பாம்புடன் திரிக்கு முருமொடு
ஒங்குவரை நாடநீ வருத லானே.
(Kilarmakanar Seliyanar—Narrinai, 383).
16. திண்திழிற்பரதவர் ஒண்கடர்க் கொளீஇ
நடுநாள் வேட்டம் போகி வைகறைக்
கடன் மீன் தந்து (Perunkannanar—Narrinai, 388).
17. நெடுநா வொண்மணி நிழற்றிய நடுநாள்

பெருமுதாளரேமஞ் சூழப்

பொழுதளந்தறியும் பொய்யா மாக்கள்
தொழுது காண்கையர் தோன்ற வாழ்த்தி
எறிநீர் வையகம் வெளி இய செல்வோய் நின்
குறநீர்க் கன்னல் இனைத்*தென் நிசைப்ப. (Mullaipattu, 50-58).

18. மாலிருள் நடுநாள் போகித் தன்னையர்
காலைத் தந்த கணைக் கோட்டு வாளைக்கு (Nakkirar—Aham, 126).

19. குறுமுயல் மறு நிறங் கிளர மதி நிறைந்து
அறுமீன் சேரும் அகலிருள் நடுநாள் (Nakkirar—Aham, 141).

II. 1. குறிவரலரைநாட் குன்றத்துச்சி
நெறி கெட வீழ்ந்த தன்னருங் கூரிருள்
(Nagankumaranar—Aham, 138).

2. அரைநாள் வேட்டம் அழுங்கில் பகல் நாள்
பசுவாய் ஞமலியொடு பைம்புத லெருக்கி
(Perumbanarrupadai, 11, 111-112).

3. ஊர் காப்பாளர் ஊக்கருங் கணையினர்
தேர்வழங்கு தெருவின் நீர்திரண் டொழுத
மழையமைந் துற்ற அரைநா ளமையமும்
அசைவில் ரெழுந்து நயம் பந்து வழங்கலின்
கடவுள் வழங்குங் கையறு கங்குலும்
(Maduraikkanji, 11, 647-651).

III. 1. பனியடே நின்ற பானாட் கங்குல் (Paranar—Aham, 125).

2. படுமழை பொழிந்த பானாட் கங்குல் (Narmanar—Aham, 92).

3. பானாள் வந்துநம்
. . . பொழிற் காணாதவன்
அல்ல லரும்படற் காண்கம் (Ammuvannar—Narmanai, 307).

4. பானாள்
உருமுச் சிவந்தெறியும் பொழுதொடு
(Perisattannar—Narmanai, 104).

5. பெயல்கால் மயங்கிய
பொழுது கழி பானாள் (Alamperisattannar—Narmanai, 255).

6. கழுதுகால் கொள்ளும் பொழுது கொள் பானாள் (Narmanai, 171).

7. கருங்காலன்றில் காமர் கடுஞ்சூல்
வயவுப் பெடையகவும் பானாட் கங்குல்
(Kunriyan—Kurunthokai, 301).

8. பானாள்
துஞ்சாதுறைநரோ டுசாவாத்
துயிர்கண் மாக்களெடு நெட் டிரா வுடைத்தே
(Kollanalisai—Kurun, 145).

9. பானாட் பள்ளி யானையி னுயிர்த்தனென் (Kapilar, Kurun, 142).
10. எல்லை சேரலினிருள் பெரிது பட்டன்று
பல்லோர் தஞ்சும் பானாட் கங்குல்
யாங்கு வந்தனையே ஒங்கல் வெற்ப (Kapilar, Kurun, 355).
11. பானாட்கங்குலும் பகலும்
ஆனாதமுலோளாய் சிறுதுதலே (Nakkirar—Aham, 58).
12. மன் னுயிர் மடிந்த பானாட் கங்குல் (Ilantevanar—Aham, 58).
13. பெருங்கடற் குட்டத்திப் புலவுத்திரை யோதம்
இருங்கழி மறுகிற் பாயப் பெரிதெழுந்து
உருகெழு பானாள் வருவரை பெயர்தலில்
பல்வேறு புள்ளின் இசையெழுந்தற்றே
அல்லங்காடி யழிதரு கம்பலை (Maduraikkanji, 11, 544-544).
14. பானாட் கொண்ட கங்குலிடையது. (Ibid. 1, 631).
15. குன்று குளிர்ப் பன்னகூதிர்ப் பானாள் (Nedunalvadai, 11, 11-12).

All these passages refer to the mid-night time in three several phrases, நடுநாள், அரைநாள் and பானாள். All these three phrases literally mean half-day. These cannot possibly mean the middle of night as such. Mid-night is always spoken of as nallirul (நள்ளிருள்), vide :

நரையுரு முரறு நாம நள்ளிருள் (Senkannanar—Narrinai, 122).

நள்ளென் யாமத் துள்ளுதொறும் படுமே
(Pudampullanar—Narrinai, 333).

நள்ளிருள் யாமத் தில் லெலி பார்க்கும்
பிள்ளை வெருகிற் கல்கிரை யாகி
(Maduraikkannanar, Kurun, 107).

The midnight as such is also called arai-irul (அரையிருள் or அரையிரவு)

1. எல்லுமிழ்ந்து
உரவுரு முரறு மரையிரு ணடுநாள்
2. வெஞ்சின வரவின் பைந்தலை துமிய
உரவுரு முரறு மரையிருள் நடுநாள்
3. ஆடிய லழற்குட்டத் தாறிரு ளரையிரவின்
(Kudalur kilar—Puram, 229).

Both the phrases அரையிருள் and நள்ளிரவு mean identically the middle of a night. நள்ளிரவு is the antithesis of நண்பகல். நள் (nal) signifies middle. Therefore நண்பகல் means the middle பகல் that is, day-time ; and நள்ளிரவு means the middle or இரவு or night-time. The other phrases நடுநாள், பானாள் and அரைநாள் can neither literally nor

semantically suggest the middle of night-time as such. But we know there is no mistaking the meaning of these phrases in all the passages in the classics where they refer only to mid-night. The passage அரையிருண்டுநாள் clearly shows that both the phrases அரையிருள் and நடுநாள் have been consciously used by the poet in the same context in juxtaposition to express the two different concepts—half of the night and half of the whole day. The poet obviously suggests by these expressions in this passage that mid-night is both the middle of the night and the middle of the solar day as reckoned in the calendar of the early Tamils. The only possible explanation would be that in the age of the classics the Tamil people considered midnight to be also the middle of their full-day. They signified the day-time or the day-half of their full-day by the word pakal பகல், as opposed to night time of their day which they called இரா or இரவு. (Vide the passage பாளுட்கங்குலும் பகலும் of Nakkirar cited above). Here he contrasts கங்குல் (night) with பகல் (day). But a whole day consisting both of night and day is known by the name of நாள் (nal. பாளுள் means பாதிநாள் or half of the day. So also அரைநாள் and நடுநாள் mean half or the middle of a day. The calling of the mid-night deliberately by phrases suggesting conclusively that it was the middle of a day would be possible only with the consciousness that it was exactly the half of the full day as reckoned by the Tamil people of that age. It seems fairly certain, therefore, that the Tamil people reckoned the time of their solar day in times of yore from meridian to meridian, and not from sunrise to sunrise. The innumerable excerpts cited above would conclusively convince all unbiassed minds that this is the only significance squaring with the language in which all the poets of the early classical age refer to midnight. This is a phase and aspect of an astronomical or astrological problem which deserves, in my opinion, further study and more scientific investigation.

தொல்காப்பிய- ஆராய்ச்சி

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12. திணைமயக் குறுதலுங் கடிநிலை யிலவே
நிலனொருங்கு மயங்குத லின்றென மொழிப
புலன் குணர்ந்த புலமை யோரே.

இதுவும் இதையடுத்த 'உரிப்பொருளல்லன்' என்னுஞ் சூத்திரமும் முன் ஐந்தாவது சூத்திரத்திற் கூறிய முல்லை முதலிய நிலவகைகளுக்கும், பின் 'புணர்தல் பிரிதல்' எனும் 14-வது சூத்திரத்திற் கூறும் குறிஞ்சி முதலிய திணைவகைகளுக்கும் உள்ள இயைபுமுரண்களை, நடுநிலை விளக்காய் நின்று எடுத்துக்காட்டி ஐயமகற்ற எழுந்த சூத்திரங்களாகும்.

(இ-ள்.):—திணை மயக்குறுதலுங் கடிநிலையிலவே=குறிஞ்சி முதலிய அன்பினைத்திணைகளான புணர்தல் பிரிதல் இருத்தல் இரங்கல் ஊடல் என்ற ஐந்தொழுக்கங்களும் தத்தமக்குச் சிறப்புரிமையுடைய; முறையே குறிஞ்சி பாலை முல்லை நெய்தல் மருதம் என்னும் நிலங்களில் தனித்தனி நிகழ்வதுடன், அவ்வாறு சிறப்புரிமையற்ற பிறநிலங்களில் வந்து கலத்தலும் விலக்கப்படா; நிலனொருங்கு மயங்குதல் இன்றென மொழிப=(இவ்வாறொழுக்கங்கள் தமக்குரிமையற்ற நிலங்களில் மயங்குதலமையு மெனினும்) அவ்வாறொழுக்க மயக்கம் பற்றி நிலங்கள் தம்முள் மயங்குதலில்லை யென்று கூறுவர், புலன் நன்குணர்ந்த புலமை யோரே=புலனெறி வழக்கங்களை நன்கறிந்த அறிவுடையோர்.

இதன் முதல் மூன்றாமடிகளின் சுற்றேகாரங்கள் அசைநிலை. உம்மையால் ஒவ்வொரு நிலத்திற்கும் ஒவ்வொருதிணை சிறப்புரிமை யுடையதென்றும், அம்முறையன்றி, நிலங்களுந் திணைகளுந் தம்முள் மயங்குதல் சிறவாதெனினும் விலக்கவும் படாதென்றுந் தெளியப்படும்.

புணர்தல் முதலிய ஐந்திணைகளையும், முறையே அவற்றிற்குச் சிறந்துரிய நிலங்களையும், குறிஞ்சி பாலை முல்லை நெய்தல் மருதம் எனப் பொதுப் பெயர்களாற் கூறுதல் தமிழ் நான் மரபு. பெய ரொற்றுமையால் திணைகளும் நிலங்களும் யாண்டும் ஒரு நீர்மைய வெனக்கொண்டு, திணைமயங்குந்தோறும் நிலமயக்கமும் உண்டெனக் கொள்ளுதல் கூடாதென வற்புறுத்தி ஐயமகற்றுவதே ஈண்டாசிரியர்

கருத்தாகும். திணையென்பது ஒழுக்கத்திற்கே சிறந்துரிய பெயராகும். ‘திணைக் குறிப்பொருளே’ என்னுஞ் சொற்றொடரும் இதனை வலியுறுத்தும். ஒவ்வொரு முக்கமும் அதற்குச் சிறப்புரிமை கூறிய ஒரு நிலத்திற்கே தனியுரிமை யுடையதன்று. ஒவ்வொரு நில மக்களும் அவ்வநிலத்தில் ஐந்திணையொழுக்கங்களையும் கையாளுதலியல்பு. ஆகவே, ஒவ்வொரு நிலத்தும் அதற்குச் சிறந்துரிய ஒழுக்கமே யன்றிப் பிறவொழுக்கங்களையும் தொடர்புபடுத்திப் புலனெறி வழக்கஞ்செய்தல் தவறாகாது. ஒருநிலத்து நிகழும் ஒழுக்கவேறுபாட்டால் அந்நிலத்தியல்பும் மாறினதாகக் கருதலாகாமையால், மாறி நிகழும் ஒழுக்கத்தோடு ஒருங்கே நிலமயக்கங் கொள்ளுதல் மரபன்று என்பதும், ஒவ்வொருதிணையும் ஒவ்வொரு நிலத்திற்குச் சிறப்புரிமையுடையதாகக் கூறப்படினும் அதுகொண்டு அந்நிலத்து அவ்வொரே ஒழுக்கம் நிகழவேண்டும் என்ற வரையறையின்றி நிலத்தியல் கருதாமல் திணையக்கம் கொள்ளப்படுமென்பதும் தமிழ்மரபென்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தால் விளக்கிப் போந்தார்.

தத்தம் இயல்மாறா நிலம் யாதாயினும், அதில் நிகழும் ஒழுக்கம்பற்றித்திணை வகையமைப்பது பழையமரபு. ஒழுக்க இயல் கருதாது, நிலவகையால் திணையமைக்கும் பிழைபட்ட பிற்கால வழக்குத் தொல்காப்பியர்க்குடன் பாடன்று என்பது இச்சூத்திரத்தால் தெற்றென விளங்கும். புணர்தல் முதலிய ஒவ்வொரு திணை அல்லது ஒழுக்கத்திற்கும் முறையே குறிஞ்சிமுதலிய நிலங்களைப் போலவே கூதிர் யாம முதலிய காலவகைகளும் தத்தம் இயற்பொருத்தம் பற்றித்தனிச்சிறப்புரிமை கொள்ளுமெனினும், ஒருதிணைக்கு ஒரே காலத்தான் கூறல் வேண்டுமெனும் வரையறையில்லை. எந்தத்திணையும் இயல்பற்றி அதற்குச் சிறந்துரியதல்லாத பிறகாலங்களிலும் நிகழ்தல் கூடுமாதலின், ஒவ்வொரு திணையும், எல்லா நிலங்களிலும் போலவே, எல்லாக்காலங்களொடும் கலந்து நிகழ்வதும் கடியப்படாது என்பது வெளிப்படை. எனவே, ஒவ்வொரு முக்கமும் அதற்குச் சிறந்துரியதாகக் கூறப்பெற்ற நிலம்பொழுதுகளிலேயே நிகழும் என ஒருதலையாகக் கொள்ளல் கூடாது. உரிப்பொருள்களாகிய எல்லா ஒழுக்கங்களும் நிலமும் பொழுதுமாகிய முதற்பொருள் வகைகளில் ஒரோவொன்றைத் தத்தம்க்கு இயலியைபு பற்றிச் சிறப்புரிமை கொள்ளினும், எல்லாநிலங்களினும் எல்லாப் பொழுதுகளினும் ஏற்றபெற்றி கலந்து நிகழ்தலுங்கடியப்படாது. இச்சூத்திரத்தில் முதற்பொருளிரண்டில் பொழுதுகூறாமல் நிலம் விதந்து கூறப்பட்டது, பொழுதுபோலன்றித், திணையொடு நிலம் குறிஞ்சிமுதலிய பொதுப்பெயர் பெற்று மயங்குதலால் வரும் ஐயமகற்றற் பொருட்டாம். பொழுதுகள் பற்றி அத்தகைய மயக்கத்திற்கிடனில்லை யாதலின், பொழுது மயக்கம் விதந்து கூறவேண்டிற்றில்லை.

இதற்கு “ஒரு நிலத்து இரண்டொழுக்கந் தம்முண் மயங்குதலன்றி, இரண்டு நிலம் ஒரோவொழுக்கத்தின்கண் மயங்குதலில்லை” என்று பொருள் கூறுவர் ஈச்சிலார்க்கினியர். இஃது உண்மையில் வேறுபாடில்லாத ஒரு மாறுபாட்டைக் கருதி மயங்குவதாகும். ஒவ்வொரு நிலத்தும் அதற்குரியவல்லாப் பிற வொழுக்க

கங்கள் நிகழ்தலமையும் என்பதனாலேயே, ஒவ்வோரொழுக்கத்திற்கும் அதற்குரிய நிலத்தொடு பிறநிலங்களையும் தொடர்பு படுத்திக் கூறுதல் அமைவுடைத்தென்பது தெளியப்படும். ஒரு நிலத்துப் பல வொழுக்கம் மயங்கும் என்றபின், பலநிலத்து ஒரொழுக்கம் மயங்கும்.(அதாவது ஒவ்வோ ரொழுக்கத்தோடும் பல நிலத்தொடர்பு மமையும்) என்பதை விலக்குமாறில்லை. எனவே, நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கூறுவதே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாயின் ‘திணைமயக்குறுதலுங் கடிநிலையிலவே’ என்ற அளவே அக்கருத்தை விளக்கப்போதியதாகும். ‘நிலனொருங்கு’ மயங்குதலின்று’ எனக் கூட்டியுரைப்பது பொருட் பொருத்தமின்றி முரண்பாடும் விளைத்து மயங்கவைக்கும். இனி, ஒருப்பட்ட தலைமக்களுள் ஒரொழுக்கம் பலநிலங்களில் நிகழ்வது ஒரு காலத்தமையாது என்று கூறி நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உரைக்கு அமைவுகாட்டுவதும் பொருந்தாது. ஒரேகாலத்தும் ஒருநிலத்தும் பலவொழுக்கம் ஒருங்குநிகழ்தல் கூடாமை வெளிப்படடை. அதனாலும் அது பொருளன்மை யறிக.

இதற்கு இளம்பூரணர்கூறும் பொருளாவது ;— “ஒருதிணைக்குரிய முதற் பொருள் மற்றோர் திணைக்குரிய முதற்பொருளொடு சேரநின்றலுங்கடியப்படாது ; ஆண்டு நிலம் சேரநின்றலில்லை யென்று சொல்லுவர் ; எனவே காலம் மயங்கும் என்றவாறாயிற்று.” சூத்திரத்தில் ஒருநிலத்திற்குரிய வொழுக்கம் வேறொரு நிலத்திற்குக் கூறுதலும் கடிநிலையிலவெனத் தெள்ளத்தெளிய விளக்கியிருக்கவும், அதற்கு மாறாக ‘ஒருதிணைக்குரிய முதற்பொருள் மற்றோர் திணைக்குரிய முதற்பொருளோடு சேர நின்றல் கூடாது’ எனப் பொருள் கொள்வது அமைவுடைத்தன்று. தொல்காப்பியர் ‘திணைமயக்குறுதல்’ என்றாரன்றி, ‘திணையில் முதற்பொருள் மயங்குதல்’ என்று கூறினரில்லை. ஆதலின், இளம் பூரணர் கூற்றும் இச்சூத்திரச் சொற்றொடருக்கு நேரியபொருளன்று.

திணைகளையும் நிலங்களையும்பட்டும் கூறி, அவற்றினியைபு விளக்க எழுந்த இச்சூத்திரத்தில், அவற்றின் புறம்பான காலங்களையும் கருப்பொருள்களையும்புகுத்தி அவற்றின் மயக்கங்களையும் அமைக்கும் முயற்சியால் பழைய உரையாசிரியர்கள் இருவரும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குத் தம்முள் மாறுபடப் பலவாறு பொருள் கூறுவாராயினர்.

13. உரிப்பொருளல்லன மயங்கவும் பெறுமே.

இது, ஐந்திணைகள்போலவே, அத்திணைகளின் சார்பான பிற உரிப்பொருள்களும் பல நிலங்களிலும் ஏற்றபெற்றிவந்து மயங்கும், என்று கூறுகிறது.

(இ-ள்.) புணர்தல், பிரிதல், இருத்தல், இரங்கல், ஊடல் எனும் ஐந்திணைக்குரிப்பொருள்களேயுமன்றி, அவற்றின் சார்பாய் அவ்வுரிப்பொருள்களோடு அமைத்துக் கோடற்பாலனவாய், பிறறைச் சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியர் கூறும் ‘கொண்டு தலைக் கழிதல்.’ ‘பிரிந்தவனிரங்கல்,’ ‘கலந்தபொழுது,’ ‘காட்சி’ முதலியனவும், உரிப்பொருள்களைப் போலவே, ஒரு நிலத்துக்குத் தனியுரிமையின்றி எல்லாநிலத்தும் வந்து மயங்கவும் பெறும்.

ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை.

திணைக்குரிப்பொருள்களாக விதந்துகூறும் புணர்தல் முதலிய ஐந்தும் எந்த நிலத்தும் வந்து மயங்குதல் மேற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறப்பட்டது. பேரளவில் அவ்வைந்தனுளடங்காமல், இயல்பற்றி உரிப்பொருளா யமைக்கப்படுவன பிறவுமுள என்பதை ஆசிரியர் 'கொண்டுதலைக்கழிதல்' 'கலந்தபொழுதும்' என்ற சூத்திரங்களிற் சுட்டுவதால், அத்தகைய அகத்திணையுரிப் பொருள்களும், விதந்தோதிய ஐந்திணையுரிப்பொருள்கள் போலவே, வரையறையின்றி யெந்த நிலத்தும் வந்து மயங்குதல் கூடும் என்பதை இந்தச் சூத்திரத்தால் ஆசிரியர் விளங்கவைத்தார். ஈண்டு 'உரிப்பொருளல்லன' என்பது முன்னைச்சூத்திரத்தில் 'திணைக்குரிப்பொருள்' என விதந்தோதிய ஐந்துமல்லாத பிறவெனக் கொள்ளல் வேண்டும். 'உரிப்பொருளல்லன' என்பதை அல்லன 'உரிப்பொருள்' எனச் சொன்மாற்றி, முன்விதந்தோதிய ஐந்து மல்லாத உரிப்பொருளாவன எனக்கொள்ளுவதே ஈண்டுப் பெரிதும் பொருத்தமுடைத்தாம். இனி : இவ்வாறு கொள்ளாமல், உரிப்பொருளல்லாத கருப்பொருள்கள் முதற்பொருள்கள் என்று இளம் பூரணர் பொருள் கொள்வதும் பொருந்தாது. ஏனெனில், திணைமயக்குறுதலும் என்ற சூத்திரத்தால் முதற்பொருள் மயக்கமும், 'எந்நில மருங்கிற் பூவும்புள்ளும்' என்பதால் கருப்பொருள்களின் மயக்கமும் ஆசிரியர் தனிவேறு சூத்திரங்களாற் கூறியிருத்தலின், அவற்றையே இச்சூத்திரத்தாலும் கூறினாரென்பது கூறியது கூறல் என்னுங் குற்றத்திற்கு அவரையாளாக்கும். ஆசிரியர் "உரிப்பொருள் என்றோதிய ஐந்திணையு மல்லாத கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணையும் நால்வகை நிலத்தும் மயங்கவும் பெறும்" என்னும் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கூற்றும் அமைவுடைத்தன்று. கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளுக்கு நிலம் பொழுதுகளில் எதுவுமே தனியுரிமை கூறும் விதியே யில்லாததால், உரித்தல்லா நிலம்பொழுதுகளில் அவை வந்து மயங்குமெனும் விலக்கும் வேண்டற்பாற்றன்று. மேலும், மேல் இரண்டாஞ்சூத்திர முதல் கீழ் 42-ஆம் சூத்திரமுடிய நிரலே நடுவெணந்திணைகளின் இயல்புகளையே விளக்கி, பிறகு 43-முதல் 49-வரையுள்ள சூத்திரங்களில் சில பொதுவியல்புகள் கூறி, அவற்றினிறுதியில் 50, 51 ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் கைக்கிளைபெருந்திணைகளை விளக்கிமுடிக்கும் ஆசிரியர் ஈண்டு அன்பினைந்திணையின் இயல்புகளுக் கிடையே இன்றியமையாத் தொடர்பு எதுவுமின்றி இறுதியிற் கூறும் கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளை யிழுத்து அவற்றின் இலக்கணம் கூறுமுன் மயக்கங் கூறினாரெனக் கொள்ளுதல் எவ்வாற்றினுஞ் சாலாமையறிக.

14. புணர்தல் பிரித லிருத்த லிரங்கல்
உட லிவற்றி னிமித்த மென்றிவை
தேருங் காலைத் திணைக்குரிப் பொருளை

இச் சூத்திரம் அகப்பொருட் பகுதியிற்சிறந்த அன்பினைந்திணைக்கு நேருரிமை கொண்ட ஒழுக்க வகைகளை உணர்த்துதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) புணர்தல் பிரிதல் இருத்தலிரங்கல் ஊடலிவற்றின் நிமித்த மென்றிவை = கூடுதல், பிரிதல், பிரிவிடையாற்றி யிருத்தல், ஆற்றாதிரங்கல், புலவி • என்ற ஐந்தும் அவற்றிற் கியைபுடைய நிமித்தங்களுமே, தேருங்காலத் திணைக் குறிப்பொருளே = ஆராயும் பொழுது அன்பினைந்திணையெனற்குச் சிறந்துரிய பொருள்களாம்.

இதில் ஈற்றேகாரம் தேற்றமாகும். முதல் கரு உரிப்பொருள்களனைத்தையும் அகத்திணைப் பகுதியாகவே அமைத்துக் கோடல் தவறன்றாயினும், திணையென்பது ஒழுக்கங்கண்ணிய பேராதலால் அன்பினைந்திணையெனற்குப் புணர்தல் பிரிதல் முதலிய ஐந்தொழுக்கங்களே சிறப்புரிமையுடைய பொருள்களாகும் என்பதை ஆசிரியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தால் விளக்கினார்.

நிமித்தமாவது ஒவ்வொருமூக்கத்தை யடுத்து முன்னும் பின்னும் முதலும் முடிவுமாகத் தொடுத்து அவ்வொழுக்கத்திற்கு இன்றியமையாத் தொடர்புடையன வற்றைச் சுட்டுவதாம். புகுமுகம்புரிதல், நகுநயம் மறைத்தல் முதலியன புணர்தலுக்கு முன்னேழும் நிமித்தங்களாம். அணிந்தவை திருத்தல், பாராட்டெடுத்தல் முதலியன புணர்வின் பின்னர் நிகழும் நிமித்தங்களாம். பிறநிமித்தமாகா “அன்ன பிறவும் நிமித்தமென்ப” என்னும் மெய்ப்பாட்டியல். 19-ம் சூத்திரமும் இதை வலியுறுத்தும். இவ்வாறே பிறதிணைகளுக்கும் நிமித்த வகைகளை ஏற்றபெற்றி அமைத்துக்கொள்க. நிறுத்தமுறையானே முன்னர் முதற்பொருளைக் கூறின ஆசிரியர் அதனையடுத்துக் கருப்பொருளைக் கூறாமல் அதற்குமுன் ஈண்டுரிப்பொருளைக் கூறுவதேன் எனின், சொல்லுவன்: அகப்பகுதியில் முதலுரிப்பொருள்கள் அல்லாதன அனைத்தும் கருப்பொருள்களா யமைதலின், வரையறைப்பட்டன வற்றை விளக்குவான் றொடங்கி, நிலம்பொழுதெனும் இரண்டேவகையுடனங்கும் முதற்பொருள் கூறினதும், அளவறுதிப்படாக் கருப்பொருள்களைக் கூறுமுன், ஒழுக்கத் தளவில் அடங்கும் உரிப்பொருளை ஈண்டுக்கூறி முறையை உய்த்துணர வைத்தார்.

15. கொண்டுதலைக் கழிதலும் பிரிந்தவ ணிரங்கலும்

உண்டென மொழிப ஓரிடத் தான.

இது, மேலேச்சூத்திரத்தில் திணைக்குறிப் பொருளென விளக்கிய ஐந்தனுள் டங்காதனவாய்த் தம்மியல்பால் அகத்திணைகளுக் குறிப்பொருளாய் ஆளப்படும் பிற சிலவும் உண்மை கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) கொண்டுதலைக் கழிதலும் = களவில் தலைவன் தலைவியைத் தன்னுடன் கொண்டுகேதலும்; பிரிந்தவணிரங்கலும் = அவ்வாறுடன்கொண்டுகேல்லுங்கால் தலைவியின் தமர் வரவுமுதலிய காரணங்களால் பிரியநேரின் ஆண்டுப் பிரிவுபற்றி யிரங்கலும்; உண்டென மொழிப = ஏற்றபெற்றி இவற்றை உரிப்பொருள் போலக் கொள்ளுதலும்; உண்டு என்று கூறுவர் (புலவர்); ஓரிடத்தான = அவை அகத்திணைக் கியைபுடைய ஒரோவிடத்துக்கண்.

கொண்டுதலைக் கழிதல் என்பதனால், தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் அது பிரிதலாகாது; நேரே புணர்தலும் அன்றும். “அது நிலம் பெயர்தலின் புணர்தலின் அடங்

காமையானும், உடன்கொண்டு பெயர்தவின் பிரிதலினடங்காமையானும், வேறு ஒதப்பட்டது” எனும் இளம்பூரணர் குறிப்பு ஈண்டுச் சிந்திக்கத் தக்கது. இனி அது வேபோல் பிரிந்தவணிரங்கல் என்பதும் பிரிந்தவர் இரங்கல் என்னுந்திணைக்குரிப் பொருளின் வேறுபட்டது என்பதை விளக்குதற்காகவே, கொண்டதலைக் கழியு மிடத்துப் பிரிய நேர்த்துழி ‘அவண் இரங்கல்’ என விதந்தோதப் பெற்றது. இவை யிரண்டும் அகப்பகுதிகளில் உரிப்பொருள்களாகிய தலைமக்களின் ஒழுக்க மாகவே ஆளப்பெறுதலானும், இவை புணர்தல் பிரிதல் இருத்தல் இரங்கல் ஊடல் என்ற ஐந்திணைக் குறிப்பொருள்களுள் எதனினும் அடங்காமையானும், அவற்றினின்றும் வேறு பிரித்து இச்சுத்திரத்தால் ஒரோவிடத்து உரிப்பொருளா தற்கு உரியன இவையென்று ஆசிரியர் விளக்குவாரானார். ஈண்டு இளம்பூரணர் கொண்டதலைக் கழிதலைப் பாலைக்கண்ணும், பிரிந்தவணிரங்கலைப்பெருந்திணைக்கண் ணும் வரும் உரிப்பொருள்களாக்கிப் பொருள் கூறுவர். தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் பிரிந் திரங்குவது நேரிய நெய்தற்றிணைக் குறிப்பொருளாகும். பிரிந்திரங்கல் எனைத்தா னும் பெருந்திணைப்பாற் படுதலில்லை, பிரிந்திரங்கல் ஒத்த காதற்றிறனையாதலின். இனி, இவ்விரண்டையும், தந்நிலையில் உரிப்பொருளாக்காமல், திணைமயக்கம் என்று கொண்டு பாலைத்திணையுள் குறிஞ்சியும் நெய்தலுமாகிய பிறதிணைகளின் மயக்கம் கூறுவதாகக் கொள்ளும் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கூற்றும் அமைவுடைத்தன்று. திணைமயக் குறுதல் என்னுஞ் சொற்றொடரால் மயங்கி, ஒருதிணையுள் பிறதிணைகள் ஒருங்கு வந்து மயங்குமெனக் கொள்ளுதல் எவ்வாற்றானும் பொருந்தாதாகும். தலைமக்க ளிருவருள் ஒருகாலத்தோரொழுக்கம் நிகழ்வதன்றிப் பலவொழுக்கம் ஒருகாலத்துக் கலந்து மயங்குமென்பது இயல்பன்றாகலின் அதற்கிலக்கணமும் வேண்டப்படா. ஒரு நிலத்திற் பலவொழுக்கங்களும் ஒரொழுக்கம் பலநிலங்களிலும் வேறுபட்ட காலங்களில் நிகழு மென்பதையே முன் திணைமயக்குறுதல் என்னுஞ் சூத்திரத்தால் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கினாரன்றி ஒருகாலத்துப் பலவொழுக்கந் தம்முள் மயங்குமென்று தொல்காப்பியர் யாண்டும் கூறிற்றிலர்; அஃதியல்பன்மையின். அதனால் இச்சுத் திரம் திணைமயக்கம் கூறுவதன்று, ஒருசார் உரிப்பொருளாம் பிற கூறுதலே நுத லிற்று என்பது தெளியப்படும். அன்றியும், இதில் திணைமயக்கம் கூறுதலே ஆசிரி யர்கருத்தாயின் இதனையும் இதுபோன்ற திணைமயக்கம் நுதலும் பிறகுத்திரங்களை யும் திணைக்குரிப் பொருள் கூறுஞ் சூத்திரத்திற்கு முன் ‘திணைமயக்குறுதலும்’ ‘உரிப்பொருளல்லன்’ என்பவற்றோடு இயையு நோக்கி இணைத்துக் கூறியிருப்பர். அவ்வாறன்றி, திணைக்குரிப்பொருள் வகை ஐந்தையுங் கூறுஞ் சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பின் இது கூறப்படுதலால், இதுவும் அவ்வைந்தனுடங்காத உரிப்பொருள்வகை விளக்குவதையே நுதலிற்றென்பது வெளிப்படை.

ஈண்டு உம்மை யிரண்டும் என்னும்மை.

16. கலந்த பொழுதுங் காட்சியு மன்ன.

இதுவும் ஐந்திணை வகுப்பில் அடங்காதனவாய் அகப்பகுதியில் உரிப்பொ ருள்களாக ஆளப்படுவன பிற சிலவற்றையே கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) கலந்த பொழுதும் = ஒத்த தலைமக்கள் தம்மிடைப் பாலதானையின் முதல் எதிர்ப்பாட்டில் நிகழ்வும், (கலந்த) காட்சியும் = அவ்வாறு தலைப்பட்டார் தம் மூன் அறிவுடம் படுத்தற்குக் கூட்டிக் குறிப்புரைக்கும் நாட்டமும், அன்ன = (மேலைச் சூத்திரத்திற் கூறியது போல) ஏற்புழி அகவொழுக்கத்திற்கு உரிப்பொருளா தற்குரியவாகும்.

உம்மை யிரண்டும் முன்னேச் சூத்திரத்தில் ஒதியவற்றுடன் வைத்தெண்ணத் தகும் என்பதைக் குறிப்பதால் இறத்தது தழீஇய எச்சவும்மை. அன்ன என்பது மேற்கூறிய கொண்டுதலைக்கழிதல், பிரிந்தவணிரங்கல் என்பனவற்றை இங்குக் கூறிய கலந்தபொழுதும் காட்சியும் உரிப்பொருளியல்பால் ஒப்பன என்பதைச் சுட்டும் குறிப்பு முற்றும். 'கலந்த' என்னும் எச்சத்தைக் 'காட்சி' யென்பதனோடுங் கூட்டுக.

சுண்டுக் 'கலந்தபொழு, தென்பது ஆசிரியர் பின் களவியல் இரண்டாளு சூத்திரத்திற் கூறும் தலைமக்களின் தலையெதிர்ப்பாட்டையும், 'காட்சி' யென்பது அக்களவியல் ஐந்தாளு சூத்திரத்தில் கூறும் 'அறிவுடம் படுத்தற்கு'க் குறிப்புநாடும் நோக்கத்தையும் முறையே குறிக்கும். கலத்தல் என்பது தலைப்படுதல் என்ற பொருளதாகும். 'ஒருமுவேங்கலந்த காலே' என்னுங் கம்பரடியும், 'கலந்து போர் செய் தாரோர் சிலர்' என்ற கந்தபுராண அடியுங் காண்க. கலப்பும் என்றது கலந்தபொழுதும் என்றது முதலெதிர்ப்படுங்காலத்து நிகழும் காட்சி; ஐயம், துணிவுமுதலிய பலவும் அடங்குதற்பொருட்டு. சூத்திரத்தில் காட்சியென்பது முதலிற் கிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுந் தலைப்பட்டுக் காணுவதன்று; அது கலந்தபொழுது என்பதில் அடங்கும். எதிர்ப்பட்ட தலைமக்களிடை அவர் அறிவுடம் படுத்தற்குக்கூட்டிக் குறிப்புரை நாடும் நோக்கத்தையே சுண்டுக் காட்சியென்றார். பின் களவியலில் விளக்கப்படு மிவை யிரண்டும் புணர்தல் முதலிய ஐந்திணைகளுள் எவையுமாகா வெனினும், அகத்துறைப்பாட்டுக்களுள் இவையும் உரிப்பொருள்களாக ஆட்சிபெறுவதால் ஐந்திணைகளுள் அடங்காத உரிப்பொருள் உண்மைகூறு மிவ்விடத்திலிவை இயைபு பற்றிக் குறிக்கப்பட்டன.

17. முதலெனப் படுவ தாயிரு வகைத்தே.

இஃது, உரிப்பொருள் கருப்பொருள்கள் போல விலக்குகள் வேண்டி விரியாமல், முதற்பொருள் நிலம்பொழு திரண்டினுள் அடங்குமென்பதை வலியுறுத்தல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) முதலெனப் படுவது = முதற்பொருள் என்று சிறப்பித்துக் கூறப் படுவது; ஆயிருவகைத்தே = மேலே நாலாவது சூத்திரத்தில் கூறியாங்கு நிலம் பொழுதிரண்டி னியல்பெனும் அவ்விரண்டு வகைகளையே யுடையதாகும்.

சுற்றேகாரம் தேற்றங்குறிக்கும். முதல், கரு, உரி என்ற அகப்பொருட் பகுதிகள் மூன்றனுள் உரிப்பொருளாவன ஐந்தொழுக்கமும், அவைபோல அகத்துறையிற் சிறந்துரிய தலைமக்களின் காதலொழுக்கங்கள் பிற சிலவுமாக வகைபெறு

மென்பதை ஆசிரியர் மேற் சூத்திரங்களில் விளக்கினார். அதுபோலவே கருப்பொருள்களும் பலவகைப் படுமென்பதை இனி வருஞ்சூத்திரத்திற் கூறுவர். இவையிரண்டும் போலாது, முதற்பொருளாவன நிலமும் பொழுதுமென் றிரண்டே வகைகளுள் அடங்குமென்பதை இயைபுநோக்கி இவ்விடைச் சூத்திரத்தால் வற்புறுத்துகிறார். இஃது இறந்தது காத்தல், கூறிற்றென்றல், முடிந்தது காட்டல் என்னும் திகளால் அமையும்.

முதல் கரு உரி என முன்னே முறைப்படுத்திக் காட்டிய ஆசிரியர் முதற்பொருள் வகையியல்புகளை முதலிற் கூறி, அத்தையடுத்துக் கருப்பொருள் கூறாமல் உரிப்பொருள்களின் இயல் கூறினார்; இவையிரண்டும் அளவுபட்டமையும் இயைபுநோக்கி. அவ்வியைபை வலியுறுத்தும் பொருட்டே ஈண்டு இச்சூத்திரத்தால் முடிந்தது காட்டித் தந்துணிபுரைத்தார். உரிப்பொருளைத்தும் தலைமக்களின் அகவொழுக்கவகைகளில் அமைந்ததங்கும். முதற்பொருள்களும் நிலம்பொழுதெனும் இரண்டே வகையி லடங்கும். இவையிரண்டும் போலாது கருப்பொருள்வகைகள் எண்ணிற்று ஏற்றபெற்றி விரியுமியல்புடையவாதலால், அளவுபட்ட இவையிரண்டும் முற்கூறி, இவற்றின்பின் இவையல்லாத அளவிறந்தனவாய் வரும் பலவும் கருப்பொருள் வகைகளாகுமென்பது விளங்கக் கருப்பொருளியல் கூறுகின்றார். இவ் வளவுமுறையான் வைப்பு முறையும் அமைகின்றது. முதற்பொருள் இரண்டே வகைகளுள் அடங்குவதாகலின் முதலில் வைக்கப்பட்டது. உரிப்பொருள்களின் வகைகள் சிலவாக ஐந்து ஒழுக்கவகைகளில் அடங்குதலால் அவற்றை முதற்பொருளின் பின்னர்க்கூறி, அவ்விருவகையளவானும் அடங்காமல் மிகப்பலபடவிரியும் கருப்பொருள்களை அவ்விரண்டின் பின் அமைத்துக் கூறினார்.

18. தெய்வ முணுவே மாமரம் புட்பறை

செய்தி யாழின் பகுதியொடு தொகைஇ

அவ்வகை பிறவுங் கருவென மொழிப.

இது முதலுரிப் பொருள்களில் அடங்காவாய் அகத்திணைக்கு உறுப்பாம் கருப்பொருள் வகை உணர்த்துதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) தெய்வம்=வழிபடு கடவுட்பகுதி; உணுவே = ஊண்வகை; மா = விலங்குவகை; மரம் = மரஞ்செடிவகை; புள் = பறவை வகை; பறை = அவ்வநிலங்களுக்குரிய பறைவகைகள்; செய்தி = தொழில்வகை; யாழின் பகுதியொடு தொகைஇ = யாழ்வகைகளொடே கூட்டி; அவ்வகை பிறவும் = அவைபோல வகைப் படுவன மற்றையனவும்; கரு எனமொழிப = கருப்பொருள்கள் என்று கூறுவர். நல்லாசிரியர்.

முன்னேச் சூத்திரக் குறிப்புரையில் சுட்டியாங்கு, முதலும் உரியுமல்லாத பொருள்களுள் அகத்திணைக்குக் கருவாய் அமைவனயாவும் கருப்பொருள்கள் என்பர் அகத்திணை நூலோர். இச்சூத்திரத்தில் கருப்பொருள்வகைகளைத்தையும்

வகுத்து நிறுத்தல் கூடாமையின், அவ்வகை பிறவும் கரு என்று கூறி, மொழிந்த பொருளோடொன்ற வவ்வயின் மொழியாததனையும் முட்டின்று முடியவைத்தார் ஆசிரியர்.

19. எந்நில மருங்கிற் பூவும் புள்ளும்
அந்நிலம் பொழுதொடு வாரா வாயினும்
வந்த நிலத்தின் பயத்த வாகும்.

இது கருப்பொருண் மயக்கமும் கடிதலில்லை யென்பது கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) எந்நில மருங்கிற் பூவும் புள்ளும் = எந்த நிலச்சார்பில் கூறப்படும் பூ புள் முதலிய கருப்பொருள்களும், அந்நிலம் பொழுதொடு வாராவாயினும் = அவ் வக்கருப்பொருட்குச் சிறந்தரிய நிலத்தோடும் பொழுதோடும் இயைந்து வந்தில வாயினும், வந்த நிலத்தின் பயத்த ஆகும் = கூறப்பட்ட நிலத்தொடு பொருந்த அதற்கேற்ற பயன் தருவனவாய் அமையும்.

பூவும் புள்ளும் என்பவற்றுள் உம்மை எண்ணும்மை. வாராவாயினும் என்ப திலும்மை யெதிர் மறை சுட்டும்; கருப்பொருள்கள் பெரும்பாலும் தத்தமக்குரிய நிலம் பொழுதொடு இயைந்து வருதலே இயன் முறை; ஒரோவிடத்து மாறிவரி னும்; வந்த நிலத்தொடு பொருந்தப் பயன்தருவதால் கடியப்படாமல் அமைத்துக் கொள்ளப்படும் எனும் பொருட்டாதலின்.

உரிப்பொருள்களைப் போலவே கருப்பொருள்களும் முதற்பொருள்களான நிலம்பொழுதுகளின் வகைகளில் இயைபுநோக்கி ஏற்றபெற்றி ஒரோவொன்றிற்கே சிறப்புரிமையுடன் பொருந்துவனவாகும். நிலம்பொழுது வகைகளின் பொருத்தம் நோக்கி அவ்வவற்றிற்குரிய கருப்பொருள்களமையக் கூறுவதே பெருவழக்காம். எனினும், ஒரோவிடத்து நிலம்பொழுதுகளுக்கு நேருரிமையல்லாத திணைக்குரிய பொழுக்கங்கள் மயங்கக்கூறுவது புலனெறி வழக்கென்று மேலே 12-13 வது சூத் திரங்களால் ஆசிரியர் கூறினராதலின், அவ்விடங்களில் தம்முளியையின்று மாறு பட்ட முதலுரிப்பொருள்களில் எதற்கியையக் கருப்பொருள்களின் அமைவு கருதப் படுமென்ற ஐயம் எழுவதில்லை. அவ்வையமகற்ற ஆசிரியர் ஈண்டு இச்சூத்திரம் கூறினர். நிலம் பொழுதுகளோடு பொருந்தக் கருப்பொருள்கள் கூறுவது பெருவ முக்கிற்றாயினும், பயன் நோக்கி அகத்திணையிற் சிறந்த ஒழுக்கங்களுக்கியைய நலந் தருவனவற்றை அமைத்துக் கோடல் பாடல்சான்ற புலனெறிவழக்கேயாம். என் பதை இச்சூத்திரம் வலியுறுத்துகிறது. “பாடலுட் பயின்றவை நாடுங்காலை” முத லிற் கருவும் கருவில் உரியுமே முறை சிறந்தன எனுந்தமிழ் மரபை ஆசிரியர் முன் னர்ச் கூறினராதலின், நிலம்பொழுதுகளிலும் சிறந்த உரிப்பொருளொழுக்கத்திற் குப் பொருத்தமிகும் கருப்பொருள்கள் முதற்பொருளுக்கியையா விடத்துக் கடியப் பாட என்று இதனால் ஆசிரியர் அமைவுகாட்டி வற்புறுத்தினார்.

‘மாயோன் மேய’ எனும் முன்னைச் சூத்திரத்தில் நாளிலங்கள் முறையே முல்லை, குறிஞ்சி, மருதம், நெய்தல் எனத்திணைப்பெயரே கொள்ளும் என்றமைத்த

தும் அகத்துறைகளில் திணைக்குரிப் பொருள்களான ஒழுக்கங்களே சிறப்புடைய வாதல் பற்றியேயாம். ஆனால் ஒரு நிலத்திற் பிறிதொழுக்கம் நிகழ்வதாய்ப் புலனெறிவழக்கஞ் செய்யுமிடத்து அவ்வந்நிலத்தொடு இயற்பொருத்த மில்லாத கருப் பொருள்களைக்கூற நேரின் நிகழுமொழுக்கத்துக்கு அக்கருப்பொருள்கள் ஏற்புடையனவாய் அமையும் பயனுடைத்தாதல் வேண்டுமென்று ஆசிரியர் ஈண்டு ஒப்பக் கூறியமைத்தார். காடு, மலை, ஊர், கடல் என்பவற்றுள் கூறுவது யாதாயினும், அதற்கியற்பொருத்தமுடைய கருப்பொருள்களமையக் கூறுதலொன்று, அன்றி அந்நிலத்தில் நிகழ்வதாய்க் கூறப்படும் திணைக்குப் பொருந்த அமைவதொன்றும். கருப்பொருள்கள் தமக்குரிய நிலம் பொழுதுகளோடு இயைய வாராவிடங்களில், அவ்வந்நிலத்து நிகழும் ஒழுக்கத்தொடு அமையும் பயனுடையவாகும். ஈண்டு 'நிலத்தின் பயத்த' என்பது ஒழுக்கத்தொடு பட்ட நிலப்பெயரைக் குறிக்கும். அஃதாவது, அந்நிலத்தில் நிகழ்வதாய்க் கூறப்படும் திணையைச்சட்டும். (நெய்தற்) கடற் கருப்பொருள்களைக் காட்டொடு சேரக் கூறுமிடங்களில், அப்பொருள்கள் காட்டிற்குரிய பயன்தருமென்பது இச்சூத்திரக் கருத்தன்று; காட்டில் நெய்தற்றிணை நிகழுமிடத்துக் காட்டிற்குரிய வல்லாக் கருப்பொருள்கள்வரின், அவை ஆங்கே நெய்தற்பயத்தனவாய் அமையக்கூறுவது புலனெறிவழக்கா மென்பதே இச்சூத்திரம் நுதலிய பொருளாகும்.

20. பெயரும் வினையுமென் றுயிரு வகைய

திணைதொறு மரீஇய திணைநிலைப்பெயரே.

இது, கருப்பொருள்களோடு அடைவுடைய, அகத்திணைக் குரியரான அவ்வந்நிலமக்களின் பெயர்ப்பாடுகூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) திணைதொறு மரீஇய திணைநிலைப் பெயரே = ஒவ்வோரொழுக்கத்தொடும் பொருந்திய முல்லை முதலிய நிலங்களில் புலனெறிவழக்கில் அகத்திணைக் குரியராய்க் கூறப்படும் மக்கட்பெயர்கள் - பெயரும் வினையுமென்றுயிருவகைய = அவ்வந்நிலத்தானமையும் பெயர்ப்பெயரும், அந்நிலத்தில் மக்களின் தொழிலான அமையும் வினைப்பெயரும் என்று அவ்விரண்டு கூறுபாட்டிணையுடைய வாகும்.

ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை. பெயரும் வினையும் என்பவற்றுள் உம்மை என்னும்மை.

நாளிலங்களினும் உள்ள மக்கள், அகத்திணைக் குரியராய்க் கூறப்படுங்கால், முல்லை முதலிய அவ்வத்திணை நிலங்களுக்குரிய இயல் இயையுடைய நிலப்பெயர்கொள்ளுதல் ஒன்று; அவ்வாறன்றித் தத்தம் தொழிற்கியையுடைய வினைப்பெயர்கொள்ளுதல் ஒன்று. இவ்விருமுறைகளே தமிழகத் தொல்லை மரபொடு அடைவுடைய வாகும். தொல்காப்பியர் காலத் தமிழுலகில் தமிழிடைப் பிறப்பளவில் என்றும் உயர்வு தாழ்வுடன் வேறுபாடுடைய சாதிவகுப்புக்கள் கிடையா. அதனால் அக்காலத் தமிழ் மக்கள் தத்தம் நிலத்துக்கேற்றாங்கு ஆயர், குறவர், களமர், பரதவர் என்றழைக்கப் பட்டார்கள்.

இனி, ஒரு நிலத்திலுள்ளார் அந்நிலத்திற்குரிய தொழில் மேற்கொள்ளாது பிறிது தொழில் கையாளுவராயின், அவரவர் செய்தொழில் வேற்றுமையால் தொழில் குறிக்கும் ஏற்புடை வினைப்பெயர்களால் அழைக்கப்படுவர். நுளைஞர், பரதவர் என்பன நெய்தனிலஞ்சுட்டிய மக்கட்பெயர். வலையர் உமணர் என்பன நிலஞ்சுட்டாது, வலைவீசிப் பிழைக்குந் தொழிலுடையாரையும், உப்பு உண்டாக்கி விற்கும் தொழிலுடையாரையும் சுட்டும் வினைப்பெயர்கள். தொழில் எதுபுரிந்தும் நெய்தனிலம் வதிபவரைப் பரதவர் அல்லது நுளைஞர் எனவழங்கல் ஒருமுறை; அப்போது அப்பெயர் நெய்தனிலமாக்கன் என்னும் பொருட்டாகும். இனி, எந்நிலத்துறையினும் வலைத்தொழில் புரிந்து வாழ்வார் என்பதைக் குறிக்குங்கால், வலையர் என்னும் வினைப்பெயரால் அத்தொழிலுடையாரைச் சுட்டுவது ஒருமுறை. தமிழகத்திற் பண்டைக்காலத்தில் பிறப்பால் சாதிவகுப்புக்கள் இல்லாமையானும், தமிழ் மக்களெல்லாரும் விரும்பியாங்குத் தத்தமக்கேற்புடைய தொழில் கொள்ளும் உரிமையுடைய ராதலானும், நிலந்தொழில் வகைகள் வேறுபடினும் உணவு மணங்களில் வேறுபாடின்றி யாண்டும் எல்லாரும் ஏற்றபெற்றி கலந்து ஒன்றிவாழ்ந்த ராதலானும், அவர் அகவொழுக்கங்கூறும் புலனெறி வழக்கில் அக்காலத்தவரிடை நிலைபெற்றுந் நிலப்பெயர் வினைப்பெயர்களால் தமிழ் மக்கள் அழைக்கப்படும் மரபுண்மையை ஆசிரியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் விளக்கிப் போந்தார்.

அகம் 110-ஆம் பாட்டில், போந்தைப் பசலையார், நுளைச்சியைத்தலைவியாகவும், நெடுந்தேருநீனத் தலைவனாகவும் திணைநிலைப்பெயர் அமைத்துக் கூறியுள்ளார். நற்றிணை 45-ஆம் பாட்டில்,

“நெடுங்கொடி நுடங்கு நியமமுதார்”

கடுந்தேர்ச் செல்வன் காதற்” நலமகளுகவும், “நிணச்சுற வறுத்த வுணக்கல் வேண்டி, யினப்புள்ளோப்பும்” புலவுநாறும் பரதவர்மகள் தலைமகளாகவும், இவ்வாறு இவ்விருவேறு நிலமக்கள் காதற்றலைமக்களாய் அகத்திணைக்குரியராயமைந்திருப்பது இங்குக் குறித்தக்கது. அகம் 280-ஆம் பாட்டில், பரதவர் மகளேத் தலைவியாகவும், பிற்தொரு நிலமக்களைத் தலைவனாகவும் அமைத்து அம்மூவனார் கூறியதும் அக்காலத்தமிழ் மரபு அதுவாதலான் என்பது வெளிப்படை. இன்ன பல பழம்பாட்டுக்களால் பண்டைத்தமிழகத்தில் நானில மக்களுள் மணமும் உணவும் பிறவி நிலை வினைகள் பற்றி வரையப்படாமல் கையாளப்பட்டன என்பது தெள்ளத் தெளியக் கொள்ளப்படும். மரபியலில் காணப்பெறும் வருணவகைபற்றிய சூத்திரங்கள் இடைச்செருகல் என்பது பிறண்டு விளக்கப்படும்.

“யாயும் யாயும் யாரா கியரோ

எந்தையும் நுந்தையும் எம்முறைக் கேளீர்

யானும் நீயும் எவ்வழி யறிதும்

செம்புலப் பெய்நீர் போல

அன்புடை நெஞ்சந் தாங்கலந் தனவே”

என்னும் குறுந்தொகை 40-ஆம் பாட்டானும் சாதிகுலம் கருதாமல் ஒத்த அன்பே மணத்திற்கும் போதியது என்னுந் தமிழ்மரபு விளக்கமாகும்.

நானிலத் தமிழ்மக்களும் தம்முள் வேறுபாடின்றி மணந்து கொள்ளும் பழைய வழக்குண்மை தமிழ் மரபுவழிவாமல் அகத்துறைகளமைத்துக் கூறும்பிற்கால்க் கோவைகளாலும் வலிபெறுகின்றது.

“கழைகோடு வில்லியைச் செற்றார் தியாகர் கமலைவெற்பின்
உழைகோடி சுற்றுங் கிரியெம தூரும தூர்மருதம்;
தழைகோடி கொண்டு சமைத்ததெம் மாடை தனித்தனியோர்
இழைகோடி பொன்பெறு மேயும் தாடை யிறையவரே.”
(எல்லப்பநயினர் திருவாரூர்க்கோவை. செய். 101)

இவ்வுண்மையை மறந்து உரைகாரர் இப்பண்டைத் தமிழிலக்கண நூற்குத் திரத்திற்கு, இயைபற்ற தங்காலப் புராணக் கதைகளையும் இயல்வழக்கற்ற ஆரியக் கொள்கைகளையும் புகுத்தி, பொருந்தாப் புத்துரைகள் கூறி மயங்கவைத்தார். ஆரியருள் நான்குவருணத்தாருக்குமே தமிழரின் அகத்திணைக் களவியல் ஒழுக்க ஆட்சியுரிமை அவர் தம் தருமசாத்திரங்களிலும் வழக்கிலும் இன்மையானும், ஆரிய தரும நூல்கள் கூறும் பிறப்புரிமையுடைய இடையிருவருணத்தார் தமிழகத்தென்று மில்லாமையானும், இவருரைகள் பொருந்தாமை யறிக. அன்றியும், தமிழிலக்கண நூல் “.....வண்புகழ் மூவர் தண்பொழில் வரைப்பில் நாற்பெயரெல்லையகத் தவர் வழங்கும் யாப்பின் வழியது” எனத் தொல்காப்பியர் தாமும், “வடவேங்கடந் தென்குமரியாயிடைத் தமிழ்கூறும் நல்லுலகத்து வழக்குஞ் செய்யுளும் ஆயிருமுதலின் எழுத்துஞ் சொல்லும் பொருளும் நாடி, செந்தமிழியற்கை சிவணிய நிலத் தொடு முந்து நூல் கண்டு முறைப்பட எண்ணிப் புலந்தொகுத்தோனே தொல்காப்பியன்,” எனத் தொல்காப்பியப் பாயிரமும் வற்புறுத்தி விளக்குதலானும், இங்குத் தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரங்கள் குறிப்பண எல்லாம் ஆரியவருண அறங்களை யல்ல, தமிழ் மரபும் தமிழர் வழக்கங்களுமேயா மென்பது தேற்றம். இவ்வுண்மைகள் இனிவருஞ் சூத்திரங்களுக்கும் ஒக்கும்.

21. ஆயர் வேட்டுவர் ஆடேத் திணைப்பெயர்

ஆவயின் வருஉங் கிழவரு முளரே.

இது மேற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறிய திணைநிலைப்பெயர் வகைகளும் அப்பெயருடையாரின் அகத்திணைக்குரிமையுங் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஆயர் வேட்டுவர் ஆடேத்திணைப்பெயர் = ஆயர் வேட்டுவர் என்பன ஆண்பால் சுட்டும் முல்லைத்திணை மக்கட் பெயர்களாம்; ஆவயின் வருஉங் கிழவரும் உளரே = அவ்விடத்து அகத்திணைக்குரிமை கொள்ளுந்தலைவரும் உளராம்.

சுற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை.

ஆயர் முல்லைநில மக்களுக்குத் திணைப்பெயராகும். அதுவேபோல், வேட்டுவர் என்பதும் முல்லைநில மக்கட்பெயரென்று இளம்பூரணரும், குறிஞ்சி நிலமக்கட்பெயரென்று நச்சினர்க்கினியரும் கூறுவர்- இவற்றுள் இளம்பூரணர் கூற்றுப் பொருட் சிறப்புடையது. ‘மாயோன் மேய’ என்னும் முன் 5 ஆஞ் சூத்திரத்தில் திணை

நிலங்களில் முதலில் வைத்தெண்ணிய மூல்லை நிலமக்களுக்குரிய பெயர்களுள், ஆய ரென்னும் நிலப்பெயரும் வேட்டுவரென்னும் வினைப்பெயரும் அந்நிலத் தாண்மக்களின் திணைப்பெயர்களாக இச்சூத்திரத்தில் தொல்காப்பியர் எடுத்துக்காட்டினாரெனக் கொள்வதே—‘பெயரும் வினையு’ மென்னும் மேற்கூத்திரக்கருத்தை அடைவுபட அமைப்பதாகும். ஆயர் என்பது தொழிற்றொடர்பு கருதாத மூல்லைநில மக்களின் திணைப்பெயராகும். வேட்டுவரென்பது மூல்லைத்திணைமக்களின் “வேட்டு” வினைசுட்டுந் திணைப்பெயராகும். அதனால், ஆசிரியர் மேலே “திணைநிலப்பெயர் - பெயரும் வினையுமென்றாயிருவகையு” எனத்தொகுத்துக் கூறியதை, இச்சூத்திரத்தில் வகுத்து மெய்நிறுத்து விளக்கினார்.

இதில் திணைப்பெயரென்றும், இதற்கு முன்னும் பின்னும் வருஞ் சூத்திரங்களில் திணைநிலப்பெயரென்றும் வருவன அகவொழுக்கத்துக் குரிமை கொள்வார் பெயரையே குறிக்கும். அக்காலத் தமிழ் மரபுக்கும் உண்மையிலகியல் வழக்குக்கு மேற்பத் தமிழ் மக்களெல்லாரும் அகத்திணைத் துறைகளில் காதற்றலைமக்களாதற்குரியர் என்பதை ஆசிரியர் இங்குப் பலசூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கின்றார். நாடாட்சிக் குரியரே அகத்திணைக் கிளவித்தலைமக்கள் ஆவதற்குரியர் போலவும், அல்லாத நானிலமக்களும் வினைவலர், அடியார் முதலாயினாரும் அன்பினைத்திணைத்துறைகளில் கிளவித்தலைவர் ஆகார் போலவும், பொருள்படுமாறு இச்சூத்திரங்களுக்குப் பிறர் கூறு முறை பொருந்தாது. தலைமக்கள் என்பது ஈண்டு அகத்திணைக் கிளவித் தலைமக்களையே குறிக்கும்; நாடாட்சித் தலைமைகுறிப்பது ஈண்டைக்கு வேண்டப்படா. மேற்கூத்திர வுரையில் காட்டிய பாட்டுக்களுடன், நற்றிணை 60, முதலிய பண்டையகப்பாட்டுக்களை யுற்றோர்க்கின், நிலம் தொழில் நிலை பிறப்பு வகைகளால் அகத்திணைக்குரிமை யாருக்கும் விலக்கில்லையென்பது தெற்றென விளங்கும். “நெல்லும் உப்பும நேரேயூரீர், கொள்ளீரோ வெனச் சேரிதோறும்” உப்புச் சுமந்து விற்றுத்திரியும் உமண்மகளைத் தலைவியாக்கி, அம்மூவனார் கூறிய அகம் 390 ஆம் பாட்டும் இவ்வுண்மையை வலியுறுத்தும்.

இன்னும் இதுவேபோல் பிறப்பாற் சிறப்பெதுவுமில்லாத ஆயர், குறவர், நுனையர் முதலிய யாரும் காதற்றலைமக்களாதற் குரியர்-என்பது பல பழம்பாட்டுக்களாற்றெளிவாகும்:—

1. “பாங்கரும் பாட்டங்காற் கன்றொடு செல்வோம், எம்

தாம்பி நொருதலை பற்றினை, ஈங்கெம்மை

முன்னினின் றுங்கே விலக்கிய எல்லா! நீ

என் ஏழுற்றாய்? விடு.

விடேன், தொடியு செல்வார்த் துமித்தெதிர் மண்டும்

கடுவய நாகுபோ னேக்கிக் கொடுமையா

னீங்கிச் சினவுவாய் மற்று.

கலத்தொடியாஞ் செல்வுழிநாடிப்புலத்தும்

வருவையா னுணிலை நீ.

(முல்லைக்கவி—16.)

2. கடி கொள்ளிருங்காப்பிற் புல்லினத்தாயர்
 குடிதொறும் நல்லாரை வேண்டுதி, எல்லா !
 இடுதேள்மருந்தோ நின்வேட்கை ? தொடுதரத்
 துன்னித்தந்தாங்கே நகைகுறித்தெம்மைத்
 தினைத்தற்கெளியமாக்கண்டை, அளைக்கெளியள்
 வெண்ணெய்க்கும் அன்னளெனக்கொண்டாய்; ஒண்ணுதால் !
 ஆங்குநீகூறினனைத்தாக; நீங்குக்.

 நின்றாய் நீ சென்றி, எமர்காண்பர்; நாளைஎங்
 கன்றொடு சேறும் புலத்து.

(முல்லைக்கவி...10.)

3. யாரிவன் என்னைவிலக்குவான் ? நீருளர்
 பூந்தாமரைப்போது தந்தவிரவுத்தார்க்
 கல்லாப்பொதுவனை ! நீமாறு, நின்னொடு
 சொல்லல் ஒம்பென்றார் எமர் ”

(முல்லைக்கவி—12.)

இனி, “என்னுள் வருதியோநன்னடைக்கொடிச்சி” என்னும் நற்றிணை
 82-ஆம் பாட்டில்வரும் அம்மள்ளனார் செய்யுளடியும்,

“உறுகழைநிவப்பிற் சிறுகுடிப்பெயரும்
 கொடிச்சி செல்புறம் நோக்கி
 விடுத்தநெஞ்சம் விடலொல்லாதே ”

என்னும் நற்றிணை 204-ஆம் பாட்டில் மள்ளனார் கூறும் அடிகளும் குறத்தி
 தலைமகளாதற்குதாரணம். அவ்வாறே,

“மீனெறி பரதவர் மடமகள்
 மானமர்நோக்கங்காணவூங்கே”
 என்னும் வெள்ளியந்தின்னனார் நற்றிணை 101. ஆம் பாட்டடிகளும்
 “முடிமுதிர் பரதவர்மடமொழிக் குறுமகள்

 கொலைவெஞ்சிறுஅர் பாற்பட்டனளே”

என்னும் நற்றிணை 207 ஆம் பாட்டடிகளும் பரத்தி தலைமகளாதற்குதார
 ணம்.

இவ்வாறு, தமிழருள் யாரும் காதற்றலைமக்களாய் அகத்திணைக்கு உரிமை
 கொள்வர் என்பதைச் சுட்டுதற்காகவே, ‘ஆவயின்வருஉங்கிழவருமுளரே’ என்று
 இதில் ஆசிரியர் அமைவுபெறக்கூறித்தெளியவைத்தார்.

“பெருநீர் வினையுளெஞ் சிறுநல் வாழ்க்கை
தும்மொடு புரைவதோ அன்றே ;
எம்மேனூர் செம்மலு முடைத்தே,”

என்று

‘உணக்கல் வேண்டியின்புள்ளோப்பும் புலவுநாறும்’ பரதவர் மகளைக்கிள
வித் தலைவியாகக் கூறும் நற்றிணையடிகளானும் இவ்வுண்மையறிக.

22. ஏனோர் மருங்கினு மெண்ணுங் காலை
ஆளு வகைய திணைநிலைப் பெயரே.

இது, மேற் சூத்திரத்திற் கூறிய முல்லைநிலம் ஒழிய, பிறநில மக்களின்
திணைநிலைப்பெயர்களும் அவ்வாதேயமையும் என்பது கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) எண்ணுங்காலை = ஆராயும் பொழுது, ஏனோர் மருங்கினும் = (மேற்
கூறிய ஆயர் வேட்டுவரென்னும் முல்லைநில மக்கள் தவிரப்) பிறநிலமக்கள் பாலும்,
திணைநிலைப்பெயர் ஆளுவகைய = அவர்க்குரிய அகத்திணைக்குறிப்பெயர்கள் எளி
திற் கூறியமையாப் பலதிறப்பட்டனவாகும்.

ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை. ஏனோர்மருங்கினும் என்பதிலும்மை, முன் ஆயர்
வேட்டுவரொப்ப அவரல்லாப் பிறநில மக்களிடத்தும் என்னும் பொருட்டாதலால்,
எச்ச வும்மையாகும்.

நிலம்பற்றியும் தொழில்பற்றியும் தமிழ்மக்கள் கொள்ளும்பெயர் பலவாத
லானும், அவ்வாறு வேறுபடும் பெயர்க்குரியார் பலரும் அகப்பகுதியில் எல்லாத்தி
ணைகளிலும் கிழவராதற் குரியராதலானும், திணைக்குரிய அனோர் பெயர்கள் கூறி
யமையா ஆதலின் ‘ஆளுவகைய திணைநிலைப்பெயர்’ என்று இங்குக் கூறப்பட்டன.

இப்பெயர் வகைகளை “பெயரும் வினையு”மென்னும் முன் சூத்திரத்தின்
கீழ்ச்சினூர்க்கினியர் கூறுமுரைக்குறிப்புக்களானு மறிக.

23. அடியோர் பாங்கினும் வினைவலர் பாங்கினும்
கடிவரை யிலபுறத் தென்மனார் புலவர்.

இஃது, அகத்திணைக் குரிமைகொள்வார் மேற்கூறியாங்கு நானிலமக்களே
யன்றிப் பிறகு முளர் என்பது கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) புறத்து = மேற்கூறிய நானிலமக்களின் திணைப்பெயர் குருப்புக்
களிலடங்காத, அடியோர் பாங்கினும் = பிறர்க்கடிமையாவரிடத்தும், வினைவலர்
பாங்கினும் = அடிமையரல்லாக் கம்மியர்போன்ற தொழிலாளரிடத்தும், கடிவரை
யில = அகத்திணை யொழுக்கங்கள் நாட்டிச் செய்யுட்செய்தலீக்கும் நிலைமையிலலை
என்மனார் புலவர் = என்றார் அறிவுடையோர்.

ஈரிடத்தும், “பாங்கினும்” எனவரும் உம்மைகள், முன்னைச் சூத்திரங்கள்
கூறுந்திணைமக்களொப்ப என இறந்தததழீஇயும், பின்னர் ‘ஏவன் மரபினேனோ
ரும்’ என்பதை நோக்கி எதிரது தழீஇயும் வந்த எச்சவும்மைகளாம்.

சுண்டுப் புறத்தென்பது, மேற் சூத்திரங்களிற் கூறப்பட்ட நானிலமக்களேயு மன்றி அவர்திணைப்பெயர் வகுப்புக்களின் புறத்தே, என்பதைச் சுட்டும். அன்பினைத் திணைகளின் புறத்தேயெனப் பொருள்கொண்டு, பழைய வுரைகாரர் இச்சூத்திரடி அடியோர் வினைவலர் போன்றவர்க்கு ஐந்திணை யொழுக்கம் உரித்தன்மெனவும், அவற்றின் புறத்தவான கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளே அத்திறத்தார்க்குரிய அகவொ முக்கங்களாமெனவும், கூறுவாராயினார். அவர் கூற்றுக்கள் சூத்திரச் சொற்றொடர்க ளுக்கு அமையாமையோடு, முன்னுக்குப்பின் அவ்வுரையாளர் கூறுவனவற்றிற்கே மாறாக முரணுவதாலும், அவை பொருளன்மையறிக. இளம்பூரணர் இச்சூத்திரத் தின் கீழ், “இது, நடுவணைந்திணைக்குரிய தலைமக்களை (முன்) கூறி, அதன் புறத்த வாகிய கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைக்குரிய மக்களை யுணர்த்துதல் நுதலிற்று” என்று குறிக்கின்றார். அன்பிணைந்திணையான ஒத்தகாமம் மேற்கூறிய நானில மக்களுக்கு மட்டும் அமையும்ன்றி, இச்சூத்திரங்கூறும் அடியோர் வினைவலர்களுக்கு என்றும் இன்றென்பதே இளம் பூரணர் கருத்தென்பது சுண்டவர் கூறுங்குறிப்பால் அறி கின்றோம். மேன்மக்களே என்றும் அன்பிணைந்திணைக் குரியார், மற்றையோர் இழித கவுடைய கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளுக்கே உரியராவர் என்பதிவர் கருத்தாமேல், முன் முதற்கூத்திர உரையில், பிரமமுதல் தெய்வமீறாக “நான்கு மணமும் மேன் மக்கள் மாட்டு நிகழ்தலானும், இவை உலகினுள் பெருவழிக்கெனப் பயின்றுவருத லானும், அது பெருந்திணையெனக் கூறப்பட்டது” என்றிவரே கூறியிரார். ஆனால், பெருந்திணை பெருவழக்கிற்றென்பதும், அது மேன்மக்கள் மாட்டு நிகழ்வ தென்பதும், ஆண்டிவர் கூறிப் போந்தார். அன்றியும், ‘எவன் மரபின்’ என்னும் அடுத்த சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ் “எவதன் மரபையுடைய ஏனையோரும் கைக்கிளை பெருந் திணைக் குரியார்” என்றிவரே கூறுகின்றார். எனவே, இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு முன்னும் பின்னும் இவ்வுரையாசிரியர் கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளுக்கு மேன்மக்கள் பெரும் பாலும் தலைமக்களாதற்குரியார் என்று தம்கருத்தை வலியுறுத்துபவர், இச்சூத்திரத் தின்கீழ் அதற்கு மாறாகக் கீழ்மக்களே கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளுக்குரியார் என்று கூறுவது மாறுகொளக் கூறவென்னுங் குற்றத்திற்கவரை யாளாக்குகிறது. இவ் வாறே, நச்சினார்க்கினியர் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பொருள் கூறுவதும் பொருந்தாது. கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளை ஆசிரியர் இவ்வியலின் இறுதியில் 50, 51-ஆம் சூத்திரங் களாக நிறுத்தி, அவற்றிற்கு முன்னெல்லாம் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு முன்னும் பின்னும் அன்பிந்திணைப் பகுதிகளையே கூறிச்செல்வதால், இதில் அவர்கருத்து வேறுபாடு சுட்டப்பெறாத நிலையில் ஐந்திணைகளுக்கு வேறான கைக்கிளைபெருந்திணைகளை அவர் கூறுவதாகப் பொருள் காணமுயல்வது அமைவுடையதாகாது.

இனி, கைக்கிளை, பெருந்திணை போலவே இழிதகவுடைய பொருந்தாக்காமம் என்று இவ்வுரையாளர் கருதுவதால், சுண்டுக்கூறப்படும் அடியோர் வினைவலராகிய மேன்மக்களல்லாதார் இழிதகவுடைய அப்பொருந்தாக்காமத்திற்கு உரியவென்று இவர்கள் பொருள் கூறுகின்றனர் போலும். தொல்காப்பியர், பெருந்திணையொன் றையே பொருந்தாக்காமமெனக் கூறிக், கைக்கிளையைக் குற்றமற்ற ஒருதலைக்காதல் என வேறுபடுத்தி விளக்குகின்றார். ஒருதலைக்காதல் கைக்கிளை. காதலித்தோரைக் காதலிக் கப்பட்டோரும் காதலித்தால், அக்கைக்கிளை ஒத்தகாமத்தின் பாலடங்கும். அவ்வாறன்றிக் காதலிக்கப்பட்டோர்பால் காதலின்மை தெளியப்பட்டால், ஆண்

டுக்கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணையிலடங்கும். அவ்வாறடக்காமல், பொருந்தாக்காமான பெருந்திணையும் ஒத்த காமமான அன்பினைந்திணையும் வெவ்வேறுகூறி, அவற்றின் வேறுபட்டதாய்க் கைக்கிளையை ஆசிரியர் பிரித்து இயல்விரித்தலால், கைக்கிளை, அன்பொத்திருதலைக்காமம் அன்றியினும், அன்பற்ற பெருந்திணையு மாகாமல், குற்றமற்ற ஒருதலைக்காமமாய் நல்லோர்பாலும் கடியப்படாத ஒழுக்கம் என்பதேதொல் காப்பியர் கருத்தென்பது தெளிவாகும். “பாங்கரும் பாட்டங்காற் கன்றொடு செல்வேம்” என்னும் முல்லைக்கலியும், “என்னோற்றனை கொல்லோ” என்னும் மருதக்கலியும், “அணிமுக மதியேய்ப்ப”’, என்னும் குறிஞ்சிக்கலியும், அடியோர், வினைவலர், அகத்திணைத்தலைமக்களாதற்குதாரணமாகும்.

24. ஏவன் மரபி னேனோரு முரியர்

ஆகிய நிலைமையவரு மன்னர்

இதுவும் அகப்பகுதியில் நானிலமக்களேயன்றி, திணைப்பெயர்க்குரிமை கொள்வாரின்னுஞ் சிலருளர் என்பது கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஏவன் மரபின் ஏனோரும் = ஒருவரிடத்தடைந்து அவர் குற்றேவல் செய்வதையே மரபாகவுடைய (அடியாரும் வினைவலருமல்லாத) பிறரும், உரியர் = நானில மக்களைப்போலவே அகத்திணைக்குரிமையுடையராவர்; ஆகிய நிலைமையவரும் = அவ்வாறு ஒருவரையுமடையாமல் நாள்தோறும் ஏவுவார் தொழில் ஏற்பதாகிய நிலைமையுடையோரும், அன்னர் = (அடைந்தாட்டமும் குற்றேவன் மாக்களைப்போலவே) அகத்திணைக்குரிமையுடையராவர்.

‘ஏனோரும்’ ‘நிலைமையவரும்’ என்பவற்றினும்மைகள் முன்னர்க் கூறியவரைக் குறித்துநிற்கும் இறந்தது தழீஇய எச்சவும்மைகளாம். இதற்கும் கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைக்கிளை யிழுத்துப் புருத்திக்கூறும் உரைகாரர் பழையவுரை பொருந்தாதென்பதை மேற்குத்திரத்துக்குக் கூறிய குறிப்புக்களைக் கொண்டுதெளிக.

ஏவன்மரபு என்பது, குற்றேவற்றொழில் முறையைக் குறிக்கும்ல்லால், பிறரை ஏவும் வாழ்வுரிமை குறியாது; ஏவுதல் மரபென்னாது ஆசிரியர் ஏவன்மரபு என்றாராதலின். ஏவலர் ஆட்பட்ட அடிமைகளின் வேறாவர். ஆகவே, அடிமையாய் ஆட்பட்ட அடியார் வேறு. அடிமைப்படாமல் ஒருவரையடுத்து அவர்க்கே குற்றேவல் செய்து வாழும் ஏவலர் வேறு. ஒருவரையு மடையாமல் நாள்தோறும் வேண்டியார்க்கு அவரேவிய செய்து வாழ்வாராய் ஏனையோர் வேறு. இம்மூவருள் அடங்காராய்க் கம்மியர் போன்ற பிறரேவல் புரியாத் தந்தொழிலரான வினைவலர் வேறு. ஆதலின் இந்நால்வரையும் முறையே ஆசிரியர் இச்சுத்திரங்களில் நானிலமக்கள் போலவே அகவொழுக்கத்திற்குரிமையுடைய ரென்று விதந்துகூறினார்.

25. ஒதல் பகையே தூதிவை பிரிவே.

இது, மேல் முதற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறிய ஏழுதிணைகளுள் குறிஞ்சிமுதலிய நடுவிணைந்திணைகளின் பொதுவியல்புகள் இதுவரையும் கூறி, இனி அவ்வைந்திணைகளுள் நடுவிணைதானதும் களவு கற்பு என்னும் இருவகைக் கைகோள்களுக்கும்பொதுவானதும் தனக்கென நிலம்பகுக்கப்படாததுமாகிய பாஸ்யென்னும் பிரிவொழுக்கத்தின் சிறப்பியல்கள் கூறத்தொடங்கி, பிரிவினிமித்தங்களுள் சில உணர்த்துகிறது.

(இ-ள்.) ஒதல் பகையேதூது இவை = கல்வி கற்றலும், பகைகடியப் பொருதலும், தம்முள் பகைத்த பிறரைப் பொருத்தற் பொருட்டு வாயிலாகச் செல்லுதலும் ஆகிய இவை, பிரிவே = பிரிதற்கு நிமித்தமாய்ப் பாலத்திணையாகும்.

இதில் ஏகாரமிரண்டும் அசைநிலை. ஒதற்பிரிவாவது பிரிண்டு தான் ஒதற் குரியவற்றைக் கற்றற்குப் பிரிதல். பகைவயிற் பிரிதலாவது தன்னாட்டிற்கும் தன்னரசிற்கும் பகையாவாரோடு போர்கருதிப் பிரிதல். தூதற்பிரிதலாவது பகைத்தார் வேறிருவரைப் பொருத்தற் பொருட்டுப் பிரிதல்.

26. அவற்றுள்.

ஒதலுந் தூது முயர்ந்தோர்மேன.

இது, மேற்குத்திரம் கூறும் மூன்றனுள் இரண்டற்குரியாரை உணர்த்துகிறது.

(இ-ள்.) அவற்றுள் = மேற்குறித்த மூன்றனுள், ஒதலுந்தூதும் = ஒதற்பிரிவும் தூதுபற்றிய பிரிவும், உயர்ந்தோர் மேன = பெயரும் வினையும்பற்றிய திணை நிலைப்பெயர்க்குரியார் பலருள்ளும் அடியோர் வினைவலர் ஏவலர் போல்வாரல்லாத உயர்ந்தோர்க்கே உரியவாகும்.

அடியோர் வினைவலர் ஏவலர் ஆவார், பிறரேவலை எதிர்பார்த்து வாழ்பவராதலின், ஒதலும் தூதுமாகிய உயர்ந்த தொழிலேற்றற்கு உரிமை கொள்ளார். அவரொழிந்த உயர்ந்தோரே அவற்றை மேற்கொள்ளுதற்குத் தகுதியுடையராதலின் இவை அவர்மேலன என்று விளக்கப்பட்டன.

உயர்ந்தோரல்லாத அடியோர் முதலிய மூவர்க்கும் அகத்திணையொழுக்கங்கள் கடியப்படாவென மேல் இரண்டு குத்திரங்களிற் கூறிய ஆசிரியர், அவ்வொழுக்கங்களுள் ஒன்றான பிரிவிற்குரிய நிமித்தங்களுள் ஒதல் தூதாகிய இரண்டிற்கும் அவர் உரியராகாமையான், அவைபற்றிய பிரிவிற்கும் அவர் உரியராகார் என்பதை இச்சுத்திரத்தால் தெளியவைத்தார். மேற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறிய பிரிவினிமித்தம் மூன்றனுள் இரண்டே உயர்ந்தோர்க்குரியன என இச்சுத்திரம்கூறுதலால், பகைவயிற் பிரிவு உயர்ந்தோர்க்குப் போலவே பிறர்க்கும் உண்டென்பது பெறவைத்தார் ஆசிரியர். உயர்ந்தோரின் ஏவல் மேற்கொண்டொழுகுவாரும், அவரேவியவழிப் பகைவரோடு பொருதற்குரிய ராதலின், பகைவயிற் பிரிவு அவர்க்கு விலக்கப்படாமை யுணர்க.

இச்சுத்திரத்திற்கு நால்வகை வருணத்துள் அந்தணர் அரசராகிய முதல் இருவகையினரே ஒதல் தூது மேற்கொள்ளற்குரியர் எனப்பிறர் கூறுமுறைபொருந்தாது. நான்கு வருணம் ஆரியர் அறநூல்களே கூறும் வகைகளாதலானும், பண்டைத் தமிழ்நாட்டில் பிறப்பளவில் என்றும் உயர்வு தாழ்வுகளுடன் வேறுபடும் அந்நால் வருணவகைகள் உலகியலில் வழங்காமையானும், தொல்காப்பியர் தாம் தமிழ் மரபுகளையே கூறுவதாக வற்புறுத்தலானும், அகத்திணையியலில் தமிழ் நாட்டு நானில மக்கள் குறிக்கப்படுகின்றாரன்றி நான்கு வருணத்தாராய்த் தமிழ் மக்கள் யாண்டும் கூறப்படாமையானும், அவருரை அமைவுடையதன்று. அஃதாசிரியர் கருத்தன்மை,

இதில் உயர்ந்தோரென்பதற்கு முதலிருவருணத்தாரென்று உரையாசிரியரும், முதல் மூன்று வருணத்தார் என்று நச்சினூக்கினியரும் தம்முள் மாறுபடக் கூறுதலானும் தெளியப்படும். அன்றியும், வணிகரை விலக்கி அந்தணரும் அரசருமே இவ்விருவகைப் பிரிவித்குரியர் என்று தாம் கூறுதற்குக் காரணம் 'ஒழுக்கத்தானும் குணத்தானும் செல்வத்தானும்—ஏனையரினும் (இவ்விருவருணத்தாரே) உயர்வுடையராதலின் (இவரை) உயர்ந்தோரென்றார்' என்பர் இளம்பூரணர். ஒழுக்கம் குணம் செல்வங்களால் வணிகர் மற்றைய இருபிறப்பாளர்க்குக் குறைந்தவர் என்பதுண்மையன்றாகலானும், செல்வத்தால் வணிகர் ஏனையரினும் தாமே வுயர்வுடையராதலானும், வணிகர் ஒத்தருரியரேயாதலானும் இதுவும் ஆசிரியரின் சூத்திரக் கருத்தாகாமை பெறப்படும்.

27. தானே சேறலும் தன்னொடுசிவணிய

ஏனோர் சேறலும் வேந்தன் மேற்றே.

இது, மேற்பிரிவுவகை மூன்றனுள், மேற்குத்திரம் கூறிய இரண்டு நீக்கி, அதிற் கூறப்படாத பகைவயிற் பிரிவுக்கு உரியாரை உணர்த்துகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) தானே சேறலும் = பகைக்கடிதற்பொருட்டுத்தானே படையெடுத்துச் செல்லுதலும்; தன்னொடு சிவணிய ஏனோர் சேறலும் = தன்னொடு பொருத்திய படைத்துணையாளர் பிறர் செல்லுதலும்; வேந்தன் மேற்றே = மன்னவன் பொருட்டேயாகும்.

தானே என்பதன் ஏகாரம் பிரிநிலை; வந்த பகையை யடர்க்கத் தான் எவுத்தருரிய படைஞர் பிறரைநீக்கி வேந்தன் தானே சேறல் என்பதைச் சுட்டும். சுற்றே காரம் அசைநிலை. நாட்டின் பகைவராய் வந்தாரைநலிவது வேந்தனுக்கே கடமையும் உரிமையும் ஆகும். மற்றையோர் பகைமை பாராட்டித்தம்முள் பொருதல் அரசனால் ஒறுக்கப்படும் குற்றமாகும். அதனால் தன்கடனாற்றி, மண்ணசையால் வந்தவேந்தனை அஞ்ச எதிர்ப்பென்று பொருதழித்த அந்நாட்டு வேந்தன் தானே செல்வதும், தன்படைஞரை ஏவி அவரைக்கொண்டு அக்கடனாற்றிப் பகையழித்தலும், அவ்வேந்தன் மேலனவாவதுவெளிப்படலாம். நெடுஞ்செழியன் வந்தபகைவர் மேற்சென்று தலையாலங்காணத்துப் பொருதழித்தது வேந்தன் தானே சேறற்குதாரணம். கருணாகரத் தொண்டைமான் படையெடுப்பென்று கலிங்கமழித்தது அரசன் தன்னொடு சிவணிய ஏனோர் சேறற்குதாரணம்.

(i) பகைதெற வேந்தன் தானே சேறற்குச் செய்யுள்

1 “மயங்கமர் மாறட்டு மண்வெளவிவருபவர்

தயங்கிய களிற்றின்மேல் தகைகாண விடுவதோ

... ..

தாள்வலம் படவென்று தகைநன்மா மேல்கொண்டு

வாள்வென்று வருபவர் வனப்பார விடுவதோ

... ..

பகைவென்று திறைகொண்ட பாய்திண்டேர் மிசையவர்

வகைகொண்ட செம்மனும் வனப்பார விடுவதோ

... ..

எனவாங்கு

வாளாதி வயங்கிழாஅய் வருந்துவ ளிவளென
நாள்வரை நிறுத்துத்தாம் சொல்லிய பொய்யன்றி
மீளீவேற் றுணையர் புகுதந்தார்
நீனாயர் கூடல் நெடுங்கொடி யெழுவே”

(பாலைக்கவி 30)

2. “கார்செய் காலையொடு கையறப் பிரிந்தோர்

தேர்தரு விருந்திற் றவிர்குதல் யாவது

மாற்றருந் தானே நோக்கி

யாற்றவு மிருத்தல் வேந்தனது தொழிலே”

பேயனார் (ஐங்குறுநூறு 451)

(ii) வேந்தனொடு சிவணிய ஏனோர் சேற்றஞ்ச் செய்யுள்

1. “காய்சினவேந்தன் பாசறை நீடி

நந்நோயறியா வறனிலாளர்

இந்நிலை களைய வருகுவர் கொல்லென

ஆனதெறிதரும் வாடையொடு

நோனேன் தோழியென் தனிமை யானே”

கழார்க்கீரனெயிற்றியார் (அகம் 294)

2. “கூதர்நின்றன் றுற்பொழுதே; காதலர்

நந்நிலையறியாராயினுந் தந்நிலை

யறந்தனர் கொல்லோ தாமே யோங்குநடைக்

காய்சின யானைகங்குற் சூழ

அஞ்சுவர விறுத்த தானே

வெஞ்சினவேந்தன் பாசறையோரே”

உம்பற்காட்டினங்கண்ணனார் (அகம் 264)

28. மேவிய சிறப்பி னேனோர் படிமைய

முல்லை முதலாச் சொல்லிய முறையாற்

பிழைத்தது பிழையா தாகல் வேண்டியும்,

இழைத்த வொண்பொருள் முடியவும், பிரிவே,

இது, மேற்கூறிய ஒத்தல் பகைதாது ஒழிய, பிரிவுக்குரிய பிறநிமித்தங்களையும் அப்பிரிவுகளுக்குரியாரையுங் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) மேவிய சிறப்பின் ஏனோர் = வேந்தனொடு பொருந்திய சிறப்புடைய வேந்தன் கிளைஞர் எனுகியர் முதலியோர்; படிமைய முல்லைமுதலாச் சொல்லிய =

நிலவகுப்புக்களான முல்லைமுதல் நெய்தலிறுதியாக (மேலே ஐந்தாஞ் சூத்திரத்திற்) சொல்லப்பட்ட நால்வகை உலகங்கள்; முறையாற் பிழைத்தது பிழையாதாகல் 'வேண்டியும் = முறைவழுவித் தப்பியது முறையாற்றப்பா தாதலைவிரும்பியும், இழைத்த ஒன்பொருண் முடியவும் = வினைசெய்து உயர்ந்த பொருளை ஆக்கவும்; பிரிவே = பிரிவினமித்தங்கள் ஆம்.

ஈற்றேகாரம் அசை. படிமைய என்பதில் படி உலகம் அல்லது நிலம் என்பதைக் குறிக்கும். இனி, படிமைய என்பதற்குப் பகைமையுடைய அல்லது கீழ்ப்படிந்த எனப்பொருள் கோடலும் பொருந்தும்.

பாலைத்திணையாகிய பிரிவு அறுவகைப்படும்; ஒதல், தூது, பகை, காவல், பொருள், பரத்தை என. அவற்றுள் பரத்தையிற்பிரிவு கைகோளிரண்டில் கற்பளவிலிடம் பெற்று, களவுக்கமையாமையின், அப்பிரிவு பின்னர் அத்தொடர்புடன் கூறப்படும். ஆதலின், அதைக்கீக்கி, மற்ற ஐந்தும் இங்கு கைகோளிரண்டிற்கும் பொதுவான அகத்திணையிலிற் கூறப்பட்டன. அவ்வைவகைப் பிரிவுள், ஒதல் தூது காவல் மூன்றும் உயர்ந்தோர்க்கே யுரியன; பகை பொருட் பிரிவுகள் யாவர்க்கும் ஒப்பவரியன.

ஒதல், பகை, தூதுபோலவே, பொருள்பற்றியும் காவல்பற்றியும் பிரிவுநிகழ்தல் உலகியலும் மரபும் ஆதலின், அவற்றுள் முதல் மூன்றும் முன்கூறியதால் காவற் பிரிவும் பொருட்பிரிவும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற் கூறப்பெற்றன. வேந்தனோடு சிவணிய ஏனோர், தம்பொருட்டு ஒதல் நுதலியும், வேந்தன் பொருட்டுத் தூது பகைதெறல் நுதலியும் பிரிவது போலவே, நாடுகாவல் பற்றியும் பொருள்முடிக்கவும் பிரிவுமேற் கொள்ளுவது மரபு என்பது இச்சூத்திரத்தில் விளக்கப்பட்டது. வேந்தனுக்குப்பகை தெறத் தானே சேறலியல்பாயினும், பிறநாடுகாவல் பற்றியும் பொருள்பற்றியும் பிரிதல் சிறத்ததன்றாகும். அதனால், தானே பகைவயிற் சேறலுண்டென மேற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறிய ஆசிரியர், அவனுக்குக் காவல் பொருட்பிரிவுகள் கூறாது, அவனோடு மேவிய சிறப்பினையுடைய ஏனைய உயர்ந்தோர்க்கு இப்பிரிவுகளை இதில் விதந்து கூறினார்.

(i) உயர்ந்தோர் காவற்பொருட்டுப் பிரிதற்குதாரணம்:—

“பல்வரி யினவண்டு புதிதுண்ணும் பருவத்துத்
தொல்கவின் ரெலைந்தவென் றடமென்றோளுள்ளுவார்
ஒல்குபு நிழல்சேர்ந்தார்க் குலையாது காத்தோம்பி
வெல்புக முலகேத்த விருந்துநாட் டுறைபவர்,
திசைதிசை தேனார்க்குந் திருமருத முன்றுறை
வசைதீர்ந்த வென்னலம் வாடுவ தருளுவார்
நசைகொண்டு தந்நிழல் சேர்ந்தாரைத்தாங்கித்த
மிசைபரந் துலகேத்த வேதினாட் டுறைபவர்.
அறல்சாஅய் பொருளோடெம் மணிநுதல் வேறுகித்
திறல்சான்ற பெருவனப் பிழப்பதை யருளுவார்

ஊறஞ்சி நிழல்சேர்ந்தார்க் குலையாது காத்தோம்பி
யாறின்றிப் பொருள்வெஃகி யகன் றநாட் டுறைபவர்-” (கலி-26)

(ii) அவர் பொருள் வயிற்பிரிதற் குடாரணம் :—

“அருஞ்சரக் கவலைந்தி என்றும்
இல்லோர்க்கில்லென் றியைவது காத்தல்
வல்லா நெஞ்சம் வலிப்ப நம்மினும்
பொருளே, காதலர் காதல் ;
அருளே காதலர் என்றி, றீயே.” (அகம்-53)
சீத்தலைச் சாத்தனர்.

“வெயில்வி ற்றிருந்த வெம்மலை யருஞ்சரம்
எகுவரென்ப தாமே தம்வயின்
இரந்தோர் மாற்றல் ஆற்றா
இல்லின் வாழ்க்கை வல்லாதோரே (நற்றிணை-84)

29. மேலோர் முறைமை நால்வர்க்கு முரித்தே.

இது, வேந்தர்க்கும் வேந்தரோடு சிவணிய சிறப்பின் ஏனோர்க்கும் உரிய பிரிவெல்லாம் அடியோர் கீழோரல்லா நானிலமக்களனைவர்க்கும் உரியவென்றுணர் த்துகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) மேலோர் முறைமை = மேலே வேந்தனென்றும் வேந்தனோடு சிவணிய ஏனோரென்றும் மேலிய சிறப்பினேனோரென்றும் குறிக்கப்பட்ட மேலோர்களுடைய பிரிவு பற்றிய மரபெல்லாம், நால்வர்க்கு முரித்தே = தமிழகத்தில் நானிலமக்களுக்கும் ஒப்பவரியன.

இதற்குப் பிற்கூறும் வேறுபொருள்கள் ஆசிரியர் கருத்தன்மை, இளம்பூரணரும் நச்சினர்க்கினியரும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குத் தம்முள் மாறுபட வுரைக்காதலான் விளங்கும். மேலோரைத் தேவரென்பர் இளம்பூரணர். வணிகரென்பர் நச்சினர்க்கினியர். தேவரைப்பற்றிய குறிப்பு ஈண்டு வேண்டப்படாமையானும், நான்குவருணத்தாருள் வணிகர் மேலோராகா மூன்றும் வகுப்பினரே யாதலானும், இவ்வீருரையும் சூத்திரக்கருத்தோடு மாறுபடும். அதுபோலவே, நால்வர் என்பதை நான்குவருணத்தார் என்று இளம்பூரணரும், வணிகரை விலக்கி வேளாளரை இருவகையராக்கி அந்தணரசரோடு கூட்டி நால்வர் என நச்சினர்க்கினியரும், தம்முள் மாறிக் கூறுவதும் அமைவுடையதன்று. தமிழகம் முல்லை முதலிய நானிலமாகத் திணைபற்றிப் பகுக்கப் படுமென்று மேலே 2, 5-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களிலும், அந்நானிலமக்களும் திணைதொறு மரீஇய திணைநிலைப்பெயரோடு அகத்துறைகளில் கிழவராவரென 20, 21-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களிலும் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கியிருப்பதால், ஈண்டு நால்வரென்பது அந்நானில மக்களையே குறிக்கும். அந்நானிலத்தும் அடியோர் முதலிய கீழோரும், வேந்தர் வேந்தரோடு சிவணிய ஏனாதியர் முதலிய மேலோரும் உளராதல், மேலே 23, 24, 26, 27, 28-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கியுள்ளார். அதனால், இதில்

மேலோரென்றும், நால்வரென்றும் குறிக்கப்படுவோர்; ஆசிரியர் இவ்வியலில் முன் விளக்கியுள்ள தமிழ் மக்களேயாவர்.

இனி யிவ்வாறன்றி 'நால்வர்' என்பது நான்குவருணத்தாரை யென்றும், 'மேலோர்' என்பது அவருள் இருபிறப்பாளராய் மேல்வகுப்பினர் மூவரையுமென்றும், அல்லது அவருள்ளுஞ் சிறந்த பார்ப்பனரை யென்றும் பொருள்கொள்ளின், மேலோரெனப்படுவார் யாவரேயாயினும் அவரை நீக்கியபின் அவரொழிந்த வருண வகுப்பினர் நால்வராதல் கூடாமை வெளிப்படலாம். அதுவுமன்றி, ஆசிரியர் அறநூல்கள் கூறும்பிறப்புரிமைகளுடைய இடையிருவருணத்தார் என்றும் தமிழகத்து இல்லாமையானும், தொல்காப்பியர் தமிழ் மரபுகளையும் தமிழர்வழக்குக்களையுமே தாம் கூறுவதாக வற்புறுத்துவதானும், அவ்வுரை தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தன்றென்பது தேறப்படும்.

(i) 1. பொருள்வயிற் பிரிவுக்குதாரணம்:—

1. “வேய்மருள் பணைத்தோள் நெகிழ்ச் சேய்நாட்டுப்
பொலங்கல வெறுக்கை தருமரர்

சுரம்புல்லென்ற ஆற்ற காடிற்றதோரே”

மாமூலனார் (அகம்—1)

2. “நட்டோராக்கம் வேண்டியும் ஒட்டிய
நின்றோள் அணிபெற வரற்கும்
அன்றோ தோழியவர் சென்றதிறமே”

பாலங்கொற்றனார்—(நற்றிணை-286)

3. “சுதலுந்துய்த்தலு மில்லோர்க் கில்லெனச்
செய்வினை கைப்பிக வெண்ணுதி, யவ்வினைக்
கம்மா வரிவையும் வருமோ,
வெம்மை யுய்த்தியோ வுரைத்திசி நெஞ்சே.”

உகாய்குடிகிழார்—(குறுந்தொகை-63)

(ii) பகைவயிற்பிரிவுக்குச் செய்யுள்.—

1. “இருபெருவேந்தர் மாறுகொள்வியன்களத்
தொருபடை கொண்டு வருபடை பெயர்க்கும்
செல்வமுடையோர்க்கு நின்றன்று விறலெனப்
பூக்கோ ளேய தண்ணுமை விலக்கிச்
செல்வேமாத லறியாள்

யாங்காகுவன்கொல்தானே”

மதுரை அனக்கர்ஞாழார் மகனார் மள்ளனார் (அகம் 174)

(iii) தூதுப்பிரிவுக்குச்செய்யுள்: —

“மிகைதணித் தற்கரிதாமிரு வேந்தர்வெம் போர்மிடைந்த
பகைதணித் தற்குப் படர்தலுற்றார் நமர் பல்பிறவித்
தொகைதணித்தற்கென் னையாண்டுகொண்டோன் நிலைச்சூழ்
[பொழில்வாய்
முகைதணித்தற்கரிதாம்புரிதாழ்தரு மொய்குழலே”
திருச்சிற்றம்பலக்கோவையார்.

30. மன்னர் பாங்கிற் பின்னோ ராகுப
உயர்ந்தோர்க்குரிய ஒத்தினுள்.

இது மன்னரைப் பொருந்திச் சிறந்த வேந்தன் கிளைஞர் ஏனாதியர் முதலிய மேலோர்க்கு மேல் 27, 28-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் கூறிய பகை, காவல், பொருள்கள் ஒழியப் பிற பிரிவுகள் கூறும் ஒழிபுச் சூத்திரமாகும்.

(இ-ள்.) உயர்ந்தோர்க்குரிய = அடியோர் முதலிய கீழோரல்லாத சிறப்பு டையோர் செய்தற்குப் பொருந்திய, ஒத்தின் ஆன = கல்வியான் ஆய பிரிவுவேண் டும் அனைத்து வினைகட்கும், மன்னர் பாங்கிற்பின்னோர் ஆகுப = மன்னர் சார்பில் அவரொடு சிவணிப் பின்னிற்றோர் உரியராவர்.

மன்னரொடு சிவணிய சிறப்பின் மேலோர், அவர் பொருட்டுப் பகைமேற் கொண்டு பிரிதல் மேல் 27-ஆம் சூத்திரத்திலும், காவலும் பொருளும் பற்றிப் பிரி தல் 28-ஆம் சூத்திரத்திலும் கூறப்பெற்றன வாதலின், அம்முன்றுமொழிய, தூது முதலிய பிறவுயர்ந்தோர் வினைபற்றிய பிரிவினைத்தும், மன்னர் பாங்கிற் பின்னோ ராய அன்னவர்க்குரித்தாம் என்பதை இவ்வொழிபுச்சூத்திரத்தில் ஆசிரியர் கூறினார்.

இவ்வாறன்றி, இதனை இரண்டு சூத்திரமாகப் பிரித்துப் பிறவுரை யாசிரியர் கள் கூறும் பொருள்கள் ஆசிரியரைக் கூறியது கூறும் குற்றத்திற் காட்படுத்தும். ‘மன்னர் பாங்கிற் பின்னோராகுப’ எனத் தனியே பிரித்து, அதற்குப் பிறர் கூறும் உரை மேலே 27, 28, 29-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியர் கூறியவற்றுள் அடங்குத லின், அஃதவர் கருத்தன்மையறிக. அதுவே போல், ‘உயர்ந்தோர்க்குரிய ஒத்தி னுள்’ என்பதைத் தனிச்சூத்திரமாக்கிப் பிறர் கூறும்பொருள், முன் ‘ஒதலுந் தூது முயர்ந்தோர்மேன்’ என்னும் சூத்திரங் கூறுவதிலடங்குமாதலின், அதுவும் அமைவ தன்று. ஏதெழுதுவோரால் இவைபிரித்தெழுதப்பெற்று அதனால் பின் உரையாசிரி யர்கள் தனிவேறு சூத்திரங்களாகக் கருதியமங்கி, ஆசிரியரின் முன்னூத்திரப் பொரு ளொடு பொருந்தாவாறு மாறுபடவுரை கூறியுள்ளார்.

31. வேந்துவினை யியற்கை வேந்தனி னொர் இய
ஏனோர் மருங்கினு மெய்திட னுடைத்தே.

இது, முடியுடை வேந்தரல்லாத குறுந்லமன்னரின் பிரிவுநயித்தங்கள் கூறு கின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) வேந்துவினையிறக்கை = பிரிவுக்குரிய மன்னர் வினையியல்பு; வேந்தனின் ஓரீஇய = முடியுடை வேந்தனின் வேறாய்; ஏனோர் மருங்கினும் = பிறவே ளிர் முதலான குறுநில மன்னரிடத்தும்; எய்திடனுடைத்தே = பொருந்துதல் உரித்தாகும்.

ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை.

குறுநில மன்னன் பிறநாடு கொள்ளப் போர்மேற்செல்லும் பிரிவுக்குதாரணம்:—

“விலங்கிடுஞ் சிமையக் குன்றத்தும்பர்
வேறுபல் மொழிய தேஏம் முன்னி
வினைநசைஇப் பரிக்கும் உரன்மலிநெஞ்சமொடு
புனைமாண் எஃகம் வலவயினேந்திச்
செலன்மாண் புற்றதும் வயின்வல்லே
வலனா கென்றலும் நன்று மற்றில்ல.”

இறங்கு குடிக்குன்ற நாடன் (அகம்-215)

இவ்வாறே மற்றைப் பிரிவுகளும் வந்துழிக்கண்டுகொள்க.

32. பொருள்வயிற்பிரிதலும் அவர்வயினுரித்தே
உயர்ந்தோர் பொருள்வயினொழுக்கத்தான.

இது, மேலதற்கோர் புறனடை. குறுநிலமன்னர்க்குப் பொருட்பிரிவும் உண்டென்று கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) பொருள் வயிற்பிரிதலும் = பொருள் பற்றியபிரிவும், அவர்வயினுரித்தே = மேற்குறித்த குறுநிலமன்னர்களுக்குரியதாகும், உயர்ந்தோர் பொருள்வயின் ஒழுக்கத்தான = பொருள் பற்றி உயர்ந்தோரின் ஒழுக்கத்தொடு பட்ட விடத்தில்.

வேந்தர் வினையினைத்தும் குறுநிலமன்னர்க்குப் பாலைத்திணையில் உரியவாகும் எனமேலே கூறப்பட்டமையால், வேந்தனுக்கு விலக்கப்பட்ட பொருள் வயிற்பிரிவு குறுநிலமன்னர்க்குக் கடிவரையின்று என்பதை ஆசிரியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தால் விளங்கவைத்தார்.

“அரிதாய அறனெய்தி அருளியோர்க் களித்தலும்
பெரிதாய பகைவென்று பேணுரைத்தெறுதலும்
புரிவமர் காதலிற் புணர்ச்சியுந்தருமெனப்
பிரிவெண்ணிப் பொருள்வயிற் சென்றநங்காதலர்.” (கலி-11)

என்னும் பாலைக்கலியடிகள் இச்சூத்திரக்கருத்தை வற்புறுத்துவதற்கு.

மேல் ‘பெயரும் வினையும்’ என்னும் 20-ஆம் சூத்திரமுதல் இதுவரையுள்ள சூத்திரங்களால், தொல்காப்பியர் தமிழகத்தில் அகத்திணைக்குரியாரை வகைப்படுத்திக் கூறினார். நாளிலமக்களும் எல்லாத் திணைக்கு முரியரென்பதை ‘ஆயர் வேட்டு

வர்' 'எனோர் பாங்கினும்' என்னும் 21, 22-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் விளக்கினார். அவரைப்போலவே, அடியோர், வினைவலர், ஏவலர், ஏவலரனையவர் ஆகிய கீழோரும் அகத்திணைகளுக்குரிமை கொள்வரென்பது 'அடியோர் பாங்கினும்,' 'ஏவன் மரபின்' என்னும் 23, 24-ஆம் சூத்திரங்களில் 'விளக்கப்பட்டது. பிறகு அகத்திணையைந்தனுள் சிறந்த பாலைத்திணையின் நிமித்தவகைகளும், அவ்வநிமித்தம் பற்றிய பிரிவுகளுக்குரியார் வகைகளும், 'ஒதல் பகையே' என்னும் 25-ஆம் சூத்திரமுதல் 'பொருள் வயிற் பிரிதலும்' என்னு மிச்சூத்திரம் வரை விளக்கப்பட்டன. அவற்றுள் 25, 26, 29-ஆம் சூத்திரங்கள், நானிலமக்களைப் பற்றியும், 27, 28, 30-ஆம் சூத்திரங்கள் வேந்தனையும் வேந்தனோடு பொருந்திய ஏனோரையும் பற்றியும், 31, 32-ஆம் சூத்திரங்கள் வேந்தர் குடியில் வாரா எந்தல்களான குறுநிலமன்னரைப்பற்றியும் கூறுகின்றன. இதனால் தொல்காப்பியக்காலத் தமிழகத்தில், அகத்திணையொழுக்கம் மேற்கொண்டவர் அடியோர் முதலிய கீழோரும், நானிலமக்களும், மூவேந்தரும், வேந்தரைச்சார்ந்து சிறந்த ஏனோரும், வேந்தர் குடிவாரா நாடாட்சிகொண்ட குறுநிலமன்னருமா யடங்குவரென்பது தேற்றம். தமிழ் நாட்டில் முடிவேந்தர் மூவரே யாவரென்பது "வண்புகழ் மூவர்தண்பொழில் வரைப்பின்" என்னும் தொல்காப்பியச் செய்யுளியற் சூத்திரத்தானும், "போந்தை, வேம்பே, ஆரெனவருஉ மாபெருந்தானையர் மலைத்தபூவும்" என்னும் புறத்திணையியற் சூத்திரத்தானும் பண்டைப்பாட்டுக்களானும், விளக்கமாகும்,

33. முந்நீர் வழக்கம் மகடுஉவோ டில்லை

இது, பெண்டிரோடு கடல்கடத்தல் தமிழ் மரபன்று என்று கூறுகின்றது,

(இ-ள்.) மகடுஉ வோடுமுந்நீர் வழக்கம் இல்லை = பெண்ணோடு கடலேறிச் செல்லுதல் மரபன்று.

வழக்கம் என்பது செல்லுதற்பொருட்டாதல் "ஆள்வழக்கற்ற சுரத்திடை" (அகம்51) என்ற பெருந்தேவனார் அகப்பாட்டடியாலும், "யாவரும் வழங்குநரின்மையின்" என்னும் மாமூலர் அகப்பாட்டடியானும், "மான்றமலை வழங்குநர்ச்செகீஇய, புலிபார்த்துறையும் புல்லதர்ச்சிறுநெறி" என்னும் பூதனார் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டடியானும், 'வளிவழங்கும்' என்னும் குறளடியானு மறிக்க.

இனி 'முந்நீர்' என்பது கடலுக்கு இயற்பெயராதல் வெளிப்படையாகவும், அச்செம்பொருளை விட்டு மூன்று நீர்மையாற்செல்லுஞ்செலவு என்று பொருள் கூறும் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உரை எவ்வகையானும் பொருந்துவதன்று. அவர் கூறுமாறு ஒதல் தூது, பொருள் காரணமாக மட்டும் தலைவன் தலைவியை உடன் கொண்டு செல்லுதல் கடியப்படுமெனின், மற்றும் பகைகாவல் முதலியவற்றில் தலைவியோடு கூடச் சேறல் உண்டு எனக்கொள்ளல் வேண்டும். ஒதல் தூது பொருள்பற்றித் தலைவியை உடன் கொண்டு செல்லுதலினும், பகை, பிறநாட்டுக்காவல் பற்றிய செலவுகளில் அவளைக்கொண்டு செல்லுதலால் வரும் ஏதம் பெரிதாகலானும், அவ்வாறு பகை காவல்பற்றித் தலைவியோடு செல்லும் வழக்குண்மை சான்றோர் செய்யுட்களில் யாண்டும் கூறப்படாமையானும், அவ்வுரை ஆசிரியர் கருத்தன்மை தேற்றமாகும்.

இனி, ஒதல் பகை தூது பொருள் காவல் அனைத்தும் பிரிவுநிமித்தங்களே யாதலானும், பிரிவு தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் பிரிதலையே குறிக்குமாதலானும், இப்பிரிவு

நிமித்த மைந்தனுள் எதுபற்றியுந் தலைமகன் தலைவியுடன் செல்லுமாறில்லையென்
பது தேற்றம். அதனாலும் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் கூறும்பொருள் ஆசிரியர் கருத்தா
காமை பெறப்படும்.

பின் இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுவது யாதெனின், அன்பினைந்நினைகளு ளெதனினு
மடங்காதனவும் அகவொழுக்கத்திற் சூரிப்பொருளா யமைவனவுமான களவில்
உடன்போக்கும், கற்பில் ஏற்புழி மனைவியுடன் சேறலும் தமிழ் மரபென்பதும்
அவ்வாறு செல்லுங்கால் பெண்டிரோடு கடல் கடத்தல் மரபன்றென்பது மேயாம்.
இவற்றுள் முன்னது 'கொண்டுதலைக்கழியினும்' என்னும் இவ்வியல் 15-ஆம் சூத்
திரத்தானும், பின்னது 'மரபு நிலைதிரியா' என்னும் இவ்வியல் 45-ஆம் சூத்திரத்
தானும் அமையும்.

(i) களவில் கொண்டுதலைக்கழிதலுக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“அழிவில முயலு மார்வ மாக்கள்
வழிபடு தெய்வங் கட்கண் டாஅங்
கலமரல் வருத்தந்தீரயாழ

நிழல்காண் டோறும் நெடிய வைகி
மணல்காண் டோறும் வண்டல் தைஇ
வருந்தா தேகுமதி, வாலெயிற்றேயே
மாநனைகொழுதி மகிழ்குயிலாலும்
நறுந்தண் பொழில் கானம்
குறும்பல் லூரயாஞ் செல்லு மாநே”

பாலைபாடியபெருங்கடுங்கோ (நற்றிணை 9)

(ii) கற்பில் தன்னை உடன்கொண்டு செல்லக் கொழுநனைமனைவி வேண்டற்குச்
செய்யுள்.

“தண்ணீர் பெறாஅத்தடுமாற் றருந்துயரம்
கண்ணீர்நனைக்குங் கடுமைய காடென்றால்
என்னீரறியாதீர் போலனிலைகூறி
னின்னீரவல்ல நெடுந்தகாய் எம்மையும்
அன்பறச் சூழாதே ஆற்றிடை தும்மொடு
துன்பத் துணையாக நாடினதுவல்ல
தின்பமு முண்டோ வெமக்கு”

(பாலைக்கவி 6)

SIDDHITRAYA

By ·

YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

Edited with English Translation and Notes

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अपि च अतोतयानागततया च तावप्यद्यापि विद्येते इति, तेन रूपेण बोधसन्नि-
कर्षे का अनुपपत्तिः ? किञ्च यथा दवीयसि देशे सता ध्रुवशिंशुमारादिना दृक् सन्निकृष्यते,
तथा दवीयसि काले सता कल्पाद्यन्तवर्तिना स्वयम्भवादिनेति नालोकं किञ्चित् । किञ्च—

नातीतानागते बुद्धेर्दूरे भवितुमर्हतः ।

बुद्ध्या प्रकाशमानत्वाद्बुद्धिबोद्धस्वरूपवत् ॥

fested, or their possession of qualities like number—may apply here also.¹⁸⁸

Moreover, since such objects may even be said to exist at this very moment as 'things that have perished' and 'things that are yet to be,' what is the difficulty in stating that consciousness comes into contact with them in the light of their having such a type of existence.¹⁸⁹ Just as the eye comes into contact with the Dhruva and Śimśumāra¹⁹⁰ maṇḍalas existing in vastly remote regions, even so, in regard to entities existing at vastly remote periods of time, consciousness comes into contact with qualities, such as Svayambhu existing at the beginning and end of the kalpa (world epoch). Hence, there is nothing that could run counter to everyday experience.¹⁹¹

Further, for the reason that they are manifested by consciousness, things past and future, like knowledge and the knower, cannot be considered to be beyond the reach of knowledge.

188. The illustration (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of number may be elaborated thus:—When one says 'There were four mangoes; three of them have been lost,' the No. 3 is associated with non-existent objects.

189. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas, according to whom *vyakti* and *jāti* are different and non-different (*bhedābheda*), maintain that objects, past and future, exist even now in the form of *jāti* and that they may well be said to possess *prākāṭya*. Similarly, it may be said that such objects have an existence of some sort. Once that is admitted, it is easy to show that consciousness may come into contact with them. See *Nyāyasiddhāntajñāna*, Buddhīpariccheda, p. 287. Compare: 'atītānāgatam svarūpatosti adhvabhedāt dharmāṇām.' *Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 12 and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary thereon and also the Vyāsa Bhāṣya.

190. The Hindu tradition has it that the Lord Nārāyaṇa, in the form of the celestial body, Śimśumāra (also called Śiśumāra), controls all the heavenly bodies, and that he acts as their support from his abode in the heart of Śimśumāra, and that many of the devas dwell in the several organs of Śimśumāra, (e.g. Agni, Mahendra, Kāśyapa and Dhruva shine forth, without ever setting, from the tail region of Śiśumāra), and that whoever sees this celestial body gets rid of his demerits (*pāpa*). See the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, Aṃśa II, ch. 9 and 12 and the *Bhāgavata purāṇa* V Skanda.

191. In all probability, the proper reading is *nālikam* rather than *nālokaṃ*. On either reading, the meaning is substantially the same.

एवञ्च चैतन्यस्य निरतिशयवेगितया अन्तराळदेशकालाग्रहणाभिमानोऽलातचक्र-
गतक्रमवद्देशभेदसंयोगविभागग्रहणाभिमानवत् ।

अपि च इन्द्रियलिङ्गसंस्कारादेर्यदर्थप्रतिनियतं रूपं, तेनैवोपश्लिष्य निस्सरच्चैतन्य-
मपि तद्गोचरेणैव सन्निकृष्यते; यथा गवादिपदशक्तिरेकबुद्धिसिद्धेऽपि सामान्यविशेषात्म-
के वस्तुनि सामान्यांशेनैव संबध्यते, यथा वा विधिः प्राप्तांशपरिहारेणाऽप्राप्तांशमेव भावनायाः
स्पृशति । अत इन्द्रियादिद्वारेण चैतन्यमपि तदर्थभिमुखं निर्गच्छतीति न्याय्यम् ।
यथाह भगवान् ‘तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि’ इति । मनुश्च—

Moreover, (against the possible objection that if consciousness can get into contact with objects far removed from us by vast stretches of space and time, it must be in contact with those of intervening space and time, it may be replied that) as consciousness moves with extreme rapidity, the false impression arises that there is no awareness of (objects existing in) the intervening space and time; just as the false belief arises, namely, that there is no apprehension of the contact (of the point of light) with different points in space or its separation therefrom—a contact and separation which proceeds in a definite sequence and which resides in the circle traced by the fire-brand (*alātacakra*).

Besides, consciousness, proceeding outward having come into association with that form of the different senses, reasons (*hetu*) and impressions (*samskāras*) which is invariably related to their respective objects, gets into contact with those objects only which are respectively related to these (i.e., the senses, etc.) ; just as the significatory potency of words, such as the cow is related only to the universal aspect (of things), even though on hearing a word, like the cow, an object constituted of universal and particular features presents itself in a single cognition; or just as the vedic injunction deals only with that aspect of the *bhāvanā* which is unknown, having neglected the part already known.^{191a} Therefore, here it is legitimate to maintain that consciousness proceeds through the senses towards their respective objects. To this effect the Adorable Kṛṣṇa says, “It (the *manas*) forcibly drags consciousness along, even as the wind drives the boat on water.”¹⁹² And Manu says, “From

191a. For example, the injunction, ‘*dadhnā juhoti*’, aims at specifying the kind of oblation to be offered at the Agnihotra, rather than at emphasising the need for performing that homa, the necessity for the latter having been already learnt from the other *vidhi*, ‘*agnihotram juhoti*’.

192. *Bh. Gītā*. II 67.

‘इन्द्रियाणां हि सर्वेषां यथेकं क्षरतीन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य क्षरति प्रज्ञा दृतेः पादादिवोदकम्’ ॥ इति ।

यत्तु गुणश्चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यातीति ; तदयुक्तम् ; प्रहाणानभ्यु-
पगमात् । अप्रहायैवात्मानमितस्ततश्चेतना इन्द्रियादिद्वारा निश्चरति । विच्छिन्नायाश्च
तस्याः संधानाभावश्शास्त्र एवोक्तः ।

दृश्यन्ते च गुणा अपि शब्दगन्धसूर्यालोकरत्नप्रभादयो गतिमन्तो धर्म्यतिवर्ति-
नश्च । अतिसूक्ष्मो दूरगमनधर्मा भौतिको हि शब्दः ।

ननु नभ इव विभुश्शब्दः व्यञ्जकध्वनिवशेन प्रादेशिक इव गत्वर इव चोप-
लभ्यते । तथाहि—शब्दः सर्वव्यापी, एकद्रव्यवर्तित्वे सत्याकाशगुणत्वात्, तत्परिमाण-
वत् । मैवम् ; अतद्गुणत्वात् । वायवीयश्शब्दः, तेन नियतसहोत्पत्तिकत्वात्, तदीयस्पर्शवत्

among the several senses even if one sense organ were to proceed out-
ward, thereupon the person's knowledge also would move outward,
even as water would flow from the hole found in the leather-bag.”¹⁹³

The objection raised—namely, how can consciousness, which is a
quality, proceed elsewhere, leaving its substrate ?—is hardly reasonable ;
for it has not been maintained that it leaves its substrate. Conscious-
ness proceeds hither and thither by way of the senses without ever
leaving the self. That its reunion (with the self) would become impossi-
ble, were it to lose contact therewith has been set forth in the (*Nyāya-
tattva*) Śāstra.

(It could even be shown that qualities may leave their substrate
and proceed elsewhere ; for) qualities, such as, sound, odour, the rays of
the sun and the lustre of the gem are found to be endowed with move-
ment and to leave their substrate. Indeed, sound (*śabda*) is exceedingly
subtle and elemental, and has the quality of proceeding to long distances.

A possible objection is the following—*śabda* (sound) is all-perva-
sive, like ether ; but, with the aid of *dhvani* (vibration) which helps to
reveal it, it appears as if it dwells in a particular place, and as if it moves
about. And it may be put in syllogistic form thus—*śabda* is all-perva-
sive ; for, like the magnitude of ether, sound, while residing in one sub-
stance, is the quality of ether. (We reply) ‘not so’ ; because *śabda* is
not a quality of ether. It really belongs to the air in motion (*vāyu*) ;
for, like touch (*sparsa*) which pertains to the air in motion (*vāyu*),
śabda invariably originates along with *vāyu*. Any quality which

यश्च येन द्रव्येण नियतसहोत्पत्तिर्गुणः, स तद्गुण एव; यथा तथाविधा रूपादयः । नियत-सहोत्पत्तिश्च वायुना शब्दः ; उभयोरपि भेरीदण्डवंशदळनादिसंयोगविभागजत्वनियमात् ।

उत्पद्यते च शब्दः, इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे सति गुणत्वात्, गन्धादिवत् । कृतकश्च; क्रियो-त्तरमेवोपलभ्यत्वात्, संयोगादिवत् । न चाभिव्यञ्जकत्वं प्रयत्नादेः कल्प्यम् ; गौरवात् । तत्प्र-तीतिकारणत्वकल्पनादपि तत्कारणत्वकल्पनैव हि लघ्वी । अभिव्यञ्जकाश्च एकदेशाव-स्थितान् एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यान् युगपदभिव्यञ्जन्ति; यथा प्रदीपो रूपसंख्यापरिमाणानि कर-कादींश्चैकप्रदेशवर्तिनः । न चैवं तात्वादिसंयोगविभागजनितपवन इति नासौ व्यञ्जकः ।

नित्यत्ववादिनश्शब्दा निर्भागव्योमवर्तिनः ।

श्रावणाश्चेत्यभिव्यक्तिनियमे नास्ति कारणम् ॥

invariably originates along with a given substance must necessarily be considered to be a quality of that substance alone ; even as colour and the like, which invariably originate along with a substance are treated as its qualities. And sound invariably originates along with *vāyu* ; in as much as both invariably originate together from the contact of the drum-stick with the drum or from the separation of the parts of the bamboo caused by its splitting.

Besides, *śabda* does originate, for, like smell, it is grasped by the senses and is also a quality. Moreover, it is created by human activity ; for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like are merely aids to the manifestation of sound ; for that would go against the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simultaneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a single sense organ ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing at an identical place, namely, the number, size, etc., and vessels, like the water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the palate and the like is not of such a nature, it cannot be a factor for manifesting sound.

He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason for certain sounds being manifested while other sounds are not ; because sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It has

देशैक्ये ग्राहकैक्ये च व्यञ्जकैक्यं हि दर्शितम् ।

तदभावात्प्रयत्नोत्थमारुतः कारणं ध्वनेः ॥

अत एव च नानात्वं प्रत्युच्चारणमिष्यताम् ।

कृतस्य करणायोगाद्धेतुषौष्कल्यभेदतः ॥

किंचोदात्तानुदात्तत्वदीर्घत्वह्रस्वतादयः ।

गादिस्था युगपद्भान्तोऽनभिन्नुः स्वाश्रयान् कथम् ॥

स्थानैक्यायातसादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञापि नैक्यतः ।

प्रदीपप्रत्यभिज्ञेव ज्ञापिता भेदहेतवः ॥

नन्वेवं चैतन्यसंयोगः संयोगजो वा कश्चित्प्रकाशः प्राप्तः ; उभयमपि तत्र चैतन्यं संभवति ; भेदापेक्षत्वात्संबन्धस्य । आत्मनोऽपि न चैतन्येन संयोगः, तद्धर्मित्वात् । न हि

already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the manifestor also must be unitary. Since, in the present case the manifestor is not unitary, the *vāyu* originating from human effort must be the cause (and not the manifestor) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simultaneously in sounds (*varṇa*), such as *ga*—qualities, such as that of possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of being long and short—fail to differentiate their substrates ? (It cannot be urged that the recognition, namely, 'This is the self-same sound which was met with before' points to the identity of the sound and also to its eternity ; for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising from the source being identical and not on the identity of the sounds themselves ; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced.

The following objection may now be raised :—(The upshot of the discussion is) *prakāśa* is either the conjunction of consciousness (with the object) or some peculiar property resulting from this (conjunction). But in regard to the manifestation of consciousness neither of these alternatives holds ; for relation always pre-supposes difference (in the relata. Therefore, consciousness cannot enter into relation with consciousness). This conjunction with consciousness cannot occur to the soul either ; for the latter is the substrate of the quality, namely, conscious-

धर्मधर्मिणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । समवायो हि सः ; अयुतसिद्धसंबन्धत्वात् । संयोगस्तु पृथक् सिद्धयोर्द्रव्ययोः क्रियानिमित्ता प्राप्तिः ; अकार्यकारणयोर्वा तयोः निरन्तरस्थितिः ।

चैतन्यसंयोगसमवाययोरन्यतरस्य संबन्धमात्रस्य वा प्रकाशत्वे ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयशरीरेन्द्रियेष्वव्याप्यतिव्याप्ती यथायोगमादर्शयितव्ये ।

तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमस्त्वनुपलब्धिबाधितो न दूषणान्तरं प्रयोजयति । अतो यद्व्यवहारोदयानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत्प्रकाशत इत्येवाभ्युपगमो युक्तः । त्रितयव्यवहारानुगुण्यं संविदस्तु स्वभाव इत्यपर्यनुयोज्यं निमित्तवैरूप्यम् । न हि स्वभावाः पर्यनुयोगमर्हन्ति ।

ness. In fact, the relation between the attribute and its substrate is not the relation of *samyoga* (conjunction) ; but really, it is *samavāya* (inherence); for it is of the nature of the relation existing between inseparable entities. *Samyoga* (conjunction), on the contrary, is either the coming into relation of two objects well-known to be disparate—a relation dependent upon activity, or the closely contiguous existence of the aforesaid objects, which do not stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect.

(In order to obviate this difficulty), if *prakāśa* is taken either as one of these relations, namely, conjunction or inherence of consciousness with objects or any one of the other possible relations of consciousness to objects, then the defects of (such a definition) being too narrow (*avyāpti*) or too broad (*ativyāpti*) may be cited, according to the circumstances of each case, in respect of the knower, knowledge, the known, the body and the senses.

The admission of *prakāśa* as a separate entity, having been effectively discredited by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), does not call forth any other adverse comment. Therefore, it is but proper to admit the following—that entity concerning which there arises knowledge capable of initiating a thought and discussion of it may be spoken of as being manifested.

As the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all these three (i.e., knowledge, the knower and the known) is an essential feature of consciousness, the diversity in the manner in which the cause (i.e., consciousness) operates (in these three cases) cannot be raised as an objection. It cannot be asked why such and such a nature belongs to such and such an object.

एवं चेत्संयोगसमवायविरहिणोऽपि पदार्थस्य निमित्तभेदानुसारेण व्यवहारहेतुः संविदिति युक्तमाश्रयितुम् । उच्यते—उक्तमत्र न निमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यं स्वकार्यमारभत इति ।

व्यवहारानुगुणसंवेदनत्वेऽपि प्रकाशपदार्थे, प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदो दुष्परिहर एव । बहुव्रीहिसमासाश्रयणे संविदन्तराभावेन तस्यां तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । कर्मधारयाश्रयणे ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेययोरसंवेदनत्वेनाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गः । व्यवहारोदयानुगुण्यं च व्यवहारतोऽवगन्तव्यम्, ततः प्रागेव च भवति विदितत्वप्रतीतिव्याहारश्च ।

If so (i.e., if the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all the three is an essential quality of knowledge, the difficulty raised on p. 128, namely, How can knowledge which is inherent in the soul generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion?) may be sought to be overcome by the suggestion that knowledge may, with the aid of various operating causes (such as the senses), be responsible for *vyavahāra* concerning the object, even though the latter be devoid of any relation (to consciousness), whether it be conjunction (*samyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*). (To this it is replied) it has already been shown (vide p. 128) that an entity does not enter on its own activities by depending on its efficient cause.

If the term *prakāśa* were to signify knowledge conducive to thought and discussion (*vyavahārānugūṇa samvedana*), then, the diversity in the significance (*pravṛttinimittabheda*) suggested by this term cannot be got over. If the expression *vyavahārānugūṇa samvedana* is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound (i.e., if it denotes 'that which possesses knowledge conducive to *vyavahāra*'), *prakāśa* would have to be denied to consciousness; for there is no knowledge (which this knowledge may be said to possess). If the expression is taken as a *karmadhāraya* compound (i.e., if it denotes 'the character of being knowledge conducive to *vyavahāra*'), *prakāśa* would have to be denied to the knower and the known; for they do not possess the character of being knowledge. And the character of being conducive to the starting of an action is to be ascertained from the action itself; but, prior to an action there is the knowledge (*prakāśa*) that the object concerning which there is activity) is already cognised and that there is discussion concerning the same.

यद्येवं कस्तर्हि प्रकाशतेपदार्थः ? न हि निरवद्यमेकरूपं ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानानुगतं तमुपलभामहे । उच्यते—नूनं भवानश्रुतपूर्वी प्रथमाधिकरणस्य न्यायतत्त्वे । अभिहितं हि तत्रेदं अनुभवे स्मृतिमुपपादयद्विरनुभवादूर्त्वं स्मृतिनिमित्तमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति—संविददूर्त्वं प्रकाश इति ।

आह—किमिदमदूर इति दूरादन्यस्तद्विरुद्धस्तदभावो वा ? तथा विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा ? अदूर इति विशेषणत्वे पक्षत्रयेऽपि नियमेन । संवेदनदूर्त्त्वानुसन्धानपूर्विकया प्रकाश इति प्रतीत्या भवितव्यम् । न च तथाऽस्ति । उपलक्षणत्वे रूपान्तरं वाच्यम् । न च तदवगम्यत इति । उच्यते—अलमस्थाने संभ्रमेण ।

If so, what is the significance of the term *prakāśate* (shines forth) ? Indeed, we do not know of a *prakāśa* which exists in common in the knower, the known and knowledge, and which has the same form in all these three, and about which no objection could be raised. (To this) it is replied.—evidently, you are not acquainted with the *Prathamādhikaraṇa* of *Nyāyatattva*. While pointing out therein that remembrance arises only in the event of there being experience, it has been clearly stated by the author (Nāthamuni) that *prakāśa* means not being remote (*adūratvam* i.e., nearness) from experience, a nearness which is the cause of *smṛti* (remembrance).¹⁹⁴ It amounts to this, namely, that *prakāśa* means not being remote (*adūra*) from experience.

(The objector may ask :) What is meant by *adūra* ? Does it mean 'different from' or 'opposed to' or 'the absence of' that which is remote ? Again, is *adūratva* (not being remote) a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or an *upalakṣaṇa*.¹⁹⁵ If it is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) in each of the three alternatives alike, the consciousness of *prakāśa* will invariably be preceded by the awareness of not being remote from experience. But, as a matter of fact, it is not so. If it is an *upalakṣaṇa*, what other nature *prakāśa* possesses besides this *upalakṣaṇa* must be pointed out. But it has been said that this nature is not apprehended. (To this) it is replied, 'Enough of this misplaced excitement'.

194. The qualification 'the causes of *smṛti*' is purposely included in this definition of *prakāśa*. Otherwise, all objects which are presented to experience would have to possess *prakāśa*. In actual fact, that is not the case. Though several objects are within the focus of attention, all of them cannot be said to be manifested ; for, clearly, we are not interested in them all. Hence, only those objects which fall within the range of experience leading to remembrance, that can be said to possess *prakāśa*. Compare 'pathi gacchatah kāṣṭhaloṣṭādijñānotpattiyā kāṣṭhaloṣṭādiṣu satopi-anubhavādūratvasya prakāśapadārthatvābhāvāt smṛtinimittamityuktam'.

195. *Upalakṣaṇa* is a characteristic which reveals certain aspects of a thing already known to possess other aspects.

भवत्वनुभवादूरं दूरादन्यद्विरोधि वा ।

तद्भावश्च प्रकाशत्वं किमत्र बहु जरूप्यते ॥

प्रकाशत इति प्रतिभासोऽपि बुद्धिविप्रकर्षप्रत्यनीकबोधतत्संसृष्टपदार्थस्वरूप-विमर्श एव, बाह्यप्रकाशवत् । तत्रापि ह्यालोके तद्व्याप्तभूभागादौ च प्रकटादिप्रख्योपाख्ये आलोकादूरत्वनिमित्ते । यथा च तत्र तन्निमित्ता सन्तमसनिवृत्तिः, एवमिहापि ज्ञानादूरत्व-निमित्ता अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । अत एव चानुभूते अनुभवे चोत्तरकालं तुल्यवत्स्मरणम् । एवं च चैतन्यसंबन्धविशेषविषयविकल्पोऽप्यलब्धावकाश इति निरनुयोज्यानुयोग एव ।

नैरन्तर्यपदपर्यायमत्यन्तसामीप्यमात्रं च संयोगः । स एव परतन्त्राश्रितः समवाय-

Let *anubhavādūra* mean either 'different from that which is remote from experience' or 'opposed to that which is remote from experience'. And to be manifest is to be different from that which is remote from experience or to be opposed to that which is remote from experience.¹⁹⁶ Why has all this prattle been indulged in ?

Like external illumination, even the cognition 'It is manifested' is no other than the awareness of the nature of knowledge and of the object connected thereto—a nature opposed to that of being remote from consciousness. There also the thought and reference 'It shines', arising in respect of the rays of light and the regions of space wherein they pervade, are based on the quality of not being remote from light. Just as, in the one case, the dispelling of darkness is due to the quality of not being remote from light, here also the dispelling of ignorance is due to the quality of not being remote from consciousness. That is why at a subsequent time recollection of the object known as also of the knowledge itself arises. There being no room for the question as to the precise nature of the relation of consciousness (i.e., whether it is *samavāya* or *samyoga*), it follows that the question raised is one that ought not to have been asked at all.

Besides, *samyoga* is merely close contiguity, which in its turn, is synonymous with *nairantarya* (not being separated by intervening space). And it is only this *samyoga*, which obtains between inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) objects of which one is self-dependent and the other dependent,

196. This verse is quoted in *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. In his *tīkā* on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Rangarāmānuja interprets *prakāśatvam* as *prakāśamānatvam*. Our translation, is based on this interpretation. He also suggests the emendation 'prakāśotra'.

It must be understood that the definition of *prakāśa* set forth in this stanza applies only to the *prakāśa* residing in objects perceived by the senses, and not to that found in objects inferred or to that residing in knowledge itself.

पदपरिभाषाभूमिर्वैशेषिकाणामिति नार्थान्तरत्वमूरीकृत्य विकल्पस्सम्भवति । यथा च संयोगान्तर्भावः समवायस्य तथा संबन्धविमर्शे दर्शयिष्यामः ।

ज्ञानादूरत्वप्रयुक्तो व्यवहारक्षमतालक्षणो वा परः(?) प्रकाशः । स च सत्यपि स्वनिमित्तपौष्कल्ये प्रतिबन्धाद्योग्यताविरहाद्वा व्यापित्वासङ्गित्वाद्यात्मधर्मान्तरेषु देहेन्द्रियादौ च न सञ्जायते, चक्षुस्सन्निकृष्ट इव काळिन्दीपर्यास रूपरसादयः ।

अतो यथोक्तनीत्यात्मा स्वतश्चैतन्यविग्रहः ।

भानस्वभाव एवान्यत्करणैः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

यत्तु सुखादिनिदर्शनेनात्मविशेषगुणतया चित्तेरागन्तुकत्वमापादितम्, तदपि गुणवृत्तापरिज्ञानेन । यतः—

that is referred to by the technical term *samavāya* in the system of the Vaiśeṣikas ; hence, the question whether the relation of consciousness with objects is *saṃyoga* or *samavāya*, proceeding as it does on the assumption that *samavāya* is a separate entity, does not arise. In the section, dealing with relation (*sambandavimarśa*),¹⁹⁷ we will presently show how inherence (*samavāya*) could be brought under conjunction (*saṃyoga*).

Or, *prakāśa* may be understood in a different sense as denoting the capacity to initiate thought and discussion—a capacity dependent upon the quality of not being remote from consciousness. Even when its causal conditions are present in their entirety, either on account of the presence of obstructing factors, or on account of the absence of the capacity for being manifested, *prakāśa* does not arise in the other qualities of the soul (besides its consciousness), such as being all-pervasive and being unattached, and in the body, senses and the like ; just as the colour, taste and the like of the water of the Jamna, which is in contact with the eye, are not manifested. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, the self has consciousness for its structure and consciousness for its nature. The self cognises the rest with the aid of the senses.

Even the charge levelled against us, namely, that consciousness, being a special quality of the soul, must, on the analogy of pleasure (*sukha*) and the like, be an occasional quality proceeds from complete ignorance of the true nature of qualities. For the qualities which are

197. The section dealing with the relation of the finite soul to the Infinite Self is included in the portions of *Ātmasiddhi* lost. Already, on an earlier occasion reference has been made to this section. Vide p. 55.

स्वरूपोपाधयो धर्मा यावदाश्रयभाविनः ।

नैवं सुखादिबोधस्तु स्वरूपोपाधिरात्मनः ॥

यथा च बोधोपाधिरात्मभावस्तथोपपादितम् । सुखदुःखे चानात्मधर्मौ ; इन्द्रिय-सौष्ठवनाशयोरेव तद्भावोपपादनात् । व्याकरिष्यते चैतदन्तिमपदार्थसमर्थनावसर इति साधनविकलता च निदर्शनस्य ।

रागद्वेषादयोऽपि मनोवस्थाविशेषा न साक्षादात्मगुणाः । विज्ञायते हि 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धा अश्रद्धा धृतिरघृतिर्हीर्षाभीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' इति गीयते च—

dependent upon the very being of anything will last as long as their substrate lasts ; but the knowledge of pleasure and pain is not dependent in this manner upon the very being of the self. It has already been shown how consciousness is responsible for the self being what it is.¹⁹⁸ Pleasure and pain, on the contrary, are not the qualities of the self ;¹⁹⁹ for they then have been shown to be no other than the flourishing or decaying state of the senses (vide p. 89). This point will be further elaborated when establishing that the soul is in its essential nature blissful, a fact signified in) the last word²⁰⁰ (i.e., *svatassukī*, occurring in the stanza commencing with 'dehendriyamana prāṇa). Hence, the defect of not possessing the *sādhana* (means of inference) vitiates the illustrative example.

Desire and aversion also ²⁰¹ are the different states of manas and are not the direct qualities of the self. Indeed, it is learnt from the scripture : " Desire, will, doubt, faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, contempt, conjecture (*dhiḥ*), fear—all this is truly manas ".²⁰² This fact has also been stated in the *Gītā* in the verse commencing with the words,

198. This text has been quoted by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*. Rangarāmānuja interprets it thus—jñānamātmatve upādhiḥ prayojakamityarthaḥ. Tatasca yāvatprayojyam prayojakāvasthānāvaśyambhāvāt bodhasya svābhāvikatvādi siddhyati iti bhāvah". See *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, Buddhhipariccheda p. 238.

199. Surely, this is not his final view on the matter ; for in a subsequent passage he declares that certainty, doubt, pleasure and pain are forms of knowledge, and consequently, qualities of the self. Here, either he defends a view other than his own or shows off his competency to prove any position (*vaibhāvavāda*). See note 144 on p. 90.

200. See note 143 on p. 90.

201. When pleasure and pain are shown to be defective as illustrative examples, one may cite desire and aversion instead. Here it is shown that the latter fare no better, for they too are equally liable to be charged with the defect of not possessing the *sādhana*.

202. *Bṛh. up.* I v. 3 and *Maitri up.* VI 30.

‘इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखं सङ्घातश्चेतनाधृतिः’ इति । चेतनाधृतिरिति क्षेत्रलक्षणमैकपदेन । चेतनया ध्रियमाणः संघातो हि देहः । स्ववृत्त्यनुगुणचैतन्यमात्रादेव प्रवर्तमानं क्षेत्रमिति यावत् । अत एव हि—अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे ‘यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यस्यापः शरीरं यस्यात्मा शरीरम्’ इत्यादिनिर्देशः । ‘तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः’ इति च पुराणे ।

किमिदं धीरिति ? उत्प्रेक्षाभिप्रायं तत्, न ज्ञप्तिविषयम् । तस्याः स्वाभाविकत्वस्य तस्यामेव श्रुतौ श्रूयमाणत्वात् । श्रूयते हि ‘न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते’ इति

“Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain.”²⁰³ As the expression *cetanādhṛtiḥ* (occurring in this stanza) is one word, it is the definition of *kṣetra* (body). The body is, in fact, the collection (of the primal elements) which is supported by consciousness.²⁰⁴ It amounts to stating that the body is what enters on its activities only with the aid of consciousness appropriate thereto. That is why descriptions such as the following are found in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*—“ . . . for whom the earth is body . . . for whom the water is body . . . for whom the soul is body. . . ”²⁰⁵ Such descriptions are met with in the *purāṇa* also.—“All these constitute His body”²⁰⁶

(The upaniṣadic passage quoted above reckons *dhīḥ*, which is obviously a quality of the soul, as one among the properties not belonging to the soul. Hence, the objector asks) what is meant by *dhīḥ* (in that text) ? (The reply is) it means conjecture (*utprekṣā*), and does not have knowledge for its significance. For in the same upaniṣad it has been declared that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Indeed, the scriptural texts assert.—“There is no cessation of the knowing of a knower (because of his imperishability)” ;²⁰⁷ “There can be no

203. How, it may be asked, does this verse from the *Gītā* declaring that desire and aversion constitute the *kṣetra* bear testimony to the view that they are the qualities of *manas* ? Possibly the author thinks that once this verse excludes the possibility of their being the qualities of the self, it could be shown, on the strength of the *Brhadāraṇyaka* text, ‘etat sarvam mana eva’, that they belong to *manas*.

204. Analysing the expression *cetanādhṛtiḥ* into *cetanayā dhṛtiḥ*, Yāmunaçārya arrives at the meaning ‘a collection supported by consciousness.’ But in the *Gītā Bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja splits it into *cetanasya ādhṛtiḥ* and interprets it to mean ‘a collocation which has sprung up as the seat of the soul (who enjoys pleasure and pain, and who seeks worldly experience or liberation therefrom)’. On either interpretation, *cetanādhṛtiḥ* denotes only the body.

205. *Brh. up.* III, vii.

206. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I, 22, 86.

yāni mūrtānyamūrtāni yānyatrānyatra vā kvacit |
santi vai vastujātāni tāni sarvāni tadvapuḥ. ||

207. *Brh. up.* IV, iii, 30.

‘न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात्’ इति च । ज्ञातुरविनाशित्वादेव ज्ञानस्याविनाशमुपपादयन्तीयं श्रुतिर्ज्ञातुः स्वरूपप्रयुक्तं ज्ञानमिति दर्शयति ।

न च दृष्टिविशेषणतया द्रष्टुरुपादानमिति सांप्रतम् ; पुल्लिङ्गनिर्देशविरोधात् । हेतोश्च साध्यसमत्वापत्तेः । द्रष्टुः स्वरूपनिर्देशपरत्वेऽपि दृष्टिपदस्यासमाधेयमहेतुत्वम् ; स्वपक्षहानिश्च । आत्मनस्तु नित्यत्वमप्रचाल्यानेकन्यायागमसिद्धं युक्तं हेतुतया व्यपदेष्टुम् । न हि सति पदार्थे तत्स्वरूपोपाधयो न भवितुमर्हन्ति, सति कनक इव पैङ्गल्यं, प्रमेव च प्रदीपे । तेनायमर्थः—आत्मस्वभावभूतायाश्चित्तेर्बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयवि-

cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability.”²⁰⁸ This scriptural text, which establishes that there can be no destruction of knowledge for the very reason that the knower is imperishable, indicates that knowledge is dependent upon the very being of the knower.

It is not right to contend that (in the text in question) the seer (*draṣṭā*) is taken as a qualification of seeing (*dr̥ṣṭi*), i.e., it is not right to interpret the text thus—‘There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer’); because, in that event, there would be impropriety in the use of the masculine gender, and because the *hetu* would come to be identical with the *sādhya* (i.e., there would be no *hetu* worth the name).²⁰⁹

Even if the term *dr̥ṣṭi* aims at revealing the very essence of the soul, the charge of there being no *hetu* is unanswerable.²¹⁰ Moreover, it would amount to the abandoning of your position. It is but right to adduce as *hetu* the proposition that the soul is eternal—a proposition established by several incontrovertible arguments and supported by the *śāstras*. When an object exists, whatever depends upon the very being of that object cannot but exist; even as yellowness or light cannot but exist when gold or the lamp exists. Therefore, this is the true meaning (of the text under consideration)—at no time, whether in the state of worldly existence or that of release is there cessation of knowledge, which is an essential feature of the soul, and which, as a result of its diverse forms of relation with dif-

208. *Bṛh. up.* IV, iii, 23.

209. Two difficulties stand in the way of taking *draṣṭā* as a qualification of *dr̥ṣṭi*—(i) If *draṣṭā* were to qualify *dr̥ṣṭi*, both the words must be in the same gender; but *draṣṭā* is masculine, while *dr̥ṣṭi* is feminine. (ii) Again, on this interpretation, the text would mean—‘There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer because it does not perish.’ Clearly, it is vitiated by *petitio principii*.

210. If the term *dr̥ṣṭi*, whose gender does not vary in accordance with that of the object which it qualifies (*niyataliṅga*), is taken as an adjective qualifying *draṣṭā*, the grammatical difficulty may be got over; but the fallacy of *petitio principii* still remains.

शेषसंबन्धप्रकारप्राप्तदृष्टिप्रातिरसयतिवक्तिश्रुतिमतिस्पृष्टिविज्ञातिव्यपदेशमेदायाः स्वात्मावभा-
सिन्याः संसारापवर्गावस्थयोः न जातुचिद्विपरिलोपो विद्यत इति । तथाच श्रुतिः—

‘स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघनः’ तथा ‘स्वेन भासा स्वेन
ज्योतिषा’ ‘आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच’ इति । तथा अपवर्गदशायामेव छन्दोगाः । ‘न
पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्’ ‘सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति’ ‘नोपजनं स्मरन्’
इति । ‘स वा एष एतेन दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते’ इति च ।
अन्याश्च ‘जानात्येवायं पुरुषो ज्ञातव्यं तु न वेद’ इत्याद्याः सकलकरणोपरमदशायामप्या-
त्मनः प्रबोधमभिदधानाः श्रुतयो बोधस्वभावतामस्य द्रढयन्ति । ‘निर्वाणमय एवायमात्मा

ferent objects, external and internal, acquires different names, such as seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, reflecting, touching and conceiving, and which shines of its own accord. (The scriptures declare): “Just as a lump of salt, without any distinction of parts, whether they be not-inner or (they be) not-outer,²¹¹ is filled right through with the same taste, even so this soul, right through, without any distinction of parts, is constituted of knowledge (*prajñānaghana*); “. . . by his own luminosity, by his own light”;²¹² “O King”, said he, “this ātman is self-luminous”.²¹³ The Chandogās say that even in the state of release “The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world. Verily, the seer perceives all.”²¹⁴; “The jīva enjoys . . . not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin”²¹⁵; “He who, with the aid of manas, the celestial eye, experiences all enjoyments and feels joyous”²¹⁶ And other texts like the following—“The puruṣa does know things, but he fails to know what he ought to understand”—which declare that even in the state when all the senses are destroyed knowledge belongs to the soul, strongly affirm that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Statements like the following are found in the purāṇas also.—“The soul is constitu-

211. *Bṛh. up.* VII, v, 13. This text enumerates the parts of the lump of salt in this negative fashion for two reasons :—(1) If the positive mode of expression, viz., inner and outer parts, were used, parts in the middle region would be left out. The negative expressions secure exhaustion. (2) Again, as the soul is *niravayava* (partless), the analogy of the lump of salt would be in order only if it uses the negative expressions.

212. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 9.

213. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 6.

214. *Chānd. up.* VII, xxvi, 2.

215. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii, 3.

216. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii, 5.

ज्ञानमयोऽमलः ' इत्यादि च पुराणे । ' ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिः ' इत्यादीतिहासे ।
भगवान् ; शौनकश्च—

यथा न क्रियते ज्योत्स्ना मलप्रक्षालनान्मणेः ।

दोषप्रहाणान्न ज्ञानमात्मनः क्रियते तथा ॥

यथोदपानकरणात्क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् ।

सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतस्संभवः कुतः ॥

तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः ।

प्रकाश्यन्ते न जन्यन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते ॥

इति । अत एव हि सूत्रकारश्च ' ज्ञोऽत एव ' इति ।

तदेवमात्मस्वभावभूतस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयसंश्लेषविशेषेषु निश्चयसंशयादिव्यवहार-
भेदस्तत्तद्विशेषभाजि चैतन्ये वा । चैतन्यस्य विषयेण दृढसंयोगो हि निश्चयः । तस्यैव

ted of bliss and jñāna, and is undefiled.”²¹⁷ Passages such as the following are found in the itihāsas—“ It (the soul), is the light of all lights.” The revered Śaunaka says, “ Just as the lustre of the gem is not created by cleansing it of its impurities, even so knowledge (which is the very essence of the soul) is not created by the shedding of imperfections. Again, water or space is not created by the digging of a well. Only that which has all along existed is rendered manifest. How can the non-existent ever come into being ? Likewise, qualities, such as jñāna, are not created but only manifested by the destruction of evil qualities (*heyaguna*); for, in truth, they are the eternal qualities of the soul ”.²¹⁸ For this very reason the Sūtrakāra says, “ That is why (the individual soul is) a knower ”.²¹⁹ The usage of the different expressions, doubt (*samśaya*) and certainty (*niścaya*) and the like,²²⁰ has reference either to the different relations of objects to consciousness, which has thus been shown to be the essence of the soul, or to the consciousness that has entered into those relations.²²¹ Indeed, certainty is the close conjunction of consciousness with a single object. Loose conjunction of the same

217. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, VI, vii, 22.

218. *Viṣṇudharmottara* 104. 55-57. Compare *Vedānta-sūtra*—*sampadyāvira-
bhāvassvena śabdāt*. IV. iv. 1.

219. *Vedānta-sūtra* II. iii. 19.

220. ' And the like ' includes pleasure and pain.

221. One does not usually speak of conjunction of objects with consciousness as being either doubtful or certain. On the contrary, it is knowledge that is described as being either doubtful or certain. Hence the second alternative. See Rāṅgārāmānuja's *ṭikā* on *Nyāyasiddhāntajñāna*, p. 274.

बहुभिर्युगपददृढसंयोगः* संशयः । ज्ञानवासनानुसारेण संश्लेषः स्मरणम् , इत्यादिः । उक्तञ्च आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति ।

न चैवं संयोगस्योभयाश्रितत्वेन विषयस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसङ्गः ; विषयेण संयोगाभावात् । चैतन्येन हि तस्य संयोगः बाह्यप्रकाशवत् , यथा खल्वालोकसंबन्धेऽपि प्रकाशे सूर्यादेरेव प्रकाशकत्वं न घटादेः । अथ सूर्यादितन्त्रत्वादालोकस्य स एव तद्धर्मी, तत्संबन्धेनार्थान्तरस्य प्रकाशः इत्युच्यते, इहापि तर्हि चैतन्यस्यात्मधर्मत्वात्तेनार्थान्तरं स्पृशन् स एव जानातीत्युपपद्यते । तत्सिद्धं चैतन्यस्वभाव एवायमात्मा आत्मानं विदन्नेवास्ते ।

with several objects simultaneously constitutes doubt.²²² The conjunction following from impressions of previous knowledge (*jñānavāsanā*) constitutes recollection (*smṛti*) ; and so on with the rest. It has already been stated that what is called knowledge is the conjunction of the object with consciousness which is an attribute of the soul.

It cannot be said that since conjunction exists in both (the object and consciousness), the object also would have to be considered the knower. For conjunction with the object is not met with in the object itself. Indeed, the object is in conjunction with consciousness, as with external light. Although illumination is only relation with light, the source of light alone, such as the sun, rather than the pot and the like is considered to be the manifestor. If it be suggested that in as much as light is dependent upon the sun, the latter alone is considered the possessor of this quality (light) and that the manifestation of other objects is due to the conjunction with this quality, (we reply) if that be so, in the present case also, the description 'He knows' legitimately applies only to the self who gets into contact with objects through the aid of consciousness, in as much as the latter is his quality. From all this it has to be concluded that the soul has certainly consciousness for its essential nature, and is aware of itself at all

* *Dṛḍhasamyogaḥ samsāyaḥ* is the reading found in all manuscripts and printed books. The correct reading is *adr̥dha samyogaḥ samsāyaḥ*. See *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*, Memorial Edition, page 30.

222. When we are in doubt as to whether the distant object is a post or a person, consciousness is in conjunction with two objects—the post and the person. As two mutually contradictory presentations cannot be given simultaneously in a single cognition, some maintain that in the state of doubt there are really two cognitions ; and that these arise in such a quick succession that they appear to be almost simultaneous. On this view, the conjunction of consciousness with the object is *adr̥dha* (unsteady). Even on the view that in the state of doubt there is but a single cognition presenting two objects simultaneously, the conjunction of consciousness with the objects may be characterised as *adr̥dha*. Here *adr̥dhasamyoga* will mean 'conjunction involving mutual contradiction'. See *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*, Memorial edition, p. 30.

अन्यत्तु निमित्तभेदानुसारेण जानाति न जानाति चेति ।

तदेवं चैतन्यस्वभावः परिस्फुरन्नप्ययमात्मा गम्भीरजलाशयचरमीनवज्जल-
संसृष्टक्षीरवच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्तीति, तदुपपादनन्यायानुगताः पूर्वानुमानभेदा
वचनानि चाद्रियन्ते । तैरप्यपरितुष्यन्तो यमनियमादियोगाङ्गानुष्ठानक्षपिताशुद्ध्यावरण-
मला निरोधाभ्यासपुटपाकनिर्धूतजस्तमःकलङ्कसत्त्वोद्रेकसमुत्थस्वेतरसकलविषयवैलक्षण्या-
परोक्षज्ञानाय प्रयतन्ते । भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्ते चापरोक्षज्ञानमुदयत इति सर्ववादिनिर्वि-
वादमिति न तदुपपादनायाद्य प्रयत्यते ।

times; and that in regard to other objects (besides itself), owing to various causal conditions, it has to be said 'He knows', 'He does not know'.

Although the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and distinctly. That is why the several arguments which have been advanced by the teachers of old, and which are consistent with the reasons employed for demonstrating the true nature of the soul, and the scriptural texts are held in esteem. Not deriving any satisfaction from these, (for, after all, they could only lead to *parokṣa jñāna*), persons who have got rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of *yama* (restraint) *niyama* (discipline) and other means of *yoga*²²³ endeavour to secure immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*) of the distinctness of the self from everything other than itself—a knowledge which arises from (1) the removal of impurities, such as, *tamas* and *rajas*, by the process of purification by fire (*puṭapāka*), in other words, by the practice of mental control, and (ii) the predominance of the *sattva* quality. Since the fact that this immediate knowledge arises at the culmination of the highest stage of concentration is not called in question by any of the rival disputants, no attempt is here made to establish it. Thus, with the

223. *Yama* (restraint), *niyama* (discipline), *āsana* (posture), *prāṇāyāma* (control of breath), *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of senses from their objects), *dhāraṇā* (concentration), *dhyāna* (meditation), and *saṁādhi* (realisation), constitute the eightfold (*aṣṭāṅga*) of *yoga*. Of these, the first, namely, *yama* signifies non-injury (*ahimsā*), truth-speaking (*satya*), abstinence from stealing (*asteya*), *brahmacharya* and giving up of possessions (*aparigraha*). *Niyama* denotes the cultivation of virtues, such as, purity (*śauca*), contentment (*saṁtoṣa*), fortitude (*tapas*), study (*svādhyāya*), and devotion to God (*Īśvara-praṇidhāna*). See *Yoga-sūtra* II, 28-32.

एवमात्मा स्वतस्सिद्धयन्नागमेनानुमानतः ।

योगाभ्यासमुवा स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रकाश्यते ॥

३३. अथास्य कालावच्छेदपरीक्षा—तत्र सुगतमतानुसारिणः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनी क्षणिकता-
माचक्षाणा नित्यात्मदर्शनमेव सर्वानर्थमूलं मन्यमानाः क्षणभङ्गिनमेनं सङ्गिरन्ते ; यत्सत्त-
त्क्षणिकं सँश्चायमात्मेति । कथं पुनः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनी क्षणिकता ? अक्षणिकस्य सत्तानु-
पपत्तेः । यत्र कस्मैचित्कार्याय अन्ततः सार्वज्ञविज्ञानगोचरत्वायापि न प्रभवति, न तस्य
सद्भावः संभाव्यत इत्यर्थक्रियाकारितैव सत्ता भावानाम् । न च सा स्वव्यापकभूतक्रम-
योगपद्यविरहिण्यक्षणिके सम्भविनीत्यन्यत्र निरवकाशतया क्षणिकतयैवानुबध्यते ।

aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the
practice of yoga, the soul which is in itself self-luminous, is manifested
more clearly and explicitly.

INQUIRY INTO THE DURATION OF THE SOUL

The Buddhistic View

33. Henceforth, the inquiry into the duration of the soul may be
taken up. Maintaining that momentariness follows from the very fact of
existence, and holding (also) that the root cause of all miseries is only
the belief that the soul is eternal, the followers of the Buddhistic
doctrines assert that the soul is momentary ; and their argument is as
follows :—Whatever exists is momentary ; the soul exists ; (and, there-
fore, it is momentary). Should it be asked how momentariness follows
from the mere fact of existence, (it may be replied) ‘ because existence
cannot be attributed to what is not momentary ’. Since it is impossible
to attribute existence to what cannot lead to fruitful activity, not even
that of being the object of the comprehension of the Omniscient Being,
the existence of objects is no other than the quality of leading to fruitful
activity. And this (fruitful activity) is invariably associated only with
momentariness ; since it cannot be met with in that which is not moment-
ary ; for herein its invariable associates, namely, action all at once and
action in a successive series, are absent.

कथं पुनः क्रमयौगपद्योरर्थक्रियाव्यापकत्वम् ? कथं वा तयोरक्षणेकत्वान्निवृत्तिः श्रूयताम् ।

अर्थक्रियासु भावानां कर्तृत्वस्य द्वयी गतिः ।
क्रमेण युगपद्वेति न विधान्तरसम्भवः ॥

भावाभाववदनयोरन्यतरनिवृत्तावन्यतरव्यवस्थानादर्थक्रियाजनने भावानां न तृतीयप्रकार-संभव इति क्रमाक्रमप्रतिबद्धैवार्थक्रिया । न चाक्षणिके क्रमयौगपद्ये संभवतः ॥.....

*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*

आत्मसिद्धावितः परं ग्रन्थो नोपलभ्यते ।

How could these, viz., action all at once and action in a successive series, be regarded as being associated with fruitful activity ? How, again, could they be said to be absent from what is not momentary ? (It is replied) 'Well, listen (to what follows)'. Objects may be said to bring about fruitful activity in one of two ways, either all at once or in a succession and there is no other possibility. In the case of these two (alternatives), as in that of being and not-being, if one is absent, the other is bound to exist ; hence in the matter of objects generating fruitful activity, there could be no third possibility ; therefore, fruitful activity is invariably associated with action, successive or non-successive. And activity taking place all at once, and action that is successive cannot be met with in what is not momentary.

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*	*	*	*	*

All the manuscripts examined are incomplete and end here abruptly.

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

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AND

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श्रीः .

न्यायकुलिशे

संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादो नवमः

इदं त्विह वक्तव्यम्—कथं संस्थानमेव जातिरिति ? तत्र ह्येके वदन्ति—

भेदेष्वेकानुवृत्ता हि जातिः प्रत्यक्षमक्ष्यते ।

तदसिद्धौ न सिद्धयेयुश्शब्दादीनां प्रवृत्तयः ॥

पश्यामो हि वयं खण्डादिष्वनुगतं हस्त्यादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तं गोत्वम् । कश्चिच्चादृष्टहस्तिजातीयो दृष्टतज्जातीयं प्रति ब्रवीति—‘ अदृष्टपूर्वोऽयमिहास्ति दृश्यताम् ’ इति । तत्रेतरो ब्रवीति—‘ दृष्टपूर्वं एव नापूर्वं पश्यामि ’ इति । इदन्त्वेतद्गतहस्तिजाति (ते ?) रेव पूर्वदृष्टत्वेनैव कल्पते; व्यक्तेरपूर्वत्वात् । अयं गौरयं हस्तीति च यथा विलक्षणाकारा (रा व्य ?) वसायाः, नैवमयं गौरयमपि गौरिति । तत्कस्य हेतोः ? अनुवृत्ताकारसन्देहादेव । न चास्य वृत्ति (व्यक्ति ?)-शक्तिमात्रानुरोधादन्यथासिद्धिः शक्या वक्तुम् ; विषयापेक्षायाः कारणशक्तिसहस्रेणापि पूरयितुं (तुम् ?) शक्यत्वात् । विषयत्वञ्च तस्याः शक्तित्वादेव प्रत्यक्षबुद्धावाशङ्कामपि नार्हति । प्रत्यक्षापि सा किमेका अनेका वा ? एकत्वे ह्यस्मदभिमतसामान्यमेव शब्दान्तरेणोक्तं स्यात् । अनेकत्वे १व्यक्तिवदकिञ्चित्करत्वम् ॥

न चोपाधिः कश्चिदस्ति विषय इति वाच्यम् ; अनन्यापेक्षत्वात् । स ह्युपाधिरिति कथ्यते, यः परम्परासम्बन्धवशेन नानार्थान् एकस्स ऋहति, यथा पाचको लावक इति । तत्र हि

पच्यादिजातिः क्रियाव्यक्तितत्सम्बन्धादिव्यवहिता पुरुषादीन् सङ्गृह्णाति । सर्वत्रैव तद्गृह्णी-
यम् । स च परम्परासम्बन्धनिरूपणापेक्षत्वात्तदशक्तप्रतीकवाच्यो नावसोयते^१ । जातिस्तु
गोमाषतिलादिषु तत्तद्विशेषसमसामग्रीकवेदनापेक्षेति नोपाधिपक्षनिक्षेपमर्हति । यद्यपि पृथिवी-
त्वद्रव्यत्वादीनां व्यञ्जकापेक्षा, तथाप्यनपेक्षस्य गोत्वादेर्जातित्वमवस्थाप्यते ; साक्षात्सम्बन्ध-
स्यापनेतुमशक्यत्वात् । पृथिवीत्वादावपि जातित्वमुपाधित्वं वा युज्यत इति विशये जाति-
न्याय एवाखण्डशब्दानां (?) लम्बनस्य बाधकाभावे व्यवस्थाप्यते ॥

यत्तु साक्षादिमत्त्वादि गोत्वादौ व्यञ्जकम्, तत् जात्यन्तरव्यावृत्तैकजातिव्यवस्थापन
एवोपयुज्यते ; न स्वरूपप्रतीतौ । उपाधयश्च प्रायशो द्रव्यक्रियागुणाश्रया जातय एव दूरं गत्वेति
सर्वसामान्यापलापवादिना भवता न लब्धुं शक्यन्ते । सामान्यविशेषनित्यानित्यादिष्वनुप(ग?)
मस्तत्तलक्षणज्ञानानन्तरभावीत्युक्तनित्योपाधिगोचर इति निश्चीयते^२ । अतो न तत्तत्प्रति-
बन्दिः प्रतिलभ्यते । यदि च नैवम्, का गतिशब्दानुमानयोः? न हि सामान्यमन्तरेण सङ्केतो
व्याप्तिर्वात्मानं लभते । न च ताभ्यां विना शब्दानुमानयोर्व्यक्त (क्तिः?) उपाधिरेव (कश्चि-
दनुमानस्य?), कश्चिच्च शब्दस्य निमित्तं भवति । तथाभ्युपगम्यते भवतापि हि केषुचिदिति
चेत्, जातिशब्दोपजीवनेनैव व्यवस्थाप्यमानस्योपाधिशब्दस्य तदपायेऽपायात् । उपाधिशब्दो
हि दण्ड्यादिः दण्डशब्दवद्दण्डत्वजातिं निमित्तीकृत्य तद्विशेषे पर्यवस्यन्तं लब्ध्वा तद्वदिति
तदुपायकत्वाद्वर्तमानस्तदुपायोऽ (स्तदपायेऽ) पेयादेव । न चाविशिष्टगोचरः कश्चिदुपाधि-
शब्दोऽस्ति । न च विशेषणानुपाय(धि?) को विशिष्टो नामार्थः कश्चिदस्ति । न च विशेषणा-
भिधायिशब्दान्तरानुपसृष्टोपाधिशब्दोऽपि प्रायेण दृष्टपूर्वः ; सर्वस्य जातिशब्दस्य निपुणैर्य-
थायोगं निरुच्यमानावयवार्थत्वात् । यत्रापि चावयवशक्तिनिर्वचनागोचरत्वम्, तत्रापि सखण्ड-
शब्दपर्यायतयैव व्युत्पादनमिति न विशेषः । तत्र तु शक्तिकल्पना केवलमतिरिच्यते; न
जात्यनुपजीवनं शक्यं वक्तुम् । स एव हि तत्र जातिशब्दोऽपीति वर्ण्यते । व्यक्तिप्राधान्या-

१. परम्परासम्बन्धावाचकपदैकदेशवाच्यतया न निश्चीयत इत्यर्थः.

२. लक्षणरूपोक्तोपाधिगोचर इत्यर्थः.

दुपाधिशब्दवाचोयुक्तिः । एकप्रसरप्रतिपत्तिगम्यत्वाद्विशिष्टार्थस्य शक्तिगौरवेऽपि
 * [स्वीकार्यत्वात् ।] न चैवं गवादिशब्दानामपि सास्त्रादिमान् गौरित्यादिव्युत्पादनादुपाधिगोचर-
 त्वमिति वाच्यम् ; सास्त्रादेरगोशब्दवाच्यत्वात् । [व्युत्पादनबलेन] यदि कल्पेन^१
 तद्व्य (कल्प्येत, नैतत्, व्य ?) भिचारोपलम्भात् । व्यवहारादिषु व्युत्पाद्यमानस्यान्वयव्यति-
 रेकगोचरप्रत्यक्षजात्यालम्बन [तयैवोपपत्तेरु] पाधिवाचित्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च सास्त्रादेरुप-
 लक्षणत्वमेवेति निश्चीयते । अतो यद्यपि केचित्प्रत्ययादात्मनो (या आत्मना ?) दण्ड्या
 [दिशब्दगताः न जाति] मभिदधति, तथापि तदभिधायिप्रकृत्यादिः (?) शब्दा-
 न्तरपुरस्सरा इति जात्यपह्वे सर्वश(शः)ब्दो न कञ्चिदर्थमभिदध्यात् ॥

सादृश्यं [प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति चेत्,] तदयुक्तम् ; गोसादृश्यस्यागो-
 शब्दार्थत्वात् । गौरैव गवान्तरसदृश इति चेत्, तच्च विशेषसादृश्यमेव न गोसादृश्यम्
 [विशेषप्रतियोगिकं सादृश्यमेव तथेति चे]त्, तर्हि स एव गोशब्दार्थो युक्तः, न
 तत्सादृश्यम् । तथाप्यनिरूपितगोत्वव्यक्तिविशेषसादृश्यमेकस्य गोत्वम्, एवमितरस्याप्ये-
 तत्सादृश्य [मेव गोत्वमिति गोत्वमनेकं स्यात् । ए] वं गोसादृश्यस्य गोशब्द-
 निमित्तत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति किं न पश्यसि ? । गोसादृश्यस्य गोशब्दार्थत्वपक्षे च गोशब्दाद्गो-
 सादृश्यमेव प्र [तीयेत, न गौः] वाचकाभावात् । अप्रतीतौ पुनः
 तत्सादृश्यमपि न प्रत्येतुं शक्येत । सादृश्यञ्चैकमनेकं वा ? एकत्वे जातिरेव शब्दा
 [न्तरेणोक्ता] भवेत् । अन्यथा व्यक्तिवदानन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यामव्युत्पत्ति-
 स्तदवस्था ॥

एतेन सदृशसंस्थानशब्दार्थत्वपक्षोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः । [एतेन] अनुमानमपि
 सामान्योपजीवीति व्याख्यातम् । यद्यपि केषुचिद्व्यक्तिविशेषेषु गोचरेषु शब्देषु अनुमानेषु
 चानपेक्षापि वक्तुं [शक्यते] तथा [पि] परिगृहीतबहुतरशब्दानुमानव्यवहारस्य लोके

जातिमन्तरेणानिष्पत्तेश्शब्दानुमानप्रामाणिक^१प्रत्य [क्षसिद्धा संस्थानाद्यतिरे]किणी नित्या
एका अनेकसमवेता च जातिस्सिद्धयतीति ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—

एकबुद्धिस्फुटं भिन्नेष्वेकोपाध्यवलम्बना ।

स च स्मारकमन्योन्यं संस्थानं सदृशात्मकम् ॥

अत्रेदं विकल्पनीयम्—केयमेकबुद्धिरिति? किमयं गौरिति एकगोपिण्डविषया बुद्धिः, उतायमपि
गौरिति अपिशब्दसम्भेदोन्नेया? । आद्या तावद्व्यक्तिगोचरतया कृतार्था न जातिमपरामव-
स्थापयितुमीष्टे । द्वितीया तु न साक्षादेकमपरं गोचरयतीत्य [न]नुमानम् ; उपाधि-
गोचरत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः । विशेष एवैकः पदार्थो बौद्धैरिष्टः । सामान्यमेकमेव गुणकर्मणोस्समवै
.... को ब्रूहि सुनिष्पन्नस्सुभिक्षं करोतीत्यपि न बुद्धिभेदमीक्षामहे । न च कल्पयितुं
शक्यम् ; अन्यथासिद्धेः । तथाहि—

एकलक्षणयोगित्वात्संस्थानाद्वा सलक्षणात् ।

सोऽपीति प्रतिपत्तिस्स्यान्न साक्षादेकमृच्छति ॥

लक्षणविशेषानुगमनिबन्धनप्रतिसन्धानं हि तत्र तत्र भवतापि व्युत्पाद्यते । सुसदृशानि च
संस्थानानि परस्परस्मृतिसमर्पणक्षमाणि । या....[नि] ज्ञानमेकमवगाहमानं [अनुरुद्धय]
तद्गोचरत्वेनैकोपाधिना प्रतिसन्धीयन्ते । तथैव हि युक्तं वक्तुम् । समानानां हि भावस्सामा-
न्यम्, तदेव च जातिः । समानानि संस्थानानि तद्वन्ति च ; तेषां भावस्स्वभावः एकसमु-
दायारम्भकत्वं वा एकसमुदायानुप्रवेशो वा । स ह्यस्ति कश्चित्समानानाम्, यदेकजननात्तद्गो-
चरतया समुदायारम्भकत्वं तद्विषयत्वेन तदनुप्रवेशो वा । अनेनोपाधिनानन्यापेक्षेण साक्षा-
द्व्यक्तिसमवायिना प्रतिसन्धानोपपत्तेर्न तदतिरिक्तजातिप्रत्यक्षत्वसिद्धिः । सम्प्रतिपन्नञ्च
परैरप्येतत्संस्थानमुपाधेरनुवृत्तप्रत्ययालम्बनत्वञ्चेति नास्माभिरपूर्वं किमपि व्युत्पाद्यते । पर-

कल्पना (परन्तु कल्पना?) (परकल्पनात्?) लाघवमेवास्माकं विशेषः। अनेनैवोपाधिना दृष्टपूर्व-
तज्जातीयस्य तज्जातीयमात्रे दिदृक्षानिवृत्तिर्दृष्टत्वव्यपदेशोऽप्युपपद्यते । एकेनैव ज्ञानेन^१
स्वप्रकाशेन सङ्गृह्यमाणानामर्थान्तरानपेक्षैकप्रतीतिवेद्यत्वादेवैकजातीयत्वम् । एवंविधैकजातीय-
सम्बन्धपरम्परा.....[सङ्गृहीतो धर्म उपाधि]रिति जात्युपाधिवैषम्यं तत्कृतप्रतिपत्तिवैषम्यञ्च
सूचयामास । अत एव जातिशब्दानामखण्डत्वमुपाधिशब्दा [नां सखण्डत्वं जाति-
शब्दानामनपेक्षत्व]मुपाधिशब्दानाञ्च जातिशब्दापेक्षत्वञ्चेति सर्वमुपपन्नम् ।

किमत्र शब्दानां निमित्तम्? इति विवेक्तव्यम् । यदि संस्थानमेव, तत्र.....[व्यक्ति-
वद्विभिन्न]त्वादानन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि संस्थानमन-
पेक्षमसाधारणमेव शब्दनिमित्तमिति कथ्येत ; [न त्वेवम् ।] किन्तु द्वितीयादिव्यक्ति-
दर्शनवेलायां हि दृश्यमानसंस्थानस्मारितपूर्वपूर्वव्यक्तिसंस्थानानामपि साश्रयाणां तदेकप्रतिप-
.....[त्ति] विषयत्वं नाम । इदञ्च सर्वेषां तज्जातीयानामविशिष्टम् । तेन साधारणेन रूपेण
संस्थानानि.....[सङ्गृहीतानि] साधारणनिमित्त.....[तामनुभवन्तीति कथमानन्त्य] व्यभि-
चारौ प्रसज्येयाताम् । एवमपि ज्ञातमेव शब्दनिमित्तमित्यापन्नम् । दण्ड्यादिषु दण्डत्वादि-
वत्तत्त्वैवान्ततस्सङ्ग्रह [करत्वात् ।] स्यादेतदेवम् , यदि प्रतीयमानं सर्वं शब्दार्थस्स्यात् ।
अनन्यथासिद्धस्तु शब्दार्थः । यथा दण्ड्यादिष्वेव प्रत्ययांशस्य द.....[ण्डत्वादीन्यर्थतां न
प्रतिपद्य]न्ते ; प्रकृतिलभ्यत्वात् । तद्वत्स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वाज्ज्ञानं न शब्दार्थः । यत्तु तद्गोचर-
स्समानं संस्थानम् , तत्त्वनन्य [लभ्यत्वाच्छ]^२क्तिगोचर इति निष्कृत्यते ॥

ननु च तज्ज्ञानं यदास्ति, तदा स्वयम्प्रकाशो भवति । न च शब्दाधीनप्रतिपत्तिगम्यं
संस्थानमपि.....[ज्ञानग्रहमन्तरा सङ्गृह्यत इति तत्कथं] न शब्दार्थः^१। यदा संस्थानं न(?)
शब्दादेव प्रत्येतव्यम्, तदा ज्ञानमप्यविद्यमानं प्रत्याय्य तदन्तर्भूतमेव संस्थानं प्रत्याययितव्य-
मिति ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वमवर्जनीयमिति चेत्; नैतदेवम् ; ज्ञानविषयस्यैवाकारस्यैकज्ञानानुप्रवेश-

१. ज्ञानेन न स्वप्रकाशेन इति पा०.

२. व्यक्तिगोचर इति पा०.

योम्यस्यानतिप्रसङ्गकस्य रूपस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । किमनेन तर्हि ज्ञानेन ? अस्ति तेनापि प्रयोजनम् ; तेनैवातिप्रसङ्गपरिहारपर्यवसानात् । तस्मिन्नहि विज्ञातेऽ (तस्मिन्ब्रह्मविज्ञाने?) न्यजातीयत्वादनु (त्वान्नानु?) प्रवेशं लभ्य (भ?) ते । तज्जातीयं तु सर्वमेवानुप्रविशति ; यदि संस्कारोन्मेषलाभ इत्येवं रूपत्वादनतिप्रसङ्गकसङ्ग्रहस्य । यथा ह्येकानुवृत्तजातिवादिनोऽपि एका सा जातिर्नानाव्यक्तिसम्बन्धितयानुभूता तथात्वेनैकस्यां बुद्धावनुप्रवेशादेवानुवृत्तिं लभते, तथा संस्थानमप्येकस्यां बुद्धावनुप्रवेशनियमादनुवृत्तमिति गीयताम् । तथापि कथमनुवृत्तिः ? एकस्य नानासम्बन्ध एव ह्यनुवृत्तिः । संस्थानं त्वेकज्ञानानुप्रवेशे न नानाव्यक्तिभिस्सम्बद्धयते । सत्यम् ; तथाप्येकसंस्थानगोचरज्ञाने संस्थानान्तरस्याप्यनुप्रवेशनियमोऽस्ति । तस्मान्नानाज्ञानानुवृत्तिरेकैकस्य संस्थानस्यास्तीति स एवानुवृत्तिशब्दार्थः । अत एव हि 'द्वितीयादिपिण्डविषयज्ञानेष्वनुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टत्वं संस्थानस्य प्रत्यक्षमवसीयत' इति भाष्यम् । एतावाननयोर्विशेषः, परपक्षे जातेरनुवृत्तिविषयीभावः (रनुवृत्तिर्विषये भावः) । अस्मत्पक्षे तु विषयविषयीभावः । उभयत्राप्यतिप्रसङ्गपरिहाराय ज्ञानापेक्षा समान (ना ?) ज्ञानमन्तर्भाव्यैवातिप्रसङ्गपरिहारनिदानधर्मलाभश्च समानः । एको धर्मः परेषां स्वसम्बन्धादतिप्रसङ्गं वारयति; समानं संस्थानमस्माकमिति ॥

ननु च गोसंस्थानं गवयसंस्थानञ्च सदृशम् । ततो गोगवययोरेकजातीयत्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न; गोगवयावयवसंस्थानानाम.....[ल्पसदृशत्वा]त् । तत एव च गोगवययोः सादृश्यनिर्वाहः । साक्षात्सादृश्याधारे सदृशसंस्थानाधारे सदृशसंस्थानवस्त्वन्तराधारे साधारण-.....[वस्त्वाधारे च] सदृशबुद्धघुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्सादृश्याभ्युपगमात् । साक्षात्सादृश्याधार एव तु सौसादृश्यम्, यत्र भवतामेकत्वग्रहः । [सौसादृश्यमपि] मेरुसर्षपादीनां द्रव्यत्ववत्स्यादिति चेत्, तवापि तर्हि लक्षणविशेषाभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिरिति १सामान्यलक्षणा-विशिष्टगोगवय..... [स्वीकारा] त् जातिसद्भावप्रसङ्गः । सा तु न दृश्यत इति चेत्, गोगवयमात्रानुगतसदृशसंस्थानान्तरमपि न दृश्यत इति तुल्यम् । न हि गोगवय.....[मात्रानुग] तः कश्चिच्छब्दस्तन्निमित्तं वास्तीत्यत्रावयोर्विशेषोऽस्ति । एतदुक्तं भवति—

साक्षात्सम्बन्धिसंस्थानं सदृशं जातिरिष्यते ।

पारम्पर्येण धीलक्षणञ्च तत् ॥

इति । तच्च साक्षात्सम्बन्धिसंस्थानं कचिदुज्वलं कचिन्मसृणमित्यपि पराभ्युपेतजातिवद्दृष्ट-
व्यमिति । किं [मिदं संस्थानं] मेवेति चेत्, यथोक्तप्रकरणानुगतं द्रव्यव्यवहारार्थं
द्रव्येषु धर्मान्तरात्मकम् ; संस्थानरूपाणां धर्माणां तच्छब्दः [निमित्तभूता] र्थान्तरापेक्षा-
व्यापारनिर्वाहकत्वात् । रूपरसादीनां तु १नेया (लक्षणोन्नेयः?) स्वभावविशेषो धर्मान्तरमनु-
वृत्तिभावात् । यद्यपि [तेषु] समवेतधर्मान्तरं नास्ति, तथापि समानाधिकरणानि व्यधि-
करणानि वा धर्मान्तराण्यपेक्ष्य तद्व्यावृत्तं (तत्?) व्यक्त्यन्तरं [व्यावृत्ति] प्रतिसम्बन्धित्व-
लक्षणानुवृत्तस्वभावविशेषो धर्मतया व्यपदिश्यते । स एव संस्थानं जातिरिति च । अत-
स्सर्वत्र स्वासाधारणं रूपमित्यनुसन्धेयम् ॥

अस्त्वेवं संस्थानम् । तस्य सादृश्यं किमिति निरूपणीयम् । न तावदवयवसामान्य-
योगः ; परोक्तस्य सामान्यस्यासिद्धेः । त्वदुक्तस्य तु सादृश्यसिद्धिसमनन्तरभाविनस्तत्सि-
द्धिनिर्वाहकत्वानुपपत्तेः । तत्त्वान्तरं तु द्रव्यगुणादिषु किमिति विकल्पासहत्वान्नावतिष्ठत इति ।

उच्यते—तत्किमेवं सादृश्यमेव नास्तीत्यभिधीयते, उतावयवसामान्यमेव प्रतिष्ठा-
प्यते । नाद्यः ; प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्, सर्वलोकेदव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गाच्च । न चोत्तरः पक्षः ;
अव्यापकत्वात् । निरवयवेषु तदभावात् ; यद्यप्यवयवशब्द उपलक्षणार्थस्तथाप्येकानुवृत्तप्रतीत्य-
भावेऽपि गजादिषु सादृश्योपलम्भात्तत्त्वान्तरमेव युक्तमास्थातुम् । तच्च न द्रव्यम्, न गुणः,
नापि कर्म, किन्तु सादृश्यमेव । तदेव तु संस्थानं सदृशञ्च ; स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वात् । सर्वत्र च
समवायो दर्शनबलादुपेयः । न च तावता गुणादीनां द्रव्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ; सादृश्यातिरिक्तगुणा-
श्रयत्वस्य द्रव्यत्वव्यवस्थापकत्वात् । गुणशब्दं हि सदृशे गुणान्तरे प्रयुज्यते, न द्रव्यशब्द-
मपि । वृद्धप्रयोगगम्यत्वाच्च शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्य न पर्यनुयोगावकाशः । एवं सुसदृशसंस्थानं
जातिरिति वदतां श्रुतिरपि न विरुद्धयेत । अन्येषां तु यावदाश्रयभाविनीं जातिमिच्छतां

सर्वद्रव्येषु चैकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानोपपादनेन प्राप्तात्सत्कार्यभावान्नित्येषु नानाजातिराश्रया-
भावान्न सिद्धिमर्हति । अनन्तश्लेषजात्याधारो वा एकैकद्रव्यमापद्येत । तस्याश्च वृत्तिविकल्पे-
देशकालकृतविच्छेदप्रत्ययेऽप्येकत्वञ्चेत्यादि सर्वं दुरुपपादम् । ‘अग्न्यवस्थे च सलिले
वाय्ववस्थे च तेजसि’ इत्यादिपुराणवचनसहस्रमपि संस्थानसामान्यपक्षमेव प्रविव (वि)
क्षतीति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीप-

श्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य

श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे

संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादो नवमः ॥

श्रोः .

न्यायकुलिशे

शक्तिवादो दशमः

शक्तानामेव भावानां हेतुत्वं नान्यथा यतः ।

अतश्शक्तिपदार्थस्य सद्भावः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

तत्र तावत्—

सामग्रीव्यापकं कार्यं तद्भावे न कथं भवेत् ।

तस्याश्शक्त्यैव वैकल्यं सत्सु सर्वेषु हेतुषु ॥

अवश्यं हि कारणसामग्री कार्या(र्यः)भावव्याप्ता । अन्यथा ह्यनपेक्षानामपि कार्याभावे तेषामकारणत्वमेव स्यात् । तेषु सत्त्वेव तद्भवति ; तन्मात्रेण च तेषां कारणत्वमिति चेन्न ; तेषामकुर्वत्स्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गे कारणत्वव्याघातात् । श्यावत्सहकारिसमवधानमकुर्वन्सहकारिसमवधानेऽपि यदि न कुर्यात् , अकुर्वत्स्वभाव एव हि स्यात् , अङ्कुरं प्रति शिलाशकलवत् । न हि ततो विशेषोऽपेक्षणीयोऽस्ति, यत्सन्निधौ करणं सम्भाव्येत । अतस्सहकारिषु सर्वेषु समवहितेषु करणमेवेति स्थितम् । यदा च तेषु समवहितेष्वपि कार्यं न जायत इति दृश्यते, तदा तेषामेव विशिष्टरूपेणाभावः कल्पनीयः । अतो यद्वैकल्याद्विशिष्टरूपाभावस्सा शक्तिरित्यास्थेयमिति ।

अत्र केचिदाहुः—यत्र कार्यं न जायते, तत्र सर्वत्र कारणानामन्यतमस्य स्वरूपमेव

नास्तीति [तत्] त्वमाणैरवसीयते ; ननु(तु ?) तेषु सत्स्वपि कार्यानुदयः, यश्शक्ति-
कल्पनया समाधीयताम् । १नन्वभिसम्पृक्ते^२ दाह्ये कदाचिद्दाहो न दृश्यते, तदा किं कारणं,
सन्निधत्ते ? कथं वा तदा विशिष्टरूपवैकल्यम् ? न हि तदेवाकस्मादेव कदाचिद्विकलशक्ति-
कमन्यदा चाविकलशक्तिकमिति युक्तम् । तत्र चेन्मणिमन्त्रादेः कस्यचित्संसर्गाच्छक्तिवै-
कल्यं भवतीति मतम्, हन्त तदभाव एव कारणमिति किन्न स्यात् ? एवं हि न दृष्टाधिकं
कल्पनीयं भवेत् । स चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणतयावधार्यत एव ॥

कथमभावः कारणमिति चेत्, भावो वा कथमिति कथ्यताम् । यदि यस्य यत्रान्वय-
व्यतिरेकाभ्यां नियतपूर्वावधित्वं दृश्यते, तदेव तत्र कारणमिति मतम्, तदेतदभावेऽपि तुल्यम् ।
भावत्वे सतीति विशेषयिष्यामीति चेत्, परः कश्चिदभावत्वे सतीति विशेषणं किन्न दद्यात् ?
यदि भवतामभावपरिहारेण भावेष्वेव शक्तिकल्पनया कारणत्वनिर्वाह इति रोचते, इतर-
स्याप्य [गन्या] दिभावपरिहारेण मण्याद्यभावेष्वेव शक्तिकल्पनया बह्व्याद्यभावेषु प्रति-
बन्धकत्वकल्पनया च तन्निर्वाहः किन्न रोचेत ? किञ्चाभावस्य प्रध्वंसस्य यथा कार्यत्वमन्वय-
व्यतिरेकाभ्यामभ्युपेयते, न तु भावस्यैव कार्यत्वमिति निर्वन्धः, एवमभावस्य कारणत्वमप्य-
वश्याभ्युपगमनीयमेव ॥

व्यभिचारादभावो न कारणम् ; उत्तम्भके सति मण्यादिसद्भावेऽपि कार्योदयादात्
चेत्, तव वा कथं शक्तिवैकल्येऽपि कार्योदयः ? उत्तम्भके सति मण्यादिशक्तिवैकल्यं न
करोतीति चेत्, कदा तर्हि करोति ? तदभाव एवेति चेत्, तर्हि यद्विशिष्टो मण्यादिशक्ति-
वैकल्यं करोतीति मनुषे, तदभाव एव कारणमित्यदोषः । न च कदाचिन्मण्याद्यभावः
कारणम् ; कदाचिदुत्तम्भक इत्यनियतहेतुकत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; उत्तम्भकाभावविशिष्टस्य
मण्यादेः प्रतिपक्षस्याभाव एव कारणमित्यभ्युपगमात् । ततश्च केवलोत्तम्भकसद्भावे प्रति-
बन्धकोत्तम्भकसद्भावे द्वयाभावे चैकजातीयकार्य (रण ?) सिद्धिः ; विशेषणविशेष्योभयाभावेषु

१. शङ्कते—नन्विति । समाधत्ते—तदेत्यादिना ।

२. अभिसम्प्रमुक्ते इति पा० ।

विशिष्टाभावानुगतिसिद्धेः। न च वाच्यमस्य प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसो वा कारणमित्यभ्युपगमे
'व्यभिचारः; उभयस्यापि कारणत्वमसम्भवादेव निरस्तम्; अन्यतरस्य कारणत्वे चानियत-
हेतुकत्वमिति; यतस्संसर्गाभावः कारणम्। संसृज्यमानो हि मण्यादिः प्रतिबध्नातीति
भवतामभ्युपगमः ॥

ननु च प्रतिबन्धको मण्यादिरिति प्रसिद्धम्। न चासौ निर्विषयः प्रतिबध्नाति।
तद्विषयश्च शक्तिरेव। दृष्टरूपस्य(स्या?)विशेषादिति चेन्न; मण्यादेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्।
सामग्रीवैकल्यं हि प्रतिबन्धपदार्थः। स च मण्यादिरेव। [तस्य] प्रयोक्तारस्तु प्रति-
बन्धकाः। यथाहुः—१'प्रतिबन्धो विसामग्री तद्धेतुः प्रतिबन्धकः' इति। ते च प्रति-
बन्धमण्यादिसंसर्गं प्र.... [युक्ता]नाः प्रतिबन्धका इति किन्नोपपद्यते? ॥

यदि च नैवम्, कः प्रतिबन्धकः? मण्यादिरेवेति चेत्, तस्याकिञ्चित्कारस्य प्रतिबन्ध-
कत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गात्किञ्चित्कारो वाच्यः। न च २तावता कार्यप्रागभावः कारणम्; ३(वकरणम्?)
प्रागभावस्याकार्यत्वात्। ४अन्यस्तु न किञ्चित्सम्भाव्यते; विकल्पासहत्वात्। स हि शक्ति-
विनाशो वा, तद्धर्मविनाशो वा, तद्धर्मान्तरजन्म वा। न तावदाद्यः कल्पः; पश्चादुत्तम्भके
सत्यपि कार्यानुदयप्रसङ्गात्। शक्त्यभावेऽपि वा कार्योत्पादे प्रतिबन्धकसन्निधायुत्तम्भका-
भावेऽपि कार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गः। उत्तम्भकशक्तिमुत्पादयतीति चेन्न; तामेव तज्जातीययां वेति
विजातीयया शक्त्या तज्जातीयकार्यासिद्धेः। सिद्धौ चानियतहेतुकत्वम्। तज्जातीयामेव
शक्तिमुत्पादयतीति चेन्न; (यतः?) तत्रैवानियतहेतुकत्वम्; पूर्वं भावसामग्र्या पश्चादुत्तम्भका-
च्छत्तयुत्पत्तेः। अत एव न द्वितीयः; विप्रकर्षात्। परस्य कश्चिदनुग्रहस्यादिति शङ्का-

१. न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिप्रथमस्तबके.

२. तावत् इति पा०.

३. प्रागभावकारणमिति पा०.

४. किञ्चित्कार इति शेषः.

नास्तीति [तत्त] त्रमाणैरवसीयते ; ननु(तु?) तेषु सत्स्वपि कार्यानुदयः, यश्शक्ति-
कल्पनया समाधीयताम् । १नन्वभिसम्पृक्ते^२ दाढे कदाचिद्दाहो न दृश्यते, तदा किं कारणं,
सन्निधत्ते? कथं वा तदा विशिष्टरूपवैकल्यम्? न हि तदेवाकस्मादेव कदाचिद्विकलशक्ति-
कमन्यदा चाविकलशक्तिकमिति युक्तम् । तत्र चेन्मणिमन्त्रादेः कस्यचित्संसर्गाच्छक्तिवै-
कल्यं भवतीति मतम्, हन्त तदभाव एव कारणमिति किन्न स्यात्? एवं हि न दृष्टाधिकं
कल्पनीयं भवेत् । स चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणतयावधार्यत एव ॥

कथमभावः कारणमिति चेत्, भावो वा कथमिति कथ्यताम् । यदि यस्य यत्रान्वय-
व्यतिरेकाभ्यां नियतपूर्वावधित्वं दृश्यते, तदेव तत्र कारणमिति मतम्, तदेतदभावेऽपि तुल्यम् ।
भावत्वे सतीति विशेषयिष्यामीति चेत्, परः कश्चिदभावत्वे सतीति विशेषणं किन्न दद्यात्?
यदि भवतामभावपरिहारेण भावेष्वेव शक्तिकल्पनया कारणत्वनिर्वाह इति रोचते, इतर-
स्याप्य [ग्न्या] दिभावपरिहारेण मण्याद्यभावेष्वेव शक्तिकल्पनया बहुधाद्यभावेषु प्रति-
बन्धकत्वकल्पनया च तन्निर्वाहः किन्न रोचेत? किञ्चाभावस्य प्रध्वंसस्य यथा कार्यत्वमन्वय-
व्यतिरेकाभ्यामभ्युपेयते, न तु भावस्यैव कार्यत्वमिति निर्वन्धः, एवमभावस्य कारणत्वमप्य-
वश्याभ्युपगमनीयमेव ॥

व्यभिचारादभावो न कारणम् ; उत्तम्भके सति मण्यादिसद्भावेऽपि कार्योदयादिति
चेत्, तव वा कथं शक्तिवैकल्येऽपि कार्योदयः? उत्तम्भके सति मण्यादिशक्तिवैकल्यं न
करोतीति चेत्, कदा तर्हि करोति? तदभाव एवेति चेत्, तर्हि यद्विशिष्टो मण्यादिशक्ति-
वैकल्यं करोतीति मनुषे, तदभाव एव कारणमित्यदोषः । न च कदाचिन्मण्याद्यभावः
कारणम् ; कदाचिदुत्तम्भक इत्यनियतहेतुकत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; उत्तम्भकाभावविशिष्टस्य
मण्यादेः प्रतिपक्षस्याभाव एव कारणमित्यभ्युपगमात् । ततश्च केवलोत्तम्भकसद्भावे प्रति-
बन्धकोत्तम्भकसद्भावे द्वयाभावे चैकजातीयकार्य (रण?) सिद्धिः ; विशेषणविशेष्योभयाभावेषु

१. शङ्कते—नन्विति । समाधत्ते—तदेत्यादिना ।

२. अभिसम्प्रमुक्ते इति पा० ।

विशिष्टाभावानुगतिसिद्धेः। न च वाच्यमस्य प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसो वा कारणमित्यभ्युपगमे व्यभिचारः; उभयस्यापि कारणत्वमसम्भवादेव निरस्तम्; अन्यतरस्य कारणत्वे चानियत-हेतुकत्वमिति; यतस्संसर्गाभावः कारणम्। संसृज्यमानो हि मण्यादिः प्रतिबध्नातीति भवतामभ्युपगमः ॥

ननु च प्रतिबन्धको मण्यादिरिति प्रसिद्धम्। न चासौ निर्विषयः प्रतिबध्नाति। तद्विषयश्च शक्तिरेव। दृष्टरूपस्य(स्या?)विशेषादिति चेन्न; मण्यादेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। सामग्रीवैकल्यं हि प्रतिबन्धपदार्थः। स च मण्यादिरेव। [तस्य] प्रयोक्तारस्तु प्रतिबन्धकाः। यथाहुः—१‘प्रतिबन्धो विसामग्री तद्वेतुः प्रतिबन्धकः’ इति। ते च प्रतिबन्धमण्यादिसंसर्गं प्र.... [युञ्जा]नाः प्रतिबन्धका इति किन्नोपपद्यते? ॥

यदि च नैवम्, कः प्रतिबन्धकः? मण्यादिरेवेति चेत्, तस्याकिञ्चित्करस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गात्किञ्चित्कारो वाच्यः। न च २तावता कार्यप्रागभावः कारणम्;३ (वकरणम्?) प्रागभावस्याकार्यत्वात्। ४अन्यस्तु न किञ्चित्सम्भाव्यते; विकल्पासहत्वात्। स हि शक्तिविनाशो वा, तद्धर्मविनाशो वा, तद्धर्मान्तरजन्म वा। न तावदाद्यः कल्पः; पश्चादुत्तम्भके सत्यपि कार्यानुदयप्रसङ्गात्। शक्त्यभावेऽपि वा कार्योत्पादे प्रतिबन्धकसन्निधावुत्तम्भकाभावेऽपि कार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गः। उत्तम्भकशक्तिमुत्पादयतीति चेन्न; तामेव तज्जातीययां वेति विजातीयया शक्त्या तज्जातीयकार्यासिद्धेः। सिद्धौ चानियतहेतुकत्वम्। तज्जातीयामेव शक्तिमुत्पादयतीति चेन्न; (यतः?) तत्रैवानियतहेतुकत्वम्; पूर्वं भावसामग्र्या पश्चादुत्तम्भकाच्छक्त्युत्पत्तेः। अत एव न द्वितीयः; विप्रकर्षात्। परस्य कश्चिदनुग्रहस्यादिति शङ्का-

१. न्यायकुसुमान्जलिप्रथमस्तबके.

२. तावत् इति पा०.

३. प्रागभावकारणमिति पा०.

४. किञ्चित्कार इति शेषः.

विच्छेदाय केवलमयं विकल्पः कृतः । न च तृतीयः ; धर्मान्तराभावस्य कारणत्वापातात् । मण्यादिवत्तस्मिन् सति कार्यानुत्पत्तेः । असत्येवोत्पत्तेः । तत्रापि न शक्तिकल्पनावकाशः ; प्रागेवाभावकारणत्वस्वीकारस्योचितत्वात् ।

यच्चोक्तम्, विप्रतिपन्नोऽग्निः अजनकदशातो विलक्षणः, जनकदशाकत्वात् । यो यत्सह-कारिसमवधानाविशेषेऽपि यज्जनकदशाकः, स तज्जन (तदजनः) कदशातो विलक्षणः; यथा तीक्ष्णः कुठारः कुण्ठकुठारात् । विवक्षितो वाग्भिर्जनकदशातो विलक्षणः, तदजनकदशाक-त्वात् । यो यदजनकः स तज्जनकदशातो विलक्षणः, यथा कुठार इति । अत्रापि सिद्धसा-धनता ; सर्वसम्प्रतिपन्नसहकारिसमवधानाविशेषेऽपि मण्यभावलक्षणसहकारिणामालाभाभ्यामेव तत्सिद्धेः । सहकारिव्यतिरिक्तातिशयकृतं वैलक्षण्यमिह विवक्षितमिति चेन्न ; तस्यापेक्षणी-यत्वापातात् । स्वसमवेतातिशयकृतं वैलक्षण्यमिह विवक्षितमिति चेन्न ; अवयवस्यावयविनि समवायायोगात् । यथा तथा वा समवायसम्बन्धातिशयवत्ता विवक्षितेति चेन्न ; तथापि सह-कारिण एवातिशयार्थत्वात्, स्वरूपमात्रस्यातिशयार्थत्वायोगात् । अवयवोऽपि ह्यवयविन-स्वकार्ये प्रवर्तमानस्योपकरोति । अतस्सोऽपि सहकारीत्युच्यते । अतो निश्शेषसहकारि-समवधानतोऽपि कस्यचित्कारणा....क [समवधानवतोऽपि कस्यचित्कारणस्य कार्यकरणाकरणे त] स्थैवातिशयान्तराभावप्रयुक्ते दृष्टे इत्यसम्बद्धमेव । अतः प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कारणत्वेना-नुपपत्तेरनुमानस्य वा परिक्षयान्न शक्तिकल्पनाप्रयासो युक्त इति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

भावानामेव हेतुत्वं प्रतियोग्यनपेक्षया^१ ।

नो^२ चेत्कानियतो हेतुः किं वा (च^३) किं स्यादकारणम् ॥

१. अनपेक्षकमिति पा०.

२. अभावस्यापि हेतुत्वाङ्गीकारे न कुत्रापि अनियतहेतुकत्वम् ; तृणारणिमणिस्थलेऽपि अनुगमस्य सुवचत्वात् । एतद्विवरणमनुपदमेव ' यदि कार्यस्य ' इत्यादिना क्रियते । किं वेत्यस्य यद्वैलक्षण्यं, किञ्चेति वा । तथैव वा पाठः । किं कस्य कारणं न भवेत् सर्वं सर्वस्य स्यादित्यर्थः । एतत्किञ्चेत्यादिनोपरि विनियते ॥

भावातिरिक्ताभावस्वरूपमेव दुर्निरूपमिति यदा वक्ष्यामः, तदा कैव कथा तस्य कारणत्वे ।
 • अस्तु एकश्च तदभावो.... [वि] ना.... [विशेषं भावस्ये] व न तस्य कारणता । स्वसम-
 वेतेन हि विशेषेण किञ्चित्कचित्कारणमितरत्रेति संन्तो विवेचयन्ते । यस्य तु तथाविधविशेष-
 सम्भावनैव नास्ति, तस्य कः कारणत्वचिन्तावकाशः ? सर्व एवाभावस्सर्वत्र कारणमिति
 वचनमतिचतुरश्रमत्रभवतामप्यनभिमतमेव । अतोऽवगतविशेषानुसारेणैवाभावस्य वि....
 [वादे] सिद्धिरिति तस्य कारणत्वेऽपि तदनुसरणमवश्यकरणम्^१ । भावस्य च मण्यादेर्विशेष-
 जिज्ञासायां प्रतिबन्धकत्वलक्षणविशेषे लब्धे तन्मात्रलक्षणान्वयव्यतिरेकौ नाभावस्य कारणत्व-
 साधने प्रभवेताम् । मण्यादिस्वरूपभेदमात्रेणाभावभेद^२सिद्धौ किं तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वनिरूपणे-
 नेति चेत्, अभावस्य कारणत्वनिरूपणायेत्युक्तम् । न हि भावकिञ्चित्कारणनिग.... [रणेन
 प्रतिप]क्षाभावस्य हेतुभावो युक्तः ^३कार्यभाववत्; यथा तस्य कार्यत्वेऽपि तमनादृत्य
 निवर्त्यानुरूपनिवर्तकान्वेषणम् । तृणकाष्ठाद्यवखण्डनाय हि तत्तदुचितकरणविशेषसम्पादन-
 व्यप्रास्ततदुद्दिशन्तो दृश्यन्ते । यथा मृदंशाद्यधितिष्ठन्तो मृदादीनुद्दिशन्तु(न्तिः), नत्वेवं
 तत्र तत्प्रध्वंसविशेषम् । तथापि स कार्यं भवति । एवमिहापि । वक्तव्यमेवं भवद्विरपि ।
 तत्र तवैव.... [मते] यथा तावत्कारणविभागात् कारणस्य (कारणाकारणविभागस्य?) कार्यं....
 [भाव] चिन्तायां सम्भावितेतरपरिहारेण^४ कार्यप्रध्वंसस्यैव सहकारित्वकल्पनं कार्यस्य
 स्वदेशकारणविभागप्रतिपक्षत्वेनैव.... [क्रिय] [इप्य] ते । न ह्यवयविसिद्धि (नि स्थि?)
 तेऽवयवस्य तद्देशाद्विभागस्सम्भवति । तथात्वे धारणाकर्षणयोरनुपपत्तेः ॥

१. अवश्यं करणं यस्य तदवश्यकरणम् । अवश्यकरणीयमित्यर्थः ।

२. भेदशब्दो विशेषपरः ।

३. कार्याभाववत् इति पा० । तदा ध्वंसवदित्यर्थः ।

४. अयं भावः—विभागजविभागो द्विविधः, कारणकारणविभागात्कार्याकार्यविभागः, कारणद्वय-
 विभागात्कारणकारणविभागश्चेति । तत्र कारणयोर्दलयोर्विभागाज्जायमानः कारणीभूतदलाकारणीभूता-
 काशप्रदेशविभागः द्वितीयः द्रव्यनाशकालादनन्तरं जायते ; न ततः पूर्वमिति मतम् । तथा च दले कर्म,
 दलद्वयविभागः, दलद्वयसंयोगनाशः, अवयविनाशः, दलाकाशविभाग इति क्रम इत्यलम् ।

एवमप्यभाव....[स्य का] र्यं ता (र्यता?) वत्कारणताप्यस्तु । तन्निवृत्तौ वा तदपि निवर्ततामिति चेन्न ; कारणत्वस्यानन्यथासिद्धिबाधितत्वात्कार्यत्वे च.... [तदभा] वात् ॥ .'

वध्यघातकसम्बन्धे भावयोरेव संस्थिते ।

अभावस्य तु कार्यत्वमगत्याध्यवसीयते ॥

प्रतिबन्धकसम्बन्धः कार्यस्यैव.... [हि वक्ष्य] ते ।

तदभावो न हेतुस्यादन्यथासिद्धिदूषितः ॥

न हि प्रध्वंसस्यानादित्वम्, आदिमतो वा अवध्यभावः, तद्वतो वान्या.... [जन्यत्व]-मिति सम्भवति । अतस्तस्य कार्यत्वसिद्धिः । नैवं कारणत्वेऽपि वाच्यम् ; अन्यथासिद्धेर-कारणत्वस्य भवद्विरेव तत्र तत्राभ्युपेतत्वात् ।[अतः] कथमेतत् 'भावो यथा तथा-ऽभावः' इति ।

व्यवहारार्थञ्च कारणत्वनिरूपणमन्यथासिद्धेषु निष्फलम् ।[तेन हि] तत्सम्पादनाय भ.... [वित] व्यम् , यतस्साफल्यं स्यात् । यद्यपि कार्योद्देशेन नोपादीयते , तथापि कारणशब्देनाभावो वक्तुमिष्ट इति चेत्, इष्यतां प्रयुज्यतां वा कारणशब्दः । 'कति कति सन्ति लोके निरर्थकशब्दप्रयोगाः ? न च वाच्यमभावस्योपादानं नाम भावाभावानाम् । (भावाभावनम् ?) । अतस्सप्रयोजनत्वमेवेति; भावस्य प्रतिक्षेप्यत्वादेव हेयत्वोपपत्तेः ॥

किञ्च प्रतियोगिविशेषन्तु तै (संस्तुते?) रेकोपाधिपरिगृहीतानां तेषामभावानामन्यतम-सद्भावे यदि कार्यं जायेत, ततो भवेदपि तस्य कारणता; यथा मृज्जातीयानां मध्ये कस्य-चिदेकस्य पिण्डस्य भावमाश्रित्य कार्यं (र्य?) जन्म । न चैवं दृश्यते । यथा च कारणाभाव-मात्रस्योदासीनत्वम् ;

कस्यचिन्मृदभावस्य न कार्यप्रतिपक्षता ।

पिण्डान्तरस्य भावेन कार्यसिद्ध्युपलम्भनात् ॥

एवं मणिमन्त्रादेरपि कारणाभावमात्रात्मनौदासीन्ये कस्यचित्सम्भावेऽपि न कार्यव्याघात-
स्यात् । न चैवमपि दृश्यते । अतो भावस्यौदासीन्यविरोधादभावस्य कारणत्वविरोधाच्च
द्वयमपि न स्यात् । तन्त्वादिष्वपि मात्रया बहुव्यक्तिसमुच्चयो दृश्यत इति चेत् , सत्यम् ;
तथापि न निश्शेषसमुच्चयापेक्षा उपपद्यते । द्वितन्तुकप्रभृतिकार्यभेदोऽपि तत्तत्कारणोप-
चयप्रयुक्तो दृश्यत इति कार्यविशेषार्थतैवोपचयस्य । यदि च सर्वव्यक्त्यपेक्षा भवेत् , विशेषण-
विशेष्योभयाभावभेदभिन्नानां विशिष्टाभावानामपि समुच्चयोऽपेक्ष्येत । न चैवं सम्भवति ।
अतस्सम्प्रतिपन्नकारणस्वभावातिक्रमादभावस्य न कारणत्वम् । तदनुसारेण प्रतिबन्धकस्यैव
तत्त्वमुचितमिति चिन्त्यताम् ।

यद्यभावो न कारणं नित्याभावः कथं प्रत्यवायं दद्यात् । यदि तद.... [न] नुष्ठान-
कालानुष्ठितावर्जनीयनिश्वासादिकं प्रत्यवायं सूत इति मतम् , तथापि तदनुष्ठानाभावविशे-
षितस्य तस्य कर्मणस्तद्वेतुत्वे भवत्येवाभावस्यापि हेतुत्वम् । इतरथापि नित्यकर्मण्यनुष्ठितेऽपि
प्रत्यवायो जायेत ॥

नैतदेवम्—यतः

सर्वस्मिन्नित्यशास्त्रार्थे यत्कालादिविशेषणम् ।

तत्स्वतः प्रत्यवायार्थं बाध्यते नित्यकर्मणा ॥

अग्निहोत्रादय (देर्य?) स्सायमादिः कालो विशेषणं भवति, तत्कालविशेषितस्यावर्जनीयस्य
कर्मणस्स्वतः प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वं तत्कालविहितेनाग्निहोत्रादिनापोद्यते । एतदुक्तं भवति—प्रति-
बन्धकमेव सर्वं प्रत्यवायपरिहारार्थं कल्पेतेति^१ ततो नाभावस्य कारणतापत्तिः ॥

यदि च मण्याद्यभावः कारणम्, ततस्तत्प्रयोक्तृपुरुषाभावोऽपि कारणं स्यात् ; प्रति-
पक्षाभावत्वाविशेषात् ।[प्रतिपक्षो विसामग्री ॥] सा कार्यविरोधिमण्यादिरेव । पुरुषस्तु
तत्प्रयोक्तृमात्रमिति चेन्न; मण्यादेरप्रयुज्यमानस्याविरोधित्वात् । ध्यानादिभिश्च कचित्प्रति-

बध्यते कार्यम् । तथापि पुरुषो न विरोधीति चेत्, तर्हि कार्यं प्रति कर्तुरपि कारणता न स्यात् । तत्तद्व्यापारविशेषस्य तत्तदधिष्ठेयवस्तुमात्रस्य वा साक्षात् कार्योपयोगात् । तथा च प्रतिपक्षाभावः कारणमिति वदतां तत्प्रयोक्तृपुरुषाभावोऽपि कारणमेष्टव्यम् । ततः 'प्रतिबन्धो विसामग्री तद्धेतुः प्रतिबन्धकः' इति विवेचनानुपपत्तिः ।

अस्तु वा मण्याद्यभावस्य कारणता । उत्तम्भकस्यापि तद्वत्स्वरूपेण कार्यार्थमनुमान- (मनुमन्यमानः?) (मनुमीयमानः?) स्यापि कारणता किन्नाश्रीयते? तद्विनापि मण्याद्यभावमात्रा- त्कदाचित्कार्यदर्शनादिति चेत्, तर्हि कार्यमेव कामं भिद्यताम्; न तु भावरूपं ग (हि?) त्वाऽ- भावात्मना कारणमिति वाच्यम् । न च मणिमन्त्रादेरिवोत्तम्भकाभावस्य स्वगतो विशेषोऽस्ति ; येन तदभावात्मनोत्तम्भकस्य कारणता कल्प्येत । प्रत्युतोत्तम्भकस्यैव तत्तज्जातिगुणादि- विशेषोपलम्भः ॥

यदि कार्यस्यानियतहेतुकत्वपरिहाराय भावस्यापि विशिष्टाभावात्मनैकीकरणं साध्यत इति मतम्; हन्त तर्हि कचिदप्यनियतहेतुकत्वन्न प्रसञ्जनीयम् । न च तत्र तत्र कार्यजाति- भेदः कल्पयितव्यः ; तत्तदभावानां मिथो वैशिष्ट्यं व्युत्पाद्य तदभावात्मनैकीकरणोपपत्तेः । तृणारणिमणीनां हि तृणारण्यभावविशिष्टमण्यभावा (भावाभावा?) त्मनैकत्वात् । तत्र भावाना- मेव मिथो भिन्नजातीयानां भावाभावात्मना कल्पनमनुपपन्नम्; अत्र तु भावाभावयोरेवोपपन्नमिति चेन्न ; विपर्ययात् । भावाभावात्मना ह्यत्यन्तविलक्षणानामपि यदि कश्चिद्व्यतिथिगोविशेष- कृतमेकत्वमाश्रित्य कारणत्वनिर्वोदुं शक्यते, किं पुनर्भावात्मना किञ्चिल्लब्धसारूप्याणां शेष- पूरणेन कारणत्वनिर्वाह इति विपरीतोपपत्तेः । उत्तम्भकस्यापि कश्चिदपरः प्रतिबन्धकस्स्यात् ; तदुपर्यपि कश्चिदित्यपवादपरम्परासु च भवता विशिष्टाभावपरिकल्पनक्लेशो नेयं तथा (नेत्यं तथा?). (नेयत्तया?) वर्णयितुं शक्यते । एवञ्च न काचित्सामग्री नाम^१ क्लृप्ता भवति ; तत्तत्प्रतिबन्धकपरम्परानिरूपणादवगुणाधिविशेषनिश्चयायोगात् ॥

किञ्च व्यभिचारिणामपि विशिष्टाभावात्मनैकोपाधिपरिग्रहादन्येनैकीकृत्य कारणत्व-

वर्णनञ्च न कचिद्व्यावर्तेत । न हि प्रतिबन्धकोत्तम्भकेयत्तानिर्णायकं किञ्चित्प्रमाणमस्ति । सर्वेषां हि सर्वहेतुत्वे व्यभिचारो दोषः । स चेन्न वक्तव्यः, कथं हेतुत्वं दुर्निरूपम् ? किं पुनः कदाचिदन्वितानां रासभादीनाम् ।

एवं कार्यकारणयोर्जातिप्रतिनियमोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकहेतुकस्सुमहता प्रयासेन सम्पादितो न सिद्धयेत् ।

किञ्च एकविशिष्टप्रतियोगितया नानावस्तुन एककारण(त्व)वदेकविशिष्टप्रतियोगितया नानावस्तुन एककार्यतापि किञ्च स्यात् ? अस्त्विति चेत्, तर्हि कार्यभेदात्कारणभेदो न कल्पनीयः । तत्र च करणविभागाद्विभागादिव्यवहारविलोपः । द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगविरोधिविभागजनकस्य कर्मणस्तद्वि (दवि?) रोधिविभागज (गाज?) नकत्वेन हि तत्सिद्धिः ॥

यदि च भावस्यापि कस्यचिद्विशिष्टैकप्रतियोगितया कारणत्वमिष्यते, तर्ह्यग्न्यादेरपि विशिष्टाभावात्मनो (ना?) धूमादिकं प्रति कारणत्वशङ्का स्यात् । तथा सत्युत्तम्भकाभावेऽपि विशेष्याभावप्रयुक्तविशिष्टाभावात् स्फोटव^१दग्न्याद्यभावेऽपि धूमादिजयितेति शङ्कायां धूमादग्न्यनुमानं न स्यादिति सर्वकार्यानुमाननिरासः ।

एवमितरानुमाननिरासोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । कथम्?—

भावस्वरूपभेदेन व्याप्यता हेतुभाववत् ।

तदतिक्रमणे तद्वदनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥

स्वाभाविको हि सम्बन्धो व्याप्तिः । ततोऽयमेवंविधोऽजहत्स्वभावोऽनेन विना न भवति । अयञ्च नियामकस्वभावः । अनेवंविधस्तु नैवमिति विवेको वाच्यः । तत्र यदि कारणत्वं वस्तुस्वरूप.... [गत] विशेषानादरेण प्रतियोगिकृतैकत्वेनेष्यते, एवं व्याप्यतापि स्यात् । ततो महाविद्यान्यायेन सर्वस्मिन्सर्वं सिद्धयेदिति सदसद्विवेकानुपपत्तिः । यद्यपि मेयत्व(त्वा?)

(त्वमः) मेयत्वमेव तत्र हेतुः, तथापि व्यापकस्य विशिष्टाभावात्मना नियामकत्वमङ्गीकृत्य तत्प्रवृत्तिरिति न व्यवतिष्ठेत् ।

दूषणत्वं यथा न स्यात्सर्वगोचरभावतः ।

तथा साधकता न स्याद्धेतोस्सर्वत्र गोचरे ॥

साधकानां दूषणानां वा सर्वगोचरता दूषणकाष्ठा वर्णनीया; इतरथा सदसद्विवेका-
भावप्रसङ्गात् । अविवेके च विवादवैफल्यात् । समुद्रघोषसदृशो हि तदा सर्वप्रयोगः । यदा
स.... [वित्र] स्वरूपविशेषप्रयुक्तं कारणत्वं कार्यत्वञ्च नियामकत्वं नियाम्यत्वञ्च, तदा सर्व-
कारणकार्यव्याप्यव्यापकव्यवस्थसिद्धेः (सिद्धयेत् ?) ॥

अतो मणिमन्त्राद्यभावस्याकारणत्वान्न तदभावात्कार्यानुदय इति शक्तिवैकल्यप्रयुक्त-
कारणासम्पत्त्या कार्यानुदयो वर्णनीयः । तद्वैकल्यञ्च मण्यादेरन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवसीयते ।
यदा चोत्तम्भकं सन्निधत्ते, तदा मण्यादेः कारणशक्तिवैकल्यापादकस्य शक्तिर्विकलीक्रियते ।
उत्तम्भकशक्तिरपि तदुत्त.... [म्भके] नेत्यव्याकुलः पन्थाः ॥

यत्तुक्तम्, मण्यादिः प्रतिबन्धः तत्प्रयोक्तारः प्रतिबन्धका इत्यास्थेयम्, इतरथा प्रति-
बन्धमकुर्वन्नेव प्रतिबन्धक इत्युपपद्यते (इत्यापद्यते?) इति, तत्रोक्तमेव **मीमांसाचार्य-**
पादैः—

वृद्धप्रयोगगम्याश्च शब्दार्थास्सर्व एव नः ।

तेन यत्र प्रयुक्तोऽयं न तस्मादपनीयते ॥

सिद्धानुगममात्रं हि कर्तुं युक्तं परीक्षकैः ।

न सर्वलोकसिद्धस्य लक्षणेन निवर्तनम्^१ ॥ इति ।

यद्यपि शब्दाभिधेयनिमित्तविशेषोऽस्माभिर्दुर्विवेचः, तथापि न सर्वलोकप्रसिद्ध-
शब्दप्रयोगोऽन्यथाकर्तुं युक्तः। सन्ति हि कतिचित्, ये तदर्थमपि न (?) विविञ्चते।
तथाहि—

उत्पत्त्यमानकार्येण विरुद्धः प्रतिबन्धकः।

तद्व्यापारः प्रसिद्धं हि प्रतिबन्धपदास्पदम् ॥

सिद्धवस्तुविरोधी घातकः। साध्यवस्तुविरोधी प्रतिबन्धकः। १कथं यदि कार्ये (यै?)
तद्विरुद्धत्वमिति चेन्न; इत्थम्। कार्यं कारणपौष्कल्ये भवति, तदपौष्कल्ये च न भवति।
अपौष्कल्यञ्च कचित्कारणानामन्यतमवैकल्यात्, क्वचिच्छक्तिवैकल्यादिति भिद्यते। यद्यपि
शक्तिर्न कारणम्, तथापि शक्त्यैव कारणत्वाद्विशेषणाभावेऽपि विशिष्टाभावन्यायेन कार-
णाभावः। तदुभयकारणेन^२ प्रागभावस्थिरीकरणात्कार्यविरोधीति प्रतिबन्धको भवति।
तत्र—

यथा कारणवैकल्यं दृष्टरूपेण कुर्वतः।

अभावः कारणं न स्यात्तथा शक्तिं विनिघ्नतः ॥

यो हि नाम प्रतिबन्धकः कारणं किञ्चिद्विनाश्य कार्यं प्रतिबध्नाति, न तस्याभावः कारणमिति
सिद्धम्। इतरथा कारणाकारणस्यापि कारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तथा तत्कारणस्येत्यनवस्था च
स्यात्। यथा हि कारणाकारणस्य कारणसन्निधानापत्तेः पर्यवसानात्संसर्गकारणाभावः, तथा
कारणविरोधितादात्म्येऽपि। तथा चाविरोधिनोऽपि तादात्म्ये कारणाभाव इति सर्वप्रतियोगिक^३
इतराभावः कारणमिति व्यापद्येत। किञ्चैवं कारणानामपि मिथो निरूपणे कारणतदभावा-

१. यदि कार्यभिदं, न तु सिद्धम्, तर्हि कथं तद्विरुद्धत्वं प्रतिबन्धकस्येति शङ्का.

२. कारणान्यतमवैकल्यशक्तिवैकल्यकारणेनेत्यर्थः।

३. प्रतियोगिकेतराभाव इति पा०.

भ्यामपि कार्यजन्मेति स्यात् । न हि कारणेष्वप्येकस्येतरतादात्म्ये तत्स्वरूपलभः । तथा च कारणतदभावाभ्यां कार्यजन्मेति न्यायसिद्धान्तस्सर्वजनहृदयङ्गमस्समर्थितो भवति । तस्माद्यथा, 'कारणवैकल्यापादकानां प्रतिबन्धकानामभावः कारणत्र भवत्येव, तथा कारणशक्तिवैकल्यापादकानामपीत्यभ्युपेत्यम् ॥

स्थितमेतत् प्रतिबन्धकस्य व्यापारः प्रतिबन्धः, न कारणाभावमात्रम् । यदि कारणाभावमात्रं प्रतिबन्धस्यात्, सर्वाभावः प्रतिबन्धस्यात्; सर्वस्य तत्र तत्र कार्येषु कारणत्वात् । सर्वप्रध्वंसकानां प्रतिबन्धकत्वमपि स्यात् । न च तथा कचित्प्रतीतिर्व्यवहारो वा जायते । न च.... [सहकार्य] भावः प्रतिबन्धः; सर्वसहकारिव्यावृत्तिलक्षणस्य तस्यासिद्धेः । अथान्यतमाभावलक्षणः, नैवमपि ; मण्याद्यभावेऽप्यग्नेर्दाहस्य वा भावे प्रतिबन्धपदप्रयोगादर्शनात् । तत्प्रध्वंस (सेः?) प्रतिबन्धपदं दृश्यते, यतस्सामग्र्या^१ एव घातकं प्रतिबन्धकं वदन्तीति चेन्न ; कार्यविरोधित्वेन प्रतिबन्धक इत्यत्रैवास्योपपत्तेः । इतरथा प्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोस्सामग्रीवैकल्यात्मना^२ अविशेषफणितिः (तेः?) किङ्कृतः प्रध्वंसे केवले प्रतिबन्धपदप्रयोगः ? ।

अपि च यदि कार्यविरोधो न विवक्षितः, किङ्कृतस्सामग्र्यभावे प्रतिबन्धपदप्रयोगः ? सा खलु कार्यवतीति कार्यविरोधात्तदभावः प्रतिबन्धो युक्तः । अतः कारणरूपतत्तद्वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रमुलङ्घ्य कार्यविरोधमेवालोच्य सामग्र्यभावस्य प्रतिबन्धक(?) त्वोपपत्तिः । न च सामग्र्यभावेऽपि प्रतिबन्धस्वरूपेण सम्भवति । अपि तु कार्यविरोधिव्यापारात्मनैव । प्रतिबन्धनिरूपणात् व्यापारः प्रतिबन्ध इत्येव हि तस्य नानाविधस्यापि सङ्ग्रहसिद्धिः ; सङ्ग्राहकान्तरायोगस्योक्तत्वात् । न प्रतिबन्धं निरूप्य तद्वेतुः प्रतिबन्धक इति साधीयः । अपि तु प्रतिबन्धकं कार्यविरोधित्वाल्लब्धात्मानं निरूप्य^३ तद्व्यापारस्य कस्यचित्प्रतिबन्धक(?) त्वमित्येव ; यथा समर्थ-

१. सामग्र्यभावेति पा०.

२. अविशेषादित्यत्र तात्पर्यम् । कचिदविशेषापत्तेरिति दृश्यते ।

३. तद्व्यापकमिति पा०.

त्वनिरूपणपूर्वकं सामर्थ्यनिरूप्यते । न हि शक्तिस्स्वरूपेण प्रत्यक्षा । शक्ते कारणे प्रत्यक्षत्वाय
'(क्षे त्वथः) १शक्तिः प्रतीयते तद्विशेषणत्वेन । कार्यविरोधित्वञ्च न पुरुषस्य साक्षात्सम्भवति;
कार्योत्पादविनाशसाधारणत्वात् । किन्तु स्वस्य वस्त्वन्तरापादनेनैव । यथा हि कारणाधिष्ठाना-
त्कारणत्वं भवति, तथा विरोध्यधिष्ठानादेव तस्य विरोधित्वमपि । ततो मण्यादेः कारणाभावत्वे-
ऽपि तावन्मात्रवेषमपहाय कार्यविरोधित्वं साक्षादभ्युपेतव्यम् । ततश्च तस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वसिद्धिः।
तद्व्यापारश्च प्रतिबन्धः । स च यद्यप्य (पि ?) दृष्टरूपेण किञ्चित्कारणं न विहन्ति, तद-
(दप्यः) तीन्द्रियं कारणरूपं विहन्तीति कल्पनीयम् ।

यत्तत्रोक्तम्, शक्तिनाशाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति; तत्राभिधीयते—

शक्तिर्ब्रह्मतीन्द्रियं रूपं यदर्थमुपकल्प्यते ।

तत्सिद्धद्यनुगुणं सिद्धयेन्न तु वस्त्वन्तरात्मकम् ॥

शक्तिनाशेऽपि हि शक्त्यन्तरोत्पत्तौ को दोषः ?[वैजात्ये कथं] कारणत्वमिति चेन्न;
शक्तिगतजात्यनभ्युपगमे तदभावात् । शक्त्यैव जातिः कार्यनियामिका, न तु शक्तिजाति-
रिति ।[प्रति]जात्याश्रयं हि विलक्षणा एव शक्तयः तदाश्रयानुरूपकार्यानुगुणा
इत्यास्थीयताम् ; यथा पुरुषस्सर्वसाधारण्येऽपि तत्तदधिष्ठानेन तत्तत्कार्यमसङ्करोण कुरुते ।
अथापरः कल्पः—

सिद्धोपकरणैः कुम्भो यथा २दण्डादिव.... [जितः] ।

स एव जायते पश्चात्तथा शक्तिर्भविष्यति ॥

प्रथमघटोत्पत्तिवेलायामेव दण्डादीनि कारणानि सन्निदधते । तस्य त्वारम्भक.... [विभाग]
परैकदेशोपचयसमनन्तरमाविविनाशतदुत्तरोत्पत्तिकल्पनायां यथा तज्जातीयस्यैव सिद्धिः,

१. शक्तिमिति पा०.

२. दण्ड्यादीति पा०.

एवमधिष्ठानदेशकालादीनि यानि परस्तात्सन्निदधते, तन्मात्रेण पूर्वमपि शक्तिसिद्धिरिति नानियतहेतुकत्वम् । अधिष्ठानशैथिल्ये शक्त्यनुत्पत्तिमपेक्ष्य शक्तिनाशवादः।....[अधिष्ठा] न-वैकल्ये पुनश्शक्तिसिद्धे शक्तिरोधानवाचोयुक्तिः । अथवा शक्तेषु भावेष्वेव व्युत्पन्नौ उत्पत्तिनाशवादौ । शक्तौ तु न तयोः प्रवृत्तिः ; वैकल्यवैकल्यशब्दयोरेव तत्र प्रयोगात् ।

अथवा सर्वभावानां किञ्चिद्रूपमतीन्द्रियम् ।

प्रभावस्तस्य सङ्कोचो विस्तार (विकासः?) इवेति युज्यते ॥

शक्तिरिति नार्थान्तरम् । तदेव हि द्रव्यं दृश्य (दृश्यादृश्य ?) रूपमिति द्विप्रकार.... [मभ्युपेयताम् ।] अन्यथा कथमयस्कान्तस्य दूरस्थायःपिण्डाकर्षणाहेत्वम् । न ह्यसम्बद्धं किञ्चित्कार्यं निष्पादयति । आकाशादीनां संयुक्तसंयोगादोनां सम्बन्धनिर्वाहकत्वेऽति-प्रसङ्गः । तस्य च रूपस्य शक्तिरिति संज्ञेति न कश्चिद्दोषः । दर्शनानुगुणकल्पनासहस्रमपि प्रामाणिकं भवति । तद्विपरीतं तु दृष्टमपि हातव्यमिति सिद्धं शक्तानामेव.... [हेतुत्व] मिति ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य

वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु

न्यायकुलिशे शक्तिवादो दशमः ॥

श्रीः ,

न्यायकुलिशे

भावान्तराभाववाद एकादशः



भगवल्लक्ष्मणाचार्यप्रख्यापितनयानुगाः ।
भावान्तरमभावं तु ब्रुवन्ति निगमैस्समम् ॥
अन्यश्चेत्यादिवाक्यस्थैरसदव्याकृतादिभिः ।
अभाववाचिभिश्शब्दैरामनन्ति हि कारणम् ॥
तत्राहुः पूर्वपक्षस्था न नञर्थस्य भावता ।
नित्यस्सप्रतियोगित्वान्न हि भावस्तथाविधः ॥
भावोऽपि नार्थो निषेधार्थस्तथेतरः ।
इति भेदेन नीतिज्ञा लक्षणं परिचक्षते ॥
भावभेदो निषेधार्थ इति वक्तुन्न शक्यते ।
यतस्सप्रतियोगित्वनिबन्ध....[विधुरो विधिः] ।
विधिगम्यस्य भावत्वमविगीतं हि वादिनाम् ।
ननु सत्यमभावस्यान्निषेधार्थस्स एव तु ॥
उपाधिरेव यः कश्चिद्भावरूप इतीष्यते ।
विशिष्टत्वादुपाधेश्च विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥
पृथग्भावात्मना सिद्धौ युज्यते भावरूपता ।
एवं हि लाघवेन स्यान्नञर्थस्योपपादनम् ॥

नैतदेवं ततो वाच्यमखण्डस्य विशेषितम् ।
 वदतामेव यद्बुद्धौ लाघवं प्रतितिष्ठति ॥
 विरम्य तिशब्दैर्यतो नैवोपपद्यते ।
 ततो नाखण्डशब्दोक्तिर्विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥
 संस्थानैकस्वभावानां देहादीनां तु वाचकाः ।
 यत्तं युक्तं वि (युक्तं यत्तद्वि?) शिष्टार्थबोधका युगपत्त्विति ॥
 भिन्नप्रसरवेद्यानां स्विष्टानां तु वाचकाः ।
 तद्विशिष्टावबोधा पा नैव शक्तयः ॥
 पदान्तार्थसमेतस्य यद्युपाध्यर्थता न तु ।
 तदस्वार्थस्तदंशस्यात्स भाव इति दुर्वचम् ॥
 किञ्च कोऽयमुपाधिस्स्याद्यस्य नास्तीति भाषणम् ।
 प्रतियोगिनि दृश्ये वा देशः केवलतां गतः ॥
 तद्वीर्वा केवलो बाध कालो देशान्वितोऽथवा ।
 अन्यः केवलशब्देन भावोत्तीर्णापरिग्रहात् ॥
 देश एव तदर्थश्चेत्पुनरुक्तिः प्रसज्यते ।
 नास्तीति च प्रयोगस्यात्प्रतियोगिनि सत्यपि ॥
 देशस्तत्रापि येनासौ प्रत्यक्षादिप्रवेदिनः ।
 न हि तन्मात्रता नास्ति मात्रशब्दो ह्यनर्थकः ॥
 प्रतियोगिविरुद्धश्चेन्नास्ति शब्दस्य भाषणे ।
 विरोधोऽर्थप्रयुक्तो वा शब्दमात्रगतोऽपि वा ॥
 आद्ये भूतलशब्द तुल्यार्थस्याविरोधभाक् ।
 भूतलव्यवहारस्य घटेन यदि बाधकम् ॥
 विशिष्टव्यवहारस्य सर्वस्य स्यादनुद्भवः ।
 शब्दमात्रस्य नार्थेन केनापि स्याद्विरुद्धता ॥

शब्दाभावेन साहित्यान्नासौ युष्माभिरिष्यते ।
 यदि नास्तीति शब्दस्य घटेन स्याद्विरुद्धता ॥
 घ (प ?) टो नास्तीति शब्दस्य (स्यात् ?) पटवत्यपि भूतले ।
 अथ सर्वेण भावेन नास्तिशब्दो विरुद्धयते ॥
 भूतलादौ घटो नास्तीत्ययं शब्दो न युज्यते ।
 यदा यत्प्रतियोगि स्यात्तदा तच्चेद्विरुद्धयते ॥
 किङ्कृतं प्रतियोगित्वमभावेन विना तव ।
 विवक्षातः प्रतिद्वन्द्वि नैवावतिष्ठते ॥
 असन्निहितमेवात्र प्रतियोगीति चेन्मतम् ।
 अभावस्सन्निधानस्य भवता स्वीकृतो भवेत् ॥
 दे [शान्तरे] ण सम्बन्धं प्रतियोगीति नोचितम् ।
 विभूनां सर्वदेशेषु निषेध्यत्वप्रसङ्गतः ॥
 विरुद्धप्रतियोगि ततोऽपि वा ।
 * * * * * ॥
 अन्योन्याभावनित्यत्वं सर्वतन्त्रे नियुज्यते ।
 न हि क्षणिकतन्मात्रविज्ञानेऽनादिताद्यपि ॥
 कालस्तु नास्ति शब्दार्थ ... [इति वक्तुं] न शक्यते ।
 यतस्सर्वत्र चैकस्सन्त्रस्या (न सोऽ?)स्तीति च बोध्यते ॥
 उपाधिभेदभिन्नस्य नास्ति शब्दार्थता यदि ।
 उपाधौ न नास्ति त्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥
 उत्पत्त्यादिरुपाधिस्तु नास्तिशब्दस्य बाधकः ।
 प्रध्वंसादिरुपाधिश्चेदेवमायुष्मतेष्यताम् ॥

अथ चेच्चरमः पक्षस्तव चेतसि विद्यते ।
 देशः कालेन संभिन्नः कालो वा देशवानिति ॥
 न चैवमपि यः कश्चिदनुवृत्तः प्रतीयते ।
 न कालमात्रयुक्तस्य देशमात्रवियुक्तता ॥
 कालभेदविशिष्टस्य देशभेदस्य वा यदि ।
 भेदः कश्चित्तदेवास्तु यत्नवद्विर्गवेषितम् ॥
 देशकालौ हि सर्वेषां यतस्साधारणौ स्थितौ ।
 ततः कस्यचिदेकस्य नास्तित्वञ्च न युज्यते ॥
 न ह्यभावं विहायान्यदसाधारणमिष्यते ।
 प्राङ्गणादिषु देशेषु प्रातराद्यन्वि....[तेषु] च ॥
 न व्यवस्थापनं शक्यमस्तिनास्तिप्रयोगयोः ।
 न चाव्यवस्थितो वाच्यः प्रयोगस्सार्वलौकिकः ॥
 व्युत्पत्तिव्यवहाराणां विसंवादप्रयोगतः ।
[उभय] त्रैव चाभावं भवानभ्युपगच्छति ॥
 स एव देशभेदस्तु कालभेदेन सङ्गतः ।
 नास्तिशब्दप्रयोगस्य गोचरः परिकल्प्यताम् ॥
 अतः परमभि [नत्व] मावयोर्गुणदोषयोः ।
 नैतदेवमभावेन भूतलादेर्विशेषणम् ॥
 न चापरस्य धर्मस्य परिकल्पः प्रतीक्षते ।
 यदा तु नास्तिशब्दानामंशभेदोऽभिधीयते ॥
 धर्मान्तरं तदामृश्यमन्यथातिप्रसङ्गतः ।
 न हि शौक्ल्यदिधर्माणामाश्रयस्यावधारणे ॥

..... मुद्दिश्य यस्याभावत्वकल्पनम् ।
तयोः परस्परं भेदो विरोधोऽप्यभ्युपेयते ॥
घटः खलु पटादन्यः घटत्वञ्चात्र नास्ति हि ।
..... त्याद्यभेदो हि न स्वरूपविघातकः ॥
ननु रूपं रसाभाव इति स्याच्चेद्विरुद्धता ।
नैवं रसाद्यभावेन रूपं यस्माद्विशिष्यते ॥
न विरोधः क्वचित्सिद्धयेदन्योन्याभाववत्तया ।
तस्य स्वरूपं भेदोऽपि भिन्नञ्चेति ह्युपेयते ॥
भेदत्वेन विरोधश्चेन्न द्रव्ये तद [सम्भवा] त् ।
न रूपिभ्यो रसो भेदस्सरसेभ्यश्च तद्धि नः ॥
अतद्वद्भयो हि तद्भेदो विरुद्धो भाव इष्यते ।
तादात्म्यं हि विरुद्धं स्यादन्योन्या [भावशालिनी]
..... तद्वतोऽपि भिद्यन्ते तैस्तैर्धर्मैस्तदुत्थितैः ।
उत्थितत्वञ्च तत्तेषां स्वरूपान्नातिरिच्यते ॥
प्रतियोगिकृतं तेषां [यदभावत्व] कल्पनम् ।
न ह्यस्ति सङ्ग्रहस्तस्य जात्युपाध्यन्तरोद्भवः ॥
गोत्वादित्यादिशब्दार्थो घटान्यत्वात्मना विना ।
एकीभूत मवगाहते ॥
गोत्वमात्रं तु विदितं न घटाभाव इष्यते ।
यस्मादेको घटाभावो गोत्वादिरखिलस्मृतः ॥
सरसं विरसं गोश्चैवमादयः ।
अन्योन्याभावतां याति विरुद्धत्वात्परस्परम् ॥

ह्रस्वमित्यत्र यत्पूर्वं परिमाणं प्रतीयते ।
 त्रययोगार्थं प्रतियोगिव्यपेक्षणम् ॥
 ननु जात्यादिनिर्मुक्तो नञर्थोऽर्थान्तरं भवेत् ।
 तदेव चेत्प्रसज्येत लक्षणस्यापि नैव ॥
 जात्यादेरुपाध्यन्तरमिध्यते ।
 तथापि न प्रसज्येत भावार्थव्यतिरेकिता ॥
 स चा [समु] दायित्वलक्षणः
 कस्माच्चिद्विन्नमित्येव सर्वस्य समुदायिता ॥
 भेदो धर्मस्वरूपं वा प्रतियोगिनिरूपितम् ।
 इत्थं राभावो भावान्तरतयोदितः ॥
 अस्माद्विधिनिर्पेधो वा यद्विशिष्टावलम्बनः ।
 तस्याभिसन्धिसम्पातः पर्यवस्येद्विशेषणे ॥
 तस्माद्भूमौ घटो नास्तीत्येवं वा जायते मनः ।
 विषयीकुरुते सेयं देशकालौ विशेषितौ ॥
 प्रतियोगिन्यवच्छिन्ने न स्यादनुपसङ्ग्रहः ।
 १ नञूपेण पूर्ववत्सर्वसङ्ग्रहात् ॥
 घटादिर्देशकालाभ्यां सङ्गतः प्रतियोग्यपि ।
 तथाहि देशा भिद्यन्ते प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपादिताः ॥
 नाना प्रातस्ताद्यैरुपाधिभिः ।
 देशकालौ तु यौ तत्र घटसम्बन्धमृच्छतः ॥
 तद्विन्नदेशकालेषु घटाभावत्वशब्दनम् ।
 ननु काले वा नास्तिधीर्भवेत् ॥

प्रातरेव घटं कापि नापरत्रेति लक्ष्यते ।
 देशेऽपि ह्येवमेकत्र कालभेदेन नास्तिता ॥
 तस्मात्तयो त्वेन विरुद्धयते ।
 सत्यमेवं तथाप्यत्र द्वयं नान्योन्यमन्वितम् ॥
 यद्यन्वितं भवेत्तच्चेत्सघटत्वेन सम्मतम् ।
 अघटत्वव प्रतीतिर्न प्रसज्यते ॥
 एकैकतस्स्थिते देशे काले वा सङ्गते ।
 एकैकान्तरभेदोऽसावभावः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥
 न ह्येकत्रैकदैवैकमस्तिनास्ति भात् ।
 देशान्तरं तदेवास्य नास्तित्वमवगम्यते ॥
 कालान्तरश्च तत्रैव देशे भवति नास्तिता ।
 द्वयं वा नास्तिता यत्र कालदेशान्तरे म ॥
 घटेन सम्बन्धाद्देशकालसमुच्चयात् ।
 भिन्नस्य देशकालस्य नास्तित्वमिति निश्चयः ॥
 प्रतियोगित्वं वादौ न घटे भवेत् ।
 न चैवं प्रतिपद्यन्ते घटो नास्तीति वादिनः ॥
 उच्येत न हि देशादौ स्वतोऽस्ति प्रतियोगिता ।
 ततो विवक्षा सा नाम लौकिकानां प्रतीयते ॥
 अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रतियोगी यथा घटः ।
 ए [कैकस्या] नुवृत्तौ च नास्तीति प्रतिपत्तिः ॥
 प्राधान्याद्देशकालाभ्यां प्रतियोगी घटो भवेत् ।
 देशकालान्वितश्चायं प्रतियोगीति गम्यते ॥
 घटमात्रस्य नास्तित्वं न कश्चिदवगच्छति ।
 नित्यानां परमाणूनां देशभेदस्तु नास्तिता ॥

व्यापिनामप्यनित्यानामभावः कालभिन्नता ।

.... [इह नास्तीति] बुद्धिश्चेन्नित्याणूनां न युज्यते ॥

नैवं तथैव निर्देशाद्धर्मस्य स्वात्मनोऽथवा ।

धर्मान्तरं [स्वरूपं वा] भेदो नास्त्यर्थ इष्यते ॥

स्वरूपभेदोऽप्यत्रास्ति भेद इत्यवसीयते ।

यस्तु स्वरूपमित्येव व्यवहारो यथा भवेत् ॥

धर्मिण्य [त्यन्तनिष्कृष्टेऽप्य] सौ विद्वद्भिरिष्यते ।

तत्रापि यदि धर्मास्त्युस्तद्वदत्रापि कल्प्यताम् ॥

अन्यैव दिशा वाच्या प्रागभावादिकल्पना ।

पूर्वो [त्तरौ तु यौ कालौ] भाविकालाद्विलक्षणौ ॥

तौ स्तः प्रागुत्तराभावादुपादानदशापि वा ।

गुणादिकर्मधर्माणां प्रागभावादिसम्भवः ॥

द्रव्याणां [नास्ति नि] त्यत्वात्तद्वद्वारा वोपचारतः ।

पूर्वोत्तरतया धर्मो प्रागभावादिसंज्ञितौ ॥

कालो वा तद्विशिष्टो वा तस्मात्सोऽपीति नापरः ।

.... [इत्थं] सर्वस्य नास्तित्वं भेद इत्यतिशोभनम् ॥

भावान्तरत्वमेतेन सर्वत्र प्रतिपादितम् ।

प्रतियोगिव्यवस्थानां न चात्रापि प्रसञ्जनम् ॥

घटादेस्तु पदार्थस्य प्रतियोगित्वकल्पने ।

प्रत्येकसमुदायादिविकल्पो नावकाशवान् ॥

भेदमात्रेण सर्वत्र व्यवस्थेत्युपपद्यते ।

एषभे वैरप्यवश्यमुपगम्यते ॥

अन्यथा न पुनस्सिद्धघेद्वावाभावविरोधिता ।

न ह्यभावेन तेनैव भेदस्यादाश्रयेष्वपि ॥

अन्योन्याश्रयतो नान्येनाप्यनवस्थिते ।
 अभावस्य विरुद्धत्वे भवेदाश्रयभिन्नता ॥
 नित्यं भिन्नाश्रयत्वे च भावाभावविरोधिता ।
 विरोधा यदि सर्वं दाश्रयभेदतः ॥
 अभावस्याविरोधस्याद्वेदाख्यस्य भवन्मते ।
 तस्य भेदान्तरापेक्षेत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गतः ॥
 नैतत्स्वरूपभेदोक्तावनवस्था ।
 स्वात्मनैव स्वभिन्नत्वे विरोधस्यात्तदात्मना ॥
 अथाभावस्य तद्रूपं यद्भावप्रतिपक्षता ।
 तेनाश्रयानपेक्षोऽयं विरो च्छति ॥
 नैवमद्याप्यसौ यस्माद्भावोत्तीर्णेन साधितः ।
 भावस्य पुनरस्त्येव तत्तद्रूपान्तरं स्फुटम् ॥
 न च भिन्नत्वमात्रेण नित्य वेत् ।
 तादात्म्यं हि विरुद्धं स्यात्स्वतो भिन्नस्य वस्तुनः ॥
 तस्माद्भिन्नस्वरूपस्य रूपं भावात्मकस्य वा ।
 अन्यतादात्म्यविद्वेषा त्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥
 स्वरूपस्याप्यभावत्वं त्वयैव काप्युपेयते ।
 यस्माद्भावेष्वभावस्य नास्तित्वन्नातिरिच्यते ॥
 तत्रापि चेत्तथा परिकल्पयते भवान् ।
 तथापि च तथेत्येवमनन्ताभावता भवेत् ॥
 अथ भावस्वभावस्य नास्तित्वन्नेति कथ्यते ।
 अभावाभाव वन्योन्याभाववर्जनात् ॥
 अथ भावाविवक्षा चेद्भावेषु क्रियते त्वया ।
 भावो नायमभावो वा एवेत्येवन्न युज्यते ?॥

अथ स्वरूपमात्रेण भावाभावौ त्वयोदितौ ।
 भावयोरेव किन्न स्यात्स्वरूपे तादृशं वचः ॥
 तथा सत्यप्रतीताद प्रसज्यते ।
 दोषश्च पूर्वपक्षोक्तस्सर्वोऽप्यत्र न दृश्यते ॥
 किञ्च भेदातिरिक्तश्चेदभावः कश्चिदिष्यते ।
 क्वचित्स्थितस्य चैत्रादे दिः कथम् ॥
 न हि प्रत्यक्षतस्सिद्धयेदन्यत्राभावनिश्चयः ।
 अर्थापत्त्यनुमानाभ्यामपि ज्ञातुं न शक्यते ॥
 न खल्वेकत्र सद्भावे भवेदनु ।
 प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीतत्वादितरैरप्यबाधनात् ॥
 एवञ्चानुपपत्तिश्चेत्सर्वत्रैषा प्रसज्यते ।
 यद्यभावाविनाभूतस्तं विना ॥
 तथाभि (पि) व्यापितैव स्यात्सा चात्रात्यन्तदुर्ग्रहा ।
 न हि व्यापकमज्ञात्वा व्याप्यत्वं जानते जनाः ॥
 व्यापकञ्चानुमानाच्चेत्प्राप्त^१मन्योन्यसंश्रयम् ।
 समीपदेशवच्चैत्रो नापरत्रेत्यथानुमा ॥
 नैतत्सप्रतिपक्षत्वाच्चैत्राधिष्ठि ।
 अथ देशान्तरे चैत्रो यदि भाविस्वदेशवत् ॥
 तत्रापि चैत्रकार्यं स्यादिति तर्कानुकूलनम् ।
 नैतद्देशान्तरे कार्यं ^२नास्त्येवात्रेत्यनिर्णयात् ॥
 [निर्णा] यक प्रमाणेन चैत्राभावोऽवसीयताम् ।
 कार्यस्य यदि विज्ञानं स्यादत्रापि च तत्समम् ॥

१. ज्ञातमन्योन्यसंश्रयः. पा०.

२. नास्त्येवान्योन्यनिर्णयात् इति पा०.

अर्थान्तरमथोच्येत हेतोस्स्याद्वद्यभिचारिता ।
 तथा देशान्तराभावः प्रत्यक्षो यद्यपि स्फुटम् ॥
 नैतावतापि दूरस्थस्तदभावोऽवसीयते ।
 अन्योन्याभावमात्रं तु सिद्धघेचैत्र ॥
 संसर्गाभावसिद्धिस्तु न प्रमाणवती तव ।
 यदार्थभावो भेदस्स्यात्स्वरूपोदेश्च भेदता ॥
 तदा देशान्तरे चैत्रो नास्तीति सुगमं भवेत् ।
 देशान्तरादिकं सर्वं चैत्रबुद्ध्या न गृह्यते ॥
 तद्विलक्षणबुद्धयैव गृह्यते तेन भिन्नता ।
 तस्मादभावस्सर्वत्र भेद इत्यतिशोभनम् ॥
 न (सः) च धर्मस्वरूपं वा यथासम्भवमिष्यताम् ।
 असद्वा इदमित्याद्या कारणालम्बना श्रुतिः ।
 अत एव हि मुख्यार्था नान्यथाप्युपपद्यते ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य

वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे

भावान्तराभाववाद एकादशः ॥

श्रीः

न्यायकुलिशे

शरीरलक्षणवादो द्वादशः

यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यं तच्छेषतैकस्वरूपञ्च तत्तस्य शरीरमिति लक्षणम् ॥

तत्र यच्छब्दयोर्द्वयं सप्रतियोगिकम् ; न तु गोत्वादिवदप्रतियोगिकम् , सर्वप्रतियोगिकं वा तत्प्रतियोगिकं वेत्यर्थः । सर्वात्मनेति नियमनधारणयोर्विशेषणम् , न शेषतायाः ; तत्रैकशब्देनैव तदर्थसिद्धेः । सर्वात्मने [त्यस्य] यावदात्मभावित्वेनेत्यर्थः । शक्यमिति नियमनविशेषणमेव ; धारणस्य नित्यानुवृत्तत्वाद्व्यवच्छेद्यासिद्धेः । स्वार्थ इति च नियमनविशेषणमेव ; धारणस्य कार्यप्रतियोगित्वानपेक्षणात् । अर्थशब्दो विषयवाची कार्यमाचष्टे । एतेन शक्येऽर्थ इत्यु [क्तं] भवति । अतश्चाशक्यगोचरनियमनानुपपत्तेरव्याप्तिः परिहृता । असम्भवो वा व्यवच्छिद्यते । चेतनप्रयोजनं स्वार्थ इति किन्नाश्रीयते ? शेषतैकस्वरूपमित्यनेन गतार्थत्वात् ।

ननु कोऽयं स्वार्थः ? यदि शरीरकार्यम् , त [दा] शरीरं प्रथमं प्रत्येतव्यम् । तत्प्रतिपत्तिश्च लक्षणाधीनेत्यन्योन्याश्रयत्वमिति चेत् , तत्र कश्चिदाह—लक्ष्यस्यात्यन्ताप्रतियोगि वयं दोषः । सर्वत्र हि लक्षणे लक्ष्यं पूर्वं प्रतिपन्नमेव, व्यावृत्तिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं लक्षणमपेक्षते । सा च प्रतीतिः कांश्चिद्वि [शेषा] नन्तर्भावयन्ति (न्ती?) कांश्चिच्च बहिष्कुर्वन्ति (ती?) सामान्यव्यवहारायापेक्ष्यते । अतोऽत्रापि लक्ष्यस्य शरीरस्य पूर्वमेव प्रतिपन्नत्वा तमेव स्वकार्यमिति प्रतीयमानं लक्षणवाक्येऽन्वयमर्हतीति ॥

नैतद्युक्तम् ; लक्षणवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । यद्यपि लक्षणान्तर च पूर्वं कस्य-
चिद्व्यक्तस्य प्रतीतिरस्ति, तथापि तस्य व्यक्त्याकारेण प्रतीतिर्लक्षण उपयुज्यते ; न तु
लक्ष्योपाधिविशिष्टतया । अत्र पि काममस्तु शरीरविशेषस्य पूर्वप्रतीतस्य
यथायोगमुपयोगः, तथापि लक्ष्यशब्दनिमित्तसामान्यरूपस्य पूर्वं [र्वं प्रसि] द्विर्नास्तीति
न तेन रूपेण लक्षणोपयोगो युक्तः । यदि च नैवं, कथं श (कथमशः?) रोरद्रव्यव्यवच्छेदः ?
कामं हि कुठारादिकमपि शरीरं विव त्वात् । तत्कार्येऽपि चेतनस्य कुठारं नियन्तुं
शक्तिरस्तीति तस्यापि शरीरत्वप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारः । एतदुक्तं भवति—यस्य शरीरलक्षणेन व्यव-
च्छेदः कार्यः यस्य वा सङ्ग्रहः तयोरशरीरत्वशरीरत्वे पूर्वं प्रतीते चेत्लक्षणवैयर्थ्यम् । अप्रतीते
चेत्, स्वकार्याप्रतीतौ लक्षणाप्रतीतिरिति । अतस्त्वशब्दो 'द्रव्यवचनः । तेनायमर्थस्सम्पद्यते—
यस्य द्रव्यस्य कार्यं [यद्वर्त] ते तत्स्वकार्यमिति । एवञ्च कार्यविशेषान्न नियन्तव्यमि-
त्युक्तं भवति । अतोऽसम्भवोऽव्याप्तिश्च परिह्रियत इत्येतदेव ॥

य...[येवं] किमिति चेष्टैव स्वकार्यमिति न गृह्यते ? उच्यते—प्रयत्नवदात्मसं-
योगासमवायिकारणिका क्रिया हि चेष्टा । नैषा शिलाकाष्ठादि...[पु सम] वैतीत्यव्या-
प्तिरेव । न च परमात्मप्रयत्नाधीनव्यापारो जीवः प्रकृतिर्वा ; ' यथा सन्निधिमात्रेण '
इत्यादिवचनविरोधात् । ' कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु ' इति च सूत्रम्^१ । न च स्पन्दाश्रयत्वं
विभूनामुपपद्यते । अस्पन्दे च कार्यावस्थामात्रे न चेष्टात्वप्रसिद्धिरिति यथोक्त एवार्थः ।

अत्रेदं चिन्तनीयम्—किमेतद्वाक्यमेकलक्षणाभिप्रायम्, उतानेकलक्षणाभिप्रायमिति ।
यदि ह्येकलक्षणाभिप्रायत्वं सङ्गच्छते, ततो (एकलक्षणाभिप्रायत्वं ततो?) व्यवच्छेद्यासिद्धेर्ल-
क्षणत्वासम्भवः । तथा च युक्तमनेकलक्षणाभिप्रायमिति । तथा हि—लक्षणत्रयमेतत् ।
तत्र यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यमित्येतत्सर्वत्र सम्पद्यते । सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं शक्यमित्ये-
कम् । सर्वात्मना धार्यमिति द्वितीयम् । तच्छेषतैकस्वरूपमिति तृतीयम् । तत्र यस्य
चेतनस्येति चैतन्यविशिष्टविवक्षया विशेष्यमात्रनियाम्यस्य धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य व्यवच्छेदः ।
यद्द्रव्यमिति शब्दादेर्व्युदासः ; तस्यापि स्वकार्ये चेतनेन विनियुज्यमानत्वात् । तन्मात्र-

१. प्राप्नोति पा०.

२. ब्र. सू. २. ४. ४१.

(तावन्मात्र ?) गोचरत्वान्नियमनशब्दस्य । अन्य...[था] महदहङ्कारादिष्वव्याप्तेः ; तेषामपि निष्पन्दत्वात् । सर्वात्मनेति कदाचित्प्रेर्यस्य परशरीरस्य व्यवच्छेदः । स्वार्थ इत्यतिप्रसङ्ग-परिहारः । नियन्तुमिति लक्षणधर्मवृत्तिः । (व्यक्तिः । ?) शक्यमित्यव्याप्तिपरिहारः, असम्भव-परिहारो वा । न हि किञ्चिदपि द्रव्यं सर्वं कार्यं सर्वदा कुर्वद्दृश्यते । एतावता लक्षणेन सर्वस्य शरीराभिमतद्रव्यस्य व्याप्तत्वादशरीरस्य च व्यवच्छेदादेतावदेवैकं लक्षणम् । तथा यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना धार्यमित्यपि ; यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं शेषतैकस्वरूपमित्यपि । कदाचिद्धार्याणां शिलाकाष्ठादीनां कदाचिच्छेषभूतानां राजभृत्यादीनाञ्च व्युदासाय सर्वात्मनेत्युपादानम् (इति ?) न कश्चिद्दोष इति । युक्तं चैतत्—न्यायसूत्रकारैरपि ‘चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयशरीरम्’ इति लक्षणत्रयाभिधानादत्रापि त्रयाणामेव लक्षणानामभिधानमिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—सत्यमनेकलक्षणत्वे सम्भवत्येकलक्षणत्रावकाशं लभते । तदेव तु कथमिति चिन्त्यम् ।

प्रथमे तावलक्षणे कुठारादिष्वतिव्याप्तिः कथं परिह्रियताम् ? चेतनेन हि देवदत्तादिना कुठारादिस्वकार्ये व्यापार्यते । अव्यवधानेन नियमनमिह विवक्षितम् । कुठारादिस्त...[तच्छ] [स्तु श] रीरव्यवधानेन हि नियाम्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि भूतवेत्ताळगर-ळादीनां मान्त्रिकशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः ; देवादिसङ्कल्पमात्रप्रव...[र्तिता]नां विमानादीनां तच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च । तदपि शरीरापेक्षमधिष्ठानम्, अशरीरस्य ध्यानाद्ययोगादिति चेन्न ; सौभरिप्रभृतीनां बहुशरीरवत्त्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तेषामपि ब्रह्मशरीरस्थात्मप्रभवज्ञानप्रसराधिष्ठेयत्वाच्छरीरान्तरस्य । तत्रापि तत्तच्छरीराधिष्ठानार्थस्य (न्न ?) चेतनस्य शरीरान्तरापेक्षेति चेन्न ; आत्मनः कचिच्छरीरे वर्तमानस्य तदनपेक्षज्ञानाधारत्वायोगात् । अन्यथा ह्यात्मनो यतस्ततोऽपि वर्तमानस्यादृष्टाधीनज्ञानजननाभ्युपगमे शरीरस्यावान्तरव्यापारता व्याहन्येत । न चाधिष्ठेयमेव शरीर...[म] वान्तरव्यापारस्तदसङ्गतमपीति युक्तम् ; शरीरसंयोगस्याविवक्षायां हृदयायतनत्वोक्तान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतयोऽनर्थिकास्त्युः ॥

.....[अपि चा] विर्भूतसत्यसङ्कल्पानां नित्यानां विश्वनियमनाधिकृतस्य भगवतो
 :विष्वक्सेनस्य च सङ्कल्पमात्रप्रवर्त्येषु तेषु...[ते]षु विमानादिषु चेतनेषु चातिव्याप्तिः । न
 हि तेषां स्वाभाविकसार्वज्ञ्यशालिनां शरीरापेक्षो ज्ञानोदयः । न च यत्नाधिष्ठेय...[त्व]
 मिह विवक्षितमित्युक्तम् । न च चेतनस्येत्येकवचनविवक्षया तस्यैव नियाम्यत्वं विवक्षित-
 मिति वाच्यम् ; जीवात्मशरीराणामेव...[परं] प्रति शरीरत्वाभ्युपगमात् । परशरीरस्य च
 परेण प्रेर्यत्वदर्शनात् । न च स्वकार्ये सर्वत्र ते...[न] नियन्तुं शक्यत्वमिह विवक्षितमिति
 वाच्यम् ; असम्भवप्रसङ्गात् । न हि यत्कार्यं शरीरेण सम्पादयितुं शक्यते तत्र सर्वत्र
 शरीरा(र?)प्रेरणं सम्भवति । भगवता वसुदेवनन्दनेन ताळफलपातनाय प्रेर्यमाणेष्वामुरशरीर-
 विशेषेषु दृढतरताळफलाभिघातक्षण.....वेगवत्क्ष(त्क्षे?) पणविशेषस्य तत्तदसुरात्मभि-
 स्सम्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । अतः प्रथमस्य नैरपेक्ष्यानुपपत्तिः ॥

तथा द्वितीयस्यापि यावदात्मभावित्वेन धार्यत्वस्य विशेष्यद्रव्यापेक्षया जीवशरीरे-
 ष्वव्याप्तेः ; अवस्थितापेक्षयापि सं...[योगाव]स्थावस्थिते कुठारादावतिव्याप्तेः । सर्व-
 साधारणसंयोगातिरिक्तसंस्थानविशेषावस्थितस्य धार्यत्वं विवक्षितमिति चेन्न ; वर्णात्मकस्य
 तत्...[दध्य] क्षात्मशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । साक्षात्सम्बन्धो विवक्षित इति चेन्न ; सौमर्यादि-
 नानाशरीरेषु तदसम्भवात् । सर्वप्रकारधारणमिह विवक्षितमिति चेन्न ; प्राणान्नपानादिकृत-
 धारणभेदस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् । चेतनस्येत्येकवचनविवक्षयैकेन धार्यत्वनिबन्धन...[परिहार-
 प्रकारः] पूर्ववन्निरस्तो विज्ञातव्यः । नित्यसंसारिभिर्नित्यप्रियमाणायाः प्रकृतेरपि तच्छरी-
 रत्वप्रसङ्गः । चैतन्यविशिष्टत्वेनैव धारणमिह विवक्षितमिति चेन्न ; प्रसुप्ते तदभावात् ।
 योग्यत्वेन विशेषणीयमिति चेन्न ; परशरीरस्य प्रविष्टशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तत्रापि हि शरी-
 रस्य योग्यता यावदात्मभाविनी । प्रविशतस्तु सहकारिभूतादृष्टाद्यभावादनधिष्ठानम् ।
 अस्त्रभूषणाध्यायप्रसिद्धनित्यसूरिधारणेषु पृथिव्यादिषु तत्तच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च दुर्निवारः ।
 अतो द्वितीय.....[लक्षणस्य निर्दोषत्वम्] पेक्ष्यमप्यनाशङ्कनीयमेव ॥

तृतीयमप्यवस्थितापेक्षया द्रव्यमात्रापेक्षया वेति पूर्ववद्वक्तव्यम् । असाधारणसं-
 स्थानविशेषवत्तयेति चेत्, प्राणेष्विन्द्रियेषु चातिव्याप्तिः । यद्यपीन्द्रियाणां कल्पावसानादवा-
 ग्निमुच्यमानैस्स्यक्तानामनधिष्ठानानामेव केषाञ्चिदवस्थानमस्ति ; तथापि शेषत्वं न व्याव-

र्तते ; तादर्थ्यस्य सहकार्यभावप्रयुक्तकार्याभावे चानपायात् । प्रकृतेश्च श्रुतिप्रसिद्धजीव-
पारार्थ्यायास्तच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः । न च भगवच्छेषभूतायास्तस्याश्लेषभूतत्वमसम्भवीति
वाच्यम् ; द्वारशेषित्वाज्जीवानाम् । इतरथा संसारिणामशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च
साक्षाच्छेषत्वे सम्भवत्यवान्तरशेषिद्वारानपेक्षेति वाच्यम् ; उभयप्रकारस्यापि श्रौतत्वेना-
वर्जनीयत्वात् । कल्पना हि ततो निवर्तते, न श्रुतिरपीति ॥

अतः प्रत्येकलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेर्विधेयत्वाधेयत्वशेषत्वानि समुच्चितान्येवैकं लक्षणमिति
वाच्यम् । अत्र लक्षणवाक्ये सर्वस्यैव पदस्य व्यवच्छेदभेदो नात्यन्ताय मृगयितव्यः ;
यतस्स्वातन्त्र्येणापूर्वं किञ्चिल्लक्षणमिह नोत्प्रेक्ष्यते । किं तर्हि क्रियते ? श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव
लक्षणमनुद्यते । तथा हि बृहदारण्यके श्रूयते—“ यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो
यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं, यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति, स त आत्मा अन्तर्या-
म्यमृत ” इति । अत्र हि यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमिति शरीरत्वं निर्दिश्य तत्कथमित्यपेक्षायां
यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तर इत्याधेयत्वं, यं पृथिवी न वेदेति शेषत्वं, यः पृथिवीम-
न्तरो यमयतीति विधेयत्वञ्च लक्षणमभिधीयते । यं पृथिवी न वेदेति कथं शेषत्वमुच्यते ?
इत्थम्—अवेदनेन साक्षादभिः...[हितेन पृ] थिव्यादेः स्वोज्जीवनप्रयुक्तस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तयो
व्युदस्यन्ते। परमात्मनो (हि ?) तदुद्देशप्रवृत्तिस्साक्षा...[त्परम्परया] वा पुरुषार्थ-
भागित्वात् । पृथिव्यादेः पुरुषार्थभागिनं कञ्चिदन्तर्भाव्यैवाचेतनेषु तदर्थोद्देशगोचरतया
कथञ्चिच्छेषि (ष ?) त्वनिर्वाहः । अत एव द्वारशेषित्वमेवाचेतनेषु परशेषित्वमिति तत्त्वम् ।
अन्यतरतादर्थ्यमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमाने नियमनादिसम्बन्धे परमात्मनस्सर्वज्ञस्य नियन्तुरमृत-
स्याचेतनपृथिव्यादिपारार्थ्यायोगात्पृथिव्यादेरेव तं प्रति पारार्थ्यमित्यवसीयते । विधेयत्वादीनां
हि ‘ सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे ’ इत्यादिविशेषणैस्स्वरूपं शोध्यते । अस्यां श्रुतौ हि न तेषामभि-
व्यक्तं रूपम् ।..... *

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य
वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीरामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे
शरीरलक्षणवादो द्वादशः ॥

श्रीः .

न्यायकुलिशे

॥ त्रयोदशो वादः

नन्वयमात्मा चेत्स्वप्रकाशः, स्वाभाविकसुखरूपादिभावात्संसारभावप्रसङ्गः । तस्य तिरोधानात्तदुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, स्वप्रकाशस्य कथं तिरोधानम् ? तथात्वे वा परार्थं (किम-पराद्धम् ?) परैः ; येन तिरोधाने स्वरूपनाशस्तेषामापाद्यत इति चेत्—अयमत्र विशेषः—निर्विशेषः प्रकाशः परेषाम्, सर्वशेषोऽस्माकम् । विशेषश्चानुकूल्यं प्रकाशस्वरूपाद्विन्नम्, यतस्सुखदुःखयोरनुगतः प्रकाशो दृश्यते । सुखमेवानुकूलम् । तत्रानुकूल्ये तारतम्यविशेषः अस्ति, मसृणं तीव्रञ्चेति । तत्र मसृणं सर्वदा प्रकाशते ; येन रूपेण देही देहादिभ्योऽतिविलक्षणस्सुषुप्तिविषयोऽपि स्वप्रकाशवृत्त्या साक्षादेवानुभूयत इत्युक्तम् । शास्त्रेण तु निखिल-सांसारिकदुःखतिरोधानं....(क्र ?) (क्ष ?) मः प्रत्यगात्मगतानुकूल्यविशेषस्स्फुट एवोपदिश्यते । तच्च विलक्षणमानुकूल्यमात्मनस्स्वाभाविकं स्वप्रकाशम्...[पि कर्म] णा तिरोधीयते । आत्म-विषयविशदज्ञानेन कर्मणः क्षये स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ; किं वा तदानीं धर्मभूतज्ञानविषयभावापेक्षं प्रकाशते । इतरत्तु मसृणरूपं पूर्वमपि प्रकाशमानं मसृणत्वादेव न सांसारिकदुःख-तिरोधानक्षमम् । एवञ्च सति धर्मभूतज्ञानस्ये (स्यै ?) व विषयान्तरवदानुकूल्यविशेषोऽ (पेऽ ?) पि कर्मणा सङ्कोच उपपादितो भवति । तत्सङ्कोचादेव प्रकाशवृत्तिसङ्कोचः । इदञ्च 'यत्र चैवात्मनात्मानं पश्यन्नात्मनि तुष्यति' इति शास्त्रादवगम्यते । विशदात्मविज्ञानविनष्टकर्म-सञ्चयस्य पुनस्स्वाभाविकस्वरूपमेवानवधिकमानुकूल्यमात्मनो धर्मभूतज्ञानगोचरतया प्रकाशमानं सत्सकलसांसारिकक्लेशं तिरोदधाति ; विषयान्तरवैराग्यञ्च विधत्ते । यदुक्तं भगवता

‘यस्मिन् स्थितो न दुःखेन गुरुणापि विचाल्यते यं लब्ध्वा चापरं लाभं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः’^१ ‘विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः । रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यत्र परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते’^२ इत्यादिषु ॥

यद्युच्येत—मानसप्रत्यक्षनिषेधात्पूर्वमननुभूतस्य स्मर्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च कथं धर्मभूत-ज्ञानेनात्मैना विशिष्टानुकूल्यं विषयीक्रियत इति—नैतत्—यतस्स्वाभाविकमेव धर्मभूत-ज्ञानस्यात्मधर्मभूतविपुलानन्दग्राहकत्वं विशदात्मानुभवविनष्टेषु प्रतिबन्धकेषु कर्मस्वाविर्भवति । प्रकृष्टादृष्टसचिवेन मानसेन वा गृह्यते तदानुकूल्यम् ; केवलं हि निषिद्धम् । ननु चात्मनस्स्वप्रकाशत्वे स्वाभाविकत्वे च तस्य, विशिष्टसुखस्वरूपत्वस्यापि कथमप्रकाशः ? न हि जडमपि किञ्चिदस्ति स्वरूपमस्येति युक्तम् ; ‘स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एव एवं वा अरे अयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव’ इत्यादिश्रुतेः । सत्यमेवम्, अजडस्वरूपस्वधर्म एवायमात्मा, तथापि स्वतस्सर्वगोचरस्य धर्मभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य संसारदशायां यथा कर्मणा सङ्कोचः, यथा च तस्य प्रसरणापेक्षस्य प्रकाशस्य सुषुप्त्यादौ तदभावादप्रकाशः, तथा स्वरूपानुकूल्यविशेषस्यापि धर्मभूतज्ञानविषयीभावापेक्षस्य तदभावादप्रकाश इति कल्प्यताम्, अप्राकृतद्रव्यवत् ॥

ननु कथं विषयीभावापेक्षं स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति । व्याहतं ह्येतत् ; नैरपेक्ष्यलक्षणत्वात्स्वप्रकाशत्वस्य । उच्यते—सत्यमेवम् । तथापि धर्मभूतज्ञानविशेषस्य स्वप्रकाशविशेषा-वादत्वादिदमुच्यत इत्यदोषः । ‘सुखमात्यन्तिकं यतद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम्’ ‘वेत्ति’^३ इत्येवमादिवचनानुसारेण तु विषयत्ववादः । स्वतस्स्वप्रकाशमालम्ब्य प्रज्ञानघन एवेत्यादि श्रुतिरूपपद्यते । तच्च रूपं मुक्तावेवाविर्भवति ।

अथवा जीवस्य सुषुप्त्यादिसर्वावस्थानुभवसिद्धं विशेष्यस्वरूपमेव सूक्ष्मज्ञान-विशिष्टं नित्यम् । अन्यत्सर्वमनौपाधिकमपि प्रतिबन्धकेन कर्मणा विनाश्यते । न चैता-

१. गी. ६. २२. २. गी. २. ५९

३. तेनेति पा० ४. गी. ६. २१.

वता आगन्तुकचैतन्यधर्मकताप्रसङ्गः । सूक्ष्मरूपेण नित्यावस्थार्यास्तुषुप्त्यादिकालेष्वनु-
भूयमानम(नस्या ?)पि सूक्ष्मतया विवेकानुसन्धानाभावादप्रकाशवादः । भाष्ये तु
“ अनुभूतेस्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमुक्तं तद्विषयप्रकाशवेलायां ज्ञातुरात्मनस्तथैव ” इत्यादिग्रन्थो
हि प्रसृतज्ञानविषयो न सूक्ष्मविषयः । आत्मनस्वरूपेण नित्यस्यापि धर्मानित्यता न
विरुद्धेति तत्र तत्र द्रष्टव्यम् । सर्वत्र सङ्कोचविकासावेवोच्येते, नोत्पत्तिविनाशाविति
चेन्न ; अविशेषात् । ‘ तिरोधानं नाम प्रकाशविनिवारण ’मित्यादिग्रन्थे हि तत्स्पष्टमनु-
सन्धीयताम् ॥

धर्मभूतज्ञानस्याप्रकाशमानस्यैव सद्भावपक्षे त्वात्मगतानुकूल्यविशेषस्यापि तद्वद-
प्रकाश इत्युक्तमेव ॥

यत एव स्वरूपे भासमाने तद्धर्मस्यानुकूल्य...[स्या] प्रकाशो युक्तः, अत एवान्त-
र्यामिणोऽपि कैवल्यमोक्ष(क्षे ?) सुखरूपत्वेनाप्रकाशोपपत्तिः । न हि कर्मयोगसाध्यावलो-
कनदशाया.....[मसौ न] संवेद्यते । ‘ यो मां पश्यति सर्वत्र सर्वञ्च मयि पश्यति ’^१ येन
भूतान्यशेषेण द्रक्ष्यस्यात्मन्यथो मयि^२ इत्यादिवचनशतं तु (शतात् ?) भक्तिसाध्याध्यक्ष-
वेळायामिवानन्तानन्दमयः प्रकाशते । तथा सति प्रत्यगात्मवेदनस्य भक्तिशेष...[त्वा]
योगात् । तद्वेदनं हि कर्मयोगादिसाध्यं विशदतमापरोक्ष्यापन्नं भगवदानुकूल्यप्रतिभास-
लक्षणभक्तिप्रतिबन्धकप्राचीनकर्मसञ्चयं विनाशयति । अतो भक्तिनिष्पत्त्यङ्गमित्यस्य (मिति ?)
‘ अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा ’ इत्यादिषु श्रूयते । यद्यपि च ‘ तेषामादित्यवज्ज्ञानं
प्रकाशयति तत्परम् ’ इत्यादिवचनानुसारेण वस्त्वन्तराण्यप्यसङ्कुचितज्ञानविकासयोगा-
स्तदानीं पश्यन्ति ; तथापि तेषां भगवच्छेषतैकरसत्वप्रयुक्तपरिशुद्धात्मस्वरूपमुक्तानु-
भाव्यानुकूल्याविष्कारो नोपजायते । यद्यपि चात्मावलोकनोपायभूतकर्मयोगज्ञानयोग-
योरपीन्द्रिया...[र्थमन आ] दि वशीकरणनिष्पाद्यतया तदर्थं भगवत्प्रपत्तिशुभाश्रयभूत-
दिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहध्यानञ्चोपदिश्यते, तथापि तस्याप्यन्ते स्वाभिलषितफलं प्रति प्रतिबन्ध-
कनिवर्तकत्वनिमित्तत्वाद्वाजभक्तिवद्देवतान्तरभक्तिवदैश्वर्याद्यर्थिभक्तिवच्चौपाधिकत्वमेव । न तु

१. नित्यावस्थानास्तुषुप्त्यादीति पा०

२. गी. ६. ३० ३. गी. ४. ३५

स्वाभाविकस्य भक्तिविशेषस्तदानी (षस्य तदानी) माविष्कारः ; तस्य परिशुद्धात्मा-
वलोकनेन वा बहुजन्मसञ्चितपुण्यविशेषपरिपाकक्रमेण वा विना दुर्लभत्वात् । न हि
विपाकिनिरूपणापेक्षः प्रेमा विपाकविरहेऽपि विषयाभावाः [भासाद्विनिवर्तते ।] स च
विषयेषु भवन्भ्रान्तोऽस्थिरश्च भवति । भगवति तात्त्विको नित्यश्च ; स्वरूपानुबन्धित्वात् ।
अत एव वस्तुनि प्रकाशमानेऽपि तद्गतभोग्यता तिरोधीयत इति कैवल्यमोक्षस्य भगवत्प्रा-
प्तिलक्षणा(णात् ?) मोक्षतत्त्वाद्भेदसिद्धिः ।

ननु केवलात्मानुभवकाले निश्शेषकर्मक्षयोऽस्ति वा न वा ? न चेत्कथं मोक्षः ?
अस्ति चेत्कथं स्वाभाविकभगवद्भोग्यतानाविष्कारः ? उच्यते । सांसारिकनिश्शेषसुखदुःखो-
पभोगसाधनकर्मक्षये स्वाभाविकप्रत्यगात्मगतानुकूल्यविशेषाविर्भावोऽपि सति अपुनरावृत्त्या
च मोक्षत्वोपपत्तेः । उपासनदशाविशेषाभिलषितमात्रस्यैव तत्कतुन्यायेन साध्यत्वाद्भगवति
भोग्यत्वस्य प्रतिबन्धक (कस ?) त्वादनाविष्कारः । यद्यपि च भगवत्प्राप्तिकामस्याप्युपासन-
वेळायामनन्तः [गुणविभूतिविस्तारस्यास्त्य]भोग्यता ; तस्य फलकालमात्रानुभाव्यस्य विशे-
षतोऽज्ञानादभ्यर्थनं नोपपद्यते ; तथापि सामान्यतो भगवद्विभूतित्वादिनास्तीति नानुपपत्तिः ।
न चैवमपि कैवल्यार्थिनोऽभिलाषोऽस्तीत्यनाविर्भाव एव । स्वात्मप्राप्यस्यानवधिकभोग्यस्य
भगवतः केवलोपायत्वाभ्यर्थनरूपा परा(?) ऐश्वर्यार्थिनो भगवति केवलोपायत्वबुद्धिवत्स्वात्मानु-
कूल्यविशेषाकृष्टचेतसोऽपि कस्यचित्तथात्वबुद्धिरिति नात्यन्ताय नोपपद्यते । अर्चिरादिना
मार्गेण गतस्य ' स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति ' इति श्रूयमाणा केवलात्मनिमेकत्वबहुत्वयोः
निरुपाधिकयोर्विरोधः उतोपाधिभेदापादितयोरपि ? न प्रथमः ; बहुषु प्रत्येकमेकत्वापादन-
प्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः ; संयोगविशेषस्यैवोपाधित्वात् । पञ्चाग्निविदो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरपि
ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रमित्यनुसन्धेयम् ; न तु ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवः । इतरथा ' योगिनामपि सर्वेषाम्
मद्भूतेनान्तरात्मना ' *

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्य-

नन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवांबुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु

न्यायकुलिशे त्रयोदशपादः ॥

न्यायकुलिशस्तत्संपूर्णः ॥

श्रीः .

॥ कैवल्यविचारः ॥

(मुमुक्षुष्पडिव्याख्यायां श्रीबालसरस्वतीकृतायां तात्पर्यद्वीपिकायां दृश्यमाना अधोनिर्दिष्टा एतद्वादसम्बन्धिन्यः कारिकास्तद्ग्रन्थानुवादेन प्रदर्श्यन्ते । यदि तत्रायं शब्दानुवादस्स्यात्तर्हि श्रीमद्वादिहंसाम्बुदाचार्यसूक्तित्वेन भाव्यताम् । यद्यर्थानुवादः, तथाप्येषामाचार्याणां कैवल्यविषयेऽभिमतस्सार आविष्कृतो भवति । तथा च तत्रानुपूर्वी—

“ वादिहंसाम्बुदाहारतु —

संसारे दुःखितो जन्तुरानन्दं परमात्मनि ।
तत्प्राप्त्युपायं तद्भक्तिं लब्ध्वा तत्रैव मज्जति ॥

‘ जन्मान्तरसहस्रेषु तपोध्यानसमाधिभिः ।
नराणां क्षीणपापानां कृष्णे भक्तिः प्रजायते ’ ॥

सर्वत्र चास्ति तत्प्रेम यद्वातृत्वनिबन्धनम् ।
अनिष्टान्तरहेतुत्वेऽप्यात्मनां कचिदेव हि ॥

‘ या प्रीतिरविवेकानां विषयेष्वनपायिनी ’ ।
सा यस्य देवदेवे स्यात्तस्य भक्तावधिक्रिया ॥

यस्य प्रीतिरसज्जाता स पुनस्तत्प्रसिद्धये ।
आत्मावलोकने यत्नं कुरुते तत्र कारणम् ॥

ज्ञानयोगः कर्मयोगः इति द्वितयमीरितम् ।
यः पुण्यपरिपाकेन पूर्वमेव जितेन्द्रियः ॥

ज्ञानयोगोऽधिकुरुते स्वशास्त्रेणावगम्य सः ।
प्रकृत्यादिविवेकात्मचिन्ता या तु निरन्तरा

केचिदादौ प्रवर्तन्ते तत्र पुण्याधिका नराः
अन्ये तु कर्मयोगेन पापकर्मक्षये सति ॥

सत्त्वोद्रेकाद्वशीकृत्य करणान्यधिकुर्वते ।
अथवान्तर्गतज्ञाने कर्मयोगोऽधिकुर्वते ॥

लोकसङ्ग्रहसौकर्यपर्यालोचनतस्ततः ।
नियमोपेतयोगेन ज्ञानयोगं विनैव तु ॥

पश्यन्त्यात्मानमित्येवमधिकारव्यवस्थितिः ।
दृष्टानुकूलमात्मानमन्यत्र विगतस्पृहः ॥

भोग्यभूतपरात्मानमुपायमनुसन्दधत् ।
तेनैव चापराधेन क्षये सत्यपि कर्मणाम् ॥

तिरोहितेशानुकूल्यस्स्वात्मानं भोग्यमश्नुते ।
तद्य इत्थं विदुरिति केवलस्यार्चिरादिका ॥

गतिश्रुतानुभूतिस्तु ब्रह्मणः प्राप्तिरीरिता ।
ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवनं केवलस्य यदीप्यते ॥

‘योगिनामपि सर्वेषां मद्भूतेनान्तरात्मना’ ।

‘चतुर्विधा भजन्ते मां जनास्सुकृतिनोऽर्जुन’

अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तस्तमाहुः परमां गतिम् ।
यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥

इत्यादिषु स्मर्यमाणस्सत्यप्राणविदोस्तथा ।
श्रुतश्छन्दोगशाखायां फलभेदोऽसमञ्जसः ॥

तदेवं भगवत्प्राप्तिः कैवल्यादतिरिच्यते ।
अथवा सर्वथा मोक्षः कैवल्यं कमलापतेः ॥

प्रत्यगात्मस्वरूपं हि तच्छेषत्वैकलक्षणम् ।
तथा शास्त्रेण विज्ञातं तथा चैवावलोकितम् ॥

तथैव चाभिलक्ष्येत प्राप्येत च तथैव च ।
विशेषणानुकूल्यञ्च न विशिष्टानुकूलताम् ॥

विहन्ति प्रत्युतैतस्या उपचायकमेव तत् ।
आजानसिद्धविज्ञानप्रसरे चानिवारिते ॥

आनुकूल्यतिरोधानमशेषेष्वप्रमाणकम् ।
कथञ्चापारकरुणानिधिरात्मप्रदो हरिः ॥

भक्त्यर्थं यतमानं तु विस्मारयति चेतनम् ।
उभयोरविशेषेण ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्श्रुतावपि ॥

आकारभेदवाच्यत्वकृतिर्वैरूप्यदूषिता ।
कान्ते कमलवासिन्याः केवलोपायता मतिः ॥

आत्मावलोकनादवाक् न तदात्मानुकूल्यधीः ।
यदा च सा तदा प्रीतिर्जायते भगवत्यपि ॥

केवलोपायताबुद्धिर्नास्तत्रोपपद्यते ।
यावद्भोग्यत्वसम्बन्धः परस्मिन्नोपलभ्यते ॥

तावज्जीवात्मनिष्ठायाः परविद्याङ्गतास्थितिः ।
यदा परस्मिन् भोग्यत्वं प्रकर्षेणानुपश्यति ॥

तदा तत्किङ्करस्वात्मविद्यैव परवेदनम् ।
अतो भेदोपचारेण ब्रह्मप्राप्तिगतिश्रुतिः ॥

भक्तिविज्ञाननिष्ठाभ्यां चिन्तनीयं पृथग्बलम् ।
अधिकारिव्यवस्थार्थमिदानीन्तनमीरितम् ॥

यथा फलैकताशब्दो न्यायश्चानन्यथास्थितः ।
न तथा फलभेदार्थाशब्दा न्यायाश्च सन्ति नः ॥

अयमेव पक्षस्समीचीन इति भगवद्भाष्यकाराभिप्राय इत्याहुः ॥

University Notes

The Ninth Founder's Day was celebrated on the 30th September, 1937, when Mr. N. S. Subba Rao, M.A. (Cantab.), Bar-at-Law, Vice-Chancellor, Mysore University, delivered the Address.

UNIVERSITY UNION.

The New Hall of the University Union was opened by Mr. N. S. Subba Rao on 1st October, 1937. Next he unveiled the portrait of Gokhale, the illustrious founder of the Servants of India Society, after whom the Hall was named.

Mr. T. S. Raghavan, M.A., who went to England as a Research Fellow of this University has joined duty after obtaining the Ph.D. Degree of the London University.

Reviews

Laboratory Manual of Organic Chemistry. By B. B. Dey and M. V. S. Raman. (G. S. and Sons, Mount Road, Madras), 1937. Price, Rs. 7.

It is not often that good books in science are written in India and the book under review forms a notable exception. Dr. Dey has been a well known teacher of Organic Chemistry in South India for nearly twenty years and it is no surprise, therefore, to see a good book on practical methods of Organic Chemistry born out of his experience during a number of years, published.

The book is divided into two parts, the second part being intended for the use of the more advanced student. As the authors remark in the preface, their book is an attempt at giving the student information both in qualitative analysis and preparative chemistry in one publication. This work is well performed, although it cannot naturally replace standard books in either of these subjects.

Special mention should be made of the excellent get-up of the publication.

K.A.N.

The Indian Tariff Policy with Special Reference to Sugar Protection.—By Bhasker N. Adarkar. Pages 161. Price Rs. 3.

The main thesis of this well brought out little book is that protection does not increase national income. The author cites the instance of the sugar industry in his support. Mr. Adarkar is a free-trader. He attacks the conception of constant exports assumed by Harrod and examines the problem of the sugar industry in India in the light of Keynes' ideas of protection and unemployment as propounded in his epoch-making 'General Theory'. But it has to be borne in mind that Mr. Keynes upto 1923 believed that the claim of protection to cure unemployment involves the protectionist fallacy in its grossest and crudest form; while he himself in his 'General Theory' accepts the protectionist theory with certain reservations. Keynes' contention that the restriction of imports will not increase home employment has been questioned even in his own country. Classical economists have always held strongly the view that tariffs lead to increased unemployment even within a short period. Turning to the Indian Sugar Industry Mr. Adarkar has nowhere succeeded in disproving the claims of men like Sir T.

Vijiaraghavachariar that Protection has led to increased employment in the Sugar industry in India. (Vide speech of Sir Vijiaraghavachariar on July 16, 1936 at the Annamalai University).

The author presents us with the trade figures for Java and would have us believe that as our exports to that country have fallen due to our restriction of imports, protection would have an unfavourable effect on our balance of trade. Apart from the dangers of laying over much of emphasis on figures of foreign trade of a country like India with a vast potential internal market, it must be pointed out that it is fallacious to argue the effect of a policy by taking figures relating to a single country. Our foreign trade must be reviewed as a whole and the general reduction in foreign trade throughout the world in a period of acute depression must also be taken into account. But more important than these is the change in the very character and contents of our foreign trade in recent years. We have maintained a favourable balance of trade, if not with Java, with all the countries taken as a whole, even though it is at the expense of a huge export of specie. It is acknowledged by eminent economists like Joan Robinson that a tariff has a favourable effect upon the terms of trade, and that in certain circumstances it may even be used as an expedient for increasing the balance of trade.

Again, the author maintains that protection has failed to be of much assistance to the Indian agriculturist. But on this point, the benefit to the agriculturist must be assessed not in terms of merely what the cultivator is realising from year to year under protection, but what he would have got if he had continued cultivating the traditional food crops. But even in the matter of cane it is not proved by the author that measures taken to secure to the cultivator in the absolute sense a more remunerative price have not been of benefit.

These are certain obvious inconsistencies in the thesis to which the reader is unable to reconcile himself. In criticising Barret Whale, he says "protection results in reduction of exports due not to a change in the conditions of supply but to a change in the conditions of demand." But it may be due to the latter also. For, in the very next statement he quotes with approval from Keynes that "The increased domestic level of costs will begin to react unfavourably on the balance of trade etc." Again, starting as an out and out free trader, with his major premise that even the reservations laid down by Keynes for a policy of protection do not apply to India, he finds no hesitation to admit that protection is quite all right when the Macmillan Committee recommends it in a certain form. As his thesis advances, when he comes down to concrete things he is more and more inclined to condemn the "high nature" of

Sugar duties rather than protection as such. He says that "A moderate level of protection might have secured these results" (page 115).

In such admissions his original thesis, drawn up by patient analysis stands glaringly contradicted. Nor can we follow his argument when he says "The people who are newly employed under the protectionist regime were not living on unemployment relief financed by taxation, but on loans from the moneylenders. Thus a good part of the earnings of the new industry may not be additional income at all." Does not the rate of spending by the community get reduced and will not that have the effect of increasing investments? Still again, on another place after denouncing tariffs as an effective remedy for unemployment, he wants us to accept that it is not the proper remedy for unemployment even though it could effect it.

Mr. Adarkar takes economists like Vakil, Munshi, Wadia and Joshi roundly to task with vehemence for their plea for the rapid industrialisation of India through a consistent tariff policy. For him industrialisation is apparently an "extraneous object, not coming within the sphere of 'pure economics'". They are advocating methods which are "not only ineffective but harmful". Lost in the meshes of the analytic economic web he has woven, Mr. Adarkar fails to notice the beacon lights of the truth of economic history. He has not put himself the question: "What would become of us in the absence of a fostered industrialism?". He has forgotten what tremendous progress countries like U.S.A. and Germany registered under the aegis of Protection. His conclusion is that the *Problem of Sugar industry* is essentially one of research. No doubt, we agree that our manufacturers have been very slack in this respect, and no doubt this is partly due to the fact that cane cultivation is extensive in an area which is not so tropically situated as *Bombay or Madras*. If it is only the object of the book to bring home to Sugar manufacturers the duty they have neglected, and the responsibility that lies on their shoulders for prospering at the expense of millions of consumers, we have no quarrel with the author. But that is altogether a different thesis.

"What a grain of theory can teach, mountains of facts cannot," remarks the author. But it is facts that determine theories and conditions which generate doctrines. Long period analyses are useful only in so far as long period tendencies reveal themselves in the statistics along with the short period movements. But as our eminent author says "in the long period, we are all dead". The success of a theory is the best criterion of its soundness.

B. V. NARAYANASWAMY.

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On a Significant Property of Postulate-sets

By

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INTRODUCTION

Purists in mathematical logic will undoubtedly be shocked at the attempt, to be made here, to couple pragmatism with the postulational technique. The former deals with practical conduct in the concrete realm, while the latter is concerned with the universe of abstract symbols, symbols so abstract that they have shed the last vestiges of significant connotation usually attached to them. We accept this delimitation of the fields of operation for pragmatism and postulationism; yet we shall attempt to show that there is an intimate but unsuspected *relationship between them*.

The postulational technique has been made popular recently through the writings of the pioneers in mathematical logic, of Whitehead and Russell (10, 13), and of Sheffer (11, 12), Lewis (5) and Huntington (4). Though the *Principia Mathematica* is an imperishable monument to the efficacy of the postulational technique, yet the credit for analysing the theoretical implications of the technique goes to the last group of writers, particularly to Sheffer and Lewis. Eaton (3) and Chapman (1) have also contributed, in a limited measure, to the development of the theory of the technique.

AXIOMS, POSTULATES AND POSTULATE-SETS

For purposes of our argument it is necessary to define three terms very clearly, namely, axioms, postulates and postulate-sets.

A very suggestive distinction is drawn between *axioms* and *postulates* in elementary geometry.¹ Self-evident truths, on which mathematical reasoning is founded, are called *axioms*, while *postulates* are 'requests' which should be granted before any mathematical demonstration can proceed. 'Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,' is an *axiom*: that a straight line may be drawn from any one point to any other point,' is a postulate which should be granted before Euclidean theorems can be proved. Not only is this distinction convenient, but it is essential to a clear comprehension of the mathematical method. Jean Nicod (6) sees no difference between an axiom and a postulate. He says,² 'The difference between a postulate and an axiom is only a matter of degree in regard to evidence, and does not exist for us because both, deprived of any fixed meaning, lack altogether any self-evidence.' As against this position, we maintain, that the distinction between axioms and postulates is fundamental. Nicod was keen on establishing the empirical foundations of geometry, and so belittled this distinction; yet even his unique purpose would have been served better, had he maintained the difference between axioms and postulates, and then showed that the necessity for the latter could be demonstrated only through empirical verification. That such a distinction is basic to mathematical reasoning is revealed by an interesting remark made by Huntington (4). In stating a set of postulates Huntington says³, '...but these laws are to be regarded no longer as 'axioms,' since they are merely blank forms, not in themselves either true or false, but rather as 'postulates' because we demand arbitrarily, that the system considered shall conform to these conditions.' Huntington is one of the small band of investigators of the theoretical foundations of the postulational method, and so his statements in this connection are of special value for us. According to him, *an axiom is true in itself, while a postulate is a proposition whose truth is arbitrarily granted for the sake of the consistency of the system to be built out of it.*

There is a certain property of an axiom, discussed by J. C. Wilson (14), which marks it out as distinct from a postulate. Discussing the intuitive nature of the apprehension of the truth of a proposition, which is axiomatic, and deprecating the distinction that is usually drawn between an axiom as intuitive and a demonstration as deductive, since every step in a deductive demonstration is seen in its proper relation to

1. Vide Hall, H. S. and Stevens, F. H., *School Geometry*, pp. 1 and 7.

2. Op. cit., p. 19 F.N.

3. Op. cit., pp. 3 and 4.

its preceding and succeeding steps only through an act of intuition, Wilson⁴ finally concludes that '....the act of thought in which we apprehend an axiom or a demonstration is exactly the same in kind.' An axiom is intuitively apprehended, while there is no such intuitive compulsion about a postulate.

Our conclusion is that :

AN AXIOM IS A SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH ; ITS CONTRADICTION IS INCONCEIVABLE. A POSTULATE IS A PROPOSITION WHOSE CONTRADICTION IS CONCEIVABLE, BUT WHOSE TRUTH IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SYSTEM WHICH IS TO BE DEVELOPED OUT OF IT.

An admirable definition of a postulate is given in the *Principia Mathematica*. 'Some propositions must be assumed without proof, since all inference proceeds from propositions previously asserted.....Such propositions will be called 'primitive propositions'.....These are to some extent a matter of arbitrary choice.'⁵ Postulates, then, are arbitrary, and challengeable, yet assumed to be true without proof. Different postulates, generating different systems (as in alternative geometries) may all be true of the same aspect of our experience.

A postulate-set is a set of propositions, such as the five primitive propositions and the three definitions of the *Principia Mathematica*, from which a complete and consistent system could be deduced. It is, as Eaton (3) points out, '....a short-hand description of formal or structural properties that would be compatible with one another in some system-actual or possible. These formal propertiesconstitute logical maps of systems ; and the logician pores over these maps, not to discover the actual terrain they may represent, but to see what principles of map-making they involve.'⁶

THE POSTULATIONAL METHOD

The postulational technique consists in starting from a postulate-set (having the characteristics to be discussed below) and drawing out of it all the logical consequences. We take a given postulate-set and ask, 'What, if it were known to be true, could be known about the truth or falsity of other propositions by reasoning alone, and without additional empirical information.' There is a wider application of the technique with

4. Op. cit., Vol II, p. 466.

5. Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 12.

6. Op. cit., p. 474.

which we are not concerned, but which we may state here in the words of Lewis and Langford (5). 'Here,.....we propose to deal with the logical consequences of a set of premises in another and more general way. We shall write down a set of conditions and then define, in connection with the set, an infinite class of properties, with a view to showing that each member of this infinite class is logically dependent upon the set in question, in the sense that either it or its contradictory is a logical consequence of the set.'⁷

Since the postulate-set is the starting point for the postulational technique we have to enquire what the conditions are which the set should satisfy. Eaton (3) remarks that, 'It is not enough to trust to our intuitions of what would be true as principles of logic, and to write these principles down haphazardly. We must find some systematic mode of procedure that will enable us to derive as *theorems* from a few *primitive propositions* or postulates all the general truths . . .'⁸ Our intuitions are helpful only in connection with axioms; in dealing with postulates we want certain universal principles for our guidance. What, then, are these principles? These principles may be summed up in a single sentence; the elements constituting the postulate-set should be (1) consistent, (2) sufficient, (3) independent and (4) as few as possible. Self-evidence is sometimes added as a last characteristic of the postulate sets, but is not insisted on, as it leads to several difficulties (one of which is that it obliterates the distinction between an axiom and a postulate).

The constituent propositions of a postulate-set should, in the first place, be consistent, that is, they should not contradict one another. In the second place they should be complete and comprehensive. No recognisable principle belonging to the system should be outside the scope of their deductions. Thirdly no postulate should be deducible from the others of the same set. Superfluity should be strictly avoided; and this leads us on to the last requirement that the postulates should be as few as possible.

POSTULATES AND HYPOTHESES.

We now hasten to state the most important point of this paper. Let us compare the requirements of a postulate-set with the requirements of an inductive hypothesis. The conditions which a good hypothesis is to satisfy are five in number; consistency, relevancy, sufficiency, parsimony and clearness.

7. Op. cit. p. 398.

8. Op. cit., p. 365.

A hypothesis should be conceivable, that is, it should involve no self-contradiction. Besides it should not contradict other hypotheses which have already been established as laws, and have thus entered into the system of scientific knowledge. (There is, of course, an exception to this requirement under certain extra-ordinary circumstances). The hypotheses should not violate the law of contradiction. The criteria of relevancy and sufficiency demand that the hypothesis under investigation should have a direct bearing on the facts to be explained, and that it should cover all the known facts. The requirement of parsimony is only one aspect of the general insistence on simplicity characteristic of the scientific method as a whole. Hypotheses should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The last requisite is self-evident.

When we place the requirements of a postulate-set by the side of the criteria of an inductive hypothesis, we discover a resemblance, *hitherto unnoticed*, a resemblance, we say, that amounts to identity. The obligation of conformity to the law of contradiction is laid upon both postulate-sets and hypothesis; both should be relevant to the task on hand, and neither should fail to take account of any element of the system they are dealing with. Absence of superfluity and the greatest parsimony are demanded of both.

It would be hardly true to say that this remarkable resemblance is the result of anything but a community of nature. The resemblance is an index of a deep-lying unity in the aim of the postulational and hypothetical technique.

Reasoning, let it be remembered, is a problem solving activity. Contemporary psychology has demonstrated, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the human mind reasons only when there is a pressing need for resolving a doubt situation. The arousal of a doubt, its resolution through reasoning and the final satisfaction secured through action guided by such resolution, are highly pragmatic activities. The general theory of scientific method⁹ tells us that, in such activities, there are four stages as outlined below :

1. The observation of facts and the formulation of a tentative explanation of facts called hypothesis,
2. Development of the hypothesis,

9. Pragmatism has been very widely misunderstood. It is nothing but the generalised philosophical form of the theory underlying the practice of scientific method. It is in this sense that the term and its adjective are used throughout this paper.

3. Verification of the results of 2,

and 4. final acceptance, rejection or modification of 1. Now, the postulational technique which we have been considering is an integral part of the empirical hypothetical method of science constituting, as it does, only the second of the four stages mentioned above. It is now plain that the whole edifice of deduction, with all its admirable extensions and modifications, has been erected in the interests of just one (the second) stage of the needs of science. The postulational method must, therefore, find its natural culmination and its only justification in the larger method of which it is but a part. In the interests of specialisation, which has become inevitable with the enormous development of human knowledge, it is necessary to isolate the second stage, and study it by itself. Such isolated study has produced various types of logistics. But we should not lose sight of the wood for the trees.

We have shown that the postulational technique has important affiliations with the hypothetical technique, and in spite of its high degree of refinement and accuracy, is only a stage in the latter. Both in its origin and in its course of development it has important points of contact with the empiricism of science. We have gone further and asserted that the former can find the fulfilment of its natural purpose only in the latter. Hence the pragmatic test of the latter serves as the supreme test, either directly or indirectly, for the former too.

SOME MATHEMATICAL LOGICIANS ON THE POSTULATIONAL TECHNIQUE.

The self-sufficient and self-contained nature of postualtionism may be seriously disputed if we follow carefully the arguments advanced by Ramsey (8) in his paper on 'Mathematical Logic'. Speaking about the development of Mathematical logic since the publication of the *Principia Mathematica*, he there¹⁰ points out that Hilbert has shown that higher mathematics may be regarded as a sort of game involving the 'manipulation of meaningless symbols according to fixed rules.' What, then, is the use of such a game? Ramsey asks, 'What *use or merit* there is in this game the mathematician plays, if it is really a game and not a form of knowledge...? That he should ask for use or merit of the game points immediately to the ultra-mathematical consideration even in formulating the question; but the answer given is still more significant. '...the only answer which is given is that some of the mathematician's formulae have or can be given meaning, and if these can be proved in the symbolic

10. Op. cit., pp. 63-81.

form their meaning will be true.' We would put it the other way: if these meanings are true then the operation is valid. The moment we speak of meaning, we leave the realm of abstraction and enter into the concrete pragmatic realm.

Ramsey examines Hilbert's and Weyl's definitions of general and existential propositions, then attempts to amend that definition in the light of Wittgenstein's theory of propositions in general, and finally makes use of Whitehead and Russell's theory of types to get out of the difficulty involved in designating the distinguishing characteristic of logical propositions (specially the primitive propositions of the *Principia Mathematica*) as tautological. Yet he concludes his paper with a very pessimistic note. '... although my attempted reconstruction of the view of Whitehead and Russell overcomes, I think, many of the difficulties, it is impossible to regard it as altogether satisfactory.' This note of pessimism need not have been sounded, if Ramsey had pushed further than the traditional limits, and entered the realm of the pragmatic test for mathematical operations.

In the course of the analysis of the contradictions which he is attempting to resolve, Ramsey (9) speaks of the psychological contradictions. '... the second set of contradictions are none of them purely logical or mathematical but all involve some psychological terms, such as meaning, defining, naming or asserting.' It is possible to rule out these contradictions as belonging to the realm of meta-mathematics, but that they should have entered into a pure mathematical discussion is, in itself, significant. They point to the only way of overcoming the difficulty, namely, the way of the pragmatic test.

In the brilliant, but incomplete work of Jean Nicod (6), we get the necessary emphasis on the fruitfulness of applying logical and mathematical systems to the empirical world. It is true that Whitehead, using the method of 'extensive abstraction' works back from completed mathematical systems to entities analogous to sense perception, while Nicod starts from perceptual data and evolves various kinds of geometry. In the perface to 'The Foundations of Geometry and Induction' Russell remarks that Nicod 'made progress of the highest importance', by 'manipulating the psychological data in such a way that we may build logical constructions that approximately satisfy the axioms of physical geometry.' But the significant point is this: if, as Nicod says, 'Geometry does not come into nature before physics, but really through physics from whose more general canvas it abstracts its own perspective . . . ' and if 'its sensible truth is no other than that of the group of physical propositions that contain it' and if physics 'attains certainty or pro-

bability only to the degree in which experience verifies its findings,'¹¹ then the primitive principles which we obtain through abstraction, and which become later the starting point for the postulational method, certainly clamour for verification in experience if they are to give us any satisfaction. This contention of ours is strengthened further by the attitude which Nicod takes up in his article on 'Mathematics' in the twelfth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. He there says, '*It may be pointed out that the motive for the choice of these premises, as well as for drawing certain consequences preferably to others, must lie in the region of possible meanings which mathematics itself ignores....*' '*.... it is clear that some of the possible and indefinite meanings of the mathematical terms and axioms are of fundamental importance in the fabric of the world. What are these meanings, and how do we know that they satisfy this or that set of axioms? Not even the 'pure' mathematician can wholly ignore this question; for the compatibility (or independence) of two given formal premises can be proved only by discovering some meaning which makes both premises true (or one true, and the other false).*'^{11a}

Ramsey's and Nicod's arguments, Nicod's more than Ramseys, stress the need for an empirical verification of the conclusions of the postulational method.

Huntington (4) too stresses the usefulness of the empirical test for postulates. He says, 'Any set of consistent postulates might be used as the basis of an abstract deductive theory, but only those sets of postulates are worth studying which are capable of some interesting concrete interpretation.'¹²

To strengthen our hands further, we may appeal to Wilson (14). In part *iv* of Statement and inference, Wilson¹³ restates the usual defence of the identity of the aim of inductive and deductive inference. His re-statement is refreshingly original and is accepted by us. When we combine this view with Wilson's insistence on intuition¹⁴ in his analysis of deductive inference, we find that the method used for testing inductive conclusions, is the only available method for testing the postulational conclusions too.

In a closely reasoned out paper on 'The Nature of Rigorous Demonstration' Dubs (2) points out the futility of self-sufficient deduction. He

11. Op. cit., pp. 12-21.

11-a. *Italics ours.*

12. Op. cit., p. 4. F. N.

13. Op. cit., pp. 578-583.

14. Op. cit., p. 465.

there shows that 'a rationalism which depends solely upon deduction from a small number of propositions is impossible', because each step of the deduction requires validating propositions which have to be established by non-deductive or empirical means.

THE ORIGIN OF POSTULATES

When we examine the actual origins of the postulate-sets, we discover the operation of empirical considerations in the choice of primitive propositions. There are no rules as to which postulates are to be chosen in any given case. There are conditions of good postulate-sets, but no statable principles as to how we are to make a postulate-set. It is the interest of the author, the purpose he has in view, his imagination, learning and talent, that govern the choice of postulates. '... what motives', asks Nicod (6), could have impelled the author to write it. Perhaps it was the unique charm of the logical adventure, the singular pleasure of deducing the implications of a group of propositions chosen-like the rules of games of mental entertainment for the sake of the diversity and harmony of their consequences. Perhaps, on the contrary, the author has tried to imitate nature by making axioms in accordance with natural objects.¹⁵

We discover, therefore, the powerful nature of empirical consideration in the very origin of postulates.

We have drawn, at the beginning of this paper, a clear distinction between axioms and postulates. The significance of that distinction is now to be examined. An axiom by itself is utterly barren. To make it yield results, we have to assume certain postulates and apply the method of deduction to the latter. How are we to assure ourselves of the truth of the conclusion of this deduction except through empirical verification, unless we are going to satisfy ourselves with the barren meaningless conclusions which are avowedly neither true nor false. Huntington (4), it is true, points out that the only way of maintaining rigour of deduction and of avoiding the danger of reading unconsciously into the steps of deduction more than what is justified by the postulates (because our mind is familiar with the subject matter of the symbols dealt with) is 'to deprive the symbols of all significant connotation and make them bare forms.'¹⁶ But if the forms are so completely empty as demanded by Huntington then no kind of deduction would be possible. Absolute silence is the only course left open for the purist in rigorous deduction.

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show that the pragmatic test is necessary for the conclusions of the postulational technique, and that the self-sufficiency of the latter is an artificial barrier which should be broken down without any hesitation. This conclusion we have sought to establish by examining (1) the implications of the distinction drawn between axioms and postulates, (2) the nature of the origins of postulate-sets and (3) the remarkable coincidence between the criteria of inductive hypotheses and postulate-sets. The last point is the most important, and the most significant one in the paper. The coincidence, we contend, is the result of deep-lying unity of purpose running through both. We have drawn attention to the fact that the postulational method is only a single stage in the larger empirical hypothetical method of science. It is, therefore, to find its fulfilment in, and is to be subjected to the same empirical tests as, the complete inductive method. Finally we have sought to support our contention by drawing upon the writings of accredited authorities on mathematical logic.

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The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Rhacophorus Maculatus*, Bouleng.

By

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INTRODUCTION

While I was engaged in embryological studies on *Rhacophorus maculatus*, Mr. R. V. Seshaiya under whose supervision I was carrying on my investigations, suggested to me that there might be a difference between *Rana* and *Rhacophorus* in the development and fate of the gill-chambers. This aspect in *Rhacophorus* has not been studied so far. Previous work on this subject was mainly carried on *Rana*. Balfour (1881) in his "comparative embryology" gave an account of the formation of the operculum in *Rana*. But this description is very vague regarding the manner in which the communication between the right and left gill-chambers is effected. Marshall (1882) gave a clear and complete description of their development in *Rana*. He pointed out that the opercular fold grows backwards and fuses with the body wall on the right and ventral surfaces while an opening is left on the left side. He also stated that the left anterior limb is liberated partly through the spiracle or primary branchial aperture. Latter (1923) suggested that branchial respiration is carried on side by side with lung respiration till the complete disappearance of the tail. He found the secondary branchial chambers acting as exits for the branchial current. Helft (1926) does not attribute any respiratory function to these secondary branchial apertures. He regards them, as mere openings sub-serving the liberation on the anterior limbs. Further he does not mention whether the spiracle or primary branchial aperture is also concerned in the liberation of the anterior limb or not. The investigations of Brock (1929-30) have confirmed the findings of Marshall (1902) and Latter (1923).

MATERIAL AND METHOD

Most of the earlier stages were supplied to me by Mr. R. V. Seshaiya who collected them some years back. For the advanced stages the tadpoles were reared in the laboratory itself from egg masses collected with in the university area. The metamorphosis was considerably speeded up by transferring the tadpoles to open air tanks in the university gardens.

The material was fixed in Bouin's fluid. It was washed in 70% alcohol till the yellow colour was completely removed. After dehydration and clearing in cedarwood oil the material was embedded in the usual way. In the case of older stages where the skull formation has started the material was kept in 2.5% nitric acid in 70% alcohol for 15 days and subsequently washed in 70% alcohol till the acidity was completely removed. In the case of the older stages cold impregnation with xylol and paraffin was also employed. In all cases, transverse, longitudinal and saggital sections of 10 to 12 μ were cut. All most all the sections were stained in Delafield's haematoxylin with cosin as counter stain. Some of the sections were also stained in Iron-alum-hoematoxylin.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FATE OF THE GILL-CHAMBERS

A. Formation of the operculum and spiracle or the primary branchial aperture :—

The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and ventral surface of the head region, just in front of the gill-clefts. In Fig. 1. the opercular fold (O.F.) has grown over the gills (G) and the right




Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.

and left gill chambers are formed (R.G.C. & L.G.C.). On the ventral side the operculum is fused with the body wall (B.W.) of the tadpole. The free edge of the operculum does not grow uniformly. Its growth on the right and left side is quicker than on the ventral side. In Fig. 2. the right and left sides of the opercular fold (R.O.F. & L.O.F.) are projecting down freely. The gill-chambers (R.G.C. & L.G.C.) are open below. The ventral portion of the opercular fold which lags behind is not shown.

The growing edge of right side of the operculum differs from that of the left. On the left side the central portion does not keep pace with the upper and lower portions. Ultimately when the opercular fold fuses with the body wall behind, a funnel shaped opening (P.B.A.) the primary branchial aperture or spiracle leading into the gill-chamber of its side (L.G.C.). The growth of the right side of the operculum is uniform and the free edge fuses completely with the body wall behind. As a result no opening leading into the right gill-chamber is formed. In Fig. 4 the ventral portion of the fold (V.O.F.) has also come up. But this does not now fuse with the body wall. On the left side the operculum (L.O.F.) shows a break in the centre. This is due to the lagging behind of that region of the fold. The right edge of the fold (R.O.F.) is uniform.




Fig. 3.

The opercular fold on the ventral side (V.O.F. Figs. 3, 4) which to begin with lags behind soon grows backwards. In the anterior region it is fused with the body wall of the tadpole so that the right gill-chamber (R.G.C.) is completely separated from the left one (L.G.C.). Posteriorly the ventral region of the fold does not fuse with the body wall for a short distance and in this region the left and right gill-chambers communicate with one another. This passage is the ventral

communicating channel (V.C.C.), Just behind this passage ventral region along with the right and left portion of the opercular fold fuses with the body wall of the tadpole. Figs. 3, 4 shows the ventral communication (V.C.C.). In Figs. 5 and 6 the opercular fold (O.F.)




Fig. 4.




Fig. 5.




Fig. 6.

has once again fused with the body wall (B.W). In Figs. 4 and 5 the primary branchial aperture (P.B.A.) is shown.

At this stage the branchial cavity consists of right and left gill-chambers (R.G.C. & L.G.C.) separated from one another anteriorly and communicating with each other by means of the ventral communicating channel (V.C.C.) posteriorly. The two chambers communicate with the exterior by a single opening—the primary branchial aperture (P.B.A.) on the left side. This condition continues till the hind legs are completely formed and the fore legs become evident.

I.M.M.




Fig. 7.

B. Formation of the secondary branchial apertures :—

As the anterior limb buds are formed the primary branchial aperture shows slight narrowing. The anterior limbs are budded off from the dorsal walls of the branchial chambers and remain there till they are completely formed. In this stage the developing limbs fill up the greater portion of the right and left gill-chambers and press against the outer walls of the chambers (Fig. 7 R.A.L. & L.A.L.). By this time the lungs are also formed and the respiration is both by lungs and gills.

When the anterior limbs are completely developed the right limb is liberated by the histolysis of the operculum in that region. After the emergence of the limb the rupture of the operculum does not close up completely, but leaves a crescentic perforation at the base of the limb (Figs. 8 and 9, R.S.B.A. and L.S.B.A.). This is the secondary branchial aperture of the right side.

Now the emergence of the left anterior limb is mainly through the primary branchial aperture and to some extent by the histolysis of the operculum. In this case also an aperture—the left secondary branchial aperture (L.S.B.A.) is formed at the base of the limb. In almost all the tadpoles I have examined the left secondary branchial aperture

is slightly larger than the right (Fig. 8, L.S.B.A. & R.S.B.A.). The right one is formed completely from the histolysis of the operculum while the left one is formed partly from the histolysis of the operculum and partly from the primary branchial aperture.




Fig. 8.

Helft (1926) has stated that these secondary branchial apertures are formed from the histolysis of the operculum in *Rana*. He does not show whether the primary branchial aperture contributes to the formation of the left perforation or not. Further he is silent regarding the manner in which the primary branchial aperture closes and its role in the liberation of the anterior limb of its side. Marshall (1882) and Brock (1929-30) though they have clearly stated that the primary branchial aperture is largely responsible in bringing about the emergence of the left anterior limb, yet they have not pointed out whether it contributes to the formation of the left secondary branchial aperture in *Rana*.

Latter (1923) and Brock (1929-30) have observed that branchial respiration along with respiration by lungs takes place even after the fore limbs have appeared. They have noticed the importance of the secondary branchial apertures which serve as exits for the branchial current. My findings are in complete confirmity with their observations. Helft (1926) however does not subscribe to this view.

C. The fate of the gill-chambers and secondary branchial apertures :—

Just after the formation of the secondary branchial apertures the opercular fold in the region of the ventral communicating channel (V.C.C.) grows upwards in the form of a median ridge and fuses with the body wall of the tadpole. The right and left gill-chambers are now completely separated from one another and each chamber communicates with the exterior independently by means of the secondary branchial aperture of its side (Fig. 9). It has not been pointed out in *Rana* by any previous worker at what stage exactly the ventral communication between the right and left gill-chambers is closed.

The above observation in *Rhacophorus* is of special interest. Huxley (quoted by Balfour; 1881) described the presence of a right and a left spiracle or primary branchial aperture in *Dactylethira*. But whether there exists a ventral communication between the right and left gill-chambers has not been pointed out. Brock (1929-30) correlated the presence of a single primary branchial aperture with the existence of a ventral communication and suggested that in *Dactylethira* a ventral communicating channel between the right and left gill-chambers might not be present. The above condition in *Rhacophorus* with completely separated right and left gill-chambers (Fig. 9) communicating independently with exterior by their secondary branchial apertures strongly supports the suggestion of Brock (1927-30).




Fig. 9.

With the widening of the mouth and the shortening of the tail the secondary branchial apertures begin to disappear. In the majority of tadpoles I have examined the left aperture disappears at a slightly later stage. To start with the thickened lips of each aperture get approximated and ultimately fuse together. In Fig. 10, the thickened lips are seen coming together. In Fig. 11 they are fused. The withdrawal of the branchial cavity (R.G.C.) inwards and the thickening of the integument (I.N.T.) which has formed as a result of fusion of the lips of the secondary branchial aperture, are shown in Fig. 12. The operculum now gradually sinks inwards and the cavities of the branchial chambers get obliterated. The inner surface of the operculum (I.O.F. Figs. 10, 11 and 12) with the outer surface of the original body wall (B.W.) of the tadpole. The outer surface of the operculum (O.O.F.) now forms the outer surface of the permanent body wall of the adult *Rhacophorus maculatus*.




Fig. 10.




Fig. 11.




Fig. 12.

SUMMARY

(1) Certain new points regarding the formation of the secondary branchial apertures and the closing of the ventral communication between the gill-chambers, which were not dealt with in *Rana* by any previous worker are described. The general development and fate of the gill-chambers in *Rhacophorus* is almost similar to that of *Rana*.

(2) The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and ventral surface of the head region just in front of the gill-clefts and grows backwards enclosing the gills in gill-chambers.

(3) The primary branchial aperture is formed on the left side as a result of the unequal growth of the operculum.

(4) There is a ventral communicating channel between right and left gill-chambers. Behind this the operculum fuses completely with the body wall.

(5) The right anterior limb is liberated by the histolysis of the operculum while the liberation of the left anterior limb is effected partly through the primary branchial aperture and partly by the histolysis of the operculum.

(6) The right secondary branchial aperture is formed entirely from the histolysis of the operculum while the left one is formed partly from the histolysis of the operculum and partly from the primary branchial aperture.

(7) The left secondary branchial aperture is slightly bigger than the right.

(8) The secondary branchial apertures subserve branchial respiration which is carried on side by side with respiration by lungs till the complete disappearance of the tail.

(9) With the appearance of the secondary branchial aperture the ventral communicating channel between the right and left gill-chambers is completely closed. Each chamber now communicates with the exterior independently by means of the secondary branchial aperture of its side.

(10) The above condition supports the suggestion of Brock (1929-30) that a ventral communicating channel might not be present in *Dactylethira*.

(11) The right secondary branchial aperture closes at a slightly earlier stage than the left.

(12) The operculum sinks inwards obliterating the branchial cavity. Its inner surface fuses with the outside of the original body wall of the tadpole and its outer surface forms the exterior of the permanent body wall of the adult.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In conclusion I would like to thank Mr. R. V. Seshaiya, M.A., Annamalai University, who not only suggested this problem but also kindly provided me with most of the material used in this work. My thanks are also due to Prof. S. G. Manavala Ramanujam, M.A., Ph.D., D.I.C., F.Z.S., Presidency College, Madras for his kindness in sending some of the references to me.

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EXPLANATION OF FIGURES.

B.W.	Body wall.
G.	Gills.
I.N.T.	Integument.
I.O.F.	Inner surface of the opercular fold.
L.A.L.	Left anterior limb.
L.G.C.	Left gill chamber.
L.O.F.	Left portion of the opercular fold.
L.S.B.A.	Left Secondary branchial aperture.
O.F.	Opercular fold.
O.O.F.	Outer surface of the opercular fold.
P.B.A.	Primary branchial aperture.
R.A.L.	Right anterior limb.
R.G.C.	Right gill chamber.
R.O.F.	Right portion of the opercular fold.
R.S.B.A.	Right secondary branchial aperture.
V.C.C.	Ventral communicating channel.
V.O.F.	Ventral portion of the opercular fold.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

By

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குத்திரம் 34.

“ எத்திணை மருங்கினும் மகடே உமடன் மீறம்
பொற்புடை நெறிமை யின்மையான ”

இது, மகளிர்க்கு மடலேற விரும்புதலும் முறையன்று என விலக்குதல் நுதலிற்று. இதுவும் பெண்ணியல் கூறும் பெற்றித்தாகலின், மகளிர்க்கு முகநீர் வழக்கம் மறக்கும் முன்னைச் சூத்திரத்தை யடுத்து மடன் மேவலை மறுக்கும் இச்சூத்திரம் அமைக்கப்பட்டது.

(இ-ள்.) எத்திணை மருங்கினும் = அகத்திணை எழனுள் எதன் கண்ணும்; மகடே உமடன் மேல் = தலைவி மடலேற விரும்புதல்; பொற்புடை நெறிமை யின்மையான = அழகிய முறைமை இல்லை.

எத்திணை மருங்கினும் என்றார்; அன்பினைத்திணைப்பகுதியில் ஆடவர் போல் பெண்டிர் மடல் விரும்புதல் அமையாமை மட்டு மன்று; பெருந்திணையினும் ஏறிய மடற்றிறம் ஆடவர்க்கன்றி, புலனெறி வழக்கில் மகளிர்க்குக் கூறுவது வழக்காறில்லை என்பதை வற்புறுத்துதற்கு. மேவல்-மேல், இடைக்குறை; ஐந்தாம் பரிபாட்டிலும், மலைபடு கடாத்திலும் ஆரல்-ஆல் ஆனதுபோல. மேவல், விருப்பப் பொருட்டு. “ கம்பு மேவு நசையாகுமே ” (தொல்-சொல், உரி, சூத். 33) பேரிசை நவிர மேவு யுறையும் ” என்னும் மலைபடு கடாத்தடியுங் காண்க. ‘இல்லை’ என ஒரு சொல்லை வருவித்து, ஆன’ என்பதைக் காரணக் குறியாக்கி, ‘பெண்பால் மடன் மேவலில்லை; பொலிவுபெறுந் நெறிமை இல்லாமையால்’, என இளம்பூரணர் கொண்டாங்குக் கொள்ளலும் தள்ளும் தன்மைத் தன்று. எவ்வாற்றானும், மடலேறுதல் எனப்பொருள் கொள்ளுதல் பொருந்தாது. ஆட வார்க்குமே மடலேறுதல் பொற்புடை நெறிமைக்கு மாறாக ‘நோத்திரத்தின் பாற்பட்ட காத லற்ற கழிகாமப் பழி பிறங்கும் இழிதகவுடைய பெருந்திணையின் பாற்படும் என்பது “ஏறிய மடற்றிறம்...பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பே”’ என்னும் சூத்திரத்தானும் வலியுறும். மடல் ஏறாமல், மடல் ஊர்வோன் எனக் கூறுதலும் ஆடவர்பால் பொற்புடை நெறியாக்காமல், ஒரோவிடத்துப் புலனெறி வழக்கில் அமைத்துக்கொள்ளப்படுகிறது. “ மடன்மா கூறும் இடனுமாருண்டே ” எனும் தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரத்தால், மடன்மா கூறுவதும் ஆடவரளவிலும் நன்மரபாகாமல், ஓராங்கு மரபு வழுவமைதியாக மட்டும் கொள்ளப்படும் தமிழ்வழக்குத் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது. அதன் காரணமும் எளிதில் அறியப்படும். ஊரறிய ஏறிய மடற்றிறம்’ ஆடவருக்கும் பொருந்தாக்காமலாம் பெருந்திணை எனக் கடியப்படுகிறது. ஏறாமல் தனியிடத்தே மடலூர்வோன் எனமட்டும் தலைமகன் ஒரோவழிக் கூறுதல் அமைத்துக்கொள்ளப்பட்டது; ஏனெனில் தலைவன் தன் காதற் பெருக்கை விளக்குமள விற்குரி, தலைவியின் உறுதுணையாம் தோழிக்குத் அவன் தனித்துத் தலைவியின்

இன்றியமையாமையை வலியுறுத்தும் திருத்துடைமை காட்டும் கருவியாக்குதலால், மடன்மா கூறுதல் அகப்பகுதியில் ஆன் மகனுக்கு மரபு வழுவுமையாக மட்டும் ஆளப்படும். இப்புலனெறி வழக்கு மறுத்தற்கில்லை என்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர், ‘மடன்மா கூறு மிடனுமாருண்டே’ என்று கூறி, உம்மையாலும் ஏகாரத்தாலும் அதுவும் நன்மரபன் நென்பதை இனிதுபெற விளக்கினார். ஆதலால் மடலேறு அவாவுதல் ஒருவாறு ஆடவர்க்கு மரபு வழுவுமையாக மட்டும் அமையுமெனக் காட்டும் ஆசிரியர், மகளிர்க்கு யாண்டும் பொற்புடை நெறிமையாகாது என்பதைச் சூத்திரத்தால் விலக்குவாரானார். இதுவே தமிழ் மரபென்பது :—

“கடலன்ன காமம் உழந்தும் மடலேறுப்
பெண்ணிற் பெருந்தக்க தில்” என்பதும் குறளாலும்,
“அன்ன நடையார் அலரேச ஆடவர்மேல்
மன்னும் மடலுரார் என்பதோர் வாசகமும்
தென்னுரையிற் கேட்டறிவதுண்டு-அதனையாம் தெளியோம்
மன்னும் வடநெறியே வேண்டினோம்”

என்னும் திருமங்கை யாழ்வாரின் பெரிய திருமடலின் அடிகளாலும் தெளியப்படும். “மடலேறுப் பெண்ணிற் பெருந்தக்க தில்” என்பதும் தலைவன் கூற்றேயாகலானும், மடல் ஊர்வேனென்று தலைவி கூறுதலாக யாண்டும் ஆன்றோர் செய்யுள் செய்யாமை யானும், மடல் ஏறும் விருப்பமும் மகளிர்க்குப் பொற்புடை நெறியாகாமை தேறப்படும், மேலும்,

“உடம்பும் உயிரும் வாடியக் காலும்
... ..
கிழவோற் சேர்தல் கிழத்திக் கில்லை”

என்னும் பொருளியற் (10) சூத்திரத்தால் மணந்து கணவனுடன் வாழும் மனைவியும் தன் காதலைக் கொண்ட கணவனுக்குமே கரத்தலே பெண்ணியல்பென வலியுறுத்தப் படுகின்றது. தனியிடத்துத் தன் கொண்ட கணவனுக்கும் கரத்தற்குரிய காதலை ஊரரிய மடலேறிப்பறை அறைவேனெனல், நாடுநாடு நிறையைப் பூணாகக் கொண்ட பெண்டகை மைக்கு முற்றிலும் இயைபற்றதாகும். இதனாலன்றோ,

“காமத் தீணையிற் கண்ணின்னு வருஉம்
நானும் மடனும் பெண்மைய, ஆதலின்
குறிப்பினும் இடத்தினும் அல்லது வேட்கை
நெறிப்பட வாரா அவள்வயி னுன”

எனும் களவியற் (17) சூத்திரத்தால் தொல்காப்பியர், களவில் தலைவியரிடம் கடலன்ன காமவேட்கை நெறிப்படுமாற்றையும், அதன் பொற்புடைமையையும் வற்புறுத்தினார்.

இத்தமிழ் மரபுக்கு மாறாக,

“கடலன்ன காமத்த ராயினும் பெண்டிர்
மடலுரார் மைந்தர்மே லென்ப—மடலுர்தல்

காட்டுகேன் வம்மின் கவிவஞ்சி யார்கோமான்
வேட்டமா மேற்கொண்ட போட்டுது ”

என நச்சினுர்க்கினியர் உரையில் மேற்கோள் காட்டினாராவெனின், பண்டை நன் மரபுக்கு மாறாக, பெண்டிரெல்லாரும் யாண்டும், எந்நிலையிலும், ஆடவ்வொழிவுக்கு உடையுமுள்ளத்தினர் எனக்கூறும் உலா, மடல் முதலிய பணுவல் எழுந்த தகுதியும் மரபும் தலைதமொறிய பிற்கால வழக்கென மறுக்க.

குத்திரம் 35.

“தன்னும் அவனும் அவளுஞ் சுட்டி
மன்னு நிமித்தம் மொழிப்பொருள் தெய்வம்
நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தலென்று
அன்ன பிறவும் அவற்றொடு தொகைஇ
முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கித்
தோழி தேளத்தும் கண்டோர் பாங்கினும்
போகிய திறத்து நற்றாய் புலம்பலும்
ஆகிய கிளவியும் அவ்வழி உரிய ”

இது, தலைவனுடன் போன தலைவியின் பிரிவாற்றாத தாயரின் பரிவு நிலையும், அது பற்றிக் கூற்று நிகழும் பகுதிகளும் கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) போகிய திறத்து நற்றாய் புலம்பலும் = தலைமகள், தலைவனுடன் போனவழி, அவளைப் பெற்ற நற்றாயின் துனிதரும் தனிமையில் மகட் பிரிவின் அகப்பரிவாற் கூறு வனவும்; தன்னும் அவனும் அவளுஞ்சுட்டி = தன்னையும், தலைமகளையும் (அவனுடன் சென்ற) தன் மகளையும் குறித்து; மன்னு நிமித்தம் = அடிப்பட்ட புள் என்னும் நிமித்தங் களோடும்; மொழிப்பொருள் = விரிசரி என்னும் நற்சொல்லோடும்; தெய்வம் = வேலன் வெறியாடல் முதலிய கடவுட் பராவலோடும்; நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தல் என்று = உடன் போக்கால் உளதாம் நன்மை தீமை அச்சம் சார்தல் என்பவற்றோடும்; அன்ன பிறவும் = அத்தகைய இடங்களுக்கேற்ற பிற கூற்றுக்களையும் அவற்றொடு தொகைஇ = மேற்கூறியவற்றோடு சேர்த்து; முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கி = இறப்பு, நிகழ்வு, எதிர்வு ஆகிய மூன்று காலங்களோடும் இயைய விளக்கி; தோழி தேளத்தும் கண்டோர் பாங்கினும் = தலைவியின் தோழியிடத்தும், தலைமக்களைக்கண்டு மீண்டோரிடத்தும்; ஆகிய கிளவியும் = நிகழும்கூற்றுக்களும்; அவ்வழி உரிய = அந்நிலையில் உரியனவாகும்.

போகிய திறத்து என்பதை முன்னே கூட்டிச் சூத்திரத் துறைகள் அனைத்திற்கும் பொதுவாக்கிப் பொருள் கொளவே பொருந்தும். ஆகிய கிளவி என்பதனை, “தன்னும் அவனும் அவளும் சுட்டி” என்பது முதல் ‘மூன்றுடன் விளக்கி’ என்பது வரை ஒவ் வொன்றோடும், ‘தோழி தேளத்தும், கண்டோர் பாங்கினும், புலம்பலும்’ என்பவற் றோடும் தனித்தனிக் கூட்டுக. ‘அவ்வழி’ என்பது அவ்வாறு உடன் போகிய மகட் பிரிவுக்கு வருந்தும் வழி என்றாகும். ‘புலம்பல்’, தோழி தேளத்தும், கண்டோர் பாங்கினும், வருந்திக் கூறலைச் சுட்டலாகப் பொருள் கோடல், ‘புலம்பே தனிமை’ (உரி-33) என்னும் சூத்திரக்கருத்துக்கு மாறாகும். ஆதலால் நற்றாயின்

தனிப்பவர் இரக்கத்தையே அச்சொல் உணர்த்து மென்க. ‘நிமித்தம்’ என்பது காக்கை கரைதல், பல்லி சொல், ஒந்தி நிலை, இடத்தோள் இடக்கண் துடிப்பு முதலியவைகளைக்கொண்டு நன்மை தீமை துணிதல். இதற்குப் புள்ளரிதல் என்றே பெயர் வழங்கிற்று. முதலில் பறவைகளைக்கொண்டு குறி பார்க்கும் வழக்கத்தால் பறவையைக் குறிக்கும் புள் என்னும் பெயர் நாளடைவில் எல்லாக் குறிகளையும் குறிக்கும், நிமித்தத்திற்கே வழங்கலாயிற்று. ‘மொழிப்பொருள், என்பது நற்சொல்; விரிச்சி, நற்சொல், மொழிப்பொருள்’ என்பன ஒரு பொருட் கிளவி விரிச்சியை,

“வேண்டிய பொருளின் விளைவுநன் கறிதற்கு
சுண்டிருண் மாலேச் சொல்லோர் தன்று”

என்பர் புறப்பொருள் வெண்பாமாலையார்.

(i) தன்னும் அவனும் அவளும் சுட்டித் தாய் கூறும் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“இரும்புனிற் நெருமைப் பெருஞ்செவிக் குழவி
பைந்தா தெருவின் வைகுதியின் மடியுஞ்
செழுந்தண் மனையோ டெம்மிய நெழியச்
செல்பெருங் காளை பொய்மருண்டு, சேய்நாட்டுச்
சுவைக்காய் நெல்லிப் போக்கரும் பொங்கர்
வீழ்கடைத் திரள்காய் ஒருங்குடன் தின்று
வீசனைச் சிறுநீர் குடியினன் கழிந்த
குவளை உண்கண்என் மகளோ ரன்ன
செய்போழ் வெட்டிப் பெய்த லாய
மலைவிரி நிலநிற பெயர்ப்புறங் காண்டற்கு
மாயிருந் தாழி கவிப்பத்
தாவின்று கழிகளற் கொள்ளாக் கூற்றே” (நற்றிணை 271).

இச்செய்யுளில் ‘எம் இவண் ஒழிய எனவும்,’ ‘எற்கொள்ளாக் கூற்றே’ எனவும் தாய் தன்னையே சுட்டியும், ‘செல்பெருங்காளை பொய் மருண்டு’ எனத் தலைவனைச் சுட்டியும், ‘வீசனைச் சிறுநீர் குடியினன் கழிந்த குவளையுண்கண் என் மகள்’ என உடன் போன மகளைச் சுட்டியும் கூறுதல் காண்க.

“என்னும் உள்ளினள் கொல்லோ தன்னை
நெஞ்சுணத் தேற்றிய வஞ்சினக் காளையொடு
அழுங்கல் மூதூர் அலரெழச்
செழும்பல் குன்றம் இறந்தவென் மகளே” (ஐங். 372)

எனும் செய்யுளுமது.

(ii) நிமித்தத்தொடு சார்த்தி நற்றாய் கூறும் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“மறுவில் தூவிச் சிறுகருங் காக்கை
அன்புடை மரபினின் கிளையோ டாரப்

பச்சுன் பெய்த பைந்ரிண வல்சி
பொலம்புணை கலத்தில் தருகுடுவன் மாதோ
வெஞ்சின விறல்வேற் காளையொடு
அஞ்சி லோதியை வரக்கரைந் திமே ” (ஐங். 391).

(iii) மொழிப்பொருள் என்ற நற்சொல்லொடு படுத்து நற்றாய் கூறுதற்குதாரணம் வந்துழிக் காண்க.

(iv) தெய்வத் தொடுபடுத்தி நற்றாய் கூறும்கிளவி :—

‘ அருஞ்சுர மிறந்தளன் பெருந்தோட் குறுமகள் ’

என்னும் அகம் (195) ஆம் பாட்டில், ‘ அறுவை தோயும் ஒருபெருங்குடுமிச் சிறுபைஞ்ஞாற் றிய பஹைலக் கருங்கோல் ஆகுவு, தறியும் முதுவாய் வேல, கூறுக மாதோ நின்கழங்கின் திட்பம், ஆறுது வருபனி கலுழும் கங்குவின் ஆறுது துயரும் என்கண் இனிது படி இயர், எம்மனை முந்துறத் தருமோ, தம்மனை உய்க்குமோ யாதவன் குறிப்பே ” எனவ ரும் அடிகள் தெய்வத்தொடு படுத்து நற்றாய் கூறும் கிளவியாகும்.

(v) “ நன்மை சார்தல் :—

மள்ளர் கொட்டின் மஞ்ஞை யாலும்
உயர்நெடுங்குன்றம் படுமழை தலைஇச்
சுரநனி யினிய வாருக தில்ல ’,
அறநெறி இதுவெனத் தெளிந்தளன்
பிறைநுதற் குறுமகள் போகிய சுரனே ’,

எனும் ஐங்குறுதூற்று(371)ச் செய்யுள் மகளின் நன்மை கருதிய தாய்கூற்றும்.

(vi) உடன் போய மகளின் துன்புறு தீமை கருதித் தாய் கூறும் கிளவி:—

“ நிழலான் றவிந்த நீரி லாரிடைக்
கழலோன் காப்பக் கடுகுபு போகி
அறுசுனை மருங்கின் மறுகுபு வெந்த
வெவ்வங் கலுழி தவ்வெனக் குடிக்கிய
யாங்குவல் லுளன்கொல் தானே எந்திய
செம்பொற் புணைகலத் தம்பொரிக் கலந்த
பாலும் பலவென உண்ணாள்
கோலமை குறுந்தொடித் தளிரன் னோனே ” (குற. 356).

“ நீர்நசைக் கூக்கிய உயவல் யானை
இயம்புணர் தூம்பின் உயிர்க்கும் அக்தம்
சென்றனள் மன்றளன் மகளே
பந்தும் பாவையும் கழங்குமெமக் கொழித்தே ” (ஐங். 377).

என்பதும்அது.

“நினைத் தொறும் கவிழும் இடும்பை எய்துக
புலிக்கோட் பிழைத்த கவைக்கோட்டு முதுகலை
மான்பிணை அணைதர ஆண்குரல் விளிக்கும்
வெஞ்சுரம் என்மகள் உய்த்த
வம்பமை வல்லில் விடலை தாயே”

(ஐங். 378).

(vii) அன்ன பிறவும் என்பதற்குத் தலைவன் தாயை நொந்து பழிக்கும் இப்பாவைக் கொள்க.

(viii) முன்னிய காலம் மூன்றுடன் விளக்கும் நற்றாய் கூற்றிற்கு, “பிரசங்கலந்த
.....சிறுமதுகையளே” (110) என்னும் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டு உதாரணமாம். கழிந்த
மகளின் இளம்பருவச் செய்தியும் உடன் போகிய அவள் நிகழ்காலச் செய்தியும்.
அவள் எதிர்காலக் கற்புறு வாழ்வின் பெருமையும் ஒருங்கே இதிற்போதலால் விளக்கி
புள்ளது காண்க.

(ix) தோழி தேளத்து நற்றாய் கிளவிக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“செல்லிய முயலிற் பாஅய சிறகர்
வாவ லுகுக்கு மாலையாம் புலம்பப்
போகிய அவட்கோ நோவேன் தேமொழித்
துணையிலள் கலிழு நெஞ்சின்
இணையே ருண்கண் இவட்குநோ வதுவே”

(ஐங். 378).

(x) கண்டோர் பாங்கில் நற்றாய் கூறுதற்கு எடுத்துக்காட்டுச் செய்யுள் :—

“ஒருமக ஞடையேன் மன்னே அவளும்
செரும்கு மொய்ம்பிற் கூர்வேற் காணையொடு
பெருமலை அருஞ்சுரம் நெருந் சென்றனள்
இனியே, தாங்குநின் அவல மென்றிர் அதுமற்று
யாங்கனம் ஒல்லுமோ அறிவுடை யீரே
உள்ளின் உள்ளம் வேமே உண்கண்
மணிவாழ் பாவை நடைகற் றன்னவென்
அணியியற் குறுமகள் ஆடிய
மணியோர் நொச்சியுந் தெற்றியுந் கண்டே”

(நற்றிணை. 184).

இப்பாவில், ‘தாங்குநின் அவலமென்றிர், அதுமற்று யாங்கனம் ஒல்லுமோ அறிவுடையீரே’ என அறிவுடையோராகிய கண்டோர் பாங்கில் நற்றாய் பகர்ந்த கிளவி காண்க.

(xi) நற்றாய் தனிமையிற் கூறல் :—

“வன் பாவை பாவை இதுவென்
னலமரு நோக்கி னலம்வரு சுடர்நுதற்

பைங்கிளி எடுத்த பைங்கிளி என்றிவை
காண்டொறுங் காண்டொறுங் கலங்க
நீங்கின னோஎன் பூங்க ணேனே.”

எனும் ஐங்குறு நூற்று(375) ச் செய்யுள், மகட் பிரிந்ததாய் ஆற்றாமையால் வருந்தும் புலம்பு சுட்டிய கிளவி யாகும்.

சூத்திரம் 36.

எமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியுஞ் சுரத்தும்,
தாமே செல்லுந் தாயரு முளரே.”

இது, தலைவி உடன் போகிய வழி அவள் தாய்மார் அவளைத் தேடிச் செல்லுதலும் உண்டென உரைத்தல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) எமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியும்=திதுறுக்காவலுடைய பேரூரைச்சார்ந்த சேரியிலும்; சுரத்தும்=தலைவி உடன்போகிய அருவழியிலும்; தாமே செல்லும் தாயரு முளரே=தன்னையர் தமர் முதலியோர் துணையின்றிச் சென்ற மகளேத் தேடித் தாமே செல்லும் தாய்மாரும் உளராவர்.

எமமற்ற ஊராயின் தாயர்மனையிற்று புறஞ்செல்லாராதலின் ‘எமப் பேரூர்ச்சேரி’ எனப்பட்டது, எமப் பேரூர்ச் சேரியில், அத்தனாவும் மகட் பெற்ற நற்றாய் தேடிச் செல்லுதல் அமையும்; நற்றாய் சுரஞ் சென்று தேடுதல் வழக்காறில்லை, செவிலித் தாயர் சுரத்தும் தேடிச் செல்வர். இதுவே பண்டைய ஆன்றோர் செய்யுளின் கண்ட புலனெறி வழக்கம். சிற்றாராயின் தேடுதல் வேண்டாவாதலின் சேரியுடைய பேரூரே கூறப்பட்டது, ‘தாயரும்’ எனும் உம்மையால், தாமே செல்லும் தாயர் சிலரேயாவ ரென்பதும், பிறரைத் தேடிவர ஏவும் தாய்மாரே பலராவரென்பதும் பெறப்படும்.

இனி, சேரியும் சுரத்தும் என ஒருங்கெண்ணி, ‘செல்லுந் தாயரும் உளர்’ எனப் பன்மையாற் கூறதலால் நற்றாய்மனையிருந்து இரங்குவதன்றி, இறந்து புறம் பெயர்தல் இன்றெனக் கொண்டு, செவிலித்தாயரே சேரியும் சுரத்தும் செல்வர் எனப் பொருள் கொள்ளினும் தவறாகாது. நற்றாய் பேரூர்ச்சேரி அளவு தேடிச் செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :— “ஒங்குநிலைத் தாழி மல்கச் சார்த்தி”(275)என்னும் அகப்பாட்டில் “வெம்மலை அருஞ்சுரம்கண்ணுடையீரே ” எனவருமடிகள் எமப்பேரூர்ச் சேரியில் தேடிச் சென்ற நற்றாய் கூற்றாகும். “கூழை நொச்சிக் கீழது என்மகள் செம்புடைச் சிறுவிரல் வரித்த வண்டலுங் காண்டிரோ ” என்பதனால் அப்பேரூர் காவல் மதிலுடைய தென்பதும், அந்நகர் மதிப்புறத்தே, தன்மகள் விரல்கொண்டு வரித்த வண்டல்காணக் கிடப்பதாய்க் குறித்ததனால், அது நகர்ப் புறச்சேரி என்பதும் விளக்கமாகும். அன்றியும், ‘நம்மிவனெழிய’ என நற்றாய் தன் முன்னிலையோரையும் உளப்படுத்திக் கூறினதால் அவர் தலைமகள் ஊரவராதலும், தன்னையோல் அவரையும் தலைமகள் வீட்டுச்சென்றாள் எனச் சுட்டுந்தாயின் உளக் குறிப்பும் தெளியலாம்.

இனி, செவிலி தேடிச் சுரஞ் செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“காலே பரிதப் பினவே கண்ணே
நோக்கி நோக்கி வாளிழந் தனவே

அகஸிடு விசும்பின் மீனிநும்
பலரே மன்றஇவ் வுலகத்துப் பிறரே

(குறந். 44)

பாலேக்கலியில், “ எறித்தரு கதிர்தாங்கி ” எனும்பாட்டில்,

“ வெவ்விடைச் செல்வமலை ஒழுக்கத்தீர் இவ்விடை, என்மகள் ஒருத்தியும், பிறண்மகன் ஒருவனும் ; தம்முளே புணர்ந்த தாமறி புணர்ச்சியர் அன்னார் இருவரைக் காணிரோ பெரும ” எனுமடிகள் சுரஞ்சென்ற செவிலியின் கூற்றும்.

குத்திரம் 37.

“ அயலோ ராயினும் அகற்சி மேற்றே ”

இது, மேலதற்கோர் புறனடை கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று.

(இ-ள்.) அயலோராயினும் = உடன்போயவரைத் தேடிச்செல்வோர் தாயரன்றி, தமர், ஏவலர் முதலிய பிறரேயாயினும் ; அகற்சி மேற்றே = அவர்தேடுதல் அண்மையசேரியன்றி அகன்ற சேய்மைய சுரத்தின் கண்ணதேயாகும்.

மேற் குத்திரத்தில் சொல்லிய இரண்டனும், அண்மைய சேரியை விலக்கிச் சேய்மைய சுரத்திற்கே, தாயரல்லாப்பிறர் தேடிச்செல்லுதல் மரபு. ஈற்றேகாரம்தேற்றம்.

இதற்குப் பழைய உரைகாரர் வேறுபொருள் புகல்வர். அதுவருமாறு :—அயலோ ராயினும் = முற்கூறிய சேரியினும் சுரத்தினு மன்றித் தம்மனைக்கயலே பிரிந்தாராயினும் ; அகற்சிமேற்றே = அதுவும்பிரிவின் கண்ணதாம் என இளம்பூரணரும், நச்சிலார்க்கினியரும் உரைகூறுவர். மேற்குத்திரம் கூறும் சேரியுஞ் சுரமும் காதலர் பிரியுமிடம் குறியாது, உடன்போன தலைமக்களைத் தாய்மார் தேடிச்செல்லும் இடத்தையே குறிக்கு மாதலால், அங்குப்பிரியாமல் தம்மனை அயலேபிரிதலை இச்சுத்திரம் கூறுவதாகக் கொள்ளும் அவ்விரு உரையும் பொருந்தாது. அன்றியும் மேற் குத்திரம் பாலையாம் பிரிவைக் குறிப்பதேயன்று ; பிரியாமல் உடன் போன தலைமக்களை அவன்தாயர் தேடிச் செல்லுதலை மட்டுமே குறிக்கும். பிரிவையே கருதாத குத்திரம் பிரியுமிடம் குறிக்கும் எனக்கொள்வது எவ்வாற்றானும் அமைவதன்றும். அதனாலும் அவர்தம் உரை தொல் காப்பியர் கருத்தன்மை அறிக.

இனி, இதற்கு இன்னும் ஒருபொருள் கூறுவாருமுளர் :—அதுவருமாறு : அயலோ ராயினும் = உடன் போய தலைமக்கள் சேரி, சுரம் போகாமல் ஊரகத்தே மனை அயலில் தங்குவாராயினும் ; அகற்சிமேற்றே = அதுவும்பிரிவின் கண்ணதேயாம்.

இவ்வுரையும் இச்சுத்திரத்திற்குப்பொருந்தாது.

மனை அயல் உறைதல் உடன்போதலாமாறில்லை உடன்போய தலைமக்கள் மனை அயல் உறைந்ததாகப் புலனெறி வழக்கில் யாண்டும் ஆன்றோர் செய்யுளிலாட்சியு மில்லை ; ‘ தாமே செல்லும் தாயரும் ’ என்னும் முன்குத்திரத்தொடரோடு அடுத்தியையும் அயலோராயின் எனும் சொற்றோடர் அவ்வாறு செல்லுந் தாயரல்லாப்பிறரையே சுட்டு வது வெளிப்படை. மேலும், ‘ அகற்சி ’ என்பது பிரிந்த நெடுந்தாரத்தையே குறிக்கு மாதலின், மனை அயலைக்குறியாது, ‘ அகற்சி ’ யை நீங்குதல் எனப்பொருள் கொண்டு,

பிரிவெனும்பாலேத்திணையை இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுவதாக உரையாசிரியர் கொண்டனர்; முன், அவர் கொண்டதிலேக் கழிதலைப்பாலேத் திணையாகக்கொண்டதுபற்றி இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கும் இவ்வாறு உரைகூறுவாராயினர். உடன்போகும் தலைமக்கள் தம்முட் பிரிதலின்மையின், அவரொழுக்கம் பாலையாதலில்லை. அதனால் ஈண்டு 'அகற்சி' என்பது பிரிதலை உணர்த்தாது சேனையே உணர்த்துமென்க. தலைவி தமர் தேடிச்சுரஞ்செல்லுதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு:— 'அன்றையனையவாகி' என்னும் நற்றிணை (48)-ஆம் செய்யுளில், "நீர்எமரிடைஉறுதர ஒளித்தகாடே என்பதும்," 'வீனையமைபாவையின்' என்னும் நற்றிணை (362)-ஆம் செய்யுளில், 'தும்ர்வாரின் மறைகுறவென் மாயோளே' என்பதும் சேண் சென்று தமர் தேடுதலைக்குறிக்கும்.

சூத்திரம் 38.

“தலைவரும் விழும நிலையெடுத் துரைப்பினும்
போக்கற் கண்ணும் விடுத்தற் கண்ணும்
நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழுமமும்
வாய்மையும் பொய்மையும் கண்டோர்ச் சட்டித்
தாய்நிலை நோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும்
நோய்மிகப் பெருகித்தன் நெஞ்சுகலுழந் தோளே
அழிந்தது களையென மொழிந்தது கூறி
வன்புறை நெருங்கி வந்ததன் திறத்தோ
டென்றிவை யெல்லாம் இயல்புற நாடின
ஒன்றித் தோன்றும் தோழி மேன”.

இச்சூத்திரம் தோழிக்குக் கூற்று நிகழ்மிடம் உணர்த்துகின்றது. தலைவரும் விழும நிலையெடுத்துரைப்பினும் = தலைவனுக்கும், தலைவிக்கும் பிரிவாவ்ளவும் எதப்பாடுகளே எடுத்துக் கூறுதற்கண்ணும்; போக்கற்கண்ணும் = தலைமகனுடன் தலைவியை அனுப்பு மிடத்தும்; விடுத்தற்கண்ணும் = உடன்கொண்டு செல்லாமல், தலைவன் தலைவியை விட்டு நீங்கு மிடத்தும்; நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழுமமும் = தலைவிதன்னையும், தமரையும், நீத்துச் செல்லுதலால் தனக்கும், தாயர்முதலிய தமருக்குமுற்ற துன்பத்தையும்; வாய்மையும் பொய்மையும் கண்டோர்ச் சட்டித் தாய் நிலைநோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும் = மெய்யையும், பொய்யையும் புனைந்துகூறியும் கண்டோரைக்காட்டியும் நற்றாயின் பருவரலைக்கருதி மறுத்தாத் தலைவியை வரவேற்றுக்கொள்ளுதலினும்; நோய் மிகப் பெருகித்தன் நெஞ்சு கலுழந்தோளே = தலைவன்விடுத்தகல ஆற்றாமையால் மிக நொந்து மனங்கலங்கும் தலைவியை; அழிந்தது களையென = வருந்துதலை ஒழி யென; மொழிந்தது கூறி = தலைவன் கூறியதை எடுத்துக் கூறி; வன்புறை நெருங்கிவந்ததன் திறத்தொடு = வற்புறுத்தி ஆற்றுவதற்கும் கூற்றுக்கள் நிகழ்த்தும் திறத்தொடு; என்றிவை யெல்லாம் = இவை போல்வனபிற பொருந்து மிடங்களி லெல்லாம்; இயல்புறநாடின ஒன்றித்தோன்றும் தோழிமேன = அகத்துறை இலக் கணத்தை ஆராயின் தோழிக்குரியனவாய்ப் பொருந்தித் தோன்றும்.

விடுத்தற் கண்ணும் என்பதற்குப் பண்டை உரையாளராய இளம்பூரணரும், தலைவியைத் தோழி தலைவனுடன் கூட்டிவிடுத்தற்கண்ணும் எனப்பொருள் கூறுவர்.

‘போக்கற் கண்ணும்’ என்பதும் இதனையே குறிக்குமாதலின், இவர்பொருள் ஆசிரியர்க்குக் கூறியது கூறல் என்னும் குற்றம்தரும். அன்றியும் பின் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்களைக் கூறும், ‘ஒன்றாத் தமரினும்’ எனும் குத்திரத்தில் தலைவன் தலைவியை “ஒன்றிய தோழி யொடு வலிப்பினும், விடுப்பினும்” என்றுதொல்காப்பியர்கூறுதலான், தலைவியைத் தலைவன் உடன் கொண்டு செல்லுதலும், விடுத்துச்செல்லுதலும், உண்டெனத் தெளியக்கிடத்தலின், ஈண்டு விடுத்தல் என்பதும் தலைவியைத் தலைவன் விட்டுச் செல்லலையே குறிக்கு மென்பது ஒருதலை. இச்சூத்திரத்தில் தலைவன் மொழிந்தது கூறித் தலைவியைத் தோழி ஆற்றுவத்தலைக் கூறுதலானும், தலைவி வருந்தத் தலைவன் அவளைவிட்டுச் செல்லுதலுண்டென்பது போதரும்.

‘தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளினும்’ என்பதற்கு நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உடன்போய தலைவியைத் தேடிச்செல்லாமல் தாயை மீட்டுக்கொள்ளுதல் என்பபொருள் கொள்ளுவர். இதற்கு ஆன்றோர் செய்யுள் ஆட்சியின்மையின் இவ்வுரை சிறவாது. இதற்கு நச்சினார்க்கினியர் காட்டும், ‘அவளே, உடனமர் ஆயமொடு ஓரைவேண்டாது’ “எனும்பாட்டில் சுரஞ்செல்லும்தாயை மீட்டகுறிப்பொன்றுமில்லை மகட் பிரிவுக்கு வருந்தும் தாயைத் தோழி ஆற்றுவத்ததையே இச்செய்யுள் குறிக்கிறது.

“பால்பாற் படுப்பச் சென்றனன் ; அந்நான்

நீஎவ னிரங்குதி அன்னே

விழுவயர்ந் திருப்பின் அல்லதை இனியே”.

என்பதே ஈண்டுத் தோழி கூற்றாதல் காண்க. ‘ஒழிந்தது கூறி’ என நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கொண்ட பாடத்தினும், காலத்தால் முற்பட்ட இளம்பூரணர் கொண்ட ‘மொழிந்தது கூறி’ எனும் பாடமே, மரபுநிலை வழாச்சிறப்பும் செவ்விய முடைத்து. வன்புறை நெருங்குதலாவது, வற்புறுத்திக் கூறலாகும்.

இனி “நோய்மிகப் பெருகித் தன் நெஞ்சுகலுழந்தோளே, அழிந்தது களை இய ஒழிந்தது கூறி வன்புறை நெருங்கி வந்ததன் திறத்தோடு” எனப் பாடங்கொண்டு, மகட் பிரிவாற்றாது அரற்றும் தாயை அவன் வருத்தம் தீர்த்தல் கருதி, தலைவியும் தலைவனும் கூறியனவும், செய்தனவும் எடுத்துச்சொல்லி விரைவில் மீள்வாரென வற்புறுத்தித் தேற்றுவ் கூற்றோடே, எனப் பொருள் கொள்ளுவதும் பொருந்துவதாகும். அத்தற்குச் செய்யுள்:— அன்னை வாழியோ அன்னை நின்மகள்” எனும் கீழ்வருஞ் செய்யுளாம்.

தலைவரும் விழுமநிலை எடுத்துரைத்தற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“பொலம்பசும் பாண்டிற் காசுநிரை அல்குல்
இலங்குவனே மென்றோள் இழைநிலை நெகிழ்ப்
பிரிதல் வல்லுனை யாயின்
அரிநே விடலையிவள் ஆய்துதற் கவினே”

(ஐங். 310).

தோழி தலைவி விழுமம் தலைவற்குக் கூறியது.

‘பாஅல் அஞ்செனி’ எனும் பாலைக்கலியில்,
“பொய்நல்லகல் புரிந்தனை புறந்தரல் கைவிட்

டெந்நாளோ நெடுந்தகாய் நீசெல்வ
தந்நாள் கொண் டிறக்குமிவ ளரும்பெற லுயிரே ”

என வரும் போக்கியனுமதுவே.

இனி, தோழி தலைவிக்குத் தலைவன் விழுமம் உரைத்தற்குத் தாரணம் வருமாறு :—

“ தனைகிளி கடிக்கெனிற் பகலும் ஒல்லும் ;
இரவுநீ வருதலின் ஊறும் அஞ்சவல் ;
யாங்குச் செய் வாமென் னிடும்பை நோய்க்கென
ஆங்குயான் கூறிய அனைத்திற்கும் பிறிதுசெத்
தோங்குமலை நாடன் உயிர்த்தோன் மன்ற
ஐதே காமம் யானே
கழிமுதாக் குறைமையின் பழியுமென் றிசினே.” (குறு. 217).

பாக்கற்கண் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :—

“ பெருநன் றுற்றிற் பேணுரு முளரே
ஒருநன் றுடைய ளாயினும் புரிமாண்டு
புலங் றீர வளிமதி இலைகவரப்
பாடமை யொழுதிய தண்ணுஞ் சாரன்
மென்னடை மரையா துஞ்ச
நன்மலை நாட நின்னல திலளே ” (குறு. 115).

“ அண்ணந்தேந்திய ” எனும் நற்றிணை (10)-ஆம் செய்யுளில் ‘நன்னெடுங் கூந்தல் நரையொடு முடிப்பினும் நீத்தல் ஒம்புமதி பூக்கேழா ’ என்பதும் பாக்கற்கண் தோழி தலைவனுக்குக் கூறியதாகும்.

“ இவளே நின்னல திலளே யாயும்
சுவளை யுண்கண் இவளல திலளே
யானு மாயிடை யேனே
மாமலை நாட மறவா தீமே.”

எனவரும் செய்யுளுமது.

தலைவனுடன் பாக்கற்கண் தோழி தலைவிக்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ ஊடர் அலரெழச் சேரி கல்லென,
ஆன தலைக்கும் அறனில் அன்னை
தானே யிருக்க தன்மகள் யானே
நெல்லி தின்ற முள்ளெயிறு தயங்க
உணலாய்ந் திசினு லவரொடு சேய்நாட்டு
வின்தொட நிவந்த விலங்குமலைக் கவாஅற்
கரும்புநடு பாத்தி யன்ன
பெருங்களிற் றடிவழி நிலைஇய நீரே ” (குறு. 262).

தலைவியைத் தலைவன் விடுத்தற்கண் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறிய கிளவி:

உமணாசு,

சேர்ந்து கழிந்த மருங்கின் அகன்றலை
ஊர்பாழ்த் தன்ன ஓமையம் பெருங்காடு
இன்ன வென்றீ ராயின்
இனியவோ பெரும தமியேற்கு மனையே ”

(குறு. 124).

“ மரையா மரல்கவர மாரி வறப்ப
வரையோங் கருஞ்சரத் தாரிடைச் செல்வோர்
சரையம்பு மூழ்கச் சுருங்கிப் புரையோர்தம்
உண்ணீர் வறப்பப் புலர்வாடு நாவிற்குத்
தண்ணீர் பெருஅத் தடுமாற் றருந்துயரம்
கண்ணீர் நனைக்குங் கடுமைய காடென்றால்
என்னீர் அறியாதிர்போல இவைகூறின்
நின்னீர் வல்ல நெடுந்தகா யெம்மையும்
அன்பறச் சூழாதே ஆற்றிடை நம்மொடு
துன்பந் துணையாக நாடி. நதுவல்லது
இன்பமு முண்டோ எமக்கு ”

(கவி-6) எனும் பாலைக் கலியுமது.

“ ஒன்றில்காலை அன்றில் போலப்
புலம்புகொண் டுறையும் புன்கண் வாழ்க்கை
யானுமாற் றேன் அது தானும்வந் தன்று
நீங்கல் வாழி யரைய...”

எனும் நற்றிணைப் பாட்டுமதுவே.

“ மால்வெள் ளோத்திரத்து மையில் வாலினர்
அருஞ்சரம் செல்வோர் சென்னிக் கூட்டும்
அவ்வரை இறக்குவை யாயின்
மைவரை நாட வருந்துவள் பெரிதே ”

எனவரும் ஐங்குறுநூற்றுச் (301) செய்யுளுமது.

விடுத்தற்கண் தோழி தலைவிக்குக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :--

“ நிலந்தொட்டுப் புகாஅர் வான மேறார்
விலங்கிரு முந்நீர் காவிற் செல்லார்
நாட்டின் நாட்டின் ஊரின் ஊரின்
குடிமுறை குடிமுறை தேரிற்
கெடுநரு முளரோடும் காத லோரே ”

(குறு. 130).

“ பொன்செய் பாண்டிற் பொலங்கல நந்தத்
தேரக லல்குல் அவ்வரி வாட
இறந்தோர் மன்ற தாமே பிறங்குமலைப்
புல்லரை யோமை நீடிய
புலிவழங் கதர கானத் தானே ”.

எனும் ஐங்குறுதூற்று (316)ப்பாவுமதுவே.

நீக்கலின் வந்த தம்முறு விழும்ம தோழி கூறுதற்கு உதாரணம் :—

“ அன்னை வாழியோ அன்னை நின்மகள்
என்னினும் யாயினும் நின்னினும் சிறந்த
தன்னமர் இளந்துணை மருட்டலின் முனா அது
வென்றேற் புல்லி வேங்கட நெடுவரை
மழையொடு மிடைந்த வயக்களிற் றருஞ்சரம்
விழவுடை உள்ளமொடு உழைவயிற் பிரியாது
வன்கண் செய்து சென்றனள்
புன்கண் செய்தல் புரைவதோ அன்றே ”.

தாய்நிலை நோக்கித் தலைப்பெயர்த்துக் கொளற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ புள்ளு மறியாப் பல்பழம் பழுநி
மடமான் அறியாத் தடநீர் நிலைஇச்
சுரநனி இனிய வாசுக வென்று
நினைத்தொறுங் களிழு மென்னினும்
மிகப்பெரிது புலம்பின்று தோழிநம் முறே ”.

(ஐங். 398).

அழிந்தது களையென மொழிந்தது கூறி வன்புறை நெருங்கித் தோழி கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘ அரிதாய அறனெய்தி ’ என்னும் பாலை (10)க்கலியில்,

“ கடியவே கனங்குழாய் காடென்றார் அக்காட்டுள்

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பிடி யூட்டிப் பின்னுண்ணும் களிநெனவும் உரைத்தனரே ”

என்பதுபோன்ற தலைவன் மொழிந்தவற்றை எடுத்துக் காட்டி,

“ இளைநல முடைய சானஞ் சென்றோர்,
புளைநலம் வாட்டுந ரல்லர் மனைவயின்
பல்லியும் பாங்கொத் திசைத்தன
நல்லெழி லுண்கணும் ஆடுமா லிடனே ”

எனக்கூறி அழியும் தலைவியை ஆற்றுவத்தாள்.

“தண்கயத்தமன்றவண்ணபெடு துணைமலர்” எனும் மருதனினநாகனார் அகப்பாட்டில் (அகம். 59),

“வருந்தினை வாழியர் நீயே

தாம்பா ராடடிய காலையு முள்ளார
பிரிந்து சேணுறைநர் சென்ற வாறே,”

“புன்தலை மடப்பிடி உணீஇயர் அங்குழை
நெடுநிலை யாஅ மொற்றி நனைகவுள்
படிஞ்ரிமறு கடியும் களிநே”

என்று எடுத்துக்காட்டி அழியும்தலையினைத் தோழி ஆற்றுவத்தலும் காண்க.

‘என்றிவை எல்லாம்’ எனப் பொதுப்படக்கூறுதலான் ‘தோழி இது பருவமன்று’ என்பது போன்ற கூற்றுக்கள் நிகழ்த்தி ஆற்றுவத்தலையும் கொள்க. அதற்குச் செய்யுள் வருமாறு :—

“மடவ மன்ற தடவுநிலைக் கொன்றை
கல்பிறங் கத்தஞ் சென்றோர் கூறிய
பருவம் வாரா வளவை, நெரிதரக்
கொம்புசேர் கொடியினை ருழ்த்த
வம்ப மாரியைக் காரென மதித்தே”

(குறந். 66).

குத்திரம் 39.

“பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி
வழுவி னாகிய குற்றங் காட்டலும்
ஊரது சார்வும் செல்லுந் தேயமும்
ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு செப்பிய வழியினும்
புணர்ந்தோர் பாங்கிற் புணர்ந்த நெஞ்சமொடு
அழிந்தெதிர் கூறி விடுப்பினும் ஆங்கத்
தாய்நிலை கண்டு தடுப்பினும் விடுப்பினும்
சேய்நிலைக் ககன்றோர் செலவினும் வரவினும்
கண்டோர் மொழிதல் கண்டதென்ப.”

இது, தலைமக்கள் உடன்போக்கின்கண் கண்டோர் கூற்று நிகழுமிடம் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்) பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி வழுவினாகிய குற்றங் காட்டலும் = அவர் போகும்பொழுதும், வழியும் அச்சந்தரத்தக்கவாகத் தோன்ற, அதற்கஞ்சாது மேற்செல்லுந்தவற்றால், விளையும் ஏதப்பாட்டை எடுத்துக் காட்டுதலும்; ஊரது சார்வும் = உடன் போவார்க்கு வழித்தங்க அண்மையில் ஊருண்மையையும்; செல்லும் தேயமும் = அவர்கள் செல்லுமிடத்தின் சேய்மையையும்; ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு செப்பிய வழியினும் =

அன்பு நிறைந்த உள்ளத்தோடு தலைமக்கட்கு' நலம் பேணிப்பரிந்து கூறுமிடத்தும் ; புணர்ந்தோர் பாங்கிற் புணர்ந்த நெஞ்சமொடு அழிந்தெதிர் கூறி விடுப்பினும் = காதலால் கூடின தலைமக்கள்பால் அன்புற்ற உள்ளத்தோடு அவர் நிலைமைக் கழிந்து எதிரெதிர் துரைத்து அவரை விடுக்குமிடத்தும் ; ஆங்கத்தாய் நிலைகண்டு தடுப்பினும் = தலை மக்களைத் தாங்கண்ட சுரத்திடையே தேடிவரும் செவிலித்தாய் நிலைமைகண்டு அவளை மேற்செல்லாது தடுத்துரைக்கு மிடத்தும் ; விடுப்பினும் = நீ மேற்செல்லின் தலைமக்களைக் காண்பை எனக்கூறி அவளை விடுக்குமிடத்தும் ; சேய்நிலைக் கன்றோர் செலவினும் வர வினும் = தொலை செல்லும் தலைமக்களின் உடன்போக்கிலும், அவர் மறுதரவிலும் ; கண்டோர் மொழிதல் கண்டதென்ப = உடன்போம் தலைமக்களைக்கண்டவர்கள் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தல், வழக்கின்கண் காணப்பட்டதென்பர் இலக்கண நூலார்.

பொழுதும் ஆறும் உட்குவரத் தோன்றி வழுவினாகிய குற்றங் காட்டற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ எல்லு மெல்லின்று பாடுங் கேளாய்
செல்லா தீமோ சிறுபிடி துணையே
வேற்றுமுனை வெம்மையிற் சாத்துவந் திறுந்தென
வலையணி நெடுவே லேந்தி
மீளேவந்து பெயருந் தண்ணுமைக் குரலே ”. (குறு. 390).

ஊரது சார்வு கண்டோர் கூறும் கிளவி வருமாறு :—

“ நல்லோண் மெல்லடி நடையு மாற்றாள்,
பல்கதிர்ச் செல்வன் கதிரும் ஊழ்த்தனன்,
அணித்தாற் றேன்றுவது எம்மார்,
மணித்தார் மார்பு, சேர்ந்தனை சென்மோ ” (பொருளியல்).

ஆர்வ நெஞ்சமொடு கண்டோர் கூறியதற்குக் கூற்று :—

“ வில்லோன் காலன கழலே நொடியோண்
மெல்லடி மேலவுஞ் சிலம்பே நல்லோர்
யார்கொல் அளியர், தாமே ஆரியர்
கயிரூடு பறையிற் சால்பொரக் கலங்கி
வாகை வெண்ணெற் றொலிக்கும்
வேய்பயில் அழுவம் முன்னியோரே ”. (குறு. 7).

பைங்காய் நெல்லி பலவுடன் மிசைந்து
செங்கால் மராஅத்த வரிநிழல் இருந்தோர்
யார்கொல் அளியர் தாமே வார்சிறைக்
குறுங்கால் மகன்றில் அன்ன
உடன்புணர் கொள்கைக் காத லோரே '

எனும் ஐக்குறு நூறு (381) மது.

அழிந்தெதிர் கூறிவிடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இதுதாம் மூரே யாவருங் கேளிர் ;
பொதுவறு சிறப்பின் வதுவையுங் காண்டும் ;
ஈன்றோர் எய்தாச் செய்தவம்
யாம்பெற் றனமால் மீண்டனை சென்மோ ”

(பொருள்—40கு—உதாரணம்).

தாய் நிலை கண்டு கண்டோர் தடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ பெயர்ந்து போகுதி பெருமூ தாட்டி
சிலம்புகெழு சிறடி சிவப்ப
இலங்குவேற் காளையொடு இறந்தனள் சுரனே.

தாய் நிலை கண்டு விடுத்தற்கு மேற்கோள் :—

“ நெருப்பவிர் கனலி உருப்புச்சினந் தணியக்
கருங்கால் யாத்து விரிமிழ லிரீஇச்
சிறுவரை இறப்பிற் காண்குவை செறிதொடிப்
பொன்னேர் மேனி மடந்தையொடு
வென்னேல் விடலை முன்னிய சுரனே ”

(ஐங். 388).

சேய் நிலைக்ககன்றோர் செலவிற் கண்டோர் கூறும் கூற்று :—

“ செய்வினைப் பொலிந்த செறிகழல் நோன்தாள்
மையணற் காளையொடு பைய வியலிப்
பாவை யன்னஎன் ஆய்தொடி மடந்தை
சென்றனள் என்றிர் ஐய ;
ஒன்றின வோஅவள் அஞ்சிலம் படியே.

(ஐங். 389).

இதில் கண்டோர் கூற்றைச் செவிலி கொண்டு கூறுதல் அறிக.

வரவிற்கட் கண்டோர் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இவன்னிவள் ஐம்பால் பற்றவு மிவளிவன்
புன்றலை யோரி வாங்குநள் பரியவும்
காதற் செவிலியர் தவிப்பவந் தவிராது
ஏதில் சிறுசெரு வுறுப மன்னே ;
நல்லைமன் றம்ம பாலே மெல்லியற்
துணைமலர்ப் பிணையலன்ன இவர்
மணமகிழ் இயற்கை காட்டி யோயே ”

(குறு. 229).

குத்திரம் 40.

“ ஒன்றாத் தமரினும் பருவத்துஞ் சுரத்தும்,
ஒன்றிய மொழியொடு வலிப்பினும் விடுப்பினும்,

இடைச்சுர மருங்கின் அவள்தம் ரெய்திக்
கடைக்கொண்டு பெயர்தலிற் கலங்களு ரெய்திக்
கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவை யுளப்பட
அப்பாற் பட்ட வொருதிறத் தானும் ;
நாளது சின்மையும், இளமைய தருமையும்,
தாளாண் பக்கமும் தகுதிய தமைதியும்
இன்மைய திளிவும் உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும்
அன்பின தகலமும் அகற்சிய தருமையும் ;
ஒன்றப் பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கிய பாலினும் ;
வாயினுங் கையினும் வகுத்த பக்கமோடு
ஊதியங் கருதிய ஒருதிறத் தானும்
புகழும் மானமும் எடுத்துவற் புறுத்தலும்
தூதிடை யிட்ட வகையி னானும்
ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும்
மூன்றன் பகுதியும் மண்டிலத் தருமையும்
தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும்
பாசறைப் புலம்பலும் முடிந்த காலத்துப்
பாகனொடு விரும்பிய வினைத்திற வகையினும் ;
காவற் பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும் ;
பரத்தையின் அகற்சியிற் பரிந்தோட் குறுகி
இரத்தலும் தெளித்தலும் எனஇரு வகையோடு
உரைத்திற நாட்டங் கிழவோன் மேன.”

இது, உடன்போக்கும், பிரிவின் வகையும், காரணங்களும் பற்றித் தலைவனுக்குக் கூற்று நிகழும் இடன் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஒன்றத்தமரினும் பருவத்தும், சுரத்தும் ஒன்றிய மொழியொடு வலிப் பினும் = வரைவுடன்படாத சுற்றத்தோடும், பருவத்தின் கண்ணும், சுரத்திலும் ஏற்புடைச் சொல்லொடு தலைவியை உடன்கொண்டு செல்லத் துணியுமிடத்தும் ; விடுப்பினும் = கொண்டு தலைக்கழியாமல் தலைவியைத் தான் விடுத்துப் பிரியுமிடத்தும் ; இடைச்சுர மருங்கில் அவள் தமர் எய்தி = உடன்போக்கில் அரும் வழியினிடையே தலைவியின் தன்னையர் முதலிய சுற்றத்தாருற்று ; கடைக்கொண்டு பெயர்தலில் = தலைவியைக் கொண்டு திரும்புமிடத்து ; கலங்களுரெய்திக் கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவை உளப்பட = தலைவியங்கித் துன்பமெய்திக் கற்பால் தலைவன்பால் சேறலாளுளவாம் பூசலுட்பட ; அப்பாற்பட்ட ஒரு திறத்தானும் = அத்தகைய (பல) பகுதிப்பட்ட ஒரு முறையானும் ; நாளது சின்மையும் = வாழ்நாளின் சின்மையால் பொருள் வலித்தலும் ; இளமைய தருமையும் = இன்ப நுகர்ச்சிக்குரிய இளமையின் அரிய தன்மை (பொருட் பிணியை) நலித்தலும் ; தாளாண் பக்கமும் = முயற்சியின் பெருமை கருதிப் பொருள் வலித்தலும் ; தகுதிய தமைதியும் = தலைவியைப் பேணும் தகுதியின் அமைதி பொருட் பிணியை மெலித்தலும் ; இன்மையதிலிவும் = இலம் பாட்டின் இழிவு கருதிப் பொருள் வலித்தலும்.

உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும்=கிடைத்திருக்கும் தலைவியின் காதலாகிய புத்துடைமையின் பெருமை பொருட் பிணியை மெலித்தலும் ; அன்பின் தகலமும்=தலைவியால் அன்பின் பெருக்கால் அவன் பொருட்டுப் பொருள் வலித்தலும் ; அகற்சிய தருமையும்=அவனைப் பிரிந்திருக்க ஒல்லாமை, பொருட்பிணியை மெலித்தலும் ; ஒன்றர்ப் பொருள் வயின் ஊக்கிய பாலினும்=ஆக இவ்வாறு (ஒன்றுக்கொன்று மாறுபட்டுப்) பொருந்தாத பொருள் பற்றி வலிக்கும் பிரிவின் பகுதிகளிலும் ; வாயினுங் கையினும் வகுத்த பக்கமொடு ஊதியங் கருதிய ஒருதிறத்தானும்=நூல் முதலியன கற்கும் கல்வியும், படை ஓவியம் முதலிய பயிலும் கலையும் என வகுக்கப்பட்ட கல்விப் பகுதிகளின் பயனை எண்ணிப் பிரியும் ஒரு பகுதி கண்ணும் ; புகழும் மானமும் எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தலும்=(இவ்விரண்டிலும்) புகழையும் மானத்தையும் பேணற்பொருட்டுப் பிரிவு வற்புறுத்துமிடத்தும் ; தூதிடையிட்ட வகையினானும்=பகை வேந்தரிடைச் சந்து செய்யும் பிரிவு வகைகளிலும் ; ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும்=தனக்கு உரிமையாகத் தோன்றும் பாங்கரிடத்தும் ; மூன்றன் பகுதியும்=மேலே கூறியாங்கு, பொருள், ஓதல், தூது என்ற பிரிவின் பகுதி மூன்றிலும் ; மண்டிலத் தருமையும்=பகைப் புலத்தின் அருமையும் ; தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும்=புகழார் சிறந்த பகைவாரின் பெருமையும் ; பாசறைப் புலம்பலும்=போர்க்கட்டுரிற் செருமுடிந்தபின் தலைவியை உள்ளும் தலைவன் தனிமையும் ; முடிந்த காலத்துப் பாகனொடு விரும்பிய வினைத்திறவகையினும்=வந்த வினை முடிந்தபொழுது தேர்ப்பாகனொடு தலைவன் தான் செய்ய விரும்புவனவும் கூறும் வகையினும் ; காவற்பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும்=பிறர் நாடு காக்குமிடத்தானும் ஓர் பிரிவின் கண்ணும் ; பரத்தையின் கற்சியிற் பரிந்தோட்குறிக்=பரத்தையின் பிரிவால் பரியும் தலைவியை அணுகி ; இரத்தலும்=தன் தவறு பொறுக்கு மாறு தலைவன் வேண்டதலும் ; தெளித்தலும்=தன் தவறினமை கூறித் தலைவியைத் தேற்றலும் ; என இருவகையொடு=என இவ்விரண்டு வகையொடுகூட ; உரைத்திற நாட்டம்=மேற்கூறிய இடங்களிலெல்லாம் கூற்றுவகை நாடுதல் ; கிழவோன் மேன=தலைவன்கண் நிகழும்.

இச்சூத்திரம், ஒன்றர்த் தமரினும் என்பது முதல் ஒருதிறத்தானும் என்றதுவரை உடன்போக்கில் தலைவன் கூற்று நிகழுமிடங்களைச் சுட்டும் பகுதியும், எஞ்சியவெல்லாம் பிரிவின் கண் கூற்று நிகழுமிடங்களைச் சுட்டும் பகுதியுமாக அமைந்துள்ளது. பிறறைய பிரிவுப்பகுதியில் ஆறுவகைப்பிரிவும் கூறப்படுகிறது. நாளது சின்மையும் என்பதுமுதல், பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கிய பாலினும் என்பதீராகப் பொருட் பிரிவும் (1), வாயினும் கையினும் என்பது முதல் எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தலும் என்றதுவரை ஓதற் பிரிவும் (2), தூதிடையிட்ட வகையினானும் என்பதால் தூதிற் பிரிவும் (3), மண்டிலத்தருமை முதல், வினைத்திற வகையினும் என்றதுவரை பகைப் பிரிவுவகையும் (4), காவற்பாங்கின் ஆங்கோர் பக்கமும் என்பதால் காவற் பிரிவும் (5), பரத்தையின்கற்சி என்பதால் பரத்தையிற் பிரிவும் (6), ஆகப் பிரிவு வகை ஆறும் முறையே வகைப்படுத்திக் கூறப்பட்டன. பாசறைப் புலம்பல், பாகனொடு கூறல் முதலிய பகைவயிற் பிரிவன்பாற் பட்டடங்கும். ஆகித் தோன்றும் பாங்கோர் பாங்கினும், மூன்றன் பகுதியும் என்பது,—அதற்குமுன் வகைப் படுத்திக் கூறப்பட்ட “பொருள், ஓதல், தூது என்ற மூன்றன் பகுதிகளிலும் உரிய பாங்கன், பாங்கியரிடத்துத் தலைவன் கூறும்”—எனத் தொகுத்து உணர்த்தும் தொடராயமையும், ‘மூன்றன் பகுதி’—என்பதற்கு, “இப்பகுதியில் தொல்காப்பியரால் சுட்டி விளக்கப் பெறாத பிற நூல்களிற்கண்ட நால்வகைவலியுள் மூன்றென” இளம் பூரணரும், “அறம், பொருள், இன்பமென”—நச்சினுர்க்கினியரும் தம்முள் மாறு

பட்டு இருவேறு பொருள் கூறுகின்றனர்.* இவை உரையன்மை வெளிப்படை, நூலில் கூறும் தொகையால் குறிக்கும் வகைகளே, ஆங்கே விளக்காது சூத்திரிப்பது நூன்மரபாகாமையானும், ஈண்டுப்பிரிவுவகை மூன்றும் விளக்கப்பட்டு, அவற்றை அடுத்து 'மூன்றன்பகுதி' எனத்தொகை கூறப்படுதலானும், இத்தொடர் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் தெளிக்கப்பட்ட பிரிவு வகைமூன்றையே குறிப்பது விளக்கமாகும். இவ்வாறே புறத் திணையியல் (24) "மாற்றரும் கூற்றம்" என்னும் சூத்திரத்திடையில், 'ஈரைந்தாகும்' எனத்தொகுத்துப் பிரித்ததும் காண்க.

பொருட் பிரிவுப் பகுதிக்கண், பொருட்பிணியால் ஒருபுறம் பிரிய விரும்புதலும், காதலால், பிரிவொல்லாது செல்வமுங்குதலுமாகத் தம்முள் முரண்படும் உணர்ச்சிகள் தலை வன்பால் நிகழியல்பை, விளக்கிய பகுதிபாராட்டற்பாலது. நாளது சின்மையால் பொருளீட்டும் விருப்பம் (காதல்) உடைமை உயர்ச்சியால் தகைக்கப்படுவதும், அன்பு பற்றித் தலைவி, தமர் முதலியோர்க்குப் பொருளீட்டும் விருப்பமும், அவ்வன்பிற்குரிய தலைவியின் அகற்சியருமையால் தகைக்கப்படுதலும், இயல்பாதலின் ஒன்றாப் பொருள் வயின் ஊக்கியபாலெனப் பொருட் பிரிவில் தலைவன் உள்ளத்தில் நிகழும் உணர்ச்சி முரண்பாடு வலியுறுத்தப்பட்டது.

'உரைத்திற நாட்டம் கிழவோன்மேன' என்பதை, அப்பாற்பட்ட ஒருதிறத்தானும், ஒன்றாப் பொருள்வயின் ஊக்கியபாலினும், ஊதியங்கருதிய ஒருதிறத்தானும், தாதிடையிட்டவகையினனும், மூன்றன்பகுதியும், வினைத்திறவகையினும், ஆங்கேர்ப்க்கமும், இரத்தலும், தெளித்தலும் என வரும் ஒவ்வொன்றோடும் தனித்தனி கூட்டுக.

பொருள், ஒதல், தூது, பகை, காவல், பரத்தை என அறுவகைப் பிரிவும் வகை பெறக்கூறும் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் முதல் மூன்றையும், 'மூன்றன்பகுதியு' மெனப் பிரித்தார்; பகை, காவலாகிய இரண்டும் தன்னளவிலும், பரத்தை தலைவி அளவிலும் பகைமை சுட்டுதலால், அம்மூன்றையும் வேறாக்கி, எண்ணுமைகளே எல்லாம் இறுதியில் ஒடுக்கொடுத்துக் கூட்டிப்பிரிவு வகை ஆறும் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

ஒன்றாத்தமரினும், பருவத்தாம், சுரத்தும் என்பவற்றின் ஒவ்வொன்றின்கண்ணும் தலைவன் வலித்தலும், விடுத்தலும் இயல்பாகும். அவைவருமாறு:—ஒன்றாத்தமர், உடன் படுமாறு தலைமகன் சான்றோரை விடுத்தது கேட்ட தோழி கூற்றாகவரும்,

"எக்கர் ஞாழல் சிறியிலைப் பெருஞ்சினை

ஒதம் வாங்குந் துறைவன்

மாயோள் பசலை நீக்கின னினியே "

என்னும் ஐங்குறுநூற்று(145)ச் செய்யுளால், தமர் ஒன்றாவழித் தலைவன் துண்தலுண்மை விளங்கும்.

"பெருநன் றுற்றிற் பேணுரு முளரே
ஒருநன்றுடைய ளாயினும் புரிமாண்டு
புலவி தீர வளிமதி இலை கவரப்
பாடமை யொழுகிய தண்ணறுஞ் சாரன்
மென்னடை மரையா துஞ்சு
நன்மலை நாட நின்னல திலளே "

(குறம். 115).

இக்குறர் தொகைச் செய்யுளில், 'நன்மலை நாட நின்னலதிலளே' எனத் தோழி தலைவற்குக் கூறுதலால், தலைவனுக்குத் தலைவியைத்தரத் தமர் ஒன்றாமையும் அதனால் தலைவன் கொண்டு தலைக்கழிய வலித்தலும் கூறப்பட்டது.

இனி மணமறுத்த ஒன்றத்தமரை உடன்படுத்தத் பொருட்டுப் பொருளீட்டக் கருதித் தலைவியை விடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் வந்துழிக் கண்டு கொள்க.

உடன் போக்கு வலித்துக்கொண்டு செல்லும் தலைவன் தலைவிக்குச் சரத்திடைக் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“அழிவில முயலும் ஆர்வ மாக்கள்
வழிபடு தெய்வம் கட்கண் டாஅங்
கலமரல் வருத்தந் தீர யாழநின்
நலமென் பணைத்தோள் எய்தின மாகலிற்
பொரிப்பூம் புன்கின் எழிற்றகை யொண்முறி
சுணங்கணி வனமுலை அணங்குகொளத் திமிரி
நிழல்காண் டோறும் நெடிய வைகி
மணல்காண் டோறும் வண்டல் தைஇ,
வருந்தா தேகுமதி, வாலெயிற் றேயே
“மாநனை கொழுநி மகிழ்குயி லாலும்
நறுந்தண் பொழில் கானம்,
குறும்ப லூரயாம் செல்லு மாறே”.

(நற்றிணை. 9)

“வருமழை கரந்த வுனிற விசும்பின்
துண்டுளி மாறிய உலவை யாங்கட்
டால நீழல் அசைவு நீக்கி
அஞ்சவழி அஞ்சா தசைவழி யசைஇ,
வருந்தா தேகுமதி, வாலிழைக் குறுமகள்
இம்மென் பேரலர் நுமழர்ப் புன்னை
மீமல ருதிர்ந்த தேனாறு புலனிற்
கான லார்மணன் மரீஇக்
கல்லுறச் சிவந்தநின் மெல்லடி யுயற்கே”.

(நற்றிணை. 76)

எனவரும் நற்றிணைச் செய்யுளுமது.

“புலிபொரச் சிவந்த புலாவஞ் செங்கோட்
டொலிபன் முத்த மார்ப்ப வலிசிறந்து
வன்சுவற் பராரை முருக்கிக் கன்றொடு
மடப்பிடி தழீஇய தடக்கை வேழந்
தேன்செய் பெருங்கிளை யிரிய, வேங்கைப்
பொன்புரை கவழம் புறந்தரு டூட்டு

மாமலை விடரகங் கவைஇக் காண்வரக்
கண்டிசின் வாழியோ குறுமகள் நுந்தை
அறுமீன் பயந்த அறஞ்செய் திங்கட்
செல்கடர் நெடுங்கொடி போலப்
பல்பூங் கோங்கம் அணிந்த காடே ”.

என்னும் நற்றிணைப் (202) பாலைச் செய்யுளுமது.

இனி, சுரத்தினதருமை கருதித் தலைவியை விடுத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ உமணர், சேர்ந்து கழிந்த மருங்கி னகன்றலை
பூர்பாழ்த் தன்ன, வேமையம் பெருங்காடு
இன்ன வென்றி ராயின்,
இனியவோ பெரும தமியோர்க்கு மனையே ” (குறு. 124).

இதில் “ என்றிராயின் ” என்பதால் தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தோழி கொண்டு கூறினாள் என்றிக. இனி, விட்டுச் சென்ற தலைவன் இடைச்சரத்துத் தலைவியை நினைந்து கூறற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

எரிகவரந் துண்ட வென்றாழ் நீரிடைச்
சிறிதுகண் படுப்பினுங் காண்குவென் டன்ற
நள்ளென் கங்குல் நனிமனை நெடுநகர்
வேங்கை வென்ற கணங்கிற்
தேம்பாய் கூந்தன் மாஅ யோளே. (ஐங். 324)

“ வேட்டச் செந்நாய் கிளைத்தூண் மிச்சில்
குளவி மொய்த்த அழுகற் சின்னீர்
வளையுடைக் கையள் எம்மொ டுனீஇய
வருகதில் லம்ம தானே
அளியளோ அளியளென் நெஞ்சமர்ந் தோளே ”. (குறு. 56)

இடைச்சர மருங்கில் தமர்வர தலைவன் அருளால் மறைதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அன்றை யனைய வாகி யின்றுமெங்
கண்ணுள் போலச் சுழலு மாதோ
புல்லிதழ்க் கோங்கின் மெல்லிதழ்க் குடைப்பு
வைகுறு மீனின் இனையத் தோன்றிப்
புறவணி கோண்ட பூநாறு கடத்திடைக்
கிடினென விடிக்குங் கோற்றொடி மறவர்
வடிநவில் அம்பின் வினையர் அஞ்சா
தமரிடை யுறுதர நீக்கிநீர்
எமரிடை யுறுதர வொளித்த காடே ” (நற். 48)

இதில், தலைவன் முன்கூறியதைத் தோழி கொண்டு கூறியதாகக் காண்கின்றோம்.

“ வினையமை பாவையினியலி தூந்தை
மனைவரை யிறந்து வந்தனை, யாயிற்
தலைநாட் கெதிரிய தண்பெய லெழிலி
அணிமிகு கானத் தகன்புறம் பரந்த
கடுஞ்செம் முதாய் கண்டுங் கொண்டு
நீவினா யாடுக சிறிதே யானே
மழகளி றுரிஞ்சிய பராரை வேங்கை
மணலிடு மருங்கின் இரும்புறம் பொருந்தி
அமர்வரின் அஞ்சேன், பெயர்க்குவென் ;
தாமர்வரின் மறைகுவென், மாஅ யோளே ”

எனும் நற்றிணை (362)ச் செய்யுளுமது. இதில், தேடிவந்த தலைவி தமர்க்கு ஊறு செய்யாது அருளான் ஒளிக்கும் தலைவன் தானே கூறியதும் அறிக. கற்பொடு புணர்ந்த கௌவைக் குத் தலைவன் கூற்றாகச் செய்யுள் வரின் கண்டுகொள்க.

நாளது சின்மையால் பொருள்தேட வலித்தல் :—பொருட்பிணியும் இன்பம் நுகரும் இளமையும் தம்முள் ஒன்றாமையுக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ புணரிற் புணராது பொருளே ; பொருள்வயிற்
பிரியிற் புணராது புணர்வே ; ஆயிடைச்
சேர்பினும் செல்லா யாயினும் நல்லதற்
குரியை, வாழியென் னெஞ்சே ; பொருளே
வாடாப் பூவின் பொய்கை நாப்பண்
ஒடுமீன் வழியிற் கெடுவ ; யானே
விழுநீர் வியலகந் தூணி யாக,
எழுமா னாளக்கும் விழுநிதி பெறினும்,
கனங்குழைக் கமர்த்த சேயரி மழைக்கண்
அமர்ந்தினிது நோக்கமொடு செகுத்தனன்
எனைய வாசுக வாழிய பொருளே ”.

(நற்றிணை, 16)

“ வங்காக் கடந்த செங்காற் பேடை
எழாலுற வீழ்ந்தெனக் கணவற் காணாது
குழலிசைக் குரல குறும்பல அகவும்
குன்றுறு சிறுநெறி அரியவென் னாது,
மறப்பருங் காதலி யொழிய
இறப்பல் என்பதுநண் டின்மைக்கு முடிவே ”.

எனும் குறுந்தொகைச் செய்யுளுமது.

பொருள் வலிக்கும் நெஞ்சுக்கு அதனோடு பொருந்தா இளமையதருமை தலைவன் கூறற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘பைங்காய் நல்லிட மொரீஇ’ என்னும் நற்றிணைச் செய்யுளில்,

“.....பாழ்நாட் டத்தம்
இறந்துசெய் பொருளும் இன்பம் தருமெனில்,
இளமையிற் சிறந்த வளமையு மில்லை,
இளமை கழிந்த பின்றை வளமை
காமந் தருதலு மின்றே அதனால்
நில்லாப் பொருட்டிணிச் சேறி,
வல்லே நெஞ்சம் வாய்க்கநின் னினையே ”

(நற். 126).

எனத் தலைவன் கூறுதல் காண்க. ஆனாலும்,

அருவியார்க்கும், எனும் நற்றிணைச் (205) செய்யுளில்

“தூன்னருங் கானம் என்னாய் நியே
சுவலே யுண்கண் இவளின் டொழிய
ஆள்வினைக் கதறி யாயின், இன்றொடு
போயின்று கொல்லோ தானே.....
ஆய்நிறம் புரையுமிவள் மாமைக் கவினே ”

என வருவதுமது.

“முதிர்ந்தோ ரிளமை ஒழிந்தும் எய்தார்
வாழ்நாள் வகையளவு அறிஞரு மில்லை ;
... ..
கருங்கண் வெம்முலை நெழுங்கப் புல்லிக்
கழிவதாக கங்குல் ”

என்று தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தலைவிஎடுத்துக்கூறும் நற்றிணைச் (314) செய்யுளில், இளமையதருமையும், நாளின் சின்மையும் தம்முள் ஒன்றாது முன்னுதலைக் காண்க.

தாளாண்மையால் பொருள் வலிக்கும் நெஞ்சிற்குத் தலைவி தகுதி நோக்கித் தலைவன் பிரிவருமை கருதற்குச் செய்யுள் :

“வினையே ஆடவர்க் குயிரே வாணுதல்
மனையுறை மகளிர்க் காடவ ருயிரென
நமக்குரைத் தோரும் தாமே ;
அழாஅல் தோழி அழுங்குவர் செலவே”

இக் குறந்தொகை(135)ச் செய்யுளில் தோழி கொண்டு கூறிய தலைவன் கூற்றால், ஆடவர்க்குத் தாளாண் பக்கம் இன்றியமையா தென்பதும், மனையுறை மகளிரின் தகுதி

பேணுதலும் உவ்வாடவர் கடனென்பதும், இவ்வாறு இருவேறுணர்ச்சி தம்முள் ஒன்றர்ப் பொருட் பிணியின்கண் தலைவர்க்குக் கூற்று நிகழு மென்பதும் காண்க. இன்னும்.

ஆறுசெல் வருத்தத்துச் சிறடி சிவப்பவும்
சினேரீங்கு தளிரின் வண்ணம் வாடவுந்
தான்வரல் துணிந்த இவளினும் இவளுடன்
வேப்பயில் அழுவம் உவக்கும்
பேதை நெஞ்சம் பெருந்தக வுடைத்தே”

(பொருள்—பக்—133)

என்னும் பொருளதிகார உதாரணச் செய்யுளானும், இவ்வொன்றர்ப் பொருட்பிணியில், தலைவியின் பிரிவருமை தலைவன் கூறியதறிக.

இன்மையதிலிவும் உடைமைய துயர்ச்சியும் கருதித்தலைவன் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ஈதலும் துய்த்தலும் இல்லோர்க் கில்லெனச்
செய்வினை கைம்மிக எண்ணுதி ; அல்வினைக்
கம்மா அரிவையும் வருமோ !

எம்மை யுய்த்தியோ ! உரைத்திசி நெஞ்சே”.

(குறு. 613).

இச் செய்யுளில், ‘இல்லோர்க்கில்லெனச் செய்வினை கைம்மிக எண்ணுதி’ என்பதால் இன்மையதிலிவும், ‘அம்மா அரிவையும் வருமோ’ என்றதால் உடைமையாம் காதலின் உயர்வும், தம்முள் ஒன்றருமை தன் நெஞ்சிற்குத் தலைவன் கூறிக் செலவு தவிர்த்தது காண்க.

இனி, இவ்வாறு செலவழுங்காமல் தலைவன் பிரிதலும் உண்டு ; அதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“இசையும் இன்பமும் ஈதலும் மூன்றும்
அசையுட னிருந்தோர்க் கரும்புணர் வின்மென
வினைவயிற் பிரிந்த வேறுபடு கொள்கை,
அரும்பனி மூலரிச் சுரும்புண் பல்போ
தணிய வருதுநின் மணியிருங் கதுப்பென
எஞ்சா வஞ்சினம் நெஞ்சணக் கூறி
மைசூழ் வெற்பின் மலைபல இறந்து
செய்பொருட் ககன்ற செயிர்தீர் காதலர்
கேளார் கொல்லோ தோழி

... ..

.....கார்ப் பெயற் சூரலே”

எனவரும் நற்றிணைச் (214) செய்யுளில் இவ்வாறு ஒன்றர்ப் பொருள்வயின் மாறு பட்டலேக்கும் உணர்ச்சி கூறித் தலைவன் ஒன்றர்ப் பொருள்வயின் பிரிந்தமையும் காண்க. “அரிதாய அறனெய்தி அருளியோர்க்களித்தலும்” எனும்பாலைக்கலி (11) யுமதுவே.

அன்புடைமையால் மனை மாட்சிக்குப் பொருள் வலித்தலும், தலைவியின் பிரிவரு
மையால், செல்லத்துணியாமையு மாகிய ஒன்றாப்பொருட் பிணிக்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“ மாரிப் பித்திகுத்து நீர்வார் கொழுமுதை
இரும்பனம் பசங்குடை பலவுடன் பொதிந்து
பெரும் பெயல் விடியல் விரித்துவிட் டன்ன
நறுந்தண்ணியனே ; நன்மாமேனி,
புனற்புணை யன்ன சாயிறைப் பணைத்தோள்
மணத்தலும், தணத்தலு மிலமே
பிரியின் வாழ்தல் அதனினு மிலமே ”

(குறு. 168)

“ மல்குசுனை புலர்ந்த நல்கூர் சுரமுதல்
குமரி வாகைக் கோலுடை நறுவீ
மடமாந் தோகைக் குடுமியிற் றேன்றும்
கான நீளிடைத் தானும் நம்மொ
டொன்றாமனம் செய்தன விவளெனில்
நன்றி நெஞ்சம் நயந்தநின் னுணரவே ”

என்ற குறுத்தொகை (347)-ப் பாட்டிலும், அன்பினதகலமும், அகற்சியதருமையும்.
ஒன்றாப்பொருள்வயின் ஊக்குதல் உணர்க.

இனி, ஒத்த பிரிவில் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள்:—

“ பொய்யற்ற கேள்வியாற் புரையோரைப் படர்ந்துநீ
மையற்ற பாடிவத்தான் மறுத்தரல் ஒல்வதோ
திங்கதிர் மதியேய்க்கும் திருமுகம், அம்முகம்
பாம்புசெர் மதிபோலப் பசப்பூர்ந்து தொலைத்தகால் ”

என்னும் பாலைக்கலித் (14) தாழிசையில் வாயின்வகுத்த கல்விப்பகுதியின் ஊதியங்கருதிய
தலைவன் பிரிவு உணர்த்தப்படும்.

“ பின்னிய தொடர்நீவிப் பிறர்நாட்டுப் படர்ந்துநீ
மன்னிய புணர்ச்சியான் மறுத்தரல் ஒல்வதோ
புரியவிழ் நறுநீலம் புரையுண்கண் கலுழ்பானாத்
திரியுமிழ் நெய்யேபோற் நெண்பனி யுறைக்குங்கால் ”

என்பதால், கையின் வகுத்த கல்விப்பகுதியின் ஊதியங் கருதித் தலைவன் பிரித்தமை
அறிக. இப்பிரிவுகளில் தலைவன் கூற்று வந்தவழித் கண்டுகொள்க. புகழும் மானமும்
எடுத்து வற்புறுத்தும் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்குச் செய்யுள்:—

நானும் நானும் ஆளவ்னை யழுங்க
இல்லிருந்து மகிழ்வோர்க் கில்லையாற் புகழென
ஒண்பொருட் ககல்வாரும் காதலர் ;
கண்பனி துடையினித் தோழி! நீயே .”

(சிற்றெட்டகம்)

“ இசையும் இன்பமும் ஈதலும் மூன்றும்
அசை யுடனிருந்தோர்க் கரும்புணர் வின்மென
வினைவயிற் பிரிந்த வேறுபடு கொள்கை

... ..

மைசூழ் வெற்பின் மலைபல இறந்து
செய்பொருட் ககன்றநம் செயிர்தீர் காதலர் ”

எனும் நற்றிணைச் (124) செய்யுளடிகளுமது. இச்செய்யுள் தலைவி கூற்றாயினும், இதில், ‘ இன்மென ’ என்பதனால் தலைவன் கூறியதைத் தலைவி கொண்டு கூறியது என விளங்குதலால், புகழும், மானமும் தலைவன் எடுத்துவாழ்ந்துத்தியதற்கி.

“ மிகைதணித் தற்கரி தாமிரு வேந்தர்வெம் போர்மிடைந்த
பகைதணித் தற்குப் படர்தலுற் றார்நமர்...”

என்னும் மணிவாசகர் செய்யுளில், தோழி கூறுதலால், தலைவன் தூதிரையிட்டுப் பிரிதல் கூறப்படுகின்றது. தூதுபற்றிய பிரிவில் தலைவன் கூற்றுக்குச் செய்யுள் வந்துழிக் காண்க. ‘ கொடுமிடனும் ’ எனும் (36-ஆம்) கலியில், தூதொடு மறந்தார் கொல்லோஎன்ற தனால், தூதின் பொருட்டுப் பிரித்தற்கரிய தலைவியையும், தலைவன் பிரித்ததறியப்படும்.

முல்லைப்பாட்டு, பட்டினப்பாலை, மதுரைக் காஞ்சி முதலியவற்றில் மண்டிலத் தருமையும், தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றோர் மேன்மையும் பலவிடத்தும் வருதல் காண்க. தன் வேந்தன் பகைவராய தோன்றல் சான்ற மாற்றரைப் பொருது வெல்லப் பிரியும் தலைவன் கூற்று வருமாறு :—

“ பல்லிருங் கூந்தல் பசப்பு நீவிடின்
செல்வேந் தில்ல யாமே செற்றார்
வெல்கொடி அரண முருக்கிய
கல்லா யானே வேந்துபகை வெலற்கே ” (ஐங்.429).

பாசறைப் புலம்பல் :—

“ புகழ்சால் சிறப்பிற் காதலி புலம்பத்
தூற்த்துவந் தனையே அருந்தொழிற் கட்டீர்
நல்லேறு தழீஇ நாகுபெயர் காலே
உள்ளுதொறுங் கவிழு நெஞ்சம்
வல்லே எம்மையும் வரவிழைத் தனையே ” (ஐங். 445).

வினை முற்றிய தலைமகன் பாகனொடு விரும்பிக் கூறுதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ விருந்தின் மன்னர் அருங்கலம் தெறுப்ப
வேந்தனும் வெம்பகை தணிந்தன் ன் தீம்பெயல்
காரு மார்க்கி தலையின்று ; தேரும்
ஓவத் தன்ன கோபச் செந்நிலம்

வள்வா யாழி உள்ளுறு புருளக்
கடவுக காண்குவம் பாக !.....”

(அகம். 54).

காவலுக்குப் பிரிந்த தலைவன் தான் வருவதாய்த் தலைவிக்குத் தூதனுப்பியது :—
“ஒருகுழை ஒருவன்போல” என்னும் பாலைக்கலியில்,

“ஒல்குபு நிழல்சேர்த்தார்த் குலையாது காத்தோம்பி
வெல்புகழ் உலகேத்த விருந்துநாட் நிறைபவர்

... ..
... ..
... ..

வருமென வந்தன்மவர் வாய்மொழித் தூதே ”

(கலி. 25).

பரத்தையினகற்சியில் பரிந்த தலைமகளிடத்துத் தலைவன் இரத்தலும், தெளித்தலும்
என இருவகையினும் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

‘ஒருஉ, கொடியியல் நல்லார்க்கு’ என்னும் மருதக்கலி (88)யில்,

“ஆயிழாய், நின்கண் பெறினல்லால் இன்னுயிர் வாழ்கல்லா
என்கண் எவனோ தவறு” எனவும்,

“அதுதக்கது, வேற்றுமை என் கண்ணோ ஓராதி தீதின்மை
தேற்றக்கண் டியாய் தெளிக்கு”

எனவும் தலைவன் தலைவியிடம், இரத்தும், தெளித்தும் கூறுதலும்,

“இனித் தேற்றேம்யாம்
தேர்மயங்கி வந்த தெரிகோதை அந்நல்லார்
தார்மயங்கி வந்த தவறஞ்சிப் போர்மயங்கி
நீகூறும் பொய்ச்சூழ் அணங்காயின்
வேற்றினி யார்மேல் விளியுமோ கூறு”

எனக் கூறித் தலைவி ஊடல் தணிதலும் வந்தமை காண்க.

“நில்லாங்கு நில்லாங்கு” என்னும் மருதக்கலி (45)யுள்

“ஆயும் ஆயிழாய் அன்னவையான் ஆங்கறியாமை
போற்றிய நின்னைத் தொடுகு”

எனத் தன் பரத்தமைக்குப் புலந்த தலைவியைத் தெளிக்கு முகத்தானும்,

“நல்லாய் பொய்யெல்லாம் ஏற்றித்தவறுதலைப் பெய்து
கையொடு கண்டாய் பிழைத்தேனருளின்”

என இரக்கு முகத்தானும் தலைவன் கூற்று நிகழ்த்தியது காண்க.

(தொடரும்)

Some Facts and Fables about Karikalan the Great

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King Karikalan was one of the greatest monarchs that adorned the Chola throne in times of yore. The ancient Tamil classics afford abundant testimony to his many and rare kingly virtues and martial valour, to his great attainments in the arts of peace as well as to his glorious achievements in many a field of war. Almost all the great anthologies of the old classical literature have poems in praise of this Chola king great alike both as man and king. *Puṛaṇānūṟu*, *Ahaṇānūṟu*, *Naṟṟiṇai*, *Pattup-pāṭṭu* and *Chilappadikaram* are full of anecdotes of this monarch and of his eventful reign. It is not however proposed here to expatiate on all those admiring eulogiums and loving homages paid to his memory by the galaxy of illustrious poets and poetesses of yore. In this thesis I shall essay to examine only some of the suspect legends and traditions that are in vogue in the world of Tamil scholarship, and are still credited and cherished even by the tallest and most erudite savants like Mahamahopadyaya Dr. V. Swaminatha Aiyar.

One of these legends about Karikalan the Great is that in his youth he strayed into and sojourned in the Chera capital of Karuvur as a vagrant ; and the Chola crown came to him unexpectedly as a windfall by a miraculous event. It is given out that the then Chola monarch passed away without leaving any heir of his own house, and as per *māmūl* the royal elephant was set at large to find and fetch a suitable candidate to occupy the vacant throne. That sagacious animal is said to have stalked all the way to the Chera metropolis of Karuvur, seized this forlorn remote scion of the Chola family there, and bringing him on his back to have put him on the throne at Uraiyur, the then capital of the Cholas. This fable is fondly believed and persistently circulated in the pandit-world universally and with such unanimity as to doubt it would at once expose the sceptic to obloquy and anathema. And yet this story seems to be not only incredible and lacking warrant in literature ; but it is also obvious that it runs counter to the positive testimony afforded by the biographical sketch of his childhood and of his rightful succession to the Chola throne portrayed in one of the Ten Idylls known as *Porunarāṟṟuppaḍai*. If the above fable were to receive any credit, Kari-

kalan must be taken to be an impecunious and hopeless vagrant without any vested right and prospects, or expectations whatever to succeed to the Chola crown. On the other hand the poet Muḍattāmakkaṇṇiār asseverates in Porunarāruppaḍai that he was born in purple as royal heir to the Chola throne, and in virtue of legitimate rights vested in him even when he was in his mother's womb he succeeded to the crown and was anointed king while he was yet a baby. Even as a crawling infant he is said to have borne the royal sceptre he was born to wield, and in his very boyhood to have warred with and vanquished the other two powerful potentates of the Tamil country. The unmistakably significant and relevant passages that bear out these facts run as follow :

“ வென் வேல்
உருவப் பஃதேரினை யோன் சிறுவன்
முருகம் சீற்றத்துருகெ முகுரிசில்,
தாய்வயிற் றிருந்து தாய் மெய்தி,
எய்யாத் தெவ்வர் ஏவல் கேட்பச்
செய்யார் தேளம் தெருமரல் கலிப்ப,
பவ்வ மீமிசைப் பகற்கதிர் பரப்பி
வெவ்வெஞ் செல்வன் விசம்பு படர்ந் தாங்குப்
பிறந்து தவழுகற்றதற்றொட்டுச் சிறந்தகன்
ஊடு செகிற்கொண்டு நாடொறும் வளர்ப்ப,—
ஆளினன் மான் அணங்குடைக் குருளை
மீளிமொய்ம்பின் மிகுவலி செருக்கி
முலைக்கோள் விடாஅ மாத்திரை னெரேரெனத்
தலைக்கோள் வேட்டங் களிற் ற் டாங்கு,—
இரும்பனம் போர்தைத் தோடும் கருஞ்சினை
அரவாய் வேம்பின் அங்குழைத் தெரியலும்
ஒங்கிருஞ் சென்னி மேம்பட மலைந்த
இருபெரும் வேந்தரும் ஒருகனத் தவிய
வெண்ணித் தாக்கிய வெருவரு நோன்றாள்
கண்ணார் கண்ணிக் கரிகால் வளவன்.”

(ll. 130-148 Porunarāruppaḍai).

There is no possible escape from the positive statement in this poem that to Karikalan descended the kingly rights and royal crown as his birth-right even antenatally, and he reigned as an anointed king continuously from the date of his nativity as baby, child, boy and man till he died full of honours and years. (Vide)

“தாய்வயிற்றிருந்து தாயம் எய்தி.”

he succeeded to his royal state even when he was in his mother's womb ; and again

“பவ்வமீமிசைப் பகற்குதிர் பரப்பி
வெவ்வெஞ்செல்வன் விசம்பு படர்ந்தாங்குப்
பிறந்துதவழ் சுற்றதற் றெட்டு சிறந்தநன்
னாடு செகிற்கொண்டு நாடொறும் வளர்ப்ப”

Notwithstanding this categorical and definite statement of fact in what is a direct narration of the biography of Karikalan by a contemporary poet, pedants still persist in giving currency to the legend which attributes his accession to the throne to a mere accident of an elephant's whimsical choice. And they cite the following verse from Pazhamozhi as the sole authority for this story :—

கழுமலத்தி யாத்த களிறும் கருவூர்
விழுமியோன் மேற்சென் றதனால்—விழுமிய
வேண்டி.னும் வேண்டா விடினும் உறற்பால
திண்டா விடுத லரிது.

In the first place there is nothing in this *venba* to relate it anywise to Karikalan at all. It only states that “an elephant tied or accoutered in *Kaḷumalam* strided into *Karuvur*, marching upon a person in distress.” Even if ‘*vizhumyon*’ (விழுமியோன்) were taken to mean a great man, and not a man in distress, there is nothing to justify that this word in the verse has any reference to Karikalan. It would be another instance of arguing in a circle. They posit that this verse relates to the incident of the elephant's choice of Karikalan for the Chola throne on the footing that that incident is an accepted fact; and in turn they cite this verse itself as if it were proof enough for this fictitious story. One unproved assumption is offered as proof of another, when neither is proved and none is provable otherwise.

Again this verse offers even more insuperable objections to the pedant's efforts to read a legend about Karikalan into its lines. If the citizens of the Chola kingdom desired to resort to an elephant's aid to choose their king, the wizard elephant should have started its auspicious march from the royal Chola capital of *Uraiyr*, and not from *Kazhumalam*. For, *Kazhumalam* was a town in the *malainad* of the *Cheranad* and belonged to the *Chera* kings. (Vide)

“நற்றேர்க் குட்டுவன் கழுமலத் தன்ன”

(I. 9. *Aham* 270)

That *Kazhumalam* was not a Chola possession, but a *Chera* city to be attacked by the Chola invaders is again evidenced by another reference in *Ahanānūru*.

“ ... பழையன் பட்டெனக்
கண்டது நோனா னாகித் திண்டேர்க்
கணைய நகப்படக் கழுமலந் தந்த
பிணையலங் கண்ணிப் பெரும்பூட் சென்னி”

(Il 11-14 Aham, 44).

This makes it clear that Perumpūtchenni, a Chola king, attacked and subdued Kazhumalam in his invasion of the Chera kingdom.

It is also inexplicable as to why Karikalan of the Chola family had to be found by the elephant in Karuvur of all places. Karuvur was the capital of the rival kingdom of the Cheras. It is not suggested that Karikalan was there seeking the help of the Chera monarch in his capital city, and the Chola citizens sent the Chola's royal elephant for fetching Karikalan to avoid a Chera invasion to succour Karikalan as a rightful claimant to the Chola throne. On the contrary the schoolmen's emphasis on the Pazhamozhi venba cited above is to show that Karikalan had no anticipations or expectations of any kind regarding the Chola crown, which with the sceptre came to him entirely as a god send and as decreed by the inscrutable destiny in his uneventful vagrant life. Thus the whole story stands self-condemned both as an incredible miracle, and as a fiction betraying its mendacious fabrication in the face of the positive facts found in Karikalan's biography in Porunarāṟuppaḍai written by a contemporary poet.

II

Let us now turn to another common story about Karikalan which has had a great vogue among Tamil scholars although forsooth it has no legs to stand on. It is persistently asserted that Karikalan was a state-prisoner in his youth detained in duress by some uncle or dāyādi who usurped the Chola throne legitimately belonging to the former, and having effected his escape he recovered his Chola kingdom with the aid of his uncle named Irumpiḍarthalaiyār. In support of this story another Pazhamozhi venba is relied upon.

“சுடப்பட்ட டுயி ருய்ந்த சோழன் மகனும்
பிடர்த்தலைப் பேராணைப் பெற்றுக்—கடைக்கால்
செயிரறு செங்கோல் செனீஇனன்; இல்லை
உயிருடையார் எய்தா வினை.”

The common interpretation put upon this verse is as follows :—“ Karikalan, who in youth met with but escaped an accident of fire which however scalded and burnt his feet, recovered or secured his kingdom, with the aid of his maternal uncle Irumpiḍarthalaiyar, which he later ruled

over. Therefore, if one lives long enough there is nothing one cannot achieve." The verse does not mention Karikalan by name, but merely refers to a son of a Chola, who in some fire-accident got off with burnt or scalded feet. The fact that Karikalan had his feet scalded in some fire accident is spoken of in a venba-verse which is appended to Porunar-āruppaḍai.

“முச்சக் கரமு மளப்பதற்கு நீட்டியகால்
இச்சக் கரமே யளந்ததால்—செய்ச்செய்
அரிகான்மேல் தேன்தொடுக்கும் ஆய்புனனீர் நாடன்
கரிகாலன் கானெருப் புற்று.”

Tacking this incident in Karikalan's life to the Pazhamozhi Venba, the commentators presumed that the latter venba refers to Karikalan not only as the person who burnt his feet in some accident of fire, but also as one who broke loose from his enemy's prison and recovered his kingdom from his usurpers with the aid of his uncle as mentioned in that venba. In this connection the incidents mentioned in Pattinappalai in reference to the hero of that poem are gratuitously and lavishly banked upon to support the thesis of Karikalan's incarceration by his usurping rival to the Chola throne.

It is of course true that the hero of Pattinappalai is said to have been in prison in his youth :

“கொடுவரிக் குருளை கூட்டுள் வளர்ந்தாங்குப்
பிறர்பிணி யகத்திலிருந்து பீடுகாழ் முற்றி,
அருங்கரை குவியக் குத்திக் குழிகொண்டு
பெருங்கை யானை பிடிபுக்காங்கு,
நுண்ணிதி னுணரநாடி நண்ணுர்
செறிவுடைத் திண்காப் பேறி, வாள்கழித்து
உருகெழு தாயம் ஊழி நெய்தி
பெற்றவை மகிழ்தல் செய்யான்.”

Translated into English, this would read as follows :—“ Even as a captive tiger-cub grows vindictive in its cage, he bided his time in incarceration in his enemy's dungeon. On attaining maturity and strength he designed resolutely and discreetly his plans for escape, and boldly broke through the strong guard of his enemies that kept him in duress, just as the captive elephant trapped into a pit escapes to rejoin his mate by butting its bank with his huge tusks and by thus filling the pit with falling earth. Having thus secured his freedom he duly vindicated his birthright with drawn sword, and wrested from the usurper his royal heritage of the Chola kingdom.” We are not told how or why the hero of Paṭṭinappālai is identified with Karikalan. The sole basis for the story seems to be an

unwarranted and untrue assumption¹ that Karikalan is the hero alike of the two poems, *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* by Muḍattāmakkaṇṇiār and *Paṭṭiṇappālai* by Rudrankaṇṇanār. Many a castle has since been built in the air on this fantastic assumption. There is nothing in *Paṭṭiṇappālai* even as a remotest hint to suggest that Karikalan was the hero it refers to. Neither his name nor any of the many great incidents and episodes of his eventful life is anywhere mentioned in *Paṭṭiṇappālai*. *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* expressly mentions Karikalan by name, speaks of his royal father also by name, and narrates the essential events of one of the most memorable battles in the classic age. *Paṭṭiṇappālai* on the other hand names its hero as Tirumāvalavan instead of as Karikalan, omits altogether both the two great victories of Karikalan in the fields of Veṇṇi (வெண்ணி) and Vākai (வாகை) which are emblazoned by the ancient poets in all the eulogiums and poetic biographies of Karikalan. These discrepancies were noticed by Mahavidvan R. Raghava Iyengar, the Tamil Research Lecturer of this university. And when he drew my attention to them, I not only confirmed his conclusion that Karikalan the hero of *Porunarāṟruppaḍai*, and Tirumāvalavan the hero of *Paṭṭiṇappālai*, were two different persons; but I also in my turn suggested to the Mahavidvan that they stood related to each other as father and son. I shall presently elucidate this relationship between Karikalan and Tirumavalavan. But in the meanwhile it is passing strange that even great scholars should ignore these irreconcilable discrepancies which conflict with the assumed identity of the heroes of these two poems and of the other legend woven out of a Pazhamozhi venba attributing Karikalan's accession to the throne to an accidental choice of a wizard elephant. The story of the elephant's choice makes our Karikalan to be a cheerless, impecunious vagrant sojourning as a voluntary exile in Karuvur, the capital of the rival Chera kings when the whimsical elephant's offer of the Chola crown came to him quite as a windfall without any expectations or claims on his part. Again, whereas *Paṭṭiṇappālai* definitely describes the early captivity and long incarceration of its hero in a hostile dungeon, kept out of his heritage by an usurping kinsman in the Chola capital of Kaviripūmpaṭṭinam until this captive hero emancipated himself by a clever stratagem and a bold coup-d-etat; *Porunarāṟruppaḍai* on the contrary distinctly speaks of Karikalan's rare good fortune in his being called to the Chola throne from the very date of his birth, and in having continuously reigned and ruled since as undisputed master and monarch of the Chola territories. It is impossible in the circumstances to confuse or identify the heroes of all these three poems, Pazhamozhi No. 105, *Porunarāṟruppaḍai*, and *Paṭṭiṇappālai*, which describe three diverse situations and different characters.

It is obvious that the adjectival phrase (சுடப்பட்டுயிருந்த) referring to the burnt-foot precedes and qualifies the word 'Cholan'. Therefore the next word (மகன்) 'Mahan' (son) must refer only to the son of the Chola with a burnt-foot, and as such to a person different from that burnt-footed Chola. If Karikalan were the sole and only person intended to be indicated in this verse, the word mahan (மகன்) in the first line of this verse is an unmeaning superfluity calculated only to cause confusion. The purpose would have been best served by dropping the word 'mahan,' and stopping with the word 'Cholan' after the qualifying phrase relating to the incident of the burnt-foot. Pazhamozhi-venba No. 21 which speaks of Karikalan refers to him only as 'Cholan', and not as Cholan mahan. (Vide).

“ நரைமுடித்துச்
சொல்லால் முறைசெய்தான் சோழன்—குலவிச்சை
கல்லாமல் பாகம் படும்.”

Cholan is the dynastic title for all kings of the Chola-house. And in conjunction with identifying attributes like the adjectival phrase in the verse under discussion, it would and should suffice by itself to indicate Cholan-Karikalan in the context. The addition of the word 'mahan', therefore, unmistakably suggests the intention of the poet to refer to a son of this 'Chola with a burnt foot as the person to whom the incidents mentioned in the subsequent lines relate or are attributed.' And we know definitely from Paṭṭinappālai that these latter incidents relate only to Tirumāvalavan.

The very Pazhamozhi venba relied on for the assumed identity of Karikalan and Tirumavalavan, and cited above in another connection, thus reveals not only that they are two different persons, but also that the latter was the son of the former. It is thus clear that the burnt footed 'Cholan' in the first line was and must be Karikalan, and the word 'mahan' obviously means, as it must, the son of that Cholan, Karikala the Great. This natural and correct meaning accords not only with the rules of grammar and the canons of interpretation, but it also appositely explains the natural relationship between Karikal Cholan of the burnt-foot and the 'mahan' who escaping from a hostile imprisonment vindicated his legitimate claims to his father's throne with his lusty sword and the loyal aid of his uncle, as mentioned in Paṭṭinappālai.

This son of Karikalan is obviously Tirumavalavan, the Paṭṭinappalai-hero. For, the incident that he secured and wielded his royal sceptre with the help of his uncle later in his life, which is referred to in this venba, exactly squares and is in all fours with the biographical description in the poem of Paṭṭinappālai. Tirumavalavan the only name

mentioned in Pattinappalai was the proper name of that hero-king. We have in the Sangam anthologies some references to more than one Chola king with the name of Tirumavalavan. e.g. (குராப்பள்ளித் துஞ்சிய திருமாவளவன்) “Kurāppalli-Tūnjiya-Tirumavalavan” referred to in Puram 58, 60, & 197, and another ‘Tirumavalavan’ mentioned in Puram 43. All these references from the old Tamil classics thus establish that Tirumavalavan, the hero of Paṭṭinappālai, was the son of Karikalan the great; and that after Karikalan’s death, his infant son Tirumavalavan was taken and kept in durance in his boyhood by some ambitious and hostile kinsman who usurped Karikalan’s kingdom; but he regained his father’s crown and his own freedom when he came of age by a clever stratagem and bold coup-de-etat with the help of ‘Pidar-thalaiyar who was perhaps his uncle, father-in-law, or both.

It is also relevant in this connection to remember that Karikalan ruled over the eastern Chola empire from his maritime capital of Kāvirippūmpaṭṭinam. Although Porunarāṟruppaḍai does not refer to Kāvirippūmpaṭṭinam by name, the entire description of Karikalan’s capital city in that poem makes it out to be a maritime city in the rich and fertile alluvial region near the estuary of the Kāviri. Moreover Silappadikaram leaves no doubt whatever that Karikalan’s capital was ‘Pukar’ otherwise known as Kāvirippūm paṭṭinam. (Vide) Vanchinamalai (ll. 11-15 and 35), Kaḍalāḍukathai-ll. 159-60; and Indiravizhavoor eḍutta kathai. It is probable that after Karikalan’s death some ambitious agnate of his usurped his throne in Pukār or Kāvirippūmpaṭṭinam when his son Tirumāvalavan was too young to fight him, and kept the rightful young heir of Karikalan in a dungeon to ensure his own safety against any revolt on behalf of that heir. It is only natural that the young prince Tirumāvalavan, who was pining in his captivity, took the earliest occasion to effect his escape as soon as he felt confident of his strength and success against the usurper.

I think it is even possible to hazard the suggestion that this Tirumāvalattan may be the very prince referred to in Puram 43. It is obvious that the other Tirumāvalattan mentioned in Puram 58 and 60 cannot be the Pattinappalai hero; for Puram 58 itself says that the Tirumavalattan it speaks of is an Uranthai-Chola, whereas the Pattinappalai hero was Pukar-Chola. But the Chola prince referred to in Puram 43 by the poet Thāmappalkaṇṇanār may well be the Pattinappālai-hero. And there are a number of other circumstances which seem to confirm this identity. The colophon under the verse No. 43 in Puram definitely says that the Chola prince Tirumavalavan it refers to W as the brother of the great warrior Chola king ‘Nalamkiḷli.’ We know from the various eulogiums of this Nalamkiḷli in Puram that he was incessantly at war with his Chola royal cousin Nedumkiḷli on the Uranthai throne, and

that Nalamkiḷḷi's own capital was Pukar. (Vide) Kovur Kizhar's eulogium of this king Nalamkiḷḷi in Puram 30. It is probable that this Nalamkiḷḷi died issueless, and his young brother Tirumavalavan was taken captive by the hostile Uranthai rivals of Nalamkiḷḷi, and that all his youth was spent in prison as a state-prisoner. On attaining age he effected his escape and avenged himself by striking down his enemies. The facts are set forth in Pattinappalai itself in all details. If this thesis were confirmed by further investigation, it would establish that Karikalan the great, who ruled over the Chola empire from his capital Pukar, left two sons—Nalamkiḷḷi and Tirumavalavan as his sons and heirs. The senior son Nalamkiḷḷi naturally succeeded his father on the Pukar throne; and on the former's death Tirumavalavan, who was then very young suffered incarceration at the hands of his rivals on account of the feuds between his deceased brother Nalamkiḷḷi and his rival Uranthai Cholas, as evidenced by the many verses of different poets collected in Puram. It is also probable that the Brahmin author of Puram 43, Thamappalkannanār was the son of the great poet Mudattamakkaṇṇiār, who was the panegyrist of Tirumavalavan's father, the great Karikala, whom he eulogised in his poem Porunāraṇṇuppaḍai. Instances are not wanting that in the ancient times sons used to have prefixed part or whole of their fathers' names to their own. As the word 'Muḍam' probably referred only to some lameness of his father, his proper name was only Thamakkannanar.

Pattinappalai definitely mentions that Uranthai also suffered and shared the desolation and devastation which dogged the heels of the invading and victorious armies of Tirumavalavan along with the other cities and rich rural areas of his enemies, and that Uranthai was subsequently renovated and restored by Tirumavalavan to be worthy of its traditions as the ancient ancestral Chola capital.

“ அருங்கடி வரைப்பின் ஊர்கனி னழியப்
பெரும்பாழ் செய்தும் அமையான்
... ..
காடுகொன்று நாடாக்கிக்
குளந்தொட்டு வளம் பெருக்கிப்
பிறங்கு நிலைமாடத் துறந்தை போக்கிக்
கோயிலொடு குடிநிதீஇ
வாயிலொடு புழையமைத்து
ஞாயிரொறும்புதையிதீஇ
திருநிலைய பெருமன் னெயில்.”

This sack and restoration of Uranthai by Thirumavalavan would only square with this thesis that the enemies be avenged near rival cousins of the Uranthai Chola house.

There is yet another legend which fathers an ordinary street-dancer, Adimandi by name, on king Karikalan as his royal daughter. It is too absurd and preposterous an anamoly to deserve any credibility. Nevertheless it found favour with some scholars. I marshalled the literary evidences which emphatically refute it. But I do not propose to discuss them here any further, as I have since found that Vidwan V. Venkata-rajulu Reddiar has dealt with this anamolous and unwarranted fable and animadverted upon it in his research thesis on Paranar published by the Madras University.

The Passive Voice in Tamil*

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We know that by 'Voice' a kind of aspect of the verbal action in relation to the subject is meant.¹ When the subject is active, that is to say, when the action of the subject produces a certain effect on its surroundings, there is a verb in the active voice. And when the subject is receptive, that is to say, when the subject is acted upon or when the subject experiences a modification of its emotional sentiments, there appears a verb in the passive voice. We do not regard "I sleep", "I die", "I suffer", as passive and "I give" "I strike", as active. The distinction between the active and the passive has reached a stage, when to regard them from the point of view of their root-meaning is not always necessary. Yet the difference between the active and passive verbs does not exist merely in the grammatical relations of the subject and object. If 'Rāma struck Rāvaṇa', one gave the blow and the other received it. Rāma acted and Rāvaṇa was receptive. This receptivity or being affected is expressed by putting the object as the subject. Then we employ a verb in the passive voice. The word 'passive' itself takes its origin from the Latin word 'passus' the past participle of "pati" meaning to suffer.²

The passive is considered by certain writers³ as one of the two necessary forms of the verb. The passive is necessary when one wishes to express an action without telling the acting subject. It is necessary also when there is a desire to bring out the object which suffers the action rather than the subject which performs it. But it appears that to the early intelligence every action perhaps required an object.⁴ And to turn an object into a subject, it seems, needed considerable powers of abstraction.

* A Paper read at the Ninth All-India Oriental Conference.

1. Vendryes "*Language*" p. 102.

2. Skeats: *Etymological Dictionary* p. 432.

3. E.g. Sylvestre de Sacy.

4. Sayce: *The Science of Language*, Vol. II, p. 158,

No wonder then that in the Primitive Indo-European there was no passive voice of the verb. "The passive is a form acquired gradually by the diverse Indo-European Languages long after the system of their conjugation was completed in its principal lines" says Mr. Breal.⁵ "The Primitive Aryan verb possessed no passive voice ; in fact, the passive is a comparatively late creation" says Prof. Sayce.⁶ That the primitive Indo-European did not have a passive conjugation is the view expressed by Mr. Brugmann⁷ and by Dr. S. K. Chatterji⁸ also. And that in Sanskrit the passive was a new base formed by the suffix 'Ya' is the opinion of Dr. Peile.⁹

Over against all these there is the view of Dr. Caldwell that each of the primitive Indo-European Languages has a regular passive voice, regularly conjugated.¹⁰ That by the primitive Indo-European he did not mean the *ursprache*—the assumed parent stock—is clear from his use of the expression "Primitive Indo-European Languages". His idea seems to be that in the languages born of the Primitive Indo-European there is to-day a regular passive conjugation. And it is by means of annexing the particle 'Ya' to the verbal theme that the Sanskrit passive is formed. And this 'Ya' which is now recognised as a particle might have once had the meaning of "to go" according to Dr. Caldwell¹¹ and Dr. S. K. Chatterji,¹² although this explanation does not greatly commend itself to Dr. Peile.¹³ Mr. Vendryes, who also holds that the Primitive Indo-European did not know the passive, has clearly stated that the Indo-European inflexion also might have been the result of the *agglutination* to the stem of elements originally independent.¹⁴ And this 'Ya' was perhaps extended from an old autonomous word that had some meaning which has now receded into the background. In other words, it has been reduced to the role of a grammatical device.

Now coming to the Dravidian languages we find that Dr. Caldwell, "the founder of Dravidian Philology,"¹⁵ has stated that "the Dravidian

5. "Semantics" p. 85.

6. "The Science of Language" Vol. II, p. 158.

7. "A Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages". Vol. IV. §. 972.

8. "Origin and Development of the Bengali Language" Vol. II. §. 653.

9. "Philology" chapter V. §. 26.

10. A Comparative Grammar of the Drn. Langs. (3rd. edn.), p. 463.

11. Comp. gram. p. 463.

12. Bengali Lang. Vol. II. p. 912.

13. "A Primer of Philology", p. 97.

14. "Language—A Linguistic Introduction" p. 104 and p. 170.

15. Grierson: Linguistic Survey of India, Vol. IV, p. 277.

verb is entirely destitute of a passive voice, properly so called, nor is there any reason to suppose that it ever had a passive".^{15a} Mr. A. H. Arden,¹⁶ Thomas Hodson,¹⁷ and Captain R. A. Cole,¹⁸ seem to have a similar view.

Straightway it must be conceded that there is no inflected passive in the Dravidian such as the old English¹⁹ "hight" (= was called) from *hātan* (= to call) or the Danish²⁰ "de slās" (with a long vowel, meaning they are beaten) from "de slas" (with a short vowel, meaning they fight one another) or the Western Panjabi²¹ "Mārindā" (= being struck) from *Māranda* (= striking). So one can whole-heartedly support Dr. Caldwell when he says "None of the Dravidian dialects possesses any means of expressing passivity by direct inflexional changes."²²

But when he says that there is a constructive passive in the Tamil Language formed by means of the preterite verbal participle of any neuter or active verb followed by the preterite of the verb 'to become' or 'to go' and when he cites "Muḍintāyirru" and "Uḍaidupōyirru" as instances in point,²³ one wonders whether this usage is not after all modern and whether the idea of completion of an act rather than that of passivity is not conveyed. It is hard to find instances of this kind with a passive import in ancient Tamil Literature. And modern expressions like "Nī Cāpittāyirra?"^{23a} are found only to convey the idea of completion of particular acts. In fact this example only means "Have you finished eating?" and not "Have you been eaten?"

A mode of expressing the passive in Tamil, mentioned by Dr. Caldwell, is by means of neuter or intransitive form of the verb. "Adu Uḍaindadu" is an instance cited by him.²⁴ A wrong translation of it

15-a. Comp. Gram. p. 463.

16. "A Grammar of the Telugu Lang." (1873) p. 101.

17. "Kanarese Grammar" (1859) p. 39.

18. "Coorg Grammar" (1867) p. 43.

19. Dr. O. F. Emerson's "The History of the English Language" (1919) p. 33.

20. Otto Jespersen's "Language—Its Nature and Development" (1928) p. 377.

21. Dr. S. K. Chatterji's Bengali Lang. Vol. II, p. 910.

22. Comp. Gram. p. 463.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

23a.	n — ந	t — த	l — ல
	ṇ — ண	ṭ — ட	ḷ — ள
	ṇ — ண	r — ர	ḷ — ள
	ṇ — ன	r — ர	
	ṇ — ன		

24. Comp. Gram. p. 464.

purporting to be literal has been given.' This expression does not mean literally "It has come into a broken condition". On the other hand it literally means "It broke". This is just like saying "Two and two make four" when really two and two *are made* four. Perhaps here the Tamil Language only framed this phrase to represent the action in a somewhat dramatic way wherein the subject is active. "It broke" or "adu Uḍaindadu" then is only a statement where an act has been attributed to the subject. This active form with a passive significance may be said to be somewhat similar to the Japanese form. Caldwell regards this mode of expressing the passive as the most idiomatic and characteristic mode in the Dravidian languages.²⁵ Probably, before learning other methods of forming the passive the Tamils used this to a considerable extent.

Occasionally Tamil active or transitive verbs are themselves used with a passive signification. For instance, "Eḷudiya tāḷ Uṇḍu" which means "there is the paper which (You or he or she or they) wrote" conveys the passive significance of "there is the written paper". And Dr. Caldwell has carefully said that this was a mode adopted only occasionally. That this method alternated with a regular use of "paḍu" for passive import is evident from the earliest extant piece of Tamil literature, namely Tolkāppiyam.^{26a} The use of the preterite active participle "Colliya" (= that which said) from the root col (= to say) and of the preterite passive participle "Collappaṭṭa" (= that which was said) from the same root is found side by side in this treatise.

The preterite neuter relative participial noun is very often used with a passive import, according to Dr. Caldwell. When Rāma commanded Bharata to do as he dictated, he is reported in Tamil to have said "connadu ceydi". The context permits either an active or a passive meaning here. It can mean either "Do that which (I) said" or "Do as was said". The point is that the real active agent is not expressed here. Expressions such as these then were probably considered adequate for sometime for conveying the significance of the passive.

But when Dr. Caldwell next proceeds to say that "the use of the more formal *modern* passive "collappaṭṭadu" (pōdum) would sound awkward and foreign,²⁶ he makes a highly disputable statement. Forms such as 'collappaṭṭa' or 'Collappaṭṭadu' are as old as Tamil literature.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 463-464.

26a. Vide § 246 and § 112 of Thol. Col.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 465-6.

The very expressions 'Collappaṭṭa' and 'Collappaṭṭana'²⁷ are found in the ancient Tamil Grammar Tolkāppiyam composed in about the 4th century B.C.²⁸ I have collected materials from all the works that are generally classified as "the Third Sangam Works in Tamil" which enable me to say without any fear of contradiction that the employment of "paḍu" for purposes of conveying a passive significance is as old as the works themselves. The collections of the Third Sangam known as Eṭṭutogai, Pattupāṭṭu and Padinenkīl-kaṇakku may be taken to belong to a period ranging between the 3rd century B.C. and the 7th century A.D. In Kalittogai (a book earlier than the 1st century A.D.) where there are 150 verses, we have no less than 25 places where 'paḍu' is found in a passive sense. In Tirukkural (of about the same age) where there are 1330 couplets we have as many as 48 occasions where 'paḍu' appears with a passive import. In Paḷamoli and Nālaḍiyār—compositions made somewhere between the 2nd and 7th centuries A.D.—where there are four hundred verses in each, there are at least 20 instances in each of 'paḍu' with a passive significance. In the earliest extant treatise, Tolkappiyam too, there are more than fifteen places in one of its three parts alone (namely Poruḷadikāram) where we notice the employment of 'paḍu' for this purpose. In the face of these facts it is inconceivable how anyone could persist in holding that expressions having 'paḍu' are modern passives. To hold that view appears to me to shut one's eyes to truth.

Nor is the use of 'paḍu' for this purpose "awkward" or "foreign" as taken by Dr. Caldwell. A mode that existed in the days of the third Tamil Sangam, a mode that flourished in the Age of the Epics (2nd century A.D. to 10th), a form that was sanctified by the use of the great religious devotees and saints commonly called "the Saiva Samaya Āchāryās" and "the Vaishnavaites Āḷwārs" in their hymns, a form that continually occurs in almost every grammatical treatise in Tamil (Kārigai, Yāpparuṅkalam, Naṇṇūl, Daṇṭialaṅkāram, Iraiyaṇārkaḷaviyal etc.), a form found in almost every purāṇa (e.g. Periapurāṇa, Mērumandarapurāṇa, Sikāḷāthipurāṇa, Taṇigaipurāṇa, Tiruvēḷaiyāḍal-purāṇa, etc.) can scarcely be considered awkward, clumsy or ungraceful. And to treat this form as a foreign one is completely to overlook all evidence from ancient Tamil Literature and to be unjust to old writers.

It is true that the employment of 'paḍu' was not the only method of conveying the idea of passive in Tamil. Alongside of other methods

27. Marappiyal §.9 and 105.

28. M. Srinivasa Ayyangar: 'Tamil Studies' (1914) p. 117 and Prof. S. S. Bharatiar in A. U. Journal, Vol. VI, p. 329.

it also existed from a time as far back as we could see. Contemporaneous with the use of active forms themselves in a passive sense, the method of affixing 'paḍu' for conveying the passive significance was co-existent with the use in ancient and medieval times of "uṇ" (meaning "to eat") for the same purpose.²⁹ "Uṇ" which means "to eat" sustained a transference in meaning and was used in a metaphorical way indicating 'to enjoy' or 'to suffer'. In this sense we find it used in Chilappadikāram (of about the 2nd century A.D.). "Viṇaiappayan uṇṇunkālai" which occurs there³⁰ means metaphorically "at the time of enjoying the fruits of (one's) deeds." This metaphorical extension in meaning of the word "uṇ" seems to have influenced the Tamil mind to seize upon it as capable of expressing, as much as is done by 'paḍu,' the idea of the passive. It was not "uṇ" alone that shared the honour of expressing the passive with 'paḍu.' 'Peru' also meaning "to get" or "to obtain" had a share in the affair. We see 'peru' employed to indicate the idea of the passive in Tolkāppiyam,³¹ Periapurānam³² (of about the 12th century) and certain Tamil inscriptions.³³ If obtaining is succeeded by enjoying or suffering, if enjoying or suffering presupposes obtaining something, the ideas of 'uṇ' (= to enjoy) and 'peru' (= to obtain) appear not far removed from each other. Hence it is that these were perhaps considered equivalent to 'paḍu' which itself had the meaning of "to get" as could be seen from ancient Tamil Literature.³⁴ But in certain connexions 'paḍu' seems to have been preferred to 'uṇ.' It seems to be uncouth or awkward now to say "colluṇḍa". "Collapaṭṭa" has however gained favour. From among the three materials that could be used for the same purpose, the Tamil mind seems to have adopted in recent times one of the equivalents 'paḍu' and dismissed the two others. Any employment of 'uṇ' in this connexion by a person of to-day will appear pedantic or antiquated. We do not meet it in ordinary conversation but we may probably find it in poetical compositions of the present day too. If poets like Mahavidwan R. Raghava Aiyengar use it now, it is perhaps

29. Vide :—

- (a) Chilappadikāram V, l. 122.
- (b) Periya Tirumoli, 11th Ten, 5th stanza.
- (c) Kambaramāyaṇam—Sundarakāṇḍam—Pāsappaḍalam, st. 29.
- (d) Periyapurānam—Eripattar purāṇam st. 26.

30. Vide Kāthai XIV l. 33.

31. Poruḷadikāram § 445.

32. Periyapurānam—Kāraikkāl Ammaiārpurāṇm st. 62 ; *ibid.*—Tiruñāna Sambandar purāṇam st. 1221.

33. South Indian Inscriptions, Vol. II, part 5. Vēlurpālaiyam Plate IV-b, l. 58-60 and Dr. P. S. S. Sastriar's "History of Grammatical Theories" p. 175.

34. Vide Puṇanānūru, st. 93, l. 93,

because they, being learned in the classics and medieval literature, adopt a form which they have very often met with and which has not perhaps gone out of their memory. And "peru" is rarely used by certain scholars like Mahāmahōpādya Dr. V. Swaminatha Aiyar and Mr. T. V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar (Editor of "Navasakti") due largely to the influence of Periyapurāṇam of which they are masters. Otherwise it may be said to have proved abortive.

Thus we have seen that ancient Tamil literature bears testimony to the fact that the passive was often-times expressed by means of the active forms themselves and that "paḍu" which alternated with "uṇ" and "peru" gained the widest use in course of time. Naturally the Tamil active forms should have preceded the passive. Since the distinction between the active and passive categories generally rests on a very slight basis as remarked by the famous French Philologist Mr. Vendryes³⁵ and since language is sometimes allogical as held by the famous Danish philologist Dr. Jespersen,³⁶ it is no surprise to see sometimes the active forms themselves standing for the passive in Tamil also. When the need for a particular element for expressing the passive significance however arose, the Tamil people employed one or another of the words which had the meaning of "to get" or "to enjoy" or "to suffer." This indeed is the way in which morphology may be expected to supply its wants or to repair its losses. One of these words "paḍu" has survived and gained preference. What then is the history of this word?

Originally it appears to have started with the meaning of "to appear." "Paṭ" was perhaps the root from which "paṭupu"^{36a} (=an appearance or rising) and "paṭam" (=an appearance or a picture) arose. And in "paḍu" also we find the same root with an euphonic addition of a vowel.³⁷ Abundant instances can be cited for the use of "paḍu" in this sense from early literature. For example, there occurs in a line of Puraṇānūru (Stanza 166.1.27) "Poṇpaḍu Kāviri". The transition from this sense to that of 'Stopping' or 'Staying' is easy, for what appears would sometimes stop or stand. In this transitional sense there is the use of "paḍu" in a line of another verse of Puraṇānūru (Stanza 134.1.4)³⁸ where the context permits of both the meanings. Next

35. Vide "Language" p. 105.

36. "Logic and Grammar" (S.P.E. Tract No. 16) and "Philosophy of Grammar" (1925) p. 345.

36a. Vide "Paḍupu ariyalanē pal kadirc chelvan" (Puram), verse 34, l. 18.

37. cf. Caldwell's Comp. Gram. p. 580.

38. "Āṅkup paṭṭaṇru avaṇ kai vaṇmai."

there is a transference from "to stop" to "to get" on one side and from "to stay" to "to perish" on the other.

The latter transference does not concern us here. It only shows how a word which once meant "to appear" came to mean just the opposite of it. To stay in the sea for a dumb, blind man for instance would involve perishing. (Cf. *Puranānūru* 238. 1. 16 "Kaṇṇil ūman kaḍal paṭṭāṅku"). The former transference is also possible because the idea of stopping at a place is easily associated with getting at it. And "Chōla Naṇṇaṭṭup paḍiṇ" which occurs in another *Puranānūru* verse (No. 67.1.8) meaning "if (you) reach or stop at chōla country," is thus found capable of yielding both the significations. There are instances however of "paḍu" where the context does not permit of both these ideas but only the idea of getting. For instance, *Puranānūru*³⁹ verse 93 contains such a statement (1. 93). And this word expressing the idea of getting or enjoying or suffering was just the thing wanted to convey the significance of the passive and therefore the Tamils probably caught hold of it at this stage.

This probable history of the word "paḍu" throws a flood of light on another aspect of the passive formation in Tamil. If in Greek, Latin,⁴⁰ Sanskrit⁴¹ and Bengali,⁴² it is from the middle voice or "the Karma-Kartru Vākya" that the passive developed, the same may be said to be true of Tamil also in a way. "Avai Kāṇappaḍukinṇaṇa," for example, may be taken to have meant "they appear visible," for "paḍu" meant also "to appear." This phrase which in the "old Greek Sense"⁴³ stands midway between the active and passive may be treated as one in the middle voice. Similarly "Kuḍam Nīraipaḍukiraḍu" (=the pot becomes full or more literally "the pot obtains fulness") and Kai Kuṛaipaḍukiraḍu" (= "the hand becomes short or more literally—"the hand obtains shortage") may be regarded as phrases in the middle voice.⁴⁴ These very same phrases are used in the passive significance respectively of "they are seen," "the pot is filled" and "the hand is cut." And in fact it is in this latter sense alone they are remembered to-day. Thus a possible development of passive formations from the middle in Tamil also is hereby suggested. And this suggestion owes much to the probable history of the word "paḍu" which I have

39. "Peruntakai Viḷuppuṇ paṭṭa mārē."

40. Peile: *Philology* p. 95.

41. Brugmann: *Comp. Gram. of I.G. Langs. Vol. IV*, p. 515.

42. Chatterji's *Bengali Lang.* p. 919.

43. Peile: *Chap. V* §25.

44. *Bengali Lang. Vol. II*, p. 919: "bās bhāṅgē (=the bamboo breaks); "kālāsī bhārē (=the Jar becomes full).

tried to construct in the preceding paragraph. The meanings "to appear" and "to obtain" of the word "paḍu" which we have seen before have rendered the matter of finding out a possible link between the passive voice and middle voice in Tamil easy.

And since the other two words employed for converting active forms into passive, namely 'uṇ' and 'peru,' had not these advantages, since they had not both the meanings of "to appear" and "to obtain" so that they could appear in several places and in an indifferent sense, "paḍu" which had these advantages has slowly reached a position denied to them. This explains how "paḍu" which existed from far-off times side by side with the other two intellectual tools has now become the solitary implement whereby the passive significance is effected in the Tamil language.⁴⁵ The old meanings of this word "to appear" or "to obtain" are no more remembered when used in passive connexions, although they may exist in a small measure elsewhere. This word appearing in passive connexions does not to-day invoke any idea of the original meanings in the mind but represents only a quality of abstractness and is therefore a specific passive symbol. By gradually and imperceptibly losing its meaning it has become a passive particle or suffix⁴⁶ and may therefore be regarded as an "empty word" in the Chinese grammatical sense.⁴⁷ It is, in fact, on its march to become a regular morpheme. It is just like the German word "mann" found in such words as "kaufmann" (=a merchant) which has not yet become a suffix but is said to be on the road to become one in that language.⁴⁸ One may be excused if one ventures to suggest after these considerations that it has already become a morpheme in the Tamil language, despite the fact that it has not suffered any phonetic change so as to obscure its identity with the old independent word. If it has not undergone any alteration in its shape, it is not because it has not lost its semantic value but because in the nature of things in the agglutinating languages of which Tamil is one it would retain its shape unaltered. As Dr. Taraporewala⁴⁹ says "each

45. The fact that in *Telugu Bhāratam*—*Āranyakāṇḍam*—IV Canto, Verse 191 (Vide Dr. C. Narayana Rao's *History of Telugu Language* Vol. II, p. 1250) and in the *Kannaḍa* inscriptions of the 7th Century A.D. (Vide *Epigraphia Carnatica*—Vol. VI, p. 323—as kindly pointed out by Dr. A. N. Narasimha in a private communication to me) "paḍu" with a passive significance appears suggests that most of the Dravidian languages might have originally borrowed it from the Primitive Dravidian.

46. cf. Sivañānaswami: *Tolkāppiya Pāyīra Virutti*, p. 40: "Seyappaḍu poruṇmai uṇarttum paḍu ennum vikuti."

47. cf. Vendryes p. 164 and 83.

48. *Ibid.* p. 167.

49. "Elements of the Science of Language" (1922) p. 62.

one of the elements of the word, though 'glued on, is felt to be a separate word and is capable of being used as such" in the agglutinating tongues. It may be easier for languages of the inflectional class⁵⁰ to alter their full words when they come to be used as grammatical devices. So a criterion,⁵¹ which insists upon change in the form of a particular word for its eligibility to be treated as a morpheme, howsoever sound so far as it relates to the inflexional languages, does not appear to be applicable to the Tamil language whose circumstances are quite different. It may not therefore be wrong to say that "paḍu" has now reached the stage of a morpheme in Tamil and that it is by means of this particle that the morphological category of passive voice is expressed in Tamil.

By retracing the road over which the Tamil language appears to have travelled and by trying to recognise the probable turnings, we have seen that in Tamil as in several other languages of the world there was a time when the passive signification was conveyed by the active forms themselves, that subsequent to, and contemporaneous with, this usage there was the method of forming the passive by means of the word "paḍu," that "paḍu" alternated in this respect with "uṇ" and "peru" for sometime and that it ultimately gained the widest use. We have seen also how from one meaning to another "paḍu" probably had a march and how because of its certain inherent advantages it came to be the most characteristic instrument for converting active forms into passive and how by constant use, by losing its original meaning and by invoking only the abstract idea of passivity it has slowly assumed the character of a morpheme. We have seen also how because of the conditions prevailing in Tamil, an agglutinating language, it would be futile to expect words that have become morphemes to have lost their original shapes. With these considerations we have now reached the stage when we may boldly say that by means of the particle "paḍu" the passive voice is formed to-day in Tamil and that the Tamil language is not therefore "destitute of a passive voice properly so-called."

50. cf. Dr. Tucker's "Natural History of Language" (1908) p. 76.

51. Whitney: *Life and Growth of Language* (1885), p. 52.

Vijayīndra Tīrtha

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI ŚARMA

CHAPTER III.

25. *Vijayīndra Tīrtha* (C. 1514-95)

i

Tradition affirms that Vijayīndra was originally a disciple of Vyāsarāya and read under him. This is confirmed by Vij. himself who, in some of his works,¹ acknowledges Vyāsarāya as his teacher, and by a statement in the *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam*, counting both Vij. and Vādirāja among the disciples of Vyāsarāya,² as well as by the references in the songs of Purandara Dāsa, Vijaya Dāsa and Śrīda Viṭṭhala.³ Vij.'s former name is said to have been Viṭṭhalācārya.⁴ He was presumably a Karnāṭaka Brahmin. He seems to have been a great favourite with Vyāsātīrtha and would, in all probability, have succeeded him, had not Surendra Tīrtha, the then Pontiff of the Vibudhendra Tīrtha Mutt, asked Vyāsarāya for a competent disciple to succeed him. Vyāsarāya is, on that occasion, said to have gifted Viṭṭhalācārya. Thus it was that Vij. came over to the Mutt of Surendra Tīrtha whom he eventually succeeded on the Piṭha. This tradition is supported by the following "sulādi" of Purandara Dāsa.⁵

1. See the introductory verses in his *Madhvādhvakaṇṭhakodhāra* (Nos. 4, 8) and

गुहपादोक्तिभिर्न्यायैरुपक्रमपराक्रमम् ।

निराकृत्योपसंहारविजयोऽयं प्रकाश्यते ॥ (*Upasamhāraviṣaya*)

as well as the introd. verse to his *Candrikodāhṛta-Nyāya-vivaraṇa*

(Tanjore Ms.).

2. iii, 6. (S.M. p. 317).

3. These have been cited by me in my paper on the *Date of Vādirāja* in the *Annals of the B.O.R.I.*, xviii, 2, p. 191 and 197.

4. There is a tradition that soon after he became a monk, Vij. was once humorously taunted by Vyāsarāya that "Vikāra" (i.e., the sound "Vi") had not left him! There is no basis for the statement on p. 316 of the *Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol.* that "Viṣṇu Tīrtha" was another surname of Vij.

5. For which I am indebted to H. H. Śrī Vidyāvāridhi Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Mutt.

श्रीसुरेन्द्रनु पुत्रभिक्षव बेडे विजयोन्द्रन्न करुणिसि
मठवन्नद्धरिसिदकारण गुरुव्यासराये परमगुरुगुल्लु पुरन्दरविठलने परदैव काणिरो ॥

ii

There is no reliable biography of Vij. such as we have for Vyāsarāya. There are a few sketches of his life in the form of stotras in Sanskrit by later-day devotees ; but they are of negligible historical value. A good many floating-traditions have gathered round the name and personality of Vij. These have for the most part been kept alive—with the help of the memory of relics in the Mutt and privileges enjoyed by the successors of Vij.—by the Pandits connected with the Mutt of Vij. at Kumbakonam which was the scene of his labors. Such works of Vij. as are yet available, a couple of inscriptions, the *Rāghavendra-Vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa and the *Guruguna-stava* of Vādindra, seventh in succession from Vij., supply more solid information. The account of tradition is more than substantiated by these sources.

DATE

According to the Mutt Lists, Vij. succeeded his Sannyāsa Guru, Surendra Tirtha in or about 1539 A.D. and remained on the Pīṭha till 1595 (*Munmatha*). The fact that he was a student of the advanced classics of the Dvaita System under Vyāsarāya,⁶ would indicate at least a few years' stay with the latter. We can therefore assume that Vij. was not less than 20 years old when he first came under the care of Vyāsarāya and not less than 25 at the time of his teacher's demise in 1539. This would give 1514 or thereabout as the probable date of Vij's birth. Nothing is however known about his family history.

iii

Vij. was a very active exponent and powerful defender of the faith of Madhva and the disciple and student of practically the greatest authority on Dvaita Vedānta since the days of Jaya Tirtha—viz., Vyāsarāya, and the most prolific writer of his school having *a hundred and four works* to his credit. With all that, he is not so intimately known to the followers of Madhva as his successor and grand-disciple Rāgha-

षड्वारं व्यासराजेन्दुमुखाच्छुत्वा विशेषतः ।

मध्वशास्त्रार्थसारं तु व्याचक्षाणं निजान्प्रति ॥

नवकृत्वो न्यायसुधां व्यासतीर्थपयोनिधेः ।

उद्धृत्य पीतवन्तं च नाकीन्द्रमिव सस्रुतम् ॥ ४ ॥

(*Vijayindra Stotra* of Setumādhava Sūri, *Stotra Mahodadhi*, p. 292).

vendra Svāmin, or even his contemporary Vādirāja. It is difficult to account for this especially when we remember the great part played by Vij. in defending the citadel of the Dvaita Vedānta against attacks from three sides : the Advaitins headed by the formidable Appayya Dikṣita, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, and the Śaivas and Lingāyats. Of the hundred and four works traditionally ascribed to him, *on sound authority*, even the names of half the number have been lost. Of the remaining fifty not more than thirty are attested either by Mss. or by cross-references in other works. Having served the original purpose for which they were intended, very well, his controversial works have now lost their fascination and his commentaries have long ago been superseded and completely put into the shade by the simpler and more attractively written ones of Rāghavendra Svāmin. The works of Vij. consequently are not “living” in any sense, in Dvaita Literature to-day. But upon the attention of the student of the history of Dvaita Vedānta and its Literature, Vijayīndra Tīrtha has great claim as a doughty champion of the reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy in the Post-Vyāsarāya Period.

CAREER

Mādhva tradition has been persistently maintaining that Vij. was a close contemporary and critic of the sixteenth century polymath Appayya Dikṣita who was besides, a redoubtable champion of the Advaita and the Śaivite revivals in the 16th Century, in S. India. Vij. is said to have tried conclusions with Appayya Dikṣita, on many occasions and written many works repelling the attacks of the latter on the system of Madhva. The criticisms of Appayya were obviously the reactions from the monistic side to the challenges thrown out by Vyāsarāya in his great controversial classics—the *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*.

Vij. seems to have spent most of his time at Kumbakonam where he had good following. There are extensive properties even to this day, belonging to the Maṭha of Vij. at Kumbakonam. There is also a Mutt in excellent state of preservation and therein rest his mortal remains. The *Rāghavendra Vijaya* says that Vij. was honored with a **रत्नाभिषेक** by Rāmarāya of Vijayanagar (1542-65). Vij. was moreover a protégé of Śevvappa Nāyaka of Tanjore, from whom he obtained the village of Arivilimangalam in 1577 A.D. It is clear from the terms of this grant⁷ that Vij.'s reputation as a scholar and a defender of the faith of Madhva against the attacks of the Māyāvādins, was already made by 1577 :—

7. The Arivilimangalam Plates of Śevvappa Nāyaka, edited by T. A. Gopinatha Rau, *Epigraphia Indica* XII.

पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञशेमुषीजितवादिने ।

मध्वाचार्यमतोद्यानसञ्चरत्तरबर्हिणे ॥

मायावादमतोच्छेदकोलाहलभरोक्तये ॥

This must indeed have been so, for Vij. was a student of Vyāsarāya who died as early as 1539. *The Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1917 mentions another grant to Vij. by Śevvappa Nāyaka in 1580 A.D. In the course of this record, it is stated that “like the three sacred fires, (a) the Lord of the Ascetics : Vijayīndra Tirtha ; (b) the leader of the Vaiṣṇavas, proficient in all the Śāstras : Tātācārya and (c) the sole Emperor of Śaivādvaita : Appayya Dikṣita, used to meet together at his (Śevvappa) court and establish the doctrines of their respective schools of philosophy :

“ त्रेतामय इव स्पष्टं विजयीन्द्रयतीश्वरः ।

ताताचार्यो वैष्णवाग्रयो सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥

शैवाद्वैतकसाम्राज्यः श्रीमानप्पय्यदीक्षितः ।

यत्सभायां मतं स्वं स्वं स्थापयन्तः स्थितास्त्रयः ॥ ”

This epigraph furnishes indisputable proof that Vij. was a very close contemporary indeed of the celebrated Appayya Dikṣita whose stone-inscription dated Śaka 1504 (1582 A.D.) on one of the walls of the temple of Kāḷakaṇṭheśvara, built by himself in his native village at Aḍayappālayam (near Vellore) gives clear indication of the fact that the Dikṣita too had more or less completed his life-work by 1582 A.D.¹⁰

Vij. was an all-round scholar, a prolific writer and a great Yogi. He is credited by Vāḍindra Tirtha with proficiency in all the sixty-four kalās (arts) and the epithet सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र is found applied to him in many of his works.¹¹ That this was no empty boast is clear from a few of his works bearing upon the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, the Nyāya and Kāvya literature.¹² The *Guruguṇastava* distinctly says that he wrote 104 works

8. Text by the kind courtesy of the Assistant Director of Archaeology, Mysore.

9. No. 395 of 1911. For remarks see also Y. Mahalinga Sastri's paper on the Date of Appayya Dikṣita, J.O.R., Madras, 1929, p. 140-160.

10. MM. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri makes a desperate attempt in his *Introd.* to his edn. of the *Nyāyāmṛta-Advaita Siddhi, etc.*, (Calcutta Ori. Ser. 9, p. 64) to show that “Appayya was already old when Vij. began to flourish and that Vij. criticised the Dikṣita only after the latter's demise”. These contentions of Sjt. Sastri have been dealt with by me in my paper entitled “The Truth about Vijayīndra Tirtha and Rāmācārya,” in the MM. Kuppuswami Sastri Com. Vol. II, Madras (in print).

11. Vide his न्यायमौक्तिकमाला (Introd. verses).

12. Yet the author of the *Madras Uni. His. Ser. No. XI*, deplors that it is “nowhere stated what these works of Vij. are.” (p. 425) !

(presumably to rival the one hundred of Appayya—and that he was a tireless champion of the creed of Madhva and a relentless critic of Advaita and Śaivism :—

चातुर्यैकाकृतिर्यश्चतुरधिकशतग्रन्थरत्नप्रणेता

धातारातिप्रबन्धस्फुटविदितचतुःषष्टिविद्याविशेषः ।

सोऽयं नः श्रीसुरेन्द्रव्रतिवरतनयाद्वैतशैवासहिष्णुः

पुष्पातु श्रीजयीन्द्रः त्रिभुवनविदितः सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रः ॥

Tradition has it that Vij. had once a disputation with the Vīra-Śaiva Guru residing at Kumbakonam. The condition under which the debate was held was that “if the Śaiva Guru won, Vij. should join his Maṭha, but if the latter triumphed, the former should make over all his belongings to his victor. The discussion lasted for 11 days at the end of which the Śaiva Guru declared himself vanquished. Consequently, Vij. entered into possession of the Śaiva Maṭha at Kumbakonam ” (P. 552, Heras, *Āraṇyaka Dynasty of Vijayanagar* and P. 346, of Ep. Ind. XIII).¹³

In the same manner, the Maṭha of Vij. to this day, enjoys the special privilege of taking out and entertaining in its own premises, the presiding deity of the Viṣṇu temple of Śārngapāṇi at Kumbakonam, on a certain day in the year. The origin of this right which is being exercised to this day, by the representatives of the Mutt, is evidently to be sought in certain timely services rendered by Vij. to the cause of Vaiṣṇavism is general and of the interests of the Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas of the Temple, in particular.¹⁴

THE WORKS OF VIJAYĪNDRA

(1-10) Commentaries on the Daśa-Prakaraṇas

Glosses on all the ten Prakaraṇas have been ascribed to Vij. But so far Mss. have been brought to light of only two of them : the ṭippanis on the TS and TD. The former is preserved at the Pejavara Mutt of Udipi

13. It may be pointed out here, that the Śaiva Maṭha referred to is the one facing the southern gate of the Kumbheśvara Temple at Kumbakonam, and which is now the property of the Pontifical successors of Vij. Vij.'s own Maṭha is situated at a distance of a mile north on the southern bank of the Cauvery river. In commemoration of the victory, the street in which the Śaiva Maṭha was, was named after Vijayīndra as “Vijayīndra Svāmi Mutt Street”—which name still survives in the Municipal records of the town. The Śaiva Maṭha is now in a dilapidated state and contains a few lithic images of Śaivite gods. It behoves the Svāmi of the Rāghavendra Mutt, to restore the building and preserve it to posterity as a historical monument.

14. It would appear that the powers-that-be at the Śrīvaiṣṇava temple, have in recent years, tried to put obstacles in the way of the Mādhvas exercising their time-honoured right and privilege.

(Palm leaf Tuḷu) and the latter at Mysore O.L. (C. 1888) as well as at Madras (R. No. 3412). A gloss on the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* is ascribed to Vij. in the M. M. Sangha List.

Tattvodyota—Ṭippaṇi^(m)

The name of this com. is given in one of the introductory verses as गूढभावप्रकाशिका. The Mysore Ms. contains 1950 granthas. The author refers in the course of his gloss to his com. on the *Nyāyāmṛta* : प्रपञ्चितं चैतन्यायामृते अस्मत्कृतटीकायां च । (P. 48b).

(11-15) *Sūtra Prasthāna*.

Vij's works under this head include glosses on the B.S.B. of Madhva, the *Anuvyākhyāna* and the *Nyāyavivaraṇa*, the *Aṇubhāṣya* and the TP of Jayatirtha.¹⁵ The glosses on the AV and the *Aṇubhāṣya* are not attested by Mss.

B.S.B. Ṭippaṇi (*Tattvamaṇi-māṇikyā-peṭikā*)^{16(m)}

This is evidently the short commentary referred to by Rāghavendra in the beginning of his *Tantradīpikā* :—

गुरुपादकृतोऽप्यस्ति संग्रहो हृदयंगमः ।

प्रस्थानभेदप्रोक्तार्थसंग्रहो वाप्ययं मम ॥ २ ॥

Tattvaparakāśikā—Ṭippaṇi^(m)

A fragment of this is preserved in the Madras O.L. (R. No. 1432). The author says that his work is more in the nature of a summary of the views set forth in the earlier comm. on the TP. He has summarised the story of गौतमशाप as given in the *Tattvapradīpa* and clarifies the term “अन्य” at the beginning of the TP. as a reference to the twenty-one “falsche commentare,” after the manner of Vadirāja (*Gurvarthadīpikā*).

(16) *Madhva-Tantra—Navamañjarī*—^(m)¹⁷

We have a much-damaged Nagari Ms. of this work in the Madras O.L. (D.C. No. 4834 Vol. X). It is a short argumentative work dealing with

15. There is no com. on the *Nyāyasudhā* of Jayatirtha, by Vij. as reported by Glasenapp (*Madhva's Philosophie Des Viṣṇu-Glaubens, Leipzig, 1923, p. 60*).

16. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma, is one of his anniversary contributions on Vij. in the *Hindu*, Madras, speaks of a fragment of this work having reached him. It is also said to be referred to in the author's *Nym-Āmoda*.

17. Presumably the same as the *Nayamañjarī* referred to on p. 317 of the Vij. *Sex. Com. Vol.*

the Sūtra Prasthāna, and written in defence of the interpretations of Madhva. The अधिकरणशरीर of the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* are quoted and criticised. The work is confined to the first five adhikaraṇas of the B.S.

(17-26) Commentaries on the Daśopaniṣad Bhāṣyas

No Ms. of any of the glosses on the Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas, traditionally ascribed to Vij. has been brought to light. (27-28). The same is the case with glosses on the *Prameya-dīpikā* and *Nyāyadīpikā* (on the *Gitā Prasthāna*) ascribed to him.¹⁸

(29-31) Glosses on the “Vyāsa-traya.”
Nyāyāmṛta-[Laghu] Āmoda.

This is represented both in the Mysore and the Tanjore O.L. The Tanjore Ms. (No. 8108) containing 2650 granthas, is incomplete and covers only Paricchedas II and III of the original. It is by nature a running com. on the *Nym.* free from digressions and quotations from the *Advaita-siddhi*. According to Dr. R. Nagaraja Śarma, reference is made in the course of this gloss to a bigger com. on the *Nym.* (*Gurvāmōda*). I have not come across any such reference. The com. called (*Nym*-) *Kaṇṭhakoddhāra* published by Sjt. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri, in C.O.S. IX, is not by Vij., as has been wrongly assumed.^{18a}

Nyāya-Mauktikamālā ^(m)19

This is reported to be a com. on the *Candrikā* (of Vyāsarāya) explaining some of the stiff passages in the original and criticising the views embodied in the bhāṣyas of Śamkara, and Śrikanṭha and in the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* and *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇī* of Appayya Dīkṣita. The scope of this work is thus both constructive and destructive :—

सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रेण विजयीन्द्राख्यमिक्षुणा ।
तन्यते ब्रह्ममीमांसान्यायमौक्तिकमालिका ॥
परोक्ते दूष्य एवांशो मितैः शब्दैरनूद्यते ।
दूष्यते च स एवांशः सिद्धान्तश्च समर्थ्यते ॥

18. Pejavar 291, mentions a com. on the *Nyāyadīpikā* by name *Bhāvadīpa*, evidently the c. of Rāghavendra.

18a. For reasons see my paper on Rāmācārya and Vijayindra Tirtha in the Kuppaswami Sastri Com. Vol. II (in print).

19. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma (*Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, p. 19) seems to be aware of the existence of a Ms. My information is based upon his. There is another *Nyāyamauktika-mālā* (Mys. O. L. A. 44) in 630 granthas which is a

Vij.'s attempt here may be looked upon as the forerunner of the *Śeṣa-candrikā* which was in itself a complement to the *Candrikā*. For, the author of the *Candrikā* had confined his attention to the leading comm. of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools alone, with stray references to the writings of Bhāskara and the Vṛttikāra. He had not noticed the Śaivite interpretations of the Śūtras attempted by Śrīkaṇṭha, which were merely a Śaivite *rechauffé* of the *Śrībhāṣya*. But the *Śrīkaṇṭha-Bhāṣya* was suddenly pushed into philosophical prominence by the talented *Appayya Dikṣita* who headed the Śaivādvaita (or more properly Śaiva-Viśiṣṭādvaita) revival in the 16th Century and wrote his *Śivārkaṇḍī-dīpikā* and other works in support of it. And Vijayīndra wrote his *Nyāyamaṇṭikamālā* so as to bring the Dvaitins' criticism of the Śūtra interpretations of rival schools, up to date, by bringing the bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha together with its com. under his purview. He thus represents a logical advance in the line of critical and comparative study of the literature on the B.S., attempted by the Dvaitins. Similar work was done in the next century by Raghunātha Tīrtha. We learn from Rāghavendra Tīrtha²⁰ that Vij. has, in this work, dealt with the objection of some contemporary critics that the syllable *Om* does not form part of the first śūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, as asserted by Madhva.

Yukti-Ratnākara ^(m)

This is the name of Vij.'s c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsarāya and a Ms. is to be found of a fragment of it in the Mysore O. L. (A-286). It is referred to by Rāghavendra Tīrtha, in his c. on the *Tarkatāṇḍava*²¹ as well as in one of the introductory verses therein :—

गुरुपादकृताप्यस्ति टीका सात्यन्तविस्तरा ।

व्याख्येयं मन्दबोधाय क्रियतेऽशेषगोचरा ॥

The Mys. Ms. runs to 3400 granthas and covers 1-11 of the original upto the discussion on "Prāmāṇya." It has been suggested that Vij. wrote only up to the end of स्वतः प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवाद. The com. is full of

tract establishing the supremacy of Viṣṇu as against that of Śiva and refuting the Śaivite interpretation of such sources as the *Puruṣasūkta*. It is also attributed to Vij.

20. यदत्र केनचित् प्रलपितम्—“ओंकारस्यादित्वे, सूत्रावयवत्वे, गुणपूर्त्यर्थत्वे, ‘स्वव्यक्तौकतं.....’ इत्यत्र ब्रह्मपदेन सूत्रग्रहणे च मानं ने” त्यादि, तत्सर्वस्य खण्डनं गुरुपादकृतन्यायमौक्तिकमालायां द्रष्टव्यम् । (*Candrikā-prakāśa*, Mysore, p. 110).

21. अत्र स्वतः प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवादपर्यन्तं विस्तरस्तु गुरुपादकृतयुक्तिरत्नाकरे द्रष्टव्यः । (Mysore G.O.L.S. 74, Vol. I, p. 4.)

technicalities and besides the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras and the Logician Narahari (p. 14) are criticised.

(32) *Pramāṇapaddhati-Vyākhyā* (p)^D

This com. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* of Jayatīrtha (granthas 800), is a tough and short one. The author comments only on those passages of the original which are not quite clear. It was perhaps for this reason that Vij.'s successor Rāghavendra wrote a more extensive com. (granthas 946) on the same text. Vij.'s comments have in some places been severely criticised by Vedeśa Bhikṣu (in his com. on the *Pramāṇapaddhati*). No attempt has however been made by Rāghavendra to meet these criticisms of Vedeśa.

Original Works

We know nearly eighteen works of Vij. of a more or less polemical character, dealing with doctrinal and interpretational issues. Most of these are available in Mss.

(33) *Adhikaraṇa-Mālā***

This is supposed to be a work explaining the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation utilized in the Nym. of Vyāsarāya.

(34) *Candrikodāhṛta-Nyāya-Vivaraṇam*^(m)

This is an exposition of the principles and Adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, made use of by Vyāsarāya, in the course of his *Tātparyā-candrikā*, in support of the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva. The necessity for writing such a work lay in the loud complaints made by Appayya Dikṣita and other hostile critics of Dvaitism, that Madhva and his followers had treated the principles of interpretation evolved by the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, with scant respect and had in many cases openly violated them. Such complaints had already been met by Vyāsarāya, in his *Candrikā* and *Nym.*, wherein he had shown that the charge against Madhva was wholly unfounded. But the complaints, taunts and sarcastic denunciations of the Advaitins continued with unabated vigor. The leader of the Advaitins in the latter part of the 16th century in S. India was Appayya Dikṣita. Even Khaṇḍadeva, the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka from the North came to have great respect for him whom he styled a veteran Mīmāṃsaka : **मीमांसकमूर्धन्यः** ! The prestige of Madhva and his followers was thus at stake and it was Vij. who saved it in time by a series of tracts replying to the criticisms of the Dikṣita, then and there. The *Candrikodāhṛtanyāyavivaraṇa* (T.P.L. 7854) is one such work in which Vij. expounds for the benefit of the critics of Madhva, the body-politic of the Adhikaraṇa-nyāyas of the Mīmāṃsā pressed into service in the

Candrikā,²² exhibiting in detail the subject-matter, the *pūrvapakṣa*, *siddhānta*, etc., in each case. The exposition is in another sense, a very good commentary on the *Adhikaraṇas* in question. The work comes to a stop with B. S. i. 1. 4, after explaining the sentence :— “सम्मतं चैतन् मीमांसकानामपि.....” of the *Candrikā* thereunder. Among the *Mīmāṃsānyāyas* dealt with are (1) the रथकार ; (2) अपच्छेद and (3) वेदोपक्रमाधिकरण ।

(35) *Appayya-Kapola-Capeṭikā* ^(m)

As the somewhat offensive title indicates, this is a general rejoinder to the multifarious charges against Madhva and his works, brought by Appayya Dikṣita. Aufrecht mentions a Ms. of it on p. 23 of his *Cat. Cat.* and Fr. Heras refers to the work in his *Aravīdu Dynasty* (p. 522). I have seen a Ms. in a private library at Kumbakonam.

(36) *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭakoddhāra*²³ ^(p)

This work, known also by its other title of *Madhva-tantra-Mukha-bhūṣaṇam*,²⁴ is a reply to the *Madhva-(tantra)mukhabhaṅga (mardana)* of Appayya Dikṣita and his own com. thereon called *Madhvamata-vidhvamsana*. The Dikṣita has, in his work, criticised Madhva's interpretation of the first five *adhikaraṇas* of the B. S., for a sample. His point is that on the dualistic interpretation, the arguments lack cogency, the *Adhikaraṇa-Śarīras* are anything but satisfactory. The critic also levels a number of minor allegations against Madhva such as that (1) he is given to systematic and wholesale fabrication of Śruti and Smṛti texts in support of his far-fetched ideas ; (2) that his *Bhāṣya* has nothing in common with others in the field, but stands severely alone and by itself ; (3) that the *Bhāṣyakāra* has nowhere been anxious to keep abreast of the *Mīmāṃsā* rules of interpretation ; (4) that he and his commentators have very often flagrantly disobeyed and at times utterly failed to

22. ये न्यायाः पूर्वतन्त्रीयाः चन्द्रिकायामुदाहृताः ।

गुरुपादैः क्रमात्तेषां विषयाद्यङ्गपूर्वकम् ।

शरीरं विजयीन्द्राख्यभिक्षुणेह प्रदर्श्यते ॥

23. A portion of the work ending with the जिज्ञासाधिकरण alone, was printed and published from Dharwar, by Mr G. R. Savanur, under a mistaken belief that it was the full work. I have the Ms. with me for the other four *adhikaraṇas* also.

24. Mr S. Śrīkanṭha Sastri (p. 317, *Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol.*) is therefore wrong in treating the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* and the *Madhva-tantra(mukha)-bhūṣaṇam* as two different works of Vij.

understand the *a, b, c* of that Śāstra, or have misunderstood its technique ; (5) that Madhva has had the audacity to pose as an Avatar of Vāyu and invent false authority for such a claim ; (6) that he is a clumsy and ill-equipped writer whose grammar and idiom suffer from serious flaws.

To all these, Vij. gives devastating replies. He points out that quotations from unknown and untraceable sources are not wanting even in the Bhāṣyas of Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīkanṭha and that therefore, the charge against Madhva alone savours of nothing but prejudice ; (2) that it is in Madhva that we have a philosopher who has refused to follow the fashionable track of the majority and who has not been afraid to think out for himself and speak out his convictions without fear or favour. Difference in outlook or methodology is what distinguishes one system from another—and the wonder of it would be when it is absent—not when it is present ! (3) Subsequent commentators on Madhva have more than made amends for the seeming indifference of the latter to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Vij. says that the critic's cry of 'Mīmāṃsā in danger' can deceive nobody. He takes up a number of instances of alleged breach of Mīmāṃsā rules, and shows that such has not at all been the case. (5) Either one believes in Avatars or not. It is not a matter which admits of argument. As for authorities, they are there. (6) Style and linguistic embellishments are not unfortunately the ultimate test of the soundness or *rationale* of one's metaphysical professions.²⁵ They have really *no place* in the discussion. The proper attitude to the deliberate employment of archaisms in the writings of great men is to treat them as usages not certainly meant to be taken for current ones. Vij. quotes from the *Candrikā*, the NS., the AV., the *Tantrarātna* and *Varadarāja*. The (adhikaraṇa) śāṛīras of the first five adhikaraṇas, are then systematically vindicated.

(37) *Cakra-Mīmāṃsā*^(m)

This is a tract (Mysore O.L. 4746, Nagari 90 ff) in which Vij. establishes the Śāstraic character of branding : तत्समुद्राधारण on the basis of texts drawn from the Vedic (Khilas as well as extant Śrutis), Pañcārātra and Paurāṇik sources.²⁶ Unlike many other works of this author, this tract is written in a clear and persuasive style.

25. Cf. यस्मिन्प्रतिश्लोकमबद्धवत्यपि (Bhāg. I, 5, 11).

26. यद्यपि तत्तच्चक्रादिधारणं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणसदाचारादिसिद्धम्.....॥

(38) *Bhedavidyā-Vilāsa*^(m)

This is a controversial manual devoted to the establishment of the reality of Difference in its five-fold aspect on the lines of Vyāsarāya's *Bhedojjivana*. A few pages of this work are reported to be available.²⁷

(39) *Nyāya Mukura*^(m)

The *Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1917 (p. 17), reports that a Ms. of this work is preserved at the Rāghavendra Svāmi Maṭha at Nanjangud. It is the same work as is wrongly entered under the name of "Nayamukurā" in the G. V. Catal. (Kumbakonam), in the S. K. (1896, p. 43) and on p. 317 of the Vijayanagar Sex. Com. Vol. I have not had access to this Ms.

(40) *Paratattva-Prakāśikā*^(m)

This (Mysore O.L.C-939, Dev. 49 ff) is a criticism of the *Śivatattva-viveka* of Appayya Dikṣita²⁸ which (latter) seeks to establish Śiva as the Supreme Brahman of the Śāstras. Appayya's thesis is directed against the beliefs and teaching of the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhva. As a counterblast to it, Vij. wrote his *Paratattva-prakāśikā*, upholding the view that in the hierarchy of Vedic and Vedāntic gods, the highest place is to be given to Viṣṇu. The parties to the controversy are agreed that there *are* different gods possessing different names and powers and want to find out and identify the chief amongst them. The issue cannot therefore be cheaply dismissed from an "Advaitic point of view." On any theistic programme, the true identity of *the one God* is bound to loom large and give no end of trouble to earnest inquirers. Vij. patiently wades through the bulk of the theological literature available in his days and after a prolonged discussion of the texts, declares ultimately in favour of the supremacy of Viṣṇu. The work consists of two parts, the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta.

27. R. Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism* . . . , 1931, p. 24. It is not unlikely that the work contains also a refutation of the *Bheda-dhikkāra* of Nrsimhāśrama. There are no Mss. however in the Madras, Mysore and Tanjore Ms. Libraries. According to the description given of it by Dr. Nagaraja Sarma, it is "a complete vindication of the thesis that Difference is fundamental of the cosmos. Authorities are cited in support and syllogisms intended to maintain identity are refuted. The scheme of five-fold difference is argumentatively maintained." (pp. 24-25).

28. Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, 1895.

(41) *Nyāya-Samgraha*^(m)

[Brahmasūtra] Nyāyasamgraha²⁹ (Mysore O. L. C-2274) is a short metrical tract of Vij. giving the gist of the adhikaraṇas of the B.S. as interpreted by Madhva, after the manner of the *Aṇubhāṣya*. The following would serve as a sample :—

जीवान्यद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं सृष्ट्यायैष्टविधायि यत् ।
शास्त्रैकगम्यं तद्ब्रह्मोपक्रमादिसमन्वयात् ॥

(42) *Siddhānta Sārāsāraviveka I*^(m)

Two Mss. of this work exist, one at Mysore O. L. (A. 88) and the other at Madras O. L. (R. No. 1293). The fragment preserved at Madras, contains only ten chapters, containing a refutation of the Rāmānuja Siddhānta. The author dismisses the classification of categories into six adopted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, as defective and argues a case for the recognition of **अन्धकार** as a separate category (p. 5, Madras). He denies to **नित्यविभूति** the status of a Dravya and criticises the doctrines of **प्रपत्ति** (p. 32) and **ब्रह्मोपादान**. The *Vijayīndra-parāṇaya* (Madras X, 4994) of Kumbakonam Tātācārya is a direct refutation of the above work of Vij.³⁰

(43) [*Siddhānta*] *Sārāsāraviveka II*^(m)

A work similar to the above and directed against the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha, is reported from Mysore (C-2331) according to a handlist of 'uncatalogued' books in the Mysore O. Library, sent to the office of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Madras.³¹

(44) *Ānandatāratamya-Vādārtha*^(m)

This (Catalogus 570 and Oppert II, 9806) is another short controversial tract of Vij. directed against the school of Rāmānuja. The subject of discourse is the gradation of bliss in Mokṣa among released souls. Since even the Rāmānujīyas are agreed that the released souls *are* debarred from participating in the cosmic functions of the Brahman

29. Presumably the same as the "Brahmasūtrārthasamgraha" mentioned on p. 317 of the *Vijayanagar Sex. Com.* Vol.

30. यतिना परकालेन विजयीन्द्रः पराजितः ।

रामानुजमतेऽप्येवमसारत्वोक्तिर्गर्हितः ॥ (end).

31. I am indebted to my friend Dr. V. Raghavan of the office of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Madras, for this information. But an examination of Mss. has shown that C-2331 of Mysore, is, in reality, a different work.

(B. S. IV, 4, 17) and are still subject to the Lord and to such limitations as are irrevocable, Vij. finds it easy to argue that the bliss of the Infinite ever-free Lord cannot be the same as that of the human soul which has gone through Samsāra and earned its deliverance by His Grace !

In his *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*, Vyāsarāya had passed severe strictures on some of the pet-theories, doctrines and sūtra-interpretations of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The thesis of Parama-sāmya was refuted by him in the closing section of the Nym. These criticisms were naturally resented by the Rāmānujīyas. The evidence of Mss. shows that close on the heels of Vyāsarāya came a number of Viśiṣṭādvaitins, who strove to repudiate the attacks made by Vyāsarāya on their system. The names of (1) Kum-bakonam Tātācārya ; (2) Śrīnivāsa Ācārya of the Śaṭhamarṣaṇakula, and (3) Mahācārya of Sholinghur, require special mention in this connection. The *Tattva-mārtāṇḍa* of the second (Madras O. L. X, 4894) is a refutation of those portions of the *Candrikā* which are specially directed against the *Śrībhāṣya* and its commentary :

Vāsudevakathāyām hi Pauṇḍrakasya kathā yathā |
 Vyāsācāryakathāyām tu Vyāsarāyakathā tathā ||
 Iti svapnopadeśena deśikānugraheṇa ca |
 Candrikodiritā doṣā na lagnā iti sādhye ||
 Sādhyate Brahmasūtrāṇām saṅgatāsaṅgatārthatā |
 Rāddhāntayoḥ svaparayoḥ Śrīnivāsakṛpāvaśāt ||
 Duruktibhir doṣagaveṣaṇāśayā gurūktiṣu bhrāntimupeyuṣā ruṣā |
 Mahāviśāśīviṣapeṭikābhir doduṣakān hanta vidanti mūṣakān ||

(D. C. Madras X, No. 4894, end).

The same writer also wrote a *Praṇavadarpaṇa* or *Oṃkāravādārtha* (Madras X, 4871), dismissing the belief of the Mādhvas that the sacred syllable Om should be read as part of the opening sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa : Iha kecit atisāhasino prathamam "Athāto brahmajijñāsā" iti brahma-mīmāṃsā-sūtre sakalaiḥ paṭhyamānam omkāram tadavayavam abhidhāti. Tadetat pramāṇapathānuvartino nānumanyante. Tathāhi . . ." ³² In like manner, the *Pārāśarya-Vijaya* of Mahācārya also has attempted to criticise the Sūtra-interpretations of Madhva.

A scrutiny of the controversial tracts of Vijayindra against the doctrines of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins would at once show that they were themselves reactions from his side to the attempted criticism of the *Candrikā* by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. It would thus be plain that Vijayindra had to carry on a *triangular fight* with (1) the Advaitins, (2) the Vira-Śaiva

32. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins must have greatly resented the attacks from Vyāsarāya—all the more so because the great Vedānta Deśika had called the Mādhvas his nearest friends : "Tatsannikṛṣṭamapi vā matam āśrayadhvam" || (*Śatadūṣaṇī*).

schoolmen including the followers of Śrīkaṇṭha and (3) the Vira-Vaiṣṇavas (Rāmānujīyas). His *Praṇavadarpaṇakhaṇḍanam* is a direct refutation of the *Praṇavadarpaṇa* of Śrīnivāsācārya. Of this we shall speak anon.

Some idea of the fury with which the Viśiṣṭādvaitins came to defend their system against the attacks of Vyāsarāya and Vijayīndra can be gathered from the title of one of the works of this period; the *Vijayīndra Parāṇaya*³³ of Kumbakonam Tātācārya and the invective rhetoric employed by them³⁴ which is conspicuous by its absence in the replies of Vijayīndra.³⁵ This Tātācārya describes himself as a native of Kumbakonam. He was presumably a younger contemporary of Vijayīndra. From certain remarks let fall by him towards the close of his work, it appears that Vijayīndra was yet alive then tho' probably too old. It was probably the same Tātācārya, that figures in Sevappa Nāyaka's grant to Vijayīndra in 1580. We cannot say if Vijayīndra again replied to the criticisms of Tātācārya most of which however, have been anticipated by him in his *Siddhāntasārāsāraviveka* I. And the thesis of ānandatāratamya has been sufficiently well established by Vijayīndra in his *Ānandatāratamyavādārtha* under notice.

(45) *Nyāyādhva-Dīpikā*.^(m)

This is a manual of the general principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system, written from the point of view of Madhva's system, and presumably for the benefit of students approaching the subject thro' the door of the Dvaita system :—

Nyāyādhvagāminām Madhvadarśanāt gatisiddhaye/
Tanyate Vijayīndreṇa tanvī Nyāyādhvādīpikā//

Besides giving a fair and clear exposition of the orthodox Mīmāṃsaka doctrines as presented by the leading commentators of that school, the work aims at harmonising them with those of Madhva and his followers. The author says that tho' there are works like the *Śāstradīpikā* lucidly explaining the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, his work would be welcomed by all—especially those who are not equal to the stiff treatment of the former. It is understood that the work will shortly be taken up for publication by the authorities of the Mysore O.L.

33. This work deals with nearly 22 subjects of topical interest in the Dvaita-vedānta and criticises them all. These include (1) Guṇaguṇabheda; (2) Ānandatāratamya; (3) Viśeṣa; (4) Avyākratākāśa; (5) denial of Brahman's material causality; (5) and the inefficacy of Prapatti.

34. "Vyātānicchrīnivāso nayamaṇimālikām dhvāntadaurgatyahantrīm |
Tasmāt aprāmāṇikam Dhvāntamatānuvartinām avayavatvakathanam iti." |

35. See his introduction to the *Praṇavadarpaṇakhaṇḍanam*.

(46) *Śrutitātparya Kaumudī**

This is mentioned by name in Rāghavendra Tīrtha's com. on the *Candrikā* (i, 3, vol. 4, Mysore edn.) as well as in his *Bhāvadīpa* on the *Tattvaparakāśikā* (p. 101, line 12):—Atra vistarastu Gurupādakṛta Śrutitātparyakaumudyām jñeyah | No further information is available regarding this work or the nature of its contents. No Ms. also is forthcoming.

(47) *Upasamhāra-Vijaya^(m)*

This is another of Vijayīndra's works bearing upon the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. It is in the nature of a reply to the *Upakrama-Parākrama* of Appayya Dikṣita, who in his work (Benares, 1904) pleads for the superiority of the upakrama (initial statement in a textual totality) over the concluding part thereof, in the settlement of the import of the whole, in case of any difficulty. Vijayīndra's work is just a plea for the soundness of the reverse procedure advocated by Madhva, and which has been ridiculed by Appayya.³⁶

The attempt to defend the position taken up by Madhva was first made by Vyāsarāya, in his *Candrikā* and other works in the light of some of the admissions and implications in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and their commentaries. It was carried still further by his eminent disciple Vijayīndra in such of his works as the *Candrikodāhrtanyāyavivaraṇam*, etc., and specially in the present one:—

Gurupādoktibhir nyāyair Upakramaparākramam/
Nirākṛtyopasamhāra-vijayoyam prakāśyate//

A complete Telugu Ms. of it is preserved in the T. P. L. (8086) in 1270 granthas. Two other Mss. are available at the Mysore O. L. Vijayīndra quotes passages *in extenso* from the work of Appayya and replies to them at length. He has discussed such adhikaraṇas as the Vedopakrama, Aśvapratiḡraheṣṭi and Apaccheda. He quotes from the *Candrikā*, AV, etc.

(48) *Naya-Pañcaka-Mālā^{37 (m)}*

A Ms. of this work is preserved in the Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt at Nanjangud. Its ascription in the *Mysore Arch. Report* for 1917 (p. 17)

36. "Yavanagurūpadiṣṭaśaucaprakṣāḥanapaurvāparyavyatyāsavat upekṣaṇīyah | "

37. Not नयचम्पकमाला as it has been called on p. 317 of the Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.

to Sujanendra Tīrtha, twelfth in succession from Vijayīndra, is a mistake. The *Satkathā* (1896, p. 43) ascribes it to Vijayīndra.

(49) *Vāgvaikhari*^(m)

This is a short tract in 1900 granthas, of a miscellaneous character dealing among other things with the validity of the Veda, the scope and purpose of Bheda-śrutis. The author seeks to establish God as a Person full of auspicious attributes and combats the doctrines of Nirguṇatva and Avācyaṭva of the Brahman, which render the majesty of God meaningless. A Dev. Ms. of this work is to be found in the Mysore O.L. (2397C).

(50) *Nārāyaṇa-Śabdārthanirvacanam*

This (Mysore O. L. 4025) is one of the tracts dealing with the etymology of the word “Nārāyaṇa” as applied to Viṣṇu, and refuting the contention of Śaivite writers like Appayya Dikṣita who have endeavoured to correlate it to Śiva. The renowned Appayya Dikṣita is said to have given up the attempt with the significant remark that the cerebral nasal ‘ṇ’ presents an insuperable difficulty to the Śaivite attunement.

(51) *Praṇavadarpaṇa-Khaṇḍanam*^(m)

A complete Ms. of this tract is preserved in the Madras O. L. (D. C. X, 4798). The work is a reply to the contention of Śrīnivāsācārya (Śaṭhamarṣaṇa) in his *Praṇavadarpaṇa*, that the syllable Om has no right to be read as part of the opening sūtra of Bādārāyaṇa. Vijayīndra quotes passages from Śrīnivāsācārya and replies to them in a more dignified fashion than his adversary has chosen to present the case of the Dvaitins : Athāto brahmajijñāseti nyāyagrathanātmakabrahmamīmāṃsā-śāstrasyādimaśūtrasya omkāraḥ, etatsūtrāvayavo naveti vipratipattiḥ. Netyanye | Bhavatyeveti Vyāsamatānusāriṇaḥ | Tatra Anyeṣām ayam abhisandhiḥ . . . ||

(52) *Piṣṭapaśu-Mīmāṃsā*^(m)

A work of this name is attributed to Vijayīndra by Dr. Nagaraja Śarma on p. 23 of his *Reign of Realism* (1931). The catalogues of various libraries examined by me, do not mention any such work. The subject dealt with is the propriety of substituting flour-made ewes for live animals, in Vedic sacrifices which is followed by the adherents of Madhva. It is of course well-known that the system of Piṣṭapaśu-yāgas, is as old as Uparīśrava Vasu, in the *Mokṣadharmā* section of the Mbh.³⁸

38. According to the *Skānda Purāṇa* (II. 9, 7, 29 ; 9, 13-14) Piṣṭapaśus have always been the Vedic law and the actual slaughter of animals has been due to a

The Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins on the other hand are advocates of the slaughter of live animals. Vijayīndra's arguments are said to be based not merely upon considerations of sentiment but the difficulty of procuring duly qualified ṛtviks to officiate at the yajñas, in a degenerate age like this. To minimise the risk, Piṣṭapaśus have to be substituted. Such substitution is sanctioned by the Mimāṃsakas and followed by all Vaidikas in respect of rites like the Sautrāmaṇī. According also to the law that a man shall sacrifice to the gods what he himself is in the habit of eating in daily life, actual slaughter of animals would seem to be unpardonable, especially in the case of Brahmins.

Belles Lettres.

Besides being a powerful controversialist and commentator, Vijayīndra was something of a poet and a dramatist too. His known works in this field are :—

(53) *Subhadrā-Dhanañjaya*^(m)

A Sanskrit drama dealing presumably with the interesting story of the romantic marriage of Arjuna with Subhadrā. We have a very badly damaged Nandināgari Ms. of this work in the Madras O. L. (D. C. XXI, 12728). It is very difficult to make out the writing in the Ms.

(54) *Ubhayagrāsa-Rāhūdaya*^(m)

Believed to be an allegorical drama written as a counterblast to the *Prabodhacandrodaya* and *Samkalpasūryodaya*. Aufrecht notices a Ms. of this work (Catalogus, p. 69) from Jy. Oppert 2504.

Two more works attributed to Vijayīndra Tirtha have been brought to light by Dr. R. Nagaraja Śarma, in his article on Vijayīndra Tirtha published in the *Indian Express*, Madras, dated 10th July '37. These are :—

(55) *Kucodya-kuṭhāra*^(m)

A fragment of which is claimed to have reached his hands, by the Doctor. The work is said to deal with the "Sūtra-Prasthāna" of the Dvaita school and defend the particular arrangement of the subject-matter of the sūtras adopted by Madhva and his commentators against the attacks of later day critics like Appayya. It is presumably the same work as is preserved in the Mys. O.L., C-970, and wrongly (?) believed

misunderstanding of scripture in later times. The Ārya Samajists hold the somewhat improbable view that in vedic sacrifices, the animals were never meant to be killed but "touched".

to be a commentary on the *Candrikā*. Vijayindra is said to refer in this work to the *Candrikā* saying that all the frivolous objections of the Monists have been silenced once for all in the *Candrikā*.³⁹

(56) *Advaita-śikṣā*^(m)

This is reported to be preserved in Ms. at the Library of the Sanskrit College, Uḍipi. The title of the work would show that Vijayindra's work was in the nature of a general chastisement of the Advaita theory. It is believed to be modelled on such polemical tracts as the *Bhedojjīvana* and deal with the metaphysical points at issue between Monism and Dualism. The occurrence of certain characteristic verses of Vijayindra in this tract confirms its genuineness as a work of that celebrated writer. The same cannot however be said of the *Kucodya-kuthāra*. I have since discovered a reference to the *Advaita-Śikṣā*, by name, in the *Nyāyamauktikamālā* of Vij. (Mysore A. 44):—

प्रपञ्चितं चैतदस्माभिर्द्वैतशिक्षायां श्रुत्यर्थसारादिष्वपीत्यलम् ॥

(57) *Śrutyarthasāra**

This is one of the works of Vij. referred to by him in the course of a passage in his *Nyāyamauktikamālā* (Mys. A. 44).⁴⁰ No Ms. of the work has however been brought to light.

(58) Yet another work—a theological tract attributed to Vij. is the *Liṅgamūlānveṣaṇa-Khaṇḍanam*^(m) dealing with the Purāṇic story of Viṣṇu's going in search of the root of the Linga-form of Śiva.

39. *Candrikā* dau vyaktatvāt na kucodyāvakāśaḥ (Ms.).

40. See passage quoted above from it.

SECTION III.

Post-Jaya Tirtha Writers

(Non-Polemical)¹

By

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CHAPTER I.

VIDYĀDHIRĀJA TĪRTHA

14. *Vidyādhirāja Tīrtha* (1388-1412)*

Vidyādhirāja was the immediate disciple and successor of Jaya Tīrtha on the Pīṭha. His former name is said to have been Kṛṣṇa-bhaṭṭa. He is assigned a 'rule' of sixty-four years in the Mutt Lists, which does not seem to be justifiable and which cannot be accepted without disturbing the otherwise settled chronology of his later successors. We have seen that the Mutt Lists themselves have pushed back the date of Madhva by two cycles, and that nothing more than the cyclic years recorded in them for each Pontiff can be admitted as certain. Even these are in need of revision in many cases.² Jaya Tīrtha himself lived up to a good age and occupied the Pīṭha for 23 years. His disciple Vidyādhirāja was evidently recruited from the Grhasthāśrama (as has been the custom ever since). Considering these facts, it seems unlikely that he could have been on the Pīṭha for 64 years. The cyclic year of his demise is given as Āṅgīrasa which would correspond to 1392 A.D. But it is equally improbable that he was Pontiff for just four years. He is the author of not less than three learned commentaries and his literary activities must have taken more of his time than four years. It seems to me then that the period of Pontifical rule assigned to him in the old Mutt lists, really represents the actual period of his life on earth: 64 years. He might have been about forty years old at the time of his accession in 1388 and might have died in or about 1412 A.D.

It was in the days of Vidyādhirāja that the first split in the "Mūla Maṭha" into two, took place. Tradition explains that he was taken

1. This paper is part of the writer's forthcoming work on the *History of Dvaita Literature*.

2. See for example the dates of Vyāsarāya, Brahmanya-Tīrtha, Vāḍindra etc.

seriously ill twice in his life on both of which occasions he was driven to the necessity of appointing a successor—the two to be so appointed being Rājendra Tirtha and Kavindra Tirtha. Rājendra's line is now represented by the Vyāsarāya Maṭha at Sosale. Kavindra was the common ancestor of what now go by the names of the Rāghavendra Svāmi and Uttarādi Mutts which branched off under similar circumstances in the days of Rāmacandra Tirtha, the second in succession from Kavindra (See Table II *ante*). Vidyādhirāja died at Ergoḷa, where his mortal remains lie entombed.

WORKS

The *Satkathā* (S. K.) throws no light on the literary activities of Vidyādhirāja.³ But from other sources we gather that he wrote some three works two of which have been preserved in Mss. The other is known only through what appears to be a reference.

*Chāndogya-Bhāṣya-Ṭikā*⁴

The above is known only through the following allusion in Śrīnivāsa Tirtha's commentary on the *Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya* :—

विद्याधिराजादिमुनीस्तथा वेदेशयोगिनः ।

छान्दोग्यभाष्यसट्टीकाकर्तृन्वन्दे निरन्तरम् ॥

It is quite possible however to interpret the phrase : छान्दोग्यभाष्यटीका-कर्तृन् “so as to refer to *Vedeśa Bhikṣu* alone, and this seems the more probable interpretation—in which case, no commentary on the *Chāndogya-bhāṣya* need be admitted for Vidyādhirāja.

(1) *Gītā-Vivṛti*^(m)

Two Mss. of Vidyādhirāja's commentary on the *Gītā* are preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C. 1343, Dev. and 2982 N.) The former, examined by me, is in a decaying condition and is very badly written. It is indifferently styled as a *Ṭikā* and as a *Vivṛti*. The author adheres closely to the

3. They are however alluded to in the introd. verse No. 6 of his C. on the *Nyāyavivaraṇa* by Raghūttama:

मध्वाक्तिद्युनदीजयार्यशुभवाक्सूर्यात्मजासंगमे
व्याख्यास्नानमहो विधाय नृहरेः प्राप्य प्रसादं परम् ।
प्रापुर्ये कृतकृत्यतां गतमला विद्याधिराजादयो

* * * * *

4. G.V.L. Catal. Kumbakonam.

G. B. of Madhva ; but while the latter passes over all those verses which are philosophically unimportant, Vidyādhirāja generally supplies a brief comment to the less important passages also. He has incorporated the additional explanations of Gītā-verses found in Madhva's G. T. But for his own distinctive style and this method of treatment, his commentary would be little more than a *rechauffe* of the G. B. of Madhva. Cf. Vidyādhirāja and Madhva on G. B. and G. T. on Gītā ii, 45.

The style of the author bears a strong family resemblance to that of Jaya Tirtha, in its simplicity and directness :—

ज्ञानिनो मोक्षनियमः । तथापि शुभकर्मणा आनन्दवृद्धिश्च । किंच, कुतः कर्म न कर्तव्यम् ? कर्माकरणस्यैव मोक्षसाधनत्वादिति चेत् , तत्किं मोक्षो नैष्कर्म्यशब्दवाच्य इत्येवमुच्यते ? उत कर्माकरणे कर्ममूलः संसारो न भवतीति ? आद्यं दूषयति—' न कर्मणाम् ' इति ॥ (Gītā iii, 4)

The commentary is mentioned by Das Gupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 11, p. 443.

(2) *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma-Bhāṣya* ^(m)

A well-written Devanāgarī Ms. of this is to be found in the Mysore O. L. (C. 137), running to nearly 1650 granthas. The author's name is given at the end :

एवं विद्याधिराजेन प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ।

विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकीर्तिता ॥

Its importance seems to rest on two considerations : (1) that the *Viṣṇu-Sahasranāma* is held in very high esteem by Madhva ;⁵ and (2) that Vidyādhirāja's happens to be the earliest Dvaita commentary on it. There are other commentaries by subsequent writers of the same school, but they cannot be said to come up to the level of this one. It most probably represents a sort of dualistic reaction against the Advaitic commentaries in the field, the earliest known of which is the one attributed to Śaṅkara, which again some scholars are inclined to attribute to a later writer of that name belonging probably to the 13th century or later.

The commentary opens with an invocation to Viṣṇu, Vedavyāsa, Pūrṇa-bodha (Madhva), Sarasvatī, and to the preceptors of the author.

5. Cf. तद्धोक्तं-भारतं सर्वशास्त्रेषु भारते गातिका वरा ।

विष्णोर्नामसहस्रं च ज्ञेयं पाठ्यं च तद्वद्वयम् ॥ इति ॥

(G.B. i. introd'n.)

The efficacy of the thousand names of the Lord, is emphasised with the help of a quotation from the G. T.

शस्त्रेषु भारतं सारं तत्र नामसहस्रकम् ।

The author repeats the well-known observation of Madhva that each one of the thousand names is capable of a hundred explanations:—

तत्प्रसादाद्यथाशक्तिं शतार्थस्य निरन्तरम् ।

विष्णुनामसहस्रस्य निरुक्तिः संप्रकाशयते ॥

He does not however presume to give *all* of them for each or even a few of these holy names. He contents himself with indicating as many explanations as can conveniently be attempted by him and digested by his readers at a time. His venture is merely illustrative not exhaustive. It is left to the ingenuity of the learned to work out for themselves many more explanations of the kind : दिङ्मात्रप्रतिपत्तये कानिचिन्निवर्चनान्युक्तानि, विद्वद्वरैरन्यान्यप्यूहितुं शक्यानीति ग्रन्थगौरवभयान्न लिख्यन्ते ॥ He has given only the necessary etymological explanations leaving out all learned and abstruse discussion and application of the rules of Grammar and Etymology involved in the process : एवं निर्वचनमात्रमत्र क्रियते । प्रकृति-प्रत्ययावशेषस्तु प्रसिद्धव्याकरणेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः (P. 4). Quotations are drawn from the AV, the Śrutis cited by Madhva, the *Ekākṣara Nighaṇṭu*, the G.B., *Brahmatarka* and the Mbh. T. N.

A noteworthy feature of this commentary is that it brings together a variety of explanations of names and epithets of the Lord that lie scattered in the major works of Madhva. Nearly a dozen explanations of the first holy name “Viśva”, are given. The commentary is a very attractive one on the whole, and deserves publication at an early date.

CHAPTER II.

VYĀSA TĪRTHA

15. Vyāsa Tīrtha (C. 1370-1400)⁶

i

This Vyāsa Tīrtha ought to be distinguished from his namesake and successor who flourished in the heydays of the Vijayanagar Empire under Kṛṣṇadevarāya and his successor. Aufrecht,⁷ P. P. S. Sastrī⁸

6. The S.K. places him about 1200 Śaka, which is inadmissible.

7. *Catalogus Cat.* i, p. 619.

8. T.P.L. Cat. XIV p. 6225.

Vāsudeva Sastri Abhyankar⁹ and others¹⁰ have confounded the two Vyāsa Tīrthas and ascribed to the latter, works really written by the former. Aufrecht is again wrong (i p. 619) in making Vyāsa Tīrtha—“the founder of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha”—a guru of Vedeśa Bhikṣu.¹¹ It would be well therefore, to adopt for the later Vyāsa Tīrtha the name of Vyāsarāya with its variants : Vyāsarāja Svāmin and Vyāsayati by which he is most widely known in Mādhva circles.

The earlier Vyāsa Tīrtha with whom we are here and now concerned, was avowedly a direct disciple of Jaya Tīrtha.¹² He was not a Pontiff of any Mutt and was what in Kannaḍa is called a “Biḍi-Sannyāsi” (stray disciple).

ii

Vyāsa Tīrtha seems to have contributed glosses to eight out of the ten Upaniṣads commented upon by Madhva leaving out the *Īśa* and the *Praśna* commented upon by Jaya Tīrtha. A commentary on the *Mbh.* T. N. and two lives of Jaya Tīrtha—one bigger and the other a short one, are all the works written by him. The ascription of such polemical treatises as the *Candrikā* and the *Nyāyāmṛta* to him,¹³ has to be rejected even on grounds of style. His commentaries on the Upaniṣads are mentioned by Raghuttama Tīrtha¹⁴ and quotations from them occur in the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā* of Jagannātha Tīrtha¹⁵

(1) *Aitareya-Upaniṣad Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā**

No Ms. of this commentary has been found. The only textual allusion to it is to be found in one of the introductory stanzas in a gloss on

9. Edn. *Sarvadarśana Samgraha*, Bombay, p. 517.

10. Madras University Historical Series No. XI, p. 424.

11. This confusion is common to P.P.S. Sastri also (Vol. XIV, Cat. T.P.L. introd. p. xvii). The real Guru of Vedeśa was Vedavyāsa Tīrtha disciple of Raghūttama.

12. See colophon to his *Anu-Jayatīrthaviḷaya* (Madras R. No. 1447-a) Vedeśa also refers to him as जयराजनिषेवकान् (Chān. com.). That this refers to the earlier Vyāsatīrtha is clear from a subsequent reference to the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Candrikā*.

13. See footnotes 7-10.

14. येन वेदान्तभाष्याणि व्याख्यातानि महात्मना ।
तं वन्दे व्यासतीर्थार्यं वेदान्तार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥

15. ii. 1. 18 ; p. 268 etc.

the *Aitareya* by a late and more or less unknown commentator : Kṛṣṇācārya, of which a Ms. exists at the T. P. L. (iii, 1592):—

महैतरेयखण्डार्थो व्यासतीर्थादिभिर्लघु ।

सङ्गृहीतः स एवार्थो विस्तराल्लिख्यते मया ॥

(2) *Taittirīya-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā* ^(p)15a
(Granthas 400).

His commentary on the (3) *Brhadāranyaka-Bhāṣya*, is a voluminous one running to 3500 granthas. Mss. of it are preserved at Baroda (O. L., AC. 3914), Mysore (C. 948) and Tanjore (iii, 1650). It is quoted by Jagannātha Tirtha and mentioned by Raghūttama at the beginning of his commentary. His (4) *Chāndogyabhāṣya-Vyākhyā* is available in Mss. both at Mysore and Tanjore (1618), complete in eight Adhyāyas, running to over 2500 granthas. It is quoted on p. 428 of the *Bhāṣya-dīpikā*. The (5) *Kena or Talavakāra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* in 100 granthas was printed in 1907. It is a very concise commentary but quite readable. The author culls *pratīkas* from the *Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* of Madhva tho' not from the *Upaniṣad* as such. (6) The *Kaṭha-bhāṣya-vyākhyā* was published in 1905. It is quoted in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*. That on the (7) *Muṇḍaka* ^(p) runs to 350 granthas and the one on the (8) *Māṇḍūkya* ^(p) to 330. The *bhāṣyārtha* and the *khaṇḍārtha* of the original are concurrently given. Of his com. on the (9) *Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya*, a Ms. in Nāgari is reported from Mysore (O.L. 5063). His (10) *Jaya-tīrtha Vijaya* ¹⁶ is a metrical life of Jayatīrtha in 5 cantos, of various metres. The first two are taken up with the doings of Madhva and his four disciples, notably Narahari (St. 4-28) and Akṣobhya (31-68). The latter's encounter with Vidyāraṇya (St. 43) and the arbitration by Vedānta Deśika (St. 64) are referred to. The III Canto closes with the early life and marriage of Jayatīrtha whose name is given as "Dhoṇḍu" (St. 5). The IV sketches his meeting with Akṣobhya and the last deals with his conversion. No account is given of the Pontifical activities of Jayatīrtha, except his devotion to Sarasvatī (V. 8-11). The *Aṇu-Jayatīrthavijaya* ^(p) is a shorter metrical life in 34 sragdharās. Some legendary details are given about Jayatīrtha. Here too, he is represented as an incarnation of Indra and to have been miraculously favoured by the Goddess Durgā (St. 16). The works contain nothing of historical importance or worth and their artificial and uninspired nature makes it difficult to believe that they were really the work of a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha.

15a. Published by T. R. Kṛṣṇācārya, Kumbakonam.

16. Jayālaya Press, Mysore.

iii

Vyāsatīrtha is the earliest Mādhva glossator on the Upaniṣads. He may, in a sense, be even said to be the first *regular* commentator of his school, on the Upaniṣads; for, the ten Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas of Madhva, were but running commentaries on the originals. They did not give any word for word meaning of the passages, such as is to be found in the bhāṣyas of Śankara and his followers. Such commentaries from the Dvaita point of view were thus a desideratum—and Vyāsatīrtha addressed himself to this task. He also commented upon the bhāṣyas of Madhva at the same time. The clarity of his exposition and the simplicity of his language are alike remarkable. It is on the lines chalked out by him that subsequent commentators like Vedeśa, Viśveśvara and Rāghavendra have written their Khaṇḍārthas on the Upaniṣads.

CHAPTER III.

VIJAYADHVAJA TĪRTHA

16. *Vijayadhvasa Tīrtha* (C. 1437-55)

From the genealogical tree of the Pejāvar Mutt of Uḍipi, given elsewhere, it will be seen that Vijayadhvasa Tīrtha was the seventh pontifical successor of Madhva on the pīṭha of that Mutt. The story in the *Satkathā* that he was a disciple of Jayatīrtha, seems to be due merely to a confusion between the names of Jaya-Tīrtha and Vijaya-tīrtha the grand preceptor परमगुरु of Vijayadhvasa. Both as the seventh successor from Ānandatīrtha and as belonging to an order of Bālya-Sannyāsins, Vijayadhvasa must undoubtedly have come *after* Jayatīrtha who was the fifth in succession from Madhva.

On the basis of a grant to Vidyā(dhi)rāja Tīrtha of the Kṛṣṇāpūr Mutt of Uḍipi, in the reign of Harihara II (1377-1402) and of a gift of land to the same Svāmi¹⁷ in the year 1409 A.D. by Devarāja Mahārāja (1406-18), we may be permitted to work out an average of nearly 20 years of rule for each pontiff in which case Vijayadhvasa would automatically fall between C. 1437-60 A.D.¹⁸ This calculation has also the

17. See *Madras Ins.*, ii, p. 871, Nos. 236 and 241. The Svāmi was the fifth Pontiff of the Mutt.

18. He could not therefore have flourished "about the same time" as Vyāsārāja, as airily remarked by a writer on p. 313 of the *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*

support of other dated inscriptions from Uḍipi bearing upon the Svāmīs of the Kāṇūr¹⁹ and Sode²⁰ Mutts.

Nothing is known about the early life and career of Vijayadhvaḥ. The S. K. (edn. 1896, p. 23), says that on one occasion, he had committed the offence of crossing the sea in a vessel and thereby incurred the odium of the orthodox. He was very poprably a Tuḷu Brahmin like his brother-pontifs of the Uḍipi Mutts. He was an indefatigable writer and a sincere soul. His mortal remains lie at *Kaṇva-tīrtha*, near Manjeshwar, ten miles south of Mangalore.

WORKS

Vijayadhvaḥ is best known to the followers of Madhva as the author of a voluminous commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* called *Padaratnāvali*. It was printed at Belgaum in 1892 and is one of the representative commentaries included in the Variorum edition of the *Purāṇa* published from Brindāvan, in 1905, with many commentaries.

The *Padaratnāvali* is the earliest complete and standard commentary of the Dvaita school on the *Bhāgavata*. There have been many subsequent commentaries on the *Bhāgavata* by writers of the same school, like Yadupati, Satyadharma, etc.; but none of them has come up to the level of Vijayadhvaḥ's epoch-making commentary, be it in stylistic grandeur, expository brilliance or comprehensive grasp of subject-matter. It is as luminous as it is voluminous, running to over 35000 granthas. It is one of the distinguished contributions of the Uḍipi Mutts to the output of Dvaita Literature. The text of Vijayadhvaḥ shows important variations from the readings known to Jaya Tīrtha, of passages quoted in the works of Madhva.²¹

The *Padaratnāvali* is a word for word commentary on the entire *Bhāgavata* unlike the B. T. of Madhva, which is merely a running com-

19. No. 113 of 1901 mentions in a grant made in 1614, Vidyādhīśa and Vibudheśa Tīrtha of the Kāṇūr Mutt, the fourteenth and fifteenth Svāmīs of the Mutt. This Vidyādhīśa ought not to be confounded with his namesake in the Uttarādi Mutt, as has been done by Prof. V. Rangacharya.

20. Vide inscriptions relating to Vādirāja Tīrtha and his pupil in my *Date of Vādirāja*, Annals B.O.R.I., XVIII, pt. 2, pp. 195-6.

21. For instance in XI, 21, 43, Vij. reads लोके which he interprets as विद्वज्जनमध्ये but J in his C on B.S.B. i. 1, 4, has “साक्षात्.” The interpretations too are different. Cf. J. on G.B. ii, 24 and Vij. on Bhāg. ii, 7, 42 and III, 5, 39.

mentary on some of the crucial verses or parts of verses alone of the Purāṇa. Vijayadhvaṇa is indeed very much indebted to the B. T. in the writing of his commentary as can be seen from the numerous quotations and extracts which he gives from it. It appears further from one of his introductory verses, that he had before him another commentary on the Purāṇa,²² written by his own Paramaguru Vijaya Tīrtha :

आनन्दतीर्थविजयतीर्थो प्रणम्य मस्करिवरन्द्यौ ।

तयोः कृतिं स्फुटमुपजीव्य प्रवच्मि भागवतं पुराणम् ॥ (verse 11).

Vijayadhvaṇa's object in writing his commentary seems to have been to supplement the B. T. of Madhva and defend it, where necessary, against contemporary criticisms. (See his remarks under III, 10, 9, 40, X, 75, 52; 10, 72, 12; XI, 13, 7). Both Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa are found to criticise certain powerfully established Advaitic interpretations of the Purāṇa. The former's references and criticisms being, as usual, very brief and enigmatic in the absence of a good commentary, Vijayadhvaṇa has ably supplied the want; i, 2, 12, 22, 24; i, 3, 3, 34; IV, 22, 40; VI, 9, 28; VII, 3, 34; VII, 9, 10; XI, 7, 51; XI, 21, 43; IV, 29, 10; IV, 33, 16; III, 5, 10; XI, 10, 13; XI, 15, 6; XI, 12, 20; IV, 24, 29 and VI, 4, 27. Besides making clear the nature and drift of Madhva's criticisms of the Advaitic interpretations of the verses, he has many independent criticisms to offer against Advaitic commentators of the Purāṇa: i, 1, 1, i, 2, 2; i, 9, 49; VI, 15, 7; VII, 3, 34; i, 3, 32; i, 5, 10; i, 7, 37; i, 9, 49. Vijayadhvaṇa gives copious extracts from certain of these commentaries but in the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to fix the identity of the commentator or commentators censured by him. It would be time to say when the earlier commentaries of Citsukha and Puṇyārāṇya come to be published and studied closely, if the views embodied in them tally with those censured by Vijayadhvaṇa. As for Śrīdhara's commentary, there are a couple of indications that Vijayadhvaṇa was acquainted with it; Cf. the two on 'ज्ञान' and 'विज्ञान' in II, 9, 31. It must however be added that there are more than fifteen places in the *Padaratnāvalī* where Advaitic interpretations of verses are quoted and severely criticised. But only in two or three stray cases do these quotations agree even remotely with the views expressed by Śrīdhara in his commentary on those verses. In

22. It is also probable that Vijaya Tīrtha's com. was on the *Bhāgavata Tātparyā* of Madhva.

most cases, he differs fundamentally in spirit²³ and letter^{23a} from the Advaitic interpretations referred to by Vijayadhvaṇa. Where he agrees with them, the occasions are of trivial account, having no textual or metaphysical significance in themselves—agreements so to say of an ordinary and inevitable kind :—III, 1, 23 ; III, 5, 10 ; I, 2, 2 ; I, 10, 4 ; VI, 9, 28 ; VII, 9, 10 ; I, 3, 8 ; II, 2, 16. On more vital issues, he is frankly dualistic in his interpretation even where a monistic interpretation could be thought of (i. 18, 14 ; VII, 3, 34). He is even anti-monistic²⁴ at times: XI, 12, 20 ; admits the reality of the श्रीविग्रह and the continuation of Bhakti in Mokṣa. With all that, Śrīdhara was an Advaitin (1, 5, 20) and there is much more than a casual agreement between his interpretation of Bhāg. VII, 9, 10, and its criticism at the hands of Vijayadhvaṇa. The latter refers to two different explanations of the term द्विषद्गुण here, the first of which is to be found in Śrīdhara's ṭīkā. In II, 2, 16 ; there is a marked resemblance in wording and interpretation between Śrīdhara and the Advaitic view criticised by Vijayadhvaṇa. At the same time, there is nothing to show that Śrīdhara himself could not, in these cases, have gone back to the earlier commentators of his own school. The *Gaurāṅgāṇoddeśādīpikā* of Kavikarṇāpūra makes Viṣṇu Purī a disciple of Jayadhvaṇa alias Jayadharma Tirtha (1430-45). Since Viṣṇu Purī quotes Śrīdhara,²⁵ we may take the latter to have been a contemporary of Jayadhvaṇa himself. And since Jayadhvaṇa himself is not far removed from Vijaya-dhvaṇa, it may be assumed that Śrīdhara Svāmin was more or less an elder contemporary of Vijayadhvaṇa.

Though following strictly in the footsteps of Madhva, Vijayadhvaṇa does, on occasions, give additional interpretations of verses, not contemplated by the former, which he nevertheless piously believes, could be brought within the range of his Master's explanations : i, 1, 3 : अत्र पिबति-भक्षणार्थः, अनेकार्थत्वाद्भातूनाम् । न चायमर्थो आचार्योक्तार्थो नेत्यश्रद्धेयम्....॥

23. i, 1, 4 ; II, 9, 15 ; II, 8, 14.

23-a. II, 8, 14 ; IV, 29, 20, where the reading व्यवच्छिद्यते is unknown to Śrīdhara ; IV, 33, 16 ; 1, 2, 12 ; 1, 2, 22, 24 ; i, 3, 3, 34 ; i, 5, 10 ; 1, 7, 37 ; VI, 4, 27 ; VI, 15, 7 ; VII, 3, 34 ; XI, 3, 34 ; XI, 12, 20.

24. जीवयतीति जीवः परमात्मा । With this cf. Madhva : जीव इति भगवतोऽनिरुद्धस्याख्या (V.T.N.) and जीवयति जीवं करोतीति जीवः, न तु स्वयं जीवः (Caitanya Candrodāya, Bib. Ind. p. 156 and Śrīdhara on Bhāg. XI, 24, 27 ; III, 35, 31 ; III 9, 3 ; i, I, 3 ; आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो (i, 7, 10) etc.

25. अत्र श्रीधरसत्तमोक्ति लिखनेन्यूनधिकं यद्भवेत् ॥

Bhaktiratnāvali,

India Office Cat. VI, No. 2535, p. 1272, Col. 2.

Under XI, 15, 6, we have in Vijayadhvaja, a valuable reference to the commentary of a certain “Śuka Tīrtha,” on the *Bhāgavata*.²⁶ We know nothing about this commentator from any other source.²⁷ His title “Tīrtha” would however suggest a Sannyāsin of the *Ekadaṇḍī* Order, though not necessarily a Mādhva ascetic. We have only a single reference to him in the whole of Vijayadhvaja’s commentary, and in the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to say to what extent some of the Advaitic interpretations criticised by Vijayadhvaja might have been directed against this commentator, had he really been (as is probable), an Advaitin, himself.

OTHER WORKS

Tradition ascribes to Vijayadhvaja a commentary also on the *Bhāgavata Tātparya* of Madhva. But no. Mss. of any such commentary has been brought to light. It seems unlikely moreover, that he would have troubled to write a fresh commentary on the B. T. when he had already dealt with the original in his *Padaratnāvali* and made ample quotations from the B. T. therein. Most probably this ascription has reference to Vijaya-Tīrtha, the Paramaguru of Vijayadhvaja, who, we have seen, has been credited with a commentary dealing either directly or indirectly with the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.

Of the other works attributed to him are (2) a commentary on the *Yamakabhārata* ;²⁸ (3) *Daśāvatāra-Harigāthāstotra*,^(P)²⁹ in praise of the ten Avatars of Viṣṇu and set to music ; and (4) a *Kṛṣṇāṣṭakam*.

CHAPTER IV.

VIDYĀNIDHI TĪRTHA

17. *Vidyānidhi Tīrtha* (1435-44).

Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Cat.*, calls him the seventh successor from Ānandatīrtha, probably counting Jayatīrtha as the *second* instead of

26. इति उक्ता एवाऽर्थावाः, संख्याश्च ; नान्याः शुक्तीर्था-
युक्तविधा इति । Vij. XI, 15, 6. (re. Siddhis)

27. Jivagosvāmin, in his *Ṣaṭsandarbha*, mentions *Śukahrdaya*” among a dozen standard commentaries on the Bhāg. It is doubtful however if its author was really the Śukatīrtha mentioned by Vijayadhvaja. Jiva mentions Vijayadhvaja too with great respect: दक्षिणादिदेशविख्यातविजयध्वज.....वेदवेदार्थविद्वद्गरा-
णाम्... (p. 21,-22).

28. M. M. Sangha List.

29. It has been published from Uḍipi along with the *Caturdaśa-Stotra* of the same author.

as the *fifth* from Madhva. Vidyānidhi's former name is said to have been Kṛṣṇa-bhaṭṭa. The S. K. in whose Table of Contents, he is mis-called Vidyānanda, considers him to have been a Tuḷu Brahmin, which is rather curious, seeing that he was the actual founder of the Uttarādi Mutt. He was the second disciple of Rāmacandra Tīrtha, the first one being Vibudhendra Tīrtha.

Absolutely nothing is known about the early life and career of Vidyānidhi. Tradition vaguely attributes to him a commentary on the *Gītā*, of which no Ms. is known. His tomb is at Ergoḷa.

CHAPTER V.

BRAHMAṆYA TĪRTHA

18. *Brahmaṇya Tīrtha* (1460-77) *

Brahmaṇya Tīrtha was third in descent from Rājendra Tīrtha. He thus belongs to the "main line" of disciples from Madhvācārya, and was evidently a Kaṛṇāṭaka Brahmin. The Mutt Lists give his date of demise as 1467 A.D. This was accepted by B. Venkoba Rau in his Introduction to the *Vyāsayogicarita*. It is however open to many objections. In the first place, it gives Brahmaṇya's disciple Vyāsarāya a Pontifical sway of over 70 years, which is too long. It also bestows upon the latter a life of 93 years and more which is not also corroborated by other evidence. Venkoba Rau himself refers (p. cxiv-cxv) to a tradition, according to which Brahmaṇya died soon after a great famine. On p. 100 of his *Forgotten Empire*, Sewell says that "about the year 1475 there was a terrible famine in the Deccan and in the country of the Telugus, which lasted for two years." Venkoba Rau himself refers to *two* such famines which broke out in the years 1423-25 and 1472-74.³⁰ The second one, it will be seen, synchronises with the date mentioned by Sewell. It is manifestly impossible that Brahmaṇya could have died in the first famine. The date is too early for him. We have therefore to assume that it was after the famine of 1475-76, that he died. The event thus cannot be placed *earlier than 1477*.

It was to the blessings of Brahmaṇya Tīrtha, that the parents of Vyāsarāya (his disciple), owed the birth of their children—notably of Vyāsarāya himself. He lived mostly at Channapatna (in the Mysore State) which is mentioned in the *Vyāsayogicarita*³¹ as his *permanent residence*. There he had a Mutt of his own which was entrusted to his

30. *Dharvar Gazetteer*, p. 405-06.

31. P. 26 (Text).

disciple (probably senior) Śrīdhara Tīrtha.³² His other disciple was the famous Vyāsarāya.

Only one work is traditionally ascribed to Brahmaṇya Tīrtha and that is a gloss on the *Tattvaprakāśikā* of Jaya Tīrtha. No Ms. of it has however come down; nor has the commentary been mentioned by Brahmaṇya's disciple Vyāsarāya in his celebrated commentary on the TP., the *Tātparyacandrikā*. The ascription therefore, does not seem to be well-founded.

CHAPTER VI.

ŚRĪPĀDA-RĀYA *alias* LAKṢMĪNĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA

19. Śrīpādarāya (1460-86)³³

Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha, more widely known as Śrīpādarāya, was Pontiff of Padmanābha Tīrtha's Mutt at Muḷbāgal. He was the seventh in descent from Padmanābha Tīrtha and the disciple and successor of Svarṇavarṇa Tīrtha, whose Bṛndāvana (tomb) has recently been discovered at Srirangam. According to a tradition recorded in the *Brahmaṇya Tīrtha-Vijāya*,³⁴ the mothers of Brahmaṇya and Śrīpādarāya were both uterine sisters. The cousins were in all probability, of the same age and lived up to the same age. It is indeed curious that both of them should have renounced the world and devoted themselves to the cause of their faith and what is more, played a conspicuous part in the spiritual evolution of their gifted disciple Vyāsarāya. Śrīpādarāya's demise may definitely be placed *after* 1457, in which year, we have a grant issued in the name of his Guru Svarṇavarṇa Tīrtha by Vijaya-Venkaṭapati, son of Virūpākṣa. (Ep. Car. IX, Muḷbāgal 1).

32. This Mutt which survives to this day, is variously known as the Kundāpūr Mutt, Abbūr or Cannapatna Mutt and so on. It has no direct connection with Vyāsarāya tho' in recent years a claim has been brought forward on behalf of the Kundāpūr Mutt that it is also directly descended from Vyāsarāya and entitled to the appellation "Vyāsarāya-Maṭha" which is denied by the Svāmīs of the Vyāsarāya Maṭha at Sosale who claim and are universally acknowledged to be the lawful successors of Vyāsarāya. There are misfits both in the genealogical table and the epigraphs cited by the Kundapur Mutt. Nor do the Svāmīs of that Mutt appear to have made *any* contribution to Dvaita literature. We shall therefore leave them out of further consideration here.

33. This is merely an approximate date for Śrīpādarāya's rule.

34. तं व्यासतीर्थं विद्यार्थं स्वमातुर्भगिनीसुतम् ।

श्रीपादराजनामानं प्रापयद्गुरुपुंगवः ॥ (quoted by Venkoba Rau,

p. lxxiii of his introd. to the *Vyāsayogicarita*).

Śrīpādarāya is further said to have been a contemporary of Raghu-nātha Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt who came into power in 1444 and died in 1502. The *Śrīpādarājāṣṭaka* mentions their joint-pilgrimage to Benares.³⁵ From the same source, we gather that the former wielded considerable influence over Sāluva Narasimha I, and was specially honored by him after his return from the Kalinga campaign (1476 A.D.).³⁶ The fact also, that it was at the instance of Śrīpādarāya that his disciple Vyāsarāya went to the court of Sāluva Narasimha at Candragiri³⁷ in or about 1485-6, attests the position of influence which Śrīpādarāya held at the court of Candragiri. He must therefore have died sometime after the departure of Vyāsarāya, about the year 1486-87.

The only work ascribed to him is a commentary on the *Nyāyasudhā* called *Vāgvajra* (*Nyāyasudhopannyāsa-vāgvajra*) of which a Dev. Ms. is available at the Mysore O.L. (C. 1560). It is a lucid and attractive commentary in about 3500 granthas. The exposition is exhaustive³⁸ and the style full of grace.³⁹ The author has in many places incorporated passages⁴⁰ wholesale from the original NS. In spite of its many attractive features, it has not made much headway in traditional circles of scholarship. Even doubts have been expressed in certain quarters touching the correctness of the tradition which makes it a work of Śrīpādarāya.

CHAPTER VII

SOMANĀTHA KAVI

20. *Somanātha Kavi*. (C. 1480-1540)*

The memory of Somanātha Kavi, the author of a sumptuous biography of Vyāsarāya, in Campū form, was first brought to the notice of the world by the late B. Venkoba Rau in his article in the *Q. J. M. S.* for 1924. The work itself was published two years later. It has been a first class literary and historical discovery. For, besides being a contemporary account of the life and doings of one of the foremost Thinkers of Southern India during the early 16th century, the *Vyāsayogicarita* commands the admiration of all true Sahṛdayas as a Campū-Kāvya of great merit.⁴¹ As a historical work, its value

35. iii, 5. (S.M.).

36. III, 4.

37. P. 40 *Vyāsayogicarita*.

38. Cf. The passage beginning with “*प्रेक्ष्यवादिनो हि...*” (P. 75a, b, Ms.)

39. Vide p. 67—“*ननु मया.....*”

40. Cp. P. 69 (of Mys. Ms.) and V.T.N.—*ṭikā* of Jayatīrtha.

41. Curiously eno' it is *not even mentioned* in the chapter on 'Literature and Art' in the *Madras University Historical Series* No. XI! The same is the case in the *Vijayanagar Sex. Com.* Vol. too.

is even greater. For, not only does it add to the literary glory of the Vijayanagar dynasty in general and of its ablest sovereign Kṛṣṇadevarāya in particular but throws a new light on the extent of patronage accorded to the religion and philosophy of Madhvācārya and its exponents, by the Kings of the II and III Dynasties of Vijayanagar.

DATE

Somanātha says of himself that he was introduced to Vyāsarāya, in the reign of Acyutarāya, by Nārāyaṇa Yati. This Nārāyaṇa Yati, (of the Akṣobhya Tirtha Mutt, Kūdli), figures in an inscription of Kṛṣṇa-deva-rāya, dated 1527 A.D. It is clear therefore that both Nārāyaṇa Yati and his *protégé* lived at least for some years into the reign of Acyuta. The *Vyāsayogicarita* was probably completed about 1535. It may be safely assumed that Somanātha flourished in the former half of the 16th century.

LIFE

As his name and those of his ancestors indicate, Somanātha was a Smārta Brahmin. His work and the spirit underlying it put one in mind of the com. of Appayya Dikṣita on the *Yādavābhyudaya* of Vedānta Deśika. It certainly is an outstanding proof of the winsome personality of Vyāsarāya, to have been able to secure so notable a biographer as Poet Somanātha.

Somanātha gives us sufficient information about his personal and family history. We learn that he hailed from the village of Govinda-tirthapura, in the Tuṇḍīra-maṇḍala, near Kāñcī (P. 84). Tradition and certain resemblances in style, have led the writer of the English Introduction to the *Vyāsayogicarita*⁴² to believe that Somanātha was on his mother's side, a nephew of Ananta-bhaṭṭa—the renowned author of the *Bhārata-Campū*.⁴³ Somanātha's genealogy is:—

1. Yajva Bhāskara
- |
2. Devarāja Somapīthī
- |
3. Bhaṭṭa Gayāmukti Bhāskara
- |
4. (Father)
- |
5. Somanātha Kavi

42. Bangalore Press, Bangalore City, 1926.

43. The evidence on this point has been discussed by Venkoba Rau in his introd. p. xlv-xlvi.

On his maternal side, he seems to have been connected with a certain Kāḷameghādhvārī.⁴⁴ Somanātha's grandfather Bhaṭṭa Gayā-mukṭi Bhāskara, was honored by several sovereigns including Bukka and Harihara. II.

His work is divided into eight *ullāsas* (chapters) and contains a little over a thousand *granthas*. It is written in the standard *campū*-style, full of puns, alliteration and other literary embellishments. The author has a perfect command over language and his expressions have all the naturalism of creative art. He does not strain after effect but is nevertheless a finished writer commanding ease and rhythm.

He says in the Epilogue, that he had his work publicly read out in an open assembly of scholars presided over by Vyāsarāya himself, by two good readers and had it duly approved. The salient points and the historical kernel of the biography will be found under "VYĀSARAYA".

SECTION IV. THE AGE OF DIALECTICISM.

Tho' the first beginnings of Dialecticism in Dvaita Vedānta can be traced to such works of Madhva as the AV. and some of the *Prakaraṇas*, and tho' its employment became increasingly evident in the *Nyāya-sudhā*, *Vādāvali* and other works of Jayatīrtha, yet, it may, for convenience's sake, be assumed to have started and developed in right earnest only from the beginning of the 15th century. The history of thought and literature can never be squeezed into straight jackets of chronology and studied in "Parts" and "Periods". Yet, in the interests of a comprehensive survey, it would be necessary to have some kind of a definite chronological background and view the development of thought or literature in any given case, as a movement of intellectual energy along definite landmarks. One such landmark in the history of Dvaita-Vedānta and its literature, is indicated by the standardisation of the Dialectic Method, and its *regular* employment in the service of the creed, from about the beginning of the 15th century. The Prince and Father of this dialectic method was doubtless Vyāsarāya Svāmin, the illustrious author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. But its actual forerunner came a century earlier, in the person of Viṣṇudāsācārya. It is gratifying to note that this Viṣṇudāsācārya himself was a disciple of Rājendra Tīrtha—the fourth lineal predecessor of Vyāsarāya.

44. A poet Kāḷamegha is said to "have been a *protégé* of Sāluva Gopa Tippa—one of Devarāya's officers governing a part of the Tamil country." *Madras Uni. His. Ser. No. XI*, p. 246.

CHAPTER I. VIṢṆUDĀSĀCĀRYA.

21. *Ṣaḍ-darśani-vallabha Viṣṇudāsācārya* (C. 1390-1440)* .

We know nothing at all about the personal history of Viṣṇudāsācārya except that he was a pupil of Rājendra Tirtha⁴⁵ (1412-30) and had the honorific “Ṣaḍ-darśani-Vallabha”⁴⁶ (Master of the Six Darśanas).

His only work that has come down to us is the *Vādaratnāvali* of which a much-injured Nāgari Ms. is preserved in the Madras O. L. (R. No. 3167) and two incomplete ones, one in Devanāgarī and the other in Telugu script, in the Mysore O. L. (C—1473 and 3098). A complete Dev. Ms. is also available with Prof. D. Śrīnivāsācār of Mysore.

The work is a polemical treatise devoted to the vindication of the principal tenets of Realism in Vedānta—such as the reality of the world and its values, the supremacy of God, the reality of Difference, the infallibility of Scripture (Vedas):—

“विश्वं सत्यं हरिः कर्ता जीवोऽन्यः परमार्थतः ।
वेदः सत्यं प्रमाणं चेत्येवं व्यासमतस्थितिः ॥”

It is divided into five “Sāras” (chapters), corresponding to the five topics for treatment indicated in the above verse. Following the requirements of a *वादग्रन्थ* the author has undertaken a dialectic refutation of the relevant doctrines of Monism. Its description therefore in the *Trien. Catal. of the Madras Oriental Lib.*, as a treatise “narrating the principles of Dvaita-Vedānta”, is quite jejune and misleading. It is a first-rate controversial classic which became the model for the more elaborate *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsarāya. Certain quotations in the *Nym.* are actually traced to the *Vādaratnāvali* of Viṣṇudāsācārya, by Śrīnivāsa Tirtha in his com. on the former.⁴⁷ But the passages are found also in the *Siddhitrāya* of Yamuna. There is no doubt however that in the writing of his *Nym.*, Vyāsarāya was very much indebted to the *Vādaratnāvali*, both for matter and manner which of course he has perfected and improved upon with distinctive touches

45. Vide Colophon: इति श्रीमत्सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रश्रीमद्राजेन्द्रतीर्थश्रीचरणकमल
.....विष्णुदासाचार्यविरचितायां.....” (Madras O.L., R. No. 3167).

46. इति षड्दर्शनाचार्यविष्णुदासार्यनिर्मिता ।
वादर्त्नावलिर्भूयात्प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः ॥

(last verse in the *Vādaratnāvali*).

47. Vide his com. on: “यथा चोक्तवृत्तः सम्राडद्वितीयोऽस्ति भूतले.....”
and मिथ्यात्वस्य च मिथ्यात्वे.....” *Nym.* p. 48. (Bby.).

and contributions of his own. As in the *Nym.*, an elaborate discussion of the real import of the so-called "Monistic-texts" like *Tattvam Asi*, *Ekamevādvitīyam*' is carried out in the *Vādaratnāvali*. But the discussions in the *Nym.*, are as a rule, more elaborate and incisive. Over a score of interpretations have been suggested for *Tattvam Asi* :—

“ दृश्यन्ते द्विदशे ब्रह्मार्थाः छन्दोगानां श्रुतेस्ततः ।

विदांकुर्वन्तु विद्वांसः सत्यां जीवेशयोर्भिदाम् ॥ ”

Quotations and rulings from the Vyākaraṇa⁴⁸ and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā⁴⁹ Śāstras are introduced in profusion, to reinforce the Siddhāntin's doctrines and interpretation. This is also a feature common to the *Nym.* And certain sections are designated भङ्गs, as in the *Nym.* Still, there is a difference in methodology between the two. The discussions in the *Nym.*, are carried on from the very beginning in the approved form of the Naiyāyika—argumentation, with a formal statement of the issues: (Vipratipatti-vākya) and analytical refutation (विकल्प). This is not followed in the *Vādaratnāvali*, which is thus less formal in its tone—and procedure. There are references however, to the views of (1) the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, (2) Śrīharṣa (*Khaṇḍana*—”) and (3) Citsukha.

There are quotations also from (what appears to be) yet another work of the same author—a *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍana*, which, to judge from its title, seems to be a criticism of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-Khādya* of Śrīharṣa. This would show that the dialectic onslaught against Advaita, by the Dvaitins, dates from much earlier than the period of Vyāsarāya, tho' it reached its culmination only in the *Nym.* That would again show that works like the *Vādāvali*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍana*, *Vādaratnāvali*, etc., were but the counteractions from the Dvaitins' side to the attacks made on various types of realistic thought in such dialectical classics as the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, the *Nyāyamakaranda* and the *Tattvapradīpikā*. There is thus no point in the complaint that one sometimes hears against the Dvaitins,⁵⁰ that they were the *first aggressors* ! The conflict between Monism and Dualism (Realism) is too old to be side-tracked by such trivial considerations.

48. There are quotations from the Sūtras of Pāṇini, the *Mahābhāṣya*, Kaiyaṭa etc.

49. And from the Vārtikas of Kumārila and various Nyāyas of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*.

50. Witness the remarks made by Śyṭ. Anantakṛṣṇa Sastri, in his Preface to his edn. of the *Nyāyāmṛta-Advaitasiddhi* etc., *Calcutta Oriental Series*, No. IX. p. 37.

SIDDHITRAYA

By

YĀMUNACĀRYA

Edited with English Translation and Notes

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

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श्रीः

। श्रीमते यामुनाय नमः ।

॥ ईश्वरसिद्धिः ॥

तत्र कस्यचिदेकस्य वशे विश्वं प्रवर्तते ।

इति साधयितुं पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

तत्र मीमांसकाः प्राहुः—नायं सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिसम्पन्नः पुरुषोऽभ्युपगममर्हति ; अतिपतितसकलसाधकप्रमाणसम्भावनाभूमित्वात् स्फुटविविधबाधकत्वाच्च । तथा हि— तस्य प्रत्यक्षमन्यद्वा साधकं भवेत् ? प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकं वैदिकं वा ?

व्यवस्थितमितस्वार्थं न तावदिह लौकिकम् ।

साधनं तेन सर्वार्थतज्ज्ञानादेरसिद्धितः ॥

In order to establish the truth that the universe runs its course under the control of some one person, let us, at the very outset, state the *prima facie* view on the matter.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA VIEW

In regard to this question, the Mīmāṃsakas say :—A person endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be posited ; for such a person is beyond the reach of all the *pramāṇas* that could possibly help to prove his existence ; (besides) there are several conclusive means of proof running counter to it (belief in such a person). To make the matter clear—(It may be asked) is it perception or some other *pramāṇa* that proves his existence ? (If the reply is perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) or super-normal perception (*yaugika-pratyakṣa*) ? The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each of the senses and being limited (to the *here* and *now*), ordinary perception cannot serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul ; for, with its aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and so on, cannot be apprehended.

सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिशालिनमवगमयता हि देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षव्यवधानजुषस्सर्व
एवार्थास्तद्दर्शनं शक्तिश्च गोचरयितव्यानि । न च विद्यमानेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षयोग्यकतिपय-
विषयनियतवृत्तेर्लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरवधिरयं महिमा सम्भावनाभूमिरिति कथमिव तदिह
साधनमिति मन्येमहि । नापि योगिप्रत्यक्षमस्य साधकम् ; यतः—

प्रत्यक्षत्वे तदप्येवं विद्यमानैकगोचरम् ।

भूतादिगोचरं वा न प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभादिवत् ॥

तत् खलु योगिविज्ञानमैन्द्रियकं न वा ? ऐन्द्रियकमपि बहिरिन्द्रियसम्भवमान्तरकरण-
जनितं वा ? बहिरिन्द्रियाणि तावत्समधिगतनिजविषयसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि तद्गोचरज्ञान-
जननानीति जगति विदितम् । अतो न रसनादिभिः रजतातिवृत्तव्यवहितादिसकलविषय-
वेदनप्रसङ्गः । न चाविद्यमानै रजतादिभिस्सम्भवति सन्निकर्षः ; तस्य व्याश्रयत्वादाश्रया-

The instrument of knowledge which could reveal a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning all these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific capacities of the different senses) in certain objects which are capable of coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of a person (endowed with such greatness) ?

Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving his existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it would, like intuitive insight (*pratibhā*), scarcely be perception. Besides, (there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the senses or not ? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses or of the internal sense ? It cannot originate from the outer senses ; for it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary causes, namely, contact with the object appropriate thereto, give rise to knowledge concerning those objects. That is why there is no possibility of knowledge concerning all things, (e.g.) silver, bygone objects, and whatever is screened from view, arising from the senses, such as, the tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, there can be no contact ; for contact presupposes two bases, and in the

भावे तदसम्भवात् । अतोऽपेक्षितोऽर्थसन्निकर्षः । सहकारिविरहे कथमिन्द्रियाण्यतीतादिविषयसाक्षात्काराय कल्पेरन् ?

भवति च—यत् यत्सहकारि यत्कार्यजननं, तत्तदभावे न तज्जनयति, यथा क्षितिसलिलसहकारि अङ्कुरकार्यजननबीजं क्षित्याद्यभावेऽङ्कुरम् । अर्थसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि बहिरिन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानजननानीति तान्यपि नातीतेऽनागते वार्थे ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति न तदुपजनितं प्रत्यक्षं यथोक्तविषयनियममतिक्रामति ॥

नाप्यान्तरकरणसम्भवम् ; आन्तरगोचर एव सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यात् । बाह्यविषयमितिषु मनसो निरङ्कुशकरणाङ्गीकारे हि कृतं चक्षुरादिभिः । अतश्च न कश्चिदन्धो बधिरो वा भवेत् ।

भवति चात्र—विमतिपदं मनो बहिरिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षं न बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचरे प्रवर्तते, तत्र

absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer senses). When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things ?

This may be expressed in syllogistic form :—That which produces a certain effect, when in association with a given auxiliary cause, cannot produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause ; for example, the seed which produces the sprout, when in association with the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of the soil and the like. The external senses, in association with the auxiliary cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in conformity with this principle, the outer senses do not also lead to knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be concluded that the knowledge generated by the external senses cannot override the rule herein mentioned with regard to objects (that they should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses).

Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and other internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard to knowledge of external objects, the manas were admitted to be the unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become superfluous. It would follow therefrom that none could be either blind or deaf.

To express it in syllogistic form :—Without seeking the assistance of the outer organs, manas, whose precise mode of apprehending external objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external perception ; for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent

तत्तन्त्रवृत्तित्वात् । यत् यत्र यत्तन्त्रवृत्तिः, न तत्तन्निरपेक्षं तत्र प्रवर्तते ; यथा आलोकापेक्ष-
प्रवृत्तिं चक्षुः स्वगोचरे अन्धतमस इति ।

न च सिद्धौषधमन्त्रतपस्समाधिमहिमसमासादितातिशयानि इन्द्रियाणि कदा-
चिदपजहति समधिगतविषयनियममिति सम्भवति ; सांसिद्धिकसामर्थ्याविर्भावैकफलत्वात्ते-
षाम् ; सामर्थ्यस्य च प्रतिनियमात् । न खलु सुप्रयुक्तभेषजशतविहितसंस्कारमपि श्रोत्रं
रूपरसविभागावगमाय कल्पते ।

भवति च — विवादाध्यासितबाह्याभ्यन्तरकरणपाटवातिशयोऽनुलङ्घितसीमा, ऐन्द्रिय-
कप्रकर्षत्वात्, दृश्यमानतत्प्रकर्षवत्, इत्यैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं नातीतादि गोचरयति ।

भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तु सत्यपि विशदनिर्भासित्वे प्राच्यानुभवगोचराद-
नधिकमधिकं वा अध्यवस्यतः स्मृतिविभ्रमस्रोतसोरन्यतरावर्तपरिवर्तिनः कुतः प्रामाण्यकूल-
प्रतिलम्भः ? कुतस्तराञ्च प्रत्यक्षतयोत्तम्भनम् ? प्रत्यक्षस्य वा सतः कथमिव विदितविषय-
upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is
dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of
that given entity ; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is
dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of
colour) in darkness.

It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the
limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by
virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs adminis-
tered by perfected souls, of *mantras* (charms), austerities (*tapas*) and
yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etc.) have for their result
only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses ;
and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear
may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly
administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse
qualities as colour and taste.

To put the matter in syllogistic form : — The excellence of the skill
belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there
is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds ; for it is sensory ex-
cellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot
make known bygone things and the like.

Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest
stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets
forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or
embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the
eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance (*smṛti*)
and illusion (*vibhrama*), and has no chance whatever of reaching the
shore of validity (*prāmāṇya*). There is much less chance of trying to

नियमव्यतिक्रमः ? अतिक्रमतो वा कुतः प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न विश्वानुभवैश्वर्यशालिनि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् ।

नापि प्रमाणान्तरम् । तत्त्वत्वनुमानमागमो वा ? अनुमानमपि विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा ? तत्र सकलपदवीदवीयसि भगवति न तावत् स्वलक्षणसाक्षात्कारपूर्व-काविनाभाववधारणाधीनोदयत्वादितदनुमानमुदेतुमलम् । न ह्यनवगतचरहुतभुजस्तद-विनाभावितया धूममनुसन्धातुमीशते । न च सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्कारपटीयसि लिङ्गं सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि किञ्चन लभ्यते ।

नन्वेकचेतनाधीनं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।

अचेतनेनारब्धत्वादरोगस्य शरीरवत् ॥

तथा सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्करणकौशलम् ।

कार्यत्वादेव जगतस्तत्कर्तुरनुमीयताम् ॥

enhance its validity by stating that it is perceptual knowledge. If it were a perception, how could it transcend the well-known limitations with regard to objects ? If it were to transcend these, how could it still be perceptual in character ? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means of proof in regard to the person endowed with the superhuman power of experiencing all things.

It cannot be any other *pramāṇa* either. (If it be) is that other *pramāṇa* inference or scripture (*āgama*)? If it is inference, is that *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*? (It cannot be *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*; for) concerning the existence of God, who is beyond the reach of all the means of proof, no inference can arise; since the birth of the latter is dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, which, in its turn, presupposes the direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomitant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference (*liṅga*) of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent to create all things and to perceive them directly.

THE NYĀYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The world, concerning which the question is raised :—Is it, or is it not, due to divine creation ?—is subservient to a single intelligent entity; for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to belong to its author.

सर्वं हि कार्यमुपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनसंवेदिचेतनरचितमवगतं घटमणिक-
गृहादि । कार्यञ्च विमतिपदमवनिगिरिमहार्णवादीति तदपि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्भेतुकमध्यव-
सीयते ।

न च कार्यत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् ; अवयवसन्निवेशादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्सिद्धेः । इह
चान्त्यावयविभ्यः प्रभृति आद्यणुकमखिलमवयविकमनिहीयमाननानावयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेष-
जनितमवगतमित्यन्तत उपादानं चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः प्रपञ्चस्य । तेषामादिपरिस्पन्दश्च
तदनुगुणादृष्टविशिष्टतत्तत्क्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगासमवायिकारणक इति उपकरणमपि समस्तक्षेत्रज्ञ-
वर्तीनि धर्माधर्मलक्षणान्यदृष्टानि । प्रयोजनं पुनस्तदभिनिर्वर्तितविचित्रार्थक्रियाकार
श्चेतनोपकारप्रकारभेदोऽपर्यन्तः । तदुपभुजस्त एव क्षेत्रज्ञास्सम्प्रदानम् । न चामी स्वसम-
वायिनावपि धर्माधर्मावलम्बलोकयितुमिति तदतिरेकी निखिलभुवननिर्माणनिपुणोऽधिकरण-

Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxiliary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are intended.¹ The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the mountain and the wide ocean, are effects ; hence it has to be concluded that they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity.

It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablished ; for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the arrangement of the parts. All objects, commencing from wholes which are not themselves the parts of other wholes (*antyāvayavi*) and ending with the diads (*dvyanukas*), are known to be constituted by the peculiar combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance with the scale of wholes ; hence it follows that ultimately four different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the world. As for the auxiliary cause (*upakaraṇa*), it must be the unseen powers (*adr̥ṣṭa*) in the shape of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) existing in all individual souls (*kṣetrajñā*) ; for the initial movement (*parispanda*) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the jīvas, a help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by them. The self-same jīvas who derive this help are the very persons for whom (*sampradāna*) the universe is intended. For the reason that these jīvas are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits,

1. Compare Pāṇinī's sūtra-karmaṇa yamabhipraiti sa sampradānam. I. iv. 32.

सिद्धान्तसमधिगतनिरतिशयसहजसकलविषयसंविदैश्वर्यशक्त्यतिशयः पुरुषधौरेय एकः
किमिति न सामान्यतोदृष्टलिङ्गादनुमीयते ।

तदिदमविदितानुमानवृत्तस्य स्वमतिरचिततरुतर्कोल्लसितमिति परिहसन्ति मामां-
सकाः । तथा हि—किमिदमेकचेतनाधीनत्वन्नामाभिप्रेतं तनुभुवनादेः ? तदायत्तत्वमिति
चेत् ,

किमस्य तस्मिन्नायत्तं किन्तु जन्माथवा स्थितिः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्वा द्वयोस्तावत्साध्यहीनं निदर्शनम् ॥

न खलु शरीरमेकचेतनाधीनोत्पत्तिस्थिति । ये हि यदेहाधीनसुखदुःखोपभोगभागिनः,
भवति हि तदुचितादृष्टशालिनां सर्वेषामेव तेषां तद्देहिन इव तदुत्पत्तिस्थितिनिमित्तत्वम् ।

अपि च शरीरावयविनः स्वावयवसमवायलक्षणा स्थितिः अवयवव्यतिषङ्गविशेषादृते

even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be
inferred with the aid of a mark of inference (*liṅga*) of the
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as under-
stood from the *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, is different from these finite souls,
who is competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with
a knowledge of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which
is natural to him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of un-
surpassed excellence.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The Mīmāṃsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the outcome
of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the
imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To make
the matter clear—What is the precise significance of the statement that
the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious
entity ? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity, (it
may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon him ? Is it their
origin or continuance or activity ? On the first two alternatives, the
illustrative example cited would be defective in not possessing the
sādhya. Indeed, the body is not dependent for its origin and
continuance upon a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in
the enjoyment of the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body
must also, equally with the person who owns it, be responsible for its
origin and continuance ; since they are endowed with unseen powers
(*adrṣṭa*) appropriate to that enjoyment.

The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which
is in the form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no

न चेतयितारं परमपेक्षते । या पुनस्तदपेक्षिणी प्राणनलक्षणा स्थितिः, न सा पक्षीकृते क्षित्य्यदौ सम्भवतीति स्थितिमपि नैकरूपां पक्षसपक्षानुयायिनीमुदीक्षामहे ।

एकचेतनाधीनप्रवृत्तित्वे तु प्रबलबहुजनसरभसप्रयत्नप्रचाल्यैरुपलतरुथादिभिर्व्यभिचारः । आरब्धत्वादेव चैतत्साध्यसिद्धावधिकमिदमुपादानविशेषवचनम् ।

चेतनाधीनतामात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता ।

चेतनैर्भोक्तृभिर्भोग्यः कर्मभिर्जन्यते हि नः ॥

युक्तञ्चैतत्, यदुभयवासिद्धानामेव चेतनानां कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमः ; लाघवात् ।

न चोपदानाद्यनभिज्ञतया तत्प्रतिक्षेपः ;

उपादानं पृथिव्यादि यागदानादि साधनम् ।

साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमन्ते यत्सर्व एव च चेतनाः ॥

intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and the like, which are offered as the *pakṣa* (minor term) in your argument ; hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in common in both the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the illustrative example (*sapakṣa*).

Should it be said that 'dependence' means having an activity subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, the argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *vyābhicāra*. Again, when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of (matter), the addition of the qualification 'endowed with a knowledge of the material cause and so on' is superfluous. If the argument were to establish only dependence upon a conscious entity, then, the argument is liable to be charged with the defect of proving what is already well-established ; for this world has been created by our own past deeds (*karma*) as something fit for enjoyment by conscious beings, experiencers (*bhoktā*). It is proper to admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants ; for this hypothesis has the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*).

It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such as sacrifice (*yajña*) and gift (*dāna*).

अद्यवदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचयैकदेशशालिनो न युगपदेव निरवशेषविलयजननभागिन इत्यन्तिमपरमाणुसाक्षात्कारो न कर्तृभावोपयोगी ॥

कर्मणश्शक्तिरूपं यदपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।

मा भूत्प्रत्यक्षता तस्य शक्तिमद्ब्रह्मक्षगोचरः ॥

न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारम्भमाणास्तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्वण्डचक्रादिकार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते । यदि परं शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधने तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः । इह तु

आगमादवगम्यन्ते विचित्राः कर्मशक्तयः ।

तेन कर्मभिरात्मानस्सर्वं निर्मिमतां पृथक् ॥

अपि च तदेव चेतनकर्तृकं जगति परिदृश्यते, यदेव शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानादि च । न तथा महीमहीधरमहार्णवादीति कथमिव तत्तत्कार्यत्वम् ? कथन्तराश्च तदुपादा-

Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate building materials is not required for agency ; because earth and other elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not secure at any time total annihilation or creation.

(It is futile to contend that as *yāga* and *dāna* become the causes of creation only through the mystic power (*apūrva*) which they generate and as this power is imperceptible to the *jīva*, he cannot be the agent ; for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such as '*apūrva*,' may not be perceptible ; but, surely, the act itself possessing this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures. Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds.

Moreover, only that which it is possible to make, and whose material cause can possibly be known, is found everywhere to have a conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (i.e., it is impossible to make them ; and their material causes cannot be known), it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respective

नोपकरणादेस्साक्षात्कारगोचरता ? यादृशं हि कार्यमुपादानायभिज्ञपूर्वकमवगतं घटमणिकादि, तादृशमेव हि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्वेतुकत्वानुमानाय प्रभवतीति ।

अपि चानिश्चरेण परिमितशक्तिज्ञानेन विग्रहवता अनवाप्तकामेन कृतमवगतं घटादिकार्यमिति तथाविधं बोद्धारमुपस्थापयन्हेतुरभिमतपुरुषसर्वज्ञसर्वैश्वर्यादिविपर्ययसाधनाद्विरुद्धः स्यात् ।

न चैवं सति सर्वानुमानव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गश्चिन्तितव्यः । प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततो विपरीतविशेषांस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि । इह पुनरतिपतित-सकलमानान्तरकर्मभावे सर्वनिर्माणनिपुणे सिषाधयिषिते यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयति ।

अपि च—

effects of different causes. It is even more difficult to conceive how their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-pot, which is known to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must have for its cause a sentient being possessing a knowledge of that kind (i.e., knowledge of *upādāna*, *upakaraṇa* and the like).

Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality, and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason (*hetu*) cited by you, establishing as it does a knower answering to this description, is liable to be charged with *viruddha doṣa*. For it establishes the very reverse of omniscience and lordship over the universe which is sought to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause of the world.

(The Mīmāṃsaka continues :)—There is no room for the objection that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, if the thing proved (*lingin*) is open to any *pramāṇa* other than that on which it is at the moment based, this other *pramāṇa* itself would dispel the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the mark of inference (*linga*). In the present case, however, when a person who transcends the reach of all other *pramāṇas* and who is competent to create all things is desired to be proved, the reason (*hetu*) will, in addition to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative evidence.

स्वार्थकारुण्यभावेन व्याप्ताः प्रेक्षावतः क्रियाः ।

ईश्वरस्योभयाभावाज्जगत्सर्गो न युज्यते ॥

अवासकामत्वान्न तावदात्मार्थे सृजति । प्रलयासमये प्रलीनसकलकरणकळेबरादि-
भोगोपकरणतया च चेतनानां दुःखाभावाद्दुःखदर्शनजनितकृपाप्रयुक्तिरपि नास्तीति व्यापक-
भूतस्वार्थकारुण्यनिवृत्तेर्व्याप्यभूतया प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यापि निवर्तितव्यम् ।

सुखैकतानं जनयेज्जगत्करणया सृजन् ।

तत्कर्मानुविधायित्वे हीयेतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥

न चोपादानादिसाक्षात्कारिण एव कर्तृत्वमित्यपि नियमः ; उपादानमुपकरणञ्चा-
विदुष एवात्मनो ज्ञानादिषु कर्तृत्वात् । अतः

असिद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धत्वादनैकान्त्याच्च वर्णितात् ।

कार्यत्वहेतोर्जगतो न यथोदितकर्तृता ॥

प्रयोगश्च भवति—महीमहीधरादि कार्यं न भवति, प्रसिद्धकार्यविलक्षणत्वात् ,

The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) the jivas are destitute of all the senses, body and other means of enjoyment, no sorrow is experienced by them ; as a consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the perception of persons afflicted by sorrow ; hence, with the absence of the *vyāpaka* (the invariably concomitant), namely, personal gain and mercy, there must be the absence of the *vyāpya* (that which is inherent), namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard to the past deeds of jivas, his independence would be lost.

Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like ; for in respect of activities, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes. Hence, in as much as the *hetu*, namely, 'being an effect' is liable (for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the defects of being unestablished (*asiddha*), adverse (*viruddha*) and *anekānta* (straying), it is impossible that the universe should have for its cause a person like the one suggested by you.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus :—(1) Phenomena, such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that,

गगनवत्, अशक्यदर्शनोपादानोपकरणत्वाद्वा व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवत् । परमाणवः न प्रत्यक्षाः, निरतिशयसूक्ष्मद्रव्यत्वात्, तथैव घटादिवत् । विमतिविषयः कालः न लोकशून्यः, कालत्वात् इदानीन्तनकालवत् । तनुभुवनादि ईश्वरकर्तृकं न भवति, कार्यत्वात्तद्वदेव । ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति, प्रयोजनरहितत्वात्, अशरीरत्वाद्वा मुक्तात्मवत् । इति ।

अत्र ब्रूमो न कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादौ शक्यनिहवम् ।

सभागत्वात्क्रियावत्त्वान्महत्त्वेन विशेषितात् ॥

तादृशादेव मूर्तत्वाद्वाह्यप्रत्यक्षतान्वितात् ।

ससामान्यविशेषत्वादित्यादिभ्यो घटादिवत् ॥

न चेदृश एव सन्निवेशः कार्यो नेतर इत्यवयवसन्निवेशप्रतिनियतं रूपभेदमुदीक्षामहे ।

यत्तु शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानोपकरणं च क्रियत इति, तदस्तु नाम । किन्तु

like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects, or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible ; for, unlike jars and the like, they are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (i.e., *pralaya*) is not characterised by the absence of the world ; for it is also a period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do not have God for their agent ; for, like the jar, they are effects. (5) God is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body.

THE NAIYĀYIKA REPLY TO THE MĪMĀMSAKA CONTENTION

To these arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka the Naiyāyika replies :— The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth (*kṣiti*) and other substances ; because, like the jar etc., they are endowed with parts, or with activities while they are yet big in magnitude, or with forms while they are yet big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower generality (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) while they are open to external perception and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about which it could be said ' This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and none else is.'

The contention that that alone can be said to be created which it is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can possibly be known may be true enough ; but the capacity to do and the power

ते क्रियाज्ञानशक्ती क्रियाज्ञानाभ्यामेव समधिगमनीये । ते च क्षित्यादिषु यथोक्तसाधनबल-
समुत्थापिते इति न विशेषः प्रसिद्धप्राकारगोपुरादिकार्येभ्यस्तनुभुवनादेः । न चैवावानेव
क्रियागोचर इति विषयनियमः कश्चित् क्रियाया दृष्टः, येनेदमशक्यक्रियमध्यवस्येम । सिद्धे
च कार्यत्वे तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्करणतदधिष्ठानतत्प्रेरणनिपुणः पुरुषविशेषस्सिद्धयत्येव ।

अधिष्ठानं च तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणसङ्कल्पवदीश्वरसन्निकर्षः ; क्षेत्रज्ञेनेव स्वशरीरादौ । स
च द्रव्यैस्संयोगलक्षणः । तद्गुणैस्तु संयुक्तसमवायरूपः ।

प्रवृत्तिश्च परमाणूनां परिस्पन्दलक्षणा । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु फलोदयानुकूलतादृश-
देशकालादिसहकारिसहितता ।

न च* ताभ्यां धर्माधर्माभ्यामेव फलम् ; चेतनानधिष्ठितानां सर्वेषामेतेषामचैतन्ये-

to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (*kṣiti*) and the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. No restriction to the effect 'The scope of activity is only this much' is noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone ; and if such a restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and other causes, and to control and direct the same.

As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the jiva, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (*dravya*) this proximity takes the form of conjunction (*samyoga*) ; and in regard to their qualities, it is inherence (*samavāya*) in that wherein there is conjunction (*samyukta*).

Coming to activity (*pravṛtti*), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely change of place (*parispanda*). With regard to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), their activity is simply their coming into association with appropriate place (*deśa*) and times (*kāla*) and other auxiliary causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds.

It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from merit and demerit themselves ; for these and all other things not controlled by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves ; since they are

*In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without the negative particle, 'tābhyām dharmādharmābhyām phalam'. But from the context it is clear that the text should be 'na ca tābhyām....'

नाकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । न हि चेतनेन वर्षकिनानधिष्ठिता वासी देशकालादिसहकारिशत-
समधिगमेऽपि यूपदीन्यापादयितुमलम् । बीजाङ्कुरादयस्तु पक्षान्तर्भूता इति तैर्व्यभिचार-
वचनमनभिज्ञतयैव श्रोत्रियाणाम् । एतेन सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ।

न चोभयवासिद्वयतामात्रेण क्षेत्रज्ञानामेवेदशाधिष्ठातृत्वकल्पनमुचितम् ; तेषां
सूक्ष्मव्यवहितादिदर्शनाशक्तेर्निश्चितत्वात् । दृष्टानुसारिणी हि सर्वत्र कल्पना ; न दृष्टविरो-
धिनी । न चैवमीश्वरस्याशक्तिर्निश्चिता ; प्रमाणान्तरतस्तत्सिद्धेः । यथोदितप्रमाणबलेन
सिद्धयन् सांसिद्धिकसर्वार्थदर्शनतत्प्रेरणशक्तिसम्पन्न एव सिद्धयति ; कार्यत्वस्य समर्थकर्तृ-
पूर्वकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धात् ।

devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such as place and time, the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent being, is, indeed, incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post (*yūpa*). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already included in the *pakṣa* (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any intelligent agent, produces the seed by its own effort) the foregoing argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* is the outcome of the ignorance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge of *vyabhicāra* by citing the instance of pleasure² and the like stands condemned.

It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply because they are accepted by both the rival disputants ; for the jīva's incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is well established. (Rather than admitting a separate entity, God, would it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the hidden to finite souls themselves ? The answer is in the negative) for what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not contradictory to, what is known. It is not well established that the incapacity to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God, as it belongs to the jīvas ; because by means of other *pramāṇas* the capacity to perceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely ascertained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all things and to direct them ; for ' being an effect ' is invariably concomitant with ' dependence upon a competent agent.'

2. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appropriate bodily responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral changes, it may be urged that the argument is vitiated by *vyabhicāra doṣa*.

यत्तु परिमितशक्तिज्ञानैश्वर्याद्यापादनाद्धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनत्वमुद्घातितम् ; तदतिस्थवीयः ; अप्रयोजकत्वात्तेषाम् । न हि किञ्चित्क्रियमाणं कर्तुरर्थान्तरविषयगसामर्थ्यमज्ञानं* वा स्वोत्पत्तयेऽपेक्षते ; स्वसम्पादनसमर्थकर्तृमात्राक्षेपात् केवलं व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः† । तावतैवोपपद्यमाने कार्योदयेऽसम्बन्धिनोऽकिञ्चित्करस्यार्थान्तरविषयस्याभावस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।

अपि च किं तदितरसमस्तवस्तुविषयमज्ञानादिव्यापकमुत कतिपयगोचरमिति विवेचनीयम् । न तावदशेषविषयम् ; अनुपलब्धेः । न खलु कुम्भकारः कुम्भातिरेकिं किमपि न विजानाति । अथ कतिपयविषयम् ; तदपि न, अनियतविषयतया तस्य तस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । न चास्ति किञ्चिद्व्यवस्थितं, यदविद्यादिमानेव कर्तृतामनुभवति ।

The objection raised already (vide p. 162), namely that, as the *hetu* points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to the absence of lordship, it establishes only the reverse of the qualities intended to be proved, is highly superficial ; for, clearly, the *hetu* in question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like. In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other things or ignorance concerning them ; for, in as much as it would only lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the absence of the capacity to produce other things does not follow therefrom. When the production of an effect may well take place solely with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production.

Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to be invariably concomitant (*vyāpaka*), namely, 'ignorance of other things and incapacity to effect them', concerns all things other than the effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertaining to all things ; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no better ; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the argument is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa* in view of the fact that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able

* The reading found in all books is ' . . . asāmarthyam jñānam . . . ' but it ought to be ' . . . asāmarthyamajñānam . . . '

† All books examined read 'kevalavystirekāsiddheḥ'. Perhaps a better reading would be 'kevalam vyatirekāsiddheḥ'.

न च शरीरिणैव कर्त्रा भाव्यम् ; शरीरग्रहणेनैवानैकान्त्यात् । न खलु शरीर-
विशिष्टरसन्नेवायमात्मा शरीरमुपादत्ते ; योगिनो युगपदनेकशरीरग्रहणायोगात् । पूर्वदेह-
परित्यागेन देहान्तरप्रापककर्मप्रेरितप्राणसहाय एव देहान्तरं प्रविशतीत्युपपादितमात्म-
चिन्तायाम् ।

किञ्च आत्मनश्शरीरमधितिष्ठतोऽधिष्ठानक्रियाकर्मभूतस्य देहस्याधिष्ठातृदेहानुप-
वेशोऽनुपपन्नः ; युगपदेकक्रियायामेकस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधात् । अधितिष्ठासितदेहसंयोगवत्
एव तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणप्रयत्नयोगलक्षणमधिष्ठानं दृष्टमिति चेत् , न ह्येतत् । किन्तु तदसम्बद्धस्य
तदधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः* प्रेर्यवस्तुसम्बन्धिना प्रेरकेण भवितव्यमिति । किन्तु न पुनर्देहसम्बन्धेन
भाव्यमिति कुतो निर्णयः ? इत एव यतोऽन्यदप्यधिष्ठोद्यमानं मानदण्डादि स्वसम्बन्धिना-
वा-

to assert " Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object
is fit to become an agent."

There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a person
endowed with a body ; for this contention is liable to be charged with
anekānta doṣa in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming a body.
Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already associated
with a body ; for, then, it would be impossible for the yogin to take up
several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of the soul it
has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body the
soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital breath
(*prāṇa*) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure a fresh
body.

Moreover, the body which is the object of the controlling activity on
the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be in-
cluded in the very body of the definition of the controller ; for one and
the same thing being at once the agent and the object in the selfsame
activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintained that control,
which is simply the possession of an effort conducive
to the activity of the body, is known to belong only to him
who is in conjunction with the body which is sought to be controlled, it
has to be replied : ' let it be admitted that the controller should be re-
lated to the object controlled ; since the control of a given object is im-
possible to him who is unrelated to it.' (It may be asked) How is it
determined that this relation need not be the bodily relation ? (The
reply is) " It is for this reason, namely, that other objects also, such as

* In preference to the two readings (i) *astvekatattvasambandhasya adhiṣṭhānā-
nupapatteḥ* (Chaukamba edition) and (ii) *astvekatattvasambaddhasya adhiṣṭhānā-
nupapatteḥ* (Telugu edition), the variant reading suggested in the Telugu edition—
nahyetat | kintu tadasambaddhasya tadadhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ—has been adopted,

धिष्णीयते । तेनाधिष्ठानक्रियापेक्षिताधिष्ठेयपदार्थसम्बन्धमात्रातिरेकेण देहसम्बन्धो नामापरो नादर्तव्यः । अस्ति चेश्वरस्यापि जगदुपादानोपकरणैस्सम्बन्ध इत्युक्तमेव ।

अथ स्वदेहव्यतिरिक्ते वस्तुनि प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वं देहद्वारेणैव ; दृष्टं हि दण्डचक्रादिषु करसंयोगादिना कुलालादेः प्रवर्तयितृत्वमित्युच्येत ; तदपि न ; अभिध्यानमात्रेण परशरीरगतगरनिरसनविसारणदर्शनात् ।

कथमसति शरीरे परप्रेरणात्मकः सङ्कल्प इति चेत्, किं शरीरं सङ्कल्पयति येन तदभावे न भवेत् । करणमिति चेन्न ; मनसः करणत्वात् ।

किमस्तीश्वरस्य मनः ? बाढम् । नन्वेवं विग्रहधर्माधर्मानैश्वर्यादयस्साधारणधर्माः प्रादुष्युः । मैवम् ; कार्यत्वाक्षिप्तसमर्थकर्तृमत्त्वद्रिभैवापास्तत्वात् । मनसो नित्येन्द्रियतया देहापगमेऽपि सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमादनैकान्तिकश्च । यावद्वि दृष्टानुगुणं व्याप्त्यु-

the measuring rod, are controlled by one who is merely related to them." Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity, namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation, like the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of the cosmos exists in God.

It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity in things other than the body is done only with the aid of the body ; for it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with the hand. This objection too is untenable ; for the extraction and the scattering of the poison that has entered one's body is observed to be effected by another by the mere exercise of his will.

When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to cause movements in other things arise ? (The reply is) Then is it contended that it is the body that wills ? If that is so, in its absence there will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, but) is the instrument (*karana*) in the act of willing, it may be replied "not so" ; for the mind (*manas*) is the instrument of willing.

Has God, then, a *manas* ? (The answer is) "Quite so". If it be said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have to be attributed to God ; the reply is "not so." For this objection is set aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the *hetu* that it is an effect. Moreover, since even when the body perishes contact with *manas* has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the argument is vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. In fact, only that much which is

पयोगि, तावदनुज्ञायते । न चास्मदादेर्मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनस्यापर्यन्तविस्तारस्य महा-
भूतभौतिकप्रपञ्चस्य प्रादेशिकशरीरकः किञ्चिज्ज्ञः पुण्यपापपरवशगतिरलं निर्माणा-
येत्यपरिमितज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिः शरीराद्यनपेक्षस्सङ्कल्पादेव सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमः कर्ता
सिद्धः ।

ईदृशेन कर्त्रा घटादिषु कार्यत्वस्य सम्बन्धो न दृष्ट इति चेत् , अतिगहनगिरितटा-
धिष्ठानेन अतिप्रकृष्टादृष्टचरेन्धननिवहसम्बन्धिना हुतवहविशेषेण महानसादौ धूमस्य
वा किं सम्बन्धो दृष्टः, येन धूमविशेषदर्शनाद्विरिशिखरे तथाविधाम्भिरनु-
मीयते । यादृशो धूमो यत्रावगतस्तत्रैव तादृशस्तत्सम्पादनसमर्थः । दृष्टान्तभूमाव-
परिदृष्टोऽपि सामान्यव्याप्तिबलेन पक्षधर्मतावशात्सिद्धयतीति चेत् , तदिदमस्मा
भिरभिधीयमानं किमिति न हृदयमधिरोहति भवताम् । इहापि कार्यत्वं

relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what is perceived is admitted. Since a person whose body occupies a limited area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit and demerit, is incapable of creating the world composed of the primal elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimitable knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his will. If it be said that in instances such as the jar no invariable relation between the character of being an effect and an agent of this description is observed, (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experienced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous quantity of fuel ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a different description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example, could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in general with fire in general, in consideration of the pakṣa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in examples, such as the pot, to have an invariable concomitance with dependence

समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वसम्पादन-समर्थमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमुपस्थापयति । यथैव हि देशकालेन्धनपरिमाणादिविशेषानादरेण धूमस्य स्वोदयानुगुणहुतवहमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमः, तथैव अनीश्वरत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वशरीरित्वपुण्यपापपरवशत्वमनुप्यत्वादिविशेषप्रहाणेन कार्यस्य स्वनिर्माणसमर्थबुद्धिमत्कर्तृमात्रेण सम्बन्धनियमनिश्चय इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

अपि च विभुद्रव्यसंयोगिनः परिस्पन्दवतश्च सर्वत्र स्पर्शवत्त्वाव्यभिचारेऽपि ज्ञान-सुखादिनित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणानुमितात्मसंयोगिनः मनसः कथमिव स्पर्शरहितत्वम् ? । कथं च वायवीयद्रव्यस्य महिमगुणशालिनो नियताधिष्ठानस्पर्शनत्वनियमदर्शनेऽपि त्वगिन्द्रिये upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth and the like, points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing them and is hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire is found, the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size and other characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established ; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the absence of lordship (*anīśvaratva*), the possession of fragmentary knowledge, the character of owning a body, of being subject to merit and demerit, and of being human, universal concomitance of an effect with an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to make it, is ascertained. Hence, there is no special feature marking off these two cases.

(Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases coming under that *vyāpti*. For example) :—When an object, which is in conjunction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses movement, is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the possession of touch, how can the mind³ whose conjunction with the soul is inferred from consciousness, pleasure and other special qualities of an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (*sparśa*) ? When what is composed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch ?⁴

3. The Naiyāyika raises this objection against the Prābhākara school, and not against the Bhāṭṭa school, of Mīmāṃsā ; for the former believes that *manas* is atomic, while the latter maintains that *manas*, like the *ātman*, is all-pervasive (*vibhu*). And on the Naiyāyika view that there cannot be any *samyoga* between two *vibhuddhavyas*, *manas* cannot be in conjunction with the soul.

4. Some entities constituted of *vāyu*, such as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *viyāna*, *udāna* and *saṁāna*, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, *prāṇa* is said to dwell in the heart (*hrdi*) ; and *saṁāna*, in the navel (*nābhi*). And the air outside is cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the

तद्विपर्ययः ? तैजसस्य वा रूपस्पर्शयोरन्यतरस्य वा प्राकट्यनियमेऽपि रूपोपलम्भसाधनतानुमिततैजसभावस्य चक्षुषो नियमेन तदुभयानुद्भवाभ्युपगमः ? ।

अथ कार्यदर्शनानुमितसद्भावानां तैजसादिभावेऽपि तत्तद्विशेषाणां योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमभङ्गप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगमः, हन्त तर्हि प्रकृतविषयेऽपि प्रसञ्जितधर्मविशेषाणामनुपलम्भबाधाविशेषादनेकनियमविवातप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाभ्युपगम इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ।

दृश्यन्ते हि नीतयः—यथा, विवादास्पदं परमाण्वादि प्रेक्षावत्प्रेरितं चेष्टते, अचेतनत्वात् । यदचेतनं, तत्तथा, यथा तथाविधं कन्दुकादि । तथा विवादाध्यासिता बाह्याभ्यन्तरप्रवृत्तयः प्रकृत्युपकरणप्रत्यक्षपूर्विकाः, कार्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव ।

When either the colour (*rūpa*) or the contact (*sparsa*) of fiery objects must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour ?

If it be said that it is so admitted (i.e., that the eye is devoid of explicit *rūpa* or *sparsa*) for the reason that the belief in the special qualities (i.e., explicit *rūpa* or *sparsa*) appropriate to the respective cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*), even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e., the eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to exist in other cases as well), there would be an end to all inference ; (it may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because such an admission would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice.

In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dispute, act under the direction of an intelligent person ; for they are non-sentient and whatever is a non-sentient object, acts in this way ; for example, the ball and other non-sentient objects. (2) All activities, internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes ; because, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument,

entire body for its adhiṣṭhāna and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it the object of the sense of touch.

*प्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रमेयत्वात्पदार्थत्वाद्धटादिवत् ।

एकेच्छानुविधायीदमचैतन्यात्स्वदेहवत् ॥

एकेनाधिष्ठिताः कार्यं कुर्वते सर्वचेतनाः ।

देहसम्बन्धसापेक्षकार्यकृत्त्वात्त्वगादिवत् ॥

they are effects. (3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible ; because, like the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4) The world is dependent upon the will of a person ; for, like our own body, it is devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under the control of a single intelligent entity (i.e., God) ; for by standing in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their

* In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the text commencing after the word योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् and ending with तद्वदेव is suggested :—

तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमदर्शनविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च पक्षधर्मताबललभ्यार्थविशेषावबोधकाने-
कश्रुत्यादिमानबाधप्रसङ्गाच्च समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियमं कार्यत्वं
क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वोत्पादकमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमद्वितीयं पुरुषधौरेयं साधयती-
त्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तरतमभावापन्नवैचित्र्यवत्तत्कार्येषु कार्यत्वमेव तत्तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमा-
पयति चेत्, महीमहीधरादिरूपजगद्गतकार्यत्वमपि तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयतीति
कैमुत्यसिद्धेऽर्थे व्यर्थोऽयं निरीश्वरमीमांसकस्यात्र दुरभिनिवेशः । दृश्यन्ते ह्यस्मिन्नर्थे
अन्ये च हेतवः (1) त्रैकालिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् तदनुगुणशक्त्यादिगुणगणवदायत्तस्थितिलयकं,
अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनत्वात्, अतिकुशलैकायत्तस्थित्यादिकतया प्रमितचित्रप्रतिमा-
दवत् । (2) विभूतिपदाभिषेयं कृत्स्नं एकाधेयविधेशेषभावं, तच्छरीरत्वात्, मच्छरीरवत् ।

Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains no substantial change. These arguments are :—

(1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future, possesses a continuance and a destruction which are subject to a person endowed with a group of qualities, such as power, appropriate thereto ; because it has manifold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind ; for example, pictures and dolls which are well known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression *vibhūti* possess the characters of being supported by (*ādheyatva*), being controlled by (*vidheyatva*), and existing for the sake of (*śeṣatva*) a person ; for, in the manner of one's own body, they constitute his body.

एकप्रधानपुरुषं विवादाध्यासितं जगत्
चेतनाचेतनात्मत्वादेकराजकदेशवत् ॥

* * * * *

॥ श्रीयामुनाय नमः ॥

एतावानेवायं ग्रन्थ उपलभ्यते ।

activities, like the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person ; because, like a country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient and nonsentient entities.

* * * * *

The text of Īśvara-Siddhi available is only this much.

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ भूमिका ॥

श्रीमन्न्यायकुलिशाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जयति सर्वस्वमिव श्रीभगवद्रामानुज-
मुनिप्रतिष्ठापितस्य विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य । प्रणेता चास्य विश्वविख्यातकीर्तिः कविता-
किंकसिद्धस्य, सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य, श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य वेदान्ताचार्यदेशिकमणोराचार्यो मातुल-
श्चआत्रेयरामानुजगुरुः ; यस्यानितरसाधारणं वादाहवकौशलमध्यक्षितवद्विस्तदानीन्तन-
बुधवरैर्वितीर्णं प्रशस्तिनाम ‘वादिहंसाम्बुवाह’ इति ।

आचार्यवर्योऽयं श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनेरन्तरङ्गशिष्यस्य ‘यतीन्द्र माहानसिक’
इति ‘घटाम्बु’ इति च आचार्यदास्यविशेषनाम्ना विश्रुतस्य आत्रेयस्य प्रणतार्तिहरा-
चार्यस्य नसा, रामानुजाचार्यस्य पौत्रः, श्रीपद्मनाभाचार्यस्य पुत्रश्चेति—

‘दुर्मोचोद्धटकर्मकोटिनिबिडोऽप्यादेशवश्यः कृतः
बाह्यैर्नैव विमोहितोऽस्मि कुदृशां पक्षैर्न विक्षोभितः ।
यो माहानसिको महान् यतिपतेर्नीतश्च तत्पौत्रजा-
नाचार्यानिति रङ्गधुर्य ! मयि ते स्वल्पावशिष्टो भूरः, ॥’

इति श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकसूक्त्या अन्यैश्च सम्प्रदायवचनैस्स्फुटमवगम्यते ।

‘नमो रामानुजार्याय वेदान्तार्थप्रदायिने ।

आत्रेयपद्मनाभार्यसुताय गुणशालिने ॥’

इति सम्प्रदायागतं वचनमप्यस्य पद्मनाभार्यः पितेति सुस्पष्टमवबोधयति । अयमाचार्य
एवात्र प्रतिवादमन्ते स्वपितृपादनामधेयं श्रीपद्मनाभार्य इति निर्दिशति ।

‘चैत्रार्द्रासम्भवं काञ्च्यां रङ्गराजगुरोस्तुतम् ।
सुप्रतिष्ठांशमात्रेयं रामानुजगुरुं भजे ॥’

इति सम्प्रतिपन्नवचनान्तरदर्शनादेतत्पितु रङ्गराजार्य इति नामान्तरमप्यस्तीति विज्ञायते ।

गुरुरसौ स्वपितुरात्रेयरङ्गराजाचार्यस्य सकाशान्मन्त्रमन्त्रार्थान्, वात्स्यवरदगुरोस्सकाशाच्छ्रीभाष्यादिकांश्च ग्रन्थानध्यगीष्टेत्यविगीता सम्प्रदायसरणिः ।

सर्वेष्वपि तन्त्रेषु निराबाधं पन्थानमवगन्तुमलङ्कर्मिणोऽसौ स्वाचार्यवरदगुरोरादेशेन प्रियभागिनेयस्य श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य सकलाः कला उपदिश्य तमेतं विंशाब्द एव विश्रुतनानाविधविद्यमकरोत् । अयमर्थः—

‘श्रीमद्भ्यां स्यादसावित्यनुपधि वरदाचार्यरामानुजाभ्यां
सम्यग्दृष्टेन सर्व सह निशितधिया वेङ्कटेशेन क्लृप्तः ।’

इति अधिकरणसारावलीग्रन्थोपक्रमश्लोकेन,

‘श्रुत्वा रामानुजार्यात्सदसदपि ततस्तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापं
व्यातानीद्वेङ्कटेशो वरदगुरुकृपालम्भितोद्दामभूमा ।’

इति तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापप्रारम्भसूक्त्या, मीमांसापादुकोपक्रमगतेन

‘यस्मादस्माभिरेतद्यतिपतिकथितप्राक्तनप्रक्रियोद्य-
त्कर्मब्रह्मावमर्शप्रभवबहुफलं सार्धमग्राहि शास्त्रम् ।
तं विष्वग्भेदविद्यास्थितिपदविषयस्थेयभूतं प्रभूतं
वन्देयात्रेयरामानुजगुरुमनघं वादिहंसाम्बुवाहम् ॥’

इति मङ्गलपद्येन 'विंशत्यब्दे विश्रुतनानाविधविद्य' इति सङ्कल्पसूयोदयवाक्येन च तत्र तत्र स्फुटमवगम्यते ।

अस्य च 'अपिष्ठा' इति भाषाव्यवहारोऽपि जागर्ति । अदसीयं सकलासु कलासु विलक्षणं वैचक्षण्यं साक्षात्कृतवन्तस्तदानीन्तना महान्तः 'श्रीभाष्यकारप्रियशिष्यः 'पिष्ठा' इति प्रसिद्धः कुरुकेशः स एव वासावित्युत्प्रेक्षित । ततः प्रभृतीदं प्रशास्तिनाम आसीदिति तत्त्वविदां साम्प्रदायिको निर्णयः ।

तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहानां प्रभावमेवं वर्णयन्ति साम्प्रदायिकाः । कदाचिच्छ्रीभाष्यकारस्य रामानुजमुनेर्भिक्षावसरे विषसम्भिश्चान्नदानेन तं लोकान्तरं प्रापयितुं केचिच्छठाः प्रायतन्त । तामेतां तेषां प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य ससंभ्रमं श्रीभाष्यकारगुरुवस्तत्र समागताः । शिष्यकोटिभिः परिवृतं रामानुजमुनिं जीवन्तं पश्यन्तोऽमन्दमानन्दमलभन्त । तत्र चासङ्ख्येषु शिष्यजनेषु प्रणतार्तिहरार्यस्य श्रीभाष्यकारशरीरेऽतिशयितं प्रेमातिशयं बहुधा परीक्ष्य तमेतं तस्यान्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्येषु न्ययूयुजन् । ततः प्रभृति श्रीभाष्यकारस्य घटतीर्थाहरणादिकमन्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्यं कुर्वाणोऽयं 'घटाम्बु' इति विरुदमलभत । त एते वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहाः श्रीमत्प्रणतार्तिहराचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकारस्य प्रियशिष्यास्स्वीयेन पाण्डित्यप्रकर्षेण 'वेदान्तोदयन' इति प्रसिद्धिमासादितवन्तो विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायं बहुधा तत्र तत्र प्रवर्तयन्तो व्यराजन्त इति । अत एव श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः—

‘इति यतिराजमहानसपरिमळपरिवाहवासितां पिबत ।

विबुधपरिषन्निषेव्यां वेदान्तोदयनसम्प्रदायसुधाम् ॥’

इति तस्यैतस्य सम्प्रदायस्य यतिराजमहानसपरिमळवासितत्वेन बुधजननिषेव्यतां वर्णयन्ति ।

एतस्यैव चाचार्यवर्यस्यानवधे वंशे कृतावतारासुप्रसिद्धवैभवा गोपालार्थमहादेशिकाः कुम्भघोणे विरचितनिवासाश्रीमतां ज्ञानानुष्ठानवैराग्यशेवधीनां 'साक्षात्स्वामी'

इति जगति विख्यातानां न्यासविद्यादर्पणश्रीतत्त्वसिद्धाञ्जनादिग्रन्थनिर्माणेन विशिष्टाद्वैत-
सिद्धान्तस्य बहूपकृतवतां श्रीमद्वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकानां वरिवस्यया अधिगतसकल-
वेदान्ततत्त्वार्थाः, पाण्डित्यानुष्ठानवैराग्यादिभिराचार्यताप्रयोजकैर्गुणगणैः ‘अपरोऽयं निग-
मान्तमहादेशिकस्यावतारः’ इति तदानीन्तनैर्बुधवरैरुत्प्रेक्षिताः, तत्त्वार्थाधिजिगमिषया
शिष्यवृत्त्या स्वीयं पादमूलमासेदुषां वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकादीनां त्रयाणामुत्तमाश्रमिणां
वेदान्तार्थानुपदिश्य तन्मुखेन विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायमविच्छिन्नमद्य यावत्प्रवर्तितवन्तो, निक्षे-
पचिन्तामण्यादिग्रन्थानां विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तसमर्थनपराणां रचयितारश्च, गुरुपङ्क्तिहार-
यष्टेरनर्घं नायकरत्नमिव विराजन्ते’ । विश्वगुणादर्शादिप्रबन्धनिर्मातारः श्लेषयमकचक्र-
वर्तिनः श्रीवेङ्कटाध्वरिणोऽप्यस्यैवाचार्यमणेशो समजनिषतेति तत्सन्ततिगता वंशावलि-
रवबोधयति ।

भगवतः श्रीभाष्यकारादनन्तरं प्रणतार्तिहराचार्यस्तत्पुत्रपौत्रप्रपौत्राश्चेति चत्वार एते
आत्रेया महानुभावा आचार्यपङ्क्तिमलङ्कुर्वन्तीति नेदं सम्प्रदायज्ञानां पुरस्तादिदम्प्रथम-
मावेदनीयम् । तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य वरदार्यो रङ्गराजार्य इति पुत्रद्वयमासीदिति
तत्सन्ततिसमुद्भवास्समुदाहरन्ति ।

‘न्यायकुलिशादिग्रन्थत्रयकर्तारः’ इति तद्वंशैस्तत्र तत्र पठ्यमानं तदीयं
प्रशस्तिपत्रमावेदयत्यन्यच्च ग्रन्थद्वयं नूनमनेन विरचितमिति । परन्तु किं तद्ग्रन्थद्वयमिति
नाद्य यावन्निश्चेतुं शक्यते । हन्त—महदिदं विषादस्थानम् ! यत् श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसि-
द्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य यद्वहवः प्राचामाचार्याणां वाग्विस्तरा एतर्हि
श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां गमिता इति ।

(१) तानेतानाचार्यानाधिकृत्य श्लोकोऽयमनुसन्धीयते—

यः श्रीशो भुवि वादिहंसजलमुग्वंशोऽवतीर्णोऽखिलान्

श्रीकृष्णाध्वरिदेशिकात्समवितुम् गोपालसूर्यात्मना ।

शिष्यैः सूरिगणैः श्रितः सुविमलैर्वेदान्तरामानुज-

श्रीरङ्गशरमानिवासयतिराण्मुख्यैस्स जीयाद् गुरुः ॥

श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिका: ‘वादिहंसाम्बुवाहाश्शुकवन्मामशिक्षयन्’ इति ‘तैर्मम हृदि लिखितं पत्रे लिखामि’ इति च वर्णयन्तस्स्वीयां निरतिशयां गुरुभक्तिं प्रकाशयन्ति ।

विस्मरणार्हस्य दुरवगाहस्याप्यर्थस्याक्लेशेन शिष्यजनहृदयेषु समुचितैरुदाहरणैर्द्व्यप्रतिष्ठापनेऽस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्यानितरसाधारणं नैपुण्यमासीदिति नेदमविदितं रहस्यत्रयसारादिग्रन्थाध्येतॄणां विदुषाम् । तत्र द्विप्राप्युदाहरणानि प्रदर्शयन्ते—

‘अग्रतः प्रययौ रामस्सीता मध्ये सुमध्यमा

पृष्ठतस्तु धनुष्पाणिर्लक्ष्मणोऽनुजगाम ह ॥

इति श्रीमद्रामायणपद्यमुदाहृत्य श्लोकोऽयं प्रणवस्य यथाक्रमं परतत्त्वपुरुषकारचेतन-प्रतिपादनपरस्यार्थानुसन्धाने सुकर उपायः । तथा अर्जुनरथः पुरतस्सारथिं परमात्मानं पश्चादर्जुनञ्च चेतनं विभ्राणः प्रणवार्थानुसन्धानस्याक्लिष्ट उपाय इति वादिहंसाम्बुवाहोप-देश इति वेदान्तगुरवः । काव्यरसिकता कथमेषामुपयुज्यत इति सहृदयाः परामृशन्तु । तथा ये भगवतः परत्वमात्रमालोच्य सौलभ्यमजानन्तस्तस्माद्दूरीभवितुं प्रयतन्ते, तेभ्यो ‘नराधमाः’ इति गीताचार्यैर्निन्दितेभ्यस्सौलभ्यमात्रवेदिनो ये गोपीवद्विवेकशून्या अपि

(१) இப்படி.....கீழும் மேலுமுள்ள பாசுரங்களெல்லாம் வேதாந்தோதயன ஸம்பிரதாயமான மடப்பள்ளிவார்த்தையை ஆசார்யன் பக்கவிலே தாங்கேட்டருளின்படியே கிடாம்பியப்புள்ளாரடியேனைக் கிளியைப் பழக்குவிக்குமாப்போலே பழக்குவிக்க அவர் திருவுள்ளத் தீவிரக்கமடியாகப் பெருமாள் தெளியப்பிரகாசிப்பித்து மறவாமற்காத்துப் பிழையறப் பேசுவித்த பாசுரங்கள். **ரஹ்ஸ்யத்ரயசாரே.**

வெள்ளைப்பரிமுகர் தேசிகராய் விரகாலடியோம். உள்ளத்தெழுதிய தோலையிலிட்டனம். **ரஹ்ஸ்யத்ரயசாரே—நிगमनाधिकारे.**

(२) இதில் ப்ரதமபதத்தில் அர்த்தங்களை அர்ஜுனரதத்திலும், ‘अग्रतः प्रययौ रामः’ என்ற சுலோகத்திலும் கண்டு கொள்வது.....இதுஅர்த்தாநு ஸந்தானத்திற்குக் குறிப்பாக வப்புள்ளாரருளிச்செய்த விாகு. **ரஹ்ஸ்யத்ரயசாரே—प्रधानप्रतितन्त्राधिकारे.**

சன்தோ ஢கவந்தஸுபஜி஢மிஷந்தி, தோ ஢ரமாஸ்திகா: ஸ்லா஢்யதமா இதி வாதிஹ்ஸாஸ்துபாஹாநாஸுதி-
ரிதி ஜி஢மான்தமா஢ா஢ேஸிகா: ।

ஂதஸ்ய ஢ேஸகாலநிர்ணயஸ்ய ஸிஷ்ய஢்ரஸிஷ்யகரமா஢தஸு஢஢ ஂவ । ததா ஹி—ஂத஢்லா-
஢ிநேயஸ்ய ஸிஷ்யஸ்ய ஑ ஸ்ரீம஢்஢ே஢ான்த஢ேஸிகஸ்ய க்ரேஸ்தவவ்ஷே ஸஸ்தயுத்தர஢்விஸதா஢ிகஸஹஸதமோ
(1270) ஂவி஢ாவ இதி விமர்ஸகானா் நிர்ணய: । ஂத: க்ரேஸ்தவத்ரயோ஢ஸததகேஸ்யா஢ி ஸ்திதி-
ராஸீ஢ிதி நிஸ்த்ரீயதோ । ‘஑ேத்ரா஢்ராஸஸ்தவம் காஸ்த்யாஸ்து’ இத்யா஢ி஢ிவ்஑னே஢்ரஸ்ரீகாஸ்த்ரீக்ஷேத்ரோ வி஑ரம-
வ்ஷேத்ரா஢்ராஸாஸ்யாவி஢ாவ இதி ஸஸ்த்ர஢ாயகரமா஢தோ நிர்ணய: ।

தஸ்யேதஸ்ய ஢்ர஢்லாநி஢ேரா஑ார்யஸ்ய ஸ்வ஢்ரதி஢ா஢்வி஢ாநிஸ்க்ஷே஢ாயமாண் ந்யாயகுலிஸா஢ி஢ாந்
நிவஸ்தநமி஢மேதஸ்த்ரீயஸிஷ்யேண வே஢ான்த஢ுரூணா ந்யாய஢்ரிஸு஢்லதா஢ோ தத்ர தத்ரோ஢ாஹதமாஸ்தோ ।

யதா ந்யாய஢்ரிஸு஢்லாவநுமானா஢்யாயோ காவலவ்யதி்ரேகி஢க்ஷே² ‘ஂக்தஸ்த ந்யாயகுலிஸோ
ஸ்வ஢்ரகாஸவா஢ே ஸ்ரீம஢்஢ாமாநு஑ா஑ார்யே:—‘ந ஑ ஸி஢்லாந்திநோஸ்ய ஢்ரஸ஑்஑: ; காவலவ்யதி்ரேகி஢ா-
மாண்யாநஸ்யு஢஢மாந்’ இதி । ஂவமத்ரேவா஢்யாயோ ஑தூர்தா஢்஢ிகோ ‘஢ாணி஢ா஢ா஢ிஸு ஢்ரத்யேகஸஸு-
஢ாயாஹ்த்வவி஑ர஢ாநு஢்ர஢்ரத்யா஢யஸ்யாஸ்தமா஑ார்யேந்யாயகுலிஸோ ஢்ர஢ஸ்திதா: ஢்ரஸு஢்ரமநுஸந்வேயா:’³
இதி ஑ । ந்யாயஸி஢்லாஸ்த்ரீணோ ஑ு஢்லி஢்ரிஸ்த்ரீ஢ேஸி ‘ஂக்தஸ்த ந்யாயகுலிஸோ । ஸ்யோ஢ஸ்து
஢்ரஸரணவै஢வா஢ி஢்ரதி஢ா஢்ரகஸாஸ்த்வலா஢ாஸ்த்ரித இதி⁴ ।’”

ய஢ேவ யாவ஢ேவ ஸ்ரீமந்ரி஢மான்த஢ுரூணா க஑ித்க஑ி஢ு஢ாஹதவாக்யஸகலம் த஢தி்ரித்க்
கித்ய஢ி ஑ காவலமஸ்தமா஑் வ்யாஸ்த்யாந்ரூணாமி ஢ூர்வ்ஷா் ஢்ரஸ்திவிஷய஢ூத் நாஸீ஢ித்யந்தமாமி காலஸ்து ।

(1) இவ்வி஢்லத்திஸ்தில் ஸர்வோஸவரணு஢ைய ஢்ரத்வமாத்தி்ரத்தோ
யதி்ர்தகலு஑ைகயாலோ நராத்தமாநேந்நு ஢ேர்஢ே஢்ர ஢ி்ரந்து கெ஢்லாநி்ர
கா஢்லில் இ஢ைஸ்க்ஸிகளோ஢் ஢ோலோ விவோகமில்லையோகிலும்த ளோஸலப்
யத்தையதி்ர்து ஂந்ரலனு஢ையோருவ்லோ நனுருகுவலனோ ஢்ரமாஸ்தி
கலனேந்ர஢்ர஑்ளாரருளிஸ்க்ஸெய்யும்த ஢ாகரம்த. ரஹ்யத்ரயஸாரோ—஢்ரி஑்ரவி஢ா஢ா஢ிகாரோ.

(2) ந்யாய஢்ரி P. 66

(3) ,, P. 185

(4) ந்யாயஸி஢்லா. P. 269.

अत इदं निबन्धनं नाममात्रशेषमासीदिति मन्यमानानां विद्याव्यसनिनां दुनोति स्म मानसम् । तदिदानीं 'यदा मृतस्य संप्राप्तिः' इत्युक्तरीत्या लब्धप्रचारमस्माकं परमं प्रीणयति मनः । अत्र न केवलं विशिष्टाद्वैतिनां, सर्वेषामपि वैदिकमतस्थानामुपजीव्यास्सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनस्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्णनादयो बहवो विषया उपलभ्यन्ते ।

एतद्ग्रन्थस्यातीव दुरवगाहत्वं समुचितोपकारविशेषश्च प्रबन्धादौ ग्रन्थकृतैव प्रतिपाद्यते । यथा—

‘अभेद्यं सर्वेषां हतकुमतिगोत्रप्रसरणं
यतीन्द्रादेशैकप्रवणसुमनस्त्राणनिपुणम् ।
कठोरेष्वात्रेयान्वयतिलकरामानुजकृतं
कथायुद्धेष्वाविष्कुरुत निशितं न्यायकुलिशम्’ ॥

इति । अतोऽत्र दुर्ग्रहाणां वादार्थानां सर्वेषां सुग्रहत्वाय वादार्थसारस्सङ्गृह्यते । अस्मिन्निबन्धने संहृत्य त्रयोदश वादाः ।

तत्र प्रथमे सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादे वेदान्तवाक्यानां सिद्धे ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव व्युत्पत्तिं वदन् प्राभाकरो व्युदस्यते ।

स ह्येवमनुते—सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिर्न भवितुमर्हति । शिक्षको जनः पित्रादिः कञ्चित्कालं अङ्गुलिनिर्देशपूर्वकं तत्तच्छब्दांस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुङ्क्ते । चेष्टापरिज्ञानवान् व्युत्पत्तिसुर्व्युत्पादकानां प्रवृत्तिं व्युत्पादनार्थो जानाति । ततश्चेष्टामन्तरेण केवलशब्देनापि स्वस्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दार्थयोस्संबन्धान्तरादर्शनात्परिशेषाद्बोध्यबोधकभावसम्बन्धेनैव अयं शब्द इममर्थं बोधयति' इति व्युत्पद्यत इति हि सिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या । सा तु न सङ्गच्छते । अङ्गुलिनिर्देशस्थले शब्दोऽर्थवद्बोध्यकोटौ निविशते ? उत निर्देशवद्बोधककोटौ ? इति विशये, निर्देशस्य बोधकताया उभयसम्प्रतिपन्नत्वात्तेनैव प्रतिपन्ने वस्तुनि शब्दस्याप्युपायत्वकल्पने प्रयोजनाभावादर्थवद्बोध्य एव शब्दः, न तु बोधक इति निर्णीयते ।

किञ्चाङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन प्रत्येकपदार्थव्युत्पादने शब्दानां प्रत्येकमर्थेषु सङ्गतिग्रहा-
दितरान्वितार्थ एव शक्तिरिति सिद्धान्तोऽपि विरुद्धयेत । अतो 'गामानय' इत्यादिवृद्ध-
व्यवहारेण व्युत्पत्तिबीजभूतेन कार्यान्वित एव शक्तिग्रहात्सिद्धान्तार्थे शक्तिर्नास्तीति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—व्युत्पादकस्य प्रयोजनाभिसन्धिनैव चेष्टया सह शब्दप्रयोगः ।
तत्रार्थस्य बोध्यत्वे हानोपादानादिरूपं प्रयोजनमस्ति । शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वे तन्नास्ति ।
अतश्शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वं न युक्तम् । यथा व्युत्पादनाय पर्यायशब्दप्रयोगो लोके दृश्यते, तथा
प्रकृते द्वयोर्बोधकत्वेऽपि सह प्रयोग उपपद्यते ।

अन्विताभिधानस्यापि न विरोधः । प्रथममर्थस्याभिधानं नास्ति । अपि तु
प्रत्येकमर्थानां स्मरणमात्रम् । अथ आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिपरामर्शः । अनन्तरमेव संहतानां
पदानां परस्परस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकत्वम् । यथा—सिद्धपरत्वे विशेष्यपदं विशेष-
णपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायि, विशेषणपदं विशेष्यपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभि-
धायि ; एवं कार्यपरत्वे कारकपदं क्रियान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकम्, क्रियापदं कारका-
न्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकमिति विभाग इति—

इति सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादः ॥

अथ स्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्णनवादे द्वितीये वेदस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं कुमारिल-
मतानुसारेण ज्ञानानां स्वतःप्रामाण्यं निर्णयते । अत्र मुख्यः पूर्वपक्षी नैयायिकः ।
अस्यायमाशयः—

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणाधीनं प्रामाण्यं दोषाधीनमप्रामाण्यञ्च संवादिविसंवादिप्रवृ-
त्तिभ्यामनुमीयते इति न तयोरुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ वा स्वतस्त्वम् । विषयप्रकाशकत्वं परं
स्वभावः । तत्तु शिशुपापलाशादिषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणयोः साधारणम् । शिशुपात्व-

पलाशत्वादिवत् प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्येऽसाधारणे । शिशुपायां पलाशत्वस्य, पलाशे शिशुपा-
त्वस्य च निवृत्तावपि वृक्षत्वानिवृत्त्या यथा शिशुपात्वाद्यपेक्षया वृक्षत्वमतिरिक्तसामान्य-
धर्मस्तद्वदेव प्रमाणज्ञानेऽप्रामाण्यस्य, अप्रमाणज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य च, निवृत्तावप्यर्थपरि-
च्छेदकत्वरूपस्य ज्ञानत्वस्यानिवृत्तेरनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यात् केवलार्थप्रका-
शकत्वरूपं ज्ञानत्वमतिरिक्तं सामान्यधर्म इति निश्चीयते । प्रामाण्यनिश्चयश्च गुणज्ञानात्,
संवादज्ञानात्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वज्ञानाद्वा ; न तु स्वतः । अप्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्तु दोष-
ज्ञानात् । स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिमते प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवसायात्मकज्ञानग्राहकेणानुमानेनैव
व्यवसायवद्धानाङ्गीकारेण प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात् ; व्यवसायनिश्चयस्यैव प्रामाण्यनिश्चय-
रूपत्वात् । वेदस्थलेऽपि गुणात्प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तिः । अप्रामाण्यहेतोर्वक्तृदोषस्याभावान्ना-
प्रामाण्यं शङ्कास्पदमपि । अतः प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना, कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशे-
षत्वात् ; अप्रमावत् इति ॥

राद्धान्तस्तु—ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव, न तु गुणात् । तथा हि—विशे-
षणविशेष्यतदुभयसम्बन्धात्मकं यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च ‘ अयं
घटः ’ इति प्रमास्थल इव ‘ इदं रजतम् ’ इति भ्रमस्थलेऽपीदमाद्यंशे वर्तते । अतो वद्देर्दा-
हकत्वमिव स्वाभाविकं तत् । ईदृशं प्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानत्वम् ; न त्वतिरिक्तम् । अतिरि-
क्तत्वेऽपि ज्ञानसामान्यवृत्त्येव प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकम् । यथा गोसामान्यवृत्त्येव सास्ना-
पुच्छकर्णशृङ्गादिसंस्थानं गोत्वव्यञ्जकम् ; यथा वैतेषामन्यतमापायेऽपि शेषं संस्थानं
गोत्वं व्यञ्जयति, तथा भ्रमस्थले विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्संसर्गाभावेऽपि शेषांशेन ज्ञानत्वव्यक्तौ
न दोषः । अतो ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रामाण्यस्य गोत्वव्यञ्जकसंस्थानस्येव साधारणत्व-
मुपपद्यते । प्रामाण्ये ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकताया अनभ्युपगमे ज्ञानत्व एव मानाभावः । निस्स्व-
भावत्वं ज्ञानस्य प्रसज्येत ।

शिशुपापलाशादिविशेषेषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणं ज्ञानत्वम् । तदवान्तर-
धर्मौ प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे इति वक्तुं न शक्यते । दृष्टान्ते हि शाखास्कन्धादिसामान्य-
रूपं तत्तदसाधारणं पर्णस्पर्शादिभेदवत्त्वञ्चेति रूपद्वयमुपलभ्यते । तत्र सामान्यरूपेण

शाखादिना वृक्षत्वं, असाधारणरूपेण पर्णादिना शिशुपात्वादिकञ्चाभिव्यज्यताम् । ज्ञाने तु ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकसामान्याकारातिरेकेण प्रमाणत्वव्यञ्जकाकारविशेषो नोपलभ्यते । अतो ज्ञानत्वप्रमाणत्वयोस्सामान्यविशेषरूपत्वं नाभ्युपगन्तुं क्षमम् ।

प्रामाण्यग्रहोऽपि न गुणज्ञानादिना । अपि तु स्वत एव । ज्ञानेन हि विषये ज्ञातताख्यो धर्म उत्पाद्यते । स एवार्थप्रकाश इत्युच्यते । तज्जनकत्वमेव ज्ञानस्यार्थ-प्रकाशकत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यम् । अनया कार्यभूतया ज्ञाततया कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । ज्ञातताल्लिङ्गकानुमानेनैव व्यवसायगतप्रामाण्यस्यापि ग्रहः । व्यवसायविषयकज्ञानग्राह्य-त्वमेव स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य । एवमपि प्रामाण्यसंशयस्य न विरोधः । प्रामाण्यस्य ह्यपवादोऽप्रामाण्यम् । तच्छङ्कया प्रामाण्यसंशयः । अपवादशङ्काकलङ्करहितमेव प्रामाण्य-ज्ञानं प्रामाण्यसंशयविरोधि ; न तु प्रामाण्यज्ञानमात्रम् । अप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते चोत्सर्गिकं प्रामाण्यमवतिष्ठते ; यथा बीजस्याङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यं स्वाभाविकं निश्चितमप्यग्निसंसर्गा-दिदोषसंशयात्संशयविषयो भवति ; दोषसंशये निरस्ते च स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यनि-श्चयः । नैतावता बीजस्य अङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वमपैति ; तद्वदिहापि । अत उदाहृतमनुमानं हेत्वसिद्ध्यादिदोषग्रस्तमिति ॥

इति स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ॥

अथ तृतीये ख्यातिनिरूपणवादे तार्किकाभिमतान्यथाख्यातिः परमसिद्धान्त-भूतयथार्थख्यातिश्च समर्थ्यते । पूर्वपक्षिणो गुरुमतानुसारिणः, अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादि-नोऽद्वैतिनश्च । तत्र गुरुमतानुसारिणामयमाशयः—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमन्यथा-ख्यातिरिति न वक्तुं शक्यते ; तत्र रजतेन सहेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावात् । किन्तु इदमिति पुरोवर्तिविषयकानुभवः । रजतमिति च पूर्वानुभूतरजतविषयकस्मृतिमात्रम् । स्मृतित्वे देशान्तरोल्लेखेन तत्र रजतमिति हि ज्ञानाकारेण भवितव्यमिति नाशङ्कनीयम् : दोषव-

शब्देशान्तरानुल्लेखोपपत्तेः । रजतत्वस्य पुरोवर्तिभास्वरद्रव्यनिष्ठतया भानाभावेऽपि स्मर्यमाणरजतभेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरिति । अत्रान्यथाख्यातिवादिनः—

‘वादिनां विमतेर्बाधाव्यवहारोऽस्मोक्तिः ।

स्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिः प्रसिद्धा नापनीयताम् ॥’

इति वदन्ति । तथा हि—१. कश्चित् शब्दो नित्य इति वदति, अन्यश्च अनित्य इति । तयोरन्यतरोऽन्यथा गृह्णातीति वक्तव्यम् । तत्रापि ज्ञानद्वयाभ्युपगमेऽधिकरणभेदेन नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोर्विरोधाभावाद्धिवादविलयप्रसङ्गः । अतो वादिनां विवादकार्यकारणतयान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

२. एवं इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिकां रजतमित्यध्यस्य समनन्तरं स एव सम्पन्नपरिशुद्ध-सामग्रीको नेदं रजतमिति जानाति । तत्र नेदं रजतमिति बाधकज्ञानमन्यथाख्यातिरूप-शुक्तिकारजतज्ञानस्य बाध्यस्याभावे न बाधकं भवति । तस्माद्बाध्यबाधकाभावान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

३. एवं व्यवहारात्—स च व्यवहारो भेदाग्रहे स्वरूपज्ञानमात्रेण न भवितुमर्हति । नेयं शुक्तिरिति शुक्तिस्फुरणदशायामपि शुक्तिभेदाग्रहस्य स्वरूपज्ञानस्य चाङ्गीकार्यत्वात् । तत्र शुक्तौ शुक्तिभेदग्रहेऽन्यथाख्यातिस्वीकारापत्तेः । अतश्शुक्तिभेदाग्रहात् नेयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानदशायामपि शुक्तिव्यवहारोदयप्रसङ्गः । अतो व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

४. एवं भ्रान्तिशब्दो ज्ञानविशेषगोचरो भेदाग्रहेऽभावरूपे न भवति । अन्यथा सुषुप्तावपि भ्रान्तिशब्दः प्रयुज्येत । मिथ्याज्ञानं भ्रान्तिरिति च पर्यायौ । अतोऽप्यन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः ।

५. स्वारस्याच्च—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति मे मतिरासीदिति विशिष्टज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमवसीयते । नत्वसंसर्गो नानुभूत इति । असंसर्गाग्रहपक्षे तथैव किल ज्ञानाकारेण भाव्यम् । तस्माल्लोकप्रमितिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति ।

अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादिनस्त्वेवमाहुः । स्वयंप्रकाशा ज्ञप्तिरेव परमार्थः । तस्या निर्धर्मकत्वादर्थेन सह विषयविषयिभावो नोपपद्यते । अर्थश्च सदसदनिर्वचनीयः । असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत, सच्चेन्न बाध्येत । अतः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनिर्वचनीयत्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वमर्थस्य । ज्ञानज्ञेययोरेध्यासाधिकरणत्वव्यतिरेकेण न सम्बन्धः कश्चिदपीति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्यानुभवत्वस्मृतित्वादिधर्माणामुपलब्धेर्ज्ञानं न निर्धर्मकम् । अतो विषयविषयिभावोपपत्तिः । प्रतीत्या सत्त्वं बाधेनासत्त्वञ्चेति संभवात्, नार्थस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वसिद्धिः । अर्थस्य पारमार्थ्यं विना रूपान्तरं नास्ति । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वम् । विश्वमपि पञ्चीकृतभूतारब्धम् । अतः सर्वत्र सर्वं यथासंभवं विद्यते । शुक्तावपि रजतांशो मनाविद्यते । शुक्तयंशस्तु तत्र भूयान् । तत्र शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्येन ग्रहः । नेदं रजतमिति तु शुक्तिभूयस्त्वसाकल्येन ग्रहः । तत्र नेदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्वे गृहीते, इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यज्ञानेन जायमाना प्रवृत्तिर्बाध्यते । बाध्यप्रवृत्तिकत्वमेव इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानस्य नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानेन बाध्यत्वं नाम । तस्मात्सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमिति ।

इति ख्यातिनिरूपणवादस्तृतीयः ॥

चतुर्थे स्वयंप्रकाशवादे भाट्टपुरारिमिश्रनैयायिकानां मतं निरस्य ज्ञानानां स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं समर्थ्यते । तत्र भाट्टाः—ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियम् । अयं घट इति ज्ञानेन विषये घटे ज्ञातताख्यः कश्चिद्धर्म उत्पाद्यते । स एव प्रकाश इत्युच्यते । तेन कार्यभूतेन प्रकाशेन कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । अतो ज्ञातताल्लिङ्गकानुमितिगम्यत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य न स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति वदन्ति ।

मिश्रादीनामयमाशयः—यथा वा चक्षुशक्तिविशेषाच्चाक्षुषज्ञाने विशेषमभ्युपेत्य रूपादावेव ज्ञातताख्यधर्मश्चाक्षुषज्ञानेनोत्पाद्यत इत्युच्यते ; न तु सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवा-

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

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श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ नारायणार्यैः अनुगृहीता नीतिमाला ॥

॥ प्रथमो वादः ॥

वस्त्वाविरस्तु पद्माक्षं मम श्रीधरमच्युतम् ।

अबुद्धयधीनसन्दर्भभारतीमूर्धभूषणम् ॥

उन्मीलयन्ति चैतन्यचक्षुर्येऽहेतुकं मम ।

हृदि १सन्निदधीरस्ते गुरवः करुणाश्रयाः ॥

वेलां लीलाविभूतिं प्रबलमितिशिलाराशिभिः पूर्वकलप्तां

ब्रह्माम्भोधेर्विषाणैः कुनयकुलमयैर्भेतुमुद्युञ्जते ये ।

तान्वादीभान्सुतीक्ष्णैर्नयकुलकरजैः पाटयलक्ष्मणार्यः २

पञ्चास्यो रङ्गधामक्षितिधरनिलयो मङ्गलं मे विधत्ताम् ॥

मुनीन्द्रपारिजातोत्थसुनीतिकुसुमैरहम् ।

मालां ग्रथ्नामि रङ्गेशवरिवस्या ३विधित्सया ॥

पौर्वापर्यस्य नियमः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः ।

तथा वेदान्तवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यनिराक्रिया ॥

१. सन्निदधुस्ते मे—पा०.

२. लक्ष्मणार्यः—पा०.

३. परिचर्या—पा०.

नीतिमालाया

विवर्तपक्षक्षपणं परिणामनिराकृतिः ।

शक्तिविक्षेपभङ्गश्च ब्रह्मणो निर्णयस्तथा ॥

निर्णयः पुरुषस्यापि विधिरूपविनिर्णयः ।

मोक्षसाधननिर्णीतिर्मोक्षस्य च विनिर्णयः ॥

१८शार्थानधिकृत्येयं **नीतिमाला** प्रवर्तते ।

दोषानत्र तिरस्कृत्य गृह्यन्तां सूत्रिभिर्गुणाः ॥

ब्रह्मभागविचारस्य कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं सूत्रितम्—‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति ।

तत्र केचिदाहुः—

त्रय्यन्तार्थविचारस्तु तदध्ययनपूर्वकः ।

तदधीनात्मलाभत्वात्त्रयीवाक्यविचारवत् ।

अनधीतवेदस्य विचारानुपपत्तेर्धर्मजिज्ञासाया वेदाध्ययनपूर्वकत्वं यथा, तथा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अपि वेदान्ताध्ययनपूर्वकत्वमेव युक्तम् । अथाध्ययनक्रमानुरोधेन कर्मभागविचारानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मभागविचारस्योच्यते, तदयुक्तम् ; भिन्नाधिकारत्वात्कर्मब्रह्मभागयोः । स्वर्गादिसाधनभूतयागादिकर्मप्रतिपाद्य(दः)कस्त्रयीभागो बुभुक्षाधिकारः । परब्रह्मतत्प्राप्तितदुपायभूततदुपासनविषयो वेदान्तभागो मुमुक्षाधिकारः । अतो मुमुक्षुभिर्वेदान्ताध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः ।

यद्यप्युद्गीथादीनां कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय^२ (कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय ?) उपासनचिन्तायाः शारीरके क्रियमाणायाः कर्मविचारोऽपेक्षितः, तथापि तेषामुपासनानां वीर्यवत्तरत्वादिकलत्वाद्ब्रह्मविचारं कृत्वापि क्रियमाणः कर्मविचारो न विरोधमावहेत् ।

ननु चार्थज्ञानपर्यन्तमध्ययनं विदधतो विषेर्बलेन मुमुक्षुणापि प्रथमं कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यत्वात्तदानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यावर्जनीयमापतेत् । नैवम्; अक्षरग्रहणमात्रपर्यवसानादध्ययन-

१. दर्शनार्थानिमान्वक्तुम्—पा०.

२. कर्माङ्गित्वादिविचाराय—पा०.

विधेः । तथाहि—अध्ययनानन्तरभावित्वादक्षरग्रहणस्य तदेव तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति, न त्वनेन व्यवहितमर्थज्ञानम् । अक्षरग्रहणस्याप्यपुरुषार्थत्वादनुद्देश्यत्वमुच्यमानमर्थज्ञानस्यापि समानम् । नन्वर्थज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेणापुरुषार्थत्वेऽपि स्वर्गादिपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वं सम्भवतीति चेन्न ; अनुष्ठानसाध्यत्वात्स्वर्गादिः । अथानुष्ठानमर्थज्ञानस्यावान्तरव्यापार इति मतम् , तथासत्यध्ययनानन्तरभाविनोऽक्षरग्रहणस्य स्वर्गादिसाधनतयोद्देश्यत्वमुपपन्नमिति तदुत्तरकालभाविनी १ अर्थज्ञानानुष्ठाने २ तस्यावान्तरव्यापारतामनुभवत इति सन्तोष्यम् ।

गृहीतस्वाध्याये पुरुषेऽधीतवेदत्वप्रसिद्धेश्चाक्षरग्रहणफलमध्ययनम् । अधीतवेदो हि श्रोत्रियः । न हि गृहीतस्वाध्यायमश्रुतमीमांसं श्रोत्रिय इति न वदन्ति । व्यापकत्वाच्चाक्षरग्रहणमेव फलमध्ययनस्य । नह्यध्ययनसंस्कृतानि वेदवाक्यानि न ग्रहणगोचरतां भजन्ते । अध्ययनकर्मत्वमपि स्वाध्यायस्येप्सिततमत्वात् स्वशक्त्या धर्मार्थकामादिपुरुषार्थतत्साधनावबोधित्वात् स्वरूपेण जपपारायणादिनाभीष्टसाधनत्वाच्च । एवमाकारभेदेनोभयार्थत्वाद्विनियुक्तविनियोगदोषो न स्यात् ; यथाग्नेर्दाहभासमानत्वयोः ।

ननु अर्थज्ञानस्यावैधत्वे स्वाध्यायाध्ययनानन्तर्यं मीमांसाया न स्यात् ; 'अधीत्य स्नायात्' इति स्मृतिप्राप्तेन स्नानेन प्रस्तावसरत्वात् । अतोऽर्थविचारस्याध्ययनानन्तर्यसिद्धये तत्कालोपनिपातिस्नानबाधार्थमनिच्छतोऽपि वैधत्वमङ्गीकरणीयमापद्येत ।

नैवम् ; अर्थविचारस्य रागप्राप्तत्वादेव न तावद्वैधत्वम् । स्नानस्मृतिस्तु न विचारं बाधितुं क्षमते ; रागबलाद् गुरुगृहान्निवृत्तेन कर्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अतः प्राक्तनीं स्थितिमुपजीव्य ३ विचारः प्रवर्तिष्यते । अध्ययनस्य समाप्तत्वात्सकलब्रह्मचारिवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः स्नातकस्य भवति । उत्तरकतुविधयोऽप्यविद्वत्त्वतया नैनमास्कन्दन्ति ।

अथवा अधीत्येत्यत्र तत्त्वाप्रत्ययस्य पूर्वकालतामात्रविहितत्वात् स्नानस्मृतिविचारयोर्निविरोधः । अथवा अध्ययनार्थविचारयोरानन्तर्यनियमो नास्माकमवश्यम्भावी । अधीतवेदत्वमेव हि

१—२. द्विवचनान्ते इमे—पदे.

३. विचारे—पा०.

विचारस्यापेक्षितम् । तदध्ययनस्य पूर्वभावित्वमात्रेणापि सिद्धयतीति स्मृत्यनुसारेण स्नात्वापि विचारयिष्यति ।

ननु च 'स्नातकस्सदृशीं भार्यां विन्देत्' इति स्नानोत्तरकालस्य दारसङ्ग्रहणावरुद्धत्वात्तत्रापि न विचारः कर्तुं शक्यते । तर्हि कृतदारो विचारयिष्यति, तदा ह्यर्थार्जनवदर्थ-विचारोऽप्यहरहः क्रियमाणो न विरोधमावहेत् । अनर्थकानां हुम्फडित्यादिवाक्यानामध्ययन-स्यार्थज्ञानप्रयोजनत्वाभावाददृष्टफलत्वमक्षरग्रहणफलत्वं वाभ्युपेयं स्यात् । तदा विधिवैरूप्यं भवति । किञ्च सत्रबृहस्पतिसवादिषु क्षत्रियवैश्ययोरनधिकारात्तत्प्रतिपादकस्य वेदभागस्या-ध्ययनं वाक्षरग्रहणादिफलत्वं (ध्ययनमदृष्टफलमक्षरग्रहणादिफलं ?) वा स्यात् । न चाविधेय-त्वेऽर्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनस्स्यादिति वक्तुं शक्यम् ; अन्यनिबन्धनत्वादर्थविचारस्य । विधिरपि पुरुषार्थमविरोधयन्नेव^१ प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्भवति । इहापि साङ्गाध्ययनेन वेदवाक्येभ्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थ-नामापाततः प्रतीतेस्तन्निर्णयफले विचारे पुरुषः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते । अतः साङ्गाध्ययनादेवाक्षर-ग्रहणफलात्प्रयोजनवदर्थवबोधकामनाद्वारेणार्थविचारे प्रवृत्तेर्नार्थविचारो निर्निबन्धनः । अर्थ-ज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वेऽपि स्वाध्यायस्यार्थपरत्वं स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायसिद्धम् । अतो मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मवि-चारेऽध्ययनविधेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वेन मुमुक्षुणा अध्ययनानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति कर्मविचारा-नन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्य न युक्तमिति ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—

यज्ञादीनां तु विद्याया उत्पत्तौ विनियोगतः ।

तेषामकरणे दोषबाहुल्यश्रवणादपि ॥

पूर्वकाण्डोदितन्यायसापेक्षत्वस्य दर्शनात् ।

विचारः कर्मणां हेतुर्ब्रह्मभागविचारणं ॥

यदुक्तमध्ययनविधेरक्षरग्रहणपर्यवसानान्न तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचारः, साङ्गाध्ययनादेव प्रयोजन-वदर्थानामापातप्रतीतेस्तन्निबन्धनोऽर्थविचार इति ; तत्सुष्ठूक्तम् ।

यत्तु कर्मज्ञानभागयोर्भिन्नधिकारत्वान्मुमुक्षोर्न कर्मविचारापेक्षेति ; तदपेशलम् ; 'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन' इत्यादिभिर्यज्ञादीनां साधनत्वेन विद्योत्पत्तौ विनियोगात् । विविदिषन्ताति वचनाद्विविदिषायां यज्ञादीनामुपयोगः न विद्योत्पत्ताविति चेन्न ; विविदिषायास्साध्यत्वस्यैवासम्भवात् । पुरुषार्थस्तत्साधनं वा साध्यम् । न तावद्विविदिषा पुरुषार्थः ; नापि तत्साधनम् ; 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इति विद्याया एव पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वश्रवणात् । अत एव विविदिषा अर्थसिद्धेति न सा पुरुषव्यापारेण साध्या । विविदिषन्तीति व्यपदेशस्तु अश्वेन जिगमिषतीतिवत् द्रष्टव्यः ॥

ननु वेदनस्य वा कथं कर्मसाध्यत्वम् ? तदपि प्रमाणाधीनम् । तत् स्वसामग्रीभूताद्वेदान्तवाक्याज्जायत इति किमिति कर्माण्यपेक्षते । तेषां वा कथं प्रमाणसामग्रीत्वम् ? उच्यते—नास्माभिर्वाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं यज्ञादिसाध्यमुच्यते । अपि तु उपासनात्मकं ज्ञानम् । तत्तु फलाभिसन्धिरहितैः परमपुरुषाराधनभूतैः कर्मभिः परिशुद्धान्तःकरणस्य जायत इति युक्तं तस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वम् ।

ननु अस्तुपासनस्य यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वात्तस्य तदपेक्षित्वम् ; कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः कथं पौर्वापर्यनियमः ? उच्यते—ब्रह्मस्वरूपतदुपासनतत्फलानि त्रीण्यपि शारीरके चिन्त्यन्ते । तत्रोपासनविचारवत्तदुपायभूतकर्मविचारोऽप्यपेक्षितत्वात्कर्तव्य एव । कर्मविचारस्य कर्तव्यतायां सत्यां कर्मणां साधनत्वात्तद्विचारस्यैव प्राथम्यमुचितम् । अनिर्णीते साधने साध्यनिर्णयानुपपत्तेः । अत एव पूर्वकाण्डे स्वर्गादिफलचिन्तायाः प्रागेव साधनभूतयागादिचिन्ता क्रियते । अतः कर्मब्रह्मभागविचारयोः पौर्वापर्यमुपपन्नम् ।

किञ्च नित्यनैमित्तिकानां कर्मणामकरणे प्रत्यङ्गायबाहुळ्यं श्रुतिभिरुद्घुष्यते । अतो मुमुक्षुरपि कर्मविचारे प्रथमं प्रयतते । अनर्थं परिहृत्यैव ह्यभ्युदये यतितव्यम् ।

अपि च सद्विद्यादहरविद्यादीनां भेदाभेदनिर्णयः कर्मभेदाभेदनिर्णयहेतुभिर्न्यायैः शारीरके क्रियते । उक्तञ्च भगवता **बादरायणेन**—'हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्द-

१. तदपि प्रमाणज्ञानम्—पा०.

२. अननुष्ठिते—पा०.

स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम्^१ 'प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम्^२' इत्यादि । अतः कर्मविचारस्यैव पूर्ववृत्तत्वं युक्तम् ।

केचिदाहुः—

अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमविद्याविनिवर्तकम् ।
 श्रूयते तस्य चोत्पत्तौ समाधिः कारणं श्रुतौ ॥
 औचित्याच्च विरुद्धत्वाच्छमादेः कर्मणामपि ।
 शमाद्यनन्तरं कर्तुं युक्तं ब्रह्मविचारणम् ॥

'एकधैवानुदृष्टव्यम्' 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिभिरद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गसाधनतया श्रुतम् । तस्य 'शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुस्समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' इति शमादीनां साधनत्वं च श्रुतम् । यज्ञादिकर्मणां साधनत्वश्रवणेऽपि करणेतिकर्तव्यताद्यनेकभेदगर्भत्वेनाद्वितीयत्वज्ञानं प्रति तेषां साधनभावो नोपपद्यते । शमादीनां तु सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारोपरतिरूपाणां साधनत्वमुपपन्नम् । तस्माच्छमाद्यानन्तर्यं ब्रह्मविचारस्यौचित्यादु(द्यु?)क्तम् ।

उच्यते—

दिव्यदेहविभूत्यादिविशिष्टब्रह्मवेदनम् ।
 साधनं त्वपवर्गस्य बह्वीषु श्रुतिषु श्रुतम् ॥
 तृतीयाश्रुतिसामर्थ्यात्तस्य कर्मादि साधनम् ।
 शमादयः परिकरा विरोधो न च विद्यते ॥

यदुक्तम्—अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गस्य साधनमिति । तत्राद्वितीयत्वं विवेचनीयम् । यदि निर्विशेषत्वमद्वितीयत्वम्, तत्सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धम् । अथ अनेकगुणविभूतिविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वम्, तदभिमतमेव । तथाविधस्य ब्रह्मणो वेदनमपवर्गसाधनतया अग्रायते च—'य एषो-

१. अ. सू. ३. ३. २६.

२. अ. सू. ३. ३. ४२.

ऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषः दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश आप्रणखात्सर्व एव सुवर्णस्तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी तस्योदिति नाम स एष सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्य उदितः । उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्यो य एवं वेद', 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारश्च मत्वा', 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारश्च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' इत्यादिभिः । स्मर्यते च—

प्रशासितारं सर्वेषामणीयांसमणीयसाम् ।

रुक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम् ॥

इति । एवं तर्हि 'एकधैवानुद्वष्टव्यम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेरर्थो वर्णनीयः । न वयं व्याख्यातारः । व्याख्यातश्च भगवता भाष्यकारेण । तत्रैवानुसन्धध्वम् । एवंविधं ब्रह्मणो वेदनं कर्मानुष्ठानसाध्यमुक्तम् ।

यत्तु शमादीनां वेदनसाधनत्वं 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादि श्रुतिसिद्धमिति; तदपि न । 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इति तृतीयया श्रुत्या यज्ञादेः साधनत्वेन विनियोगात् 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादिवचनं शमादीनामनुग्राहकत्वाभिप्रायम् । व्यापारसाध्यानां कर्मणां तदुपरतिरूपाणां शमादीनाञ्च विरोधादेककार्यान्वयो न सम्भवतीत्येतदपि नास्ति ; विषयभेदात् । विद्यासाधनभूतकर्मविषयो व्यापारः । अविहिताप्रतिषिद्धकाम्यनिषिद्धकर्मविषयाः शमादय इति । तदेवं कर्मसापेक्षत्वाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य कर्मविचारानन्तरं ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रितम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां ब्रह्मविचारस्य

कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारः प्रथमः ॥

श्रोः

नीतिमालायां द्वितीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.

वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यमसहमानाः केचिदाहुः—

सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षं शब्दादर्थविवोधेनम् ।

तच्च कार्यार्थ एवेति न शास्त्रं ब्रह्मगोचरम् ॥

शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धमजानतः पुरुषस्य शब्दो नार्थप्रत्ययहेतुर्भवति । सम्बन्धश्च वृद्धव्यवहारत एव ग्रहीतव्यः । व्यवहारश्च कार्यैकगोचरः । तथा हि—गामानयेत्यादि-प्रयोजकवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमानं प्रयोज्यमुपलभ्य पार्श्वस्थो व्युत्पत्तिगुणमवधारयति, अहं कार्यावगतिसमनन्तरं सर्वथा(दा?) प्रवर्ते । अस्याप्येतद्वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवर्तमान-त्वादिह(दिदं?) वाक्यमस्य कार्यज्ञानबुद्धिमुत्पादयतीति । पुनर्गवानयनदर्शनात्कार्यविशेषं निश्चि-नोति । पुनरपि गां बधानेत्यादिप्रयोगभेदात्पदानामावापोद्वापवशेनावयवार्थमवगच्छति । एवं कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेर्न सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

न च 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादि वाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं मुखविकासदिलिङ्गेन पुत्रजन्मा-द्यर्थनिश्चयसम्भवात्कार्यार्थ एव सम्बन्धग्रहणमिति नियमो नास्तीति वाच्यम् ; तत्रापि सुखप्रसवाद्यर्थानां हर्षहेतूनां बहूनां सम्भवाद्धर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वायोगान्मुखविकासादेः । एवं कार्यार्थ एव व्युत्पत्तेस्सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धरूपे ब्रह्मणि न वेदान्त-वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमिति ।

अत्राभिधीयते—

सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं भवेत् ।

तस्मात्कार्यार्थ एवेति निर्वन्धो निर्निबन्धनः ॥

‘पुत्रस्ते जातः’ इत्यादि सिद्धार्थेष्वपि वाक्येषु सम्बन्धग्रहणं दृश्यत एव । यदुक्तं मुखविकासादिलिङ्गस्य हर्षहेतुविशेषनिश्चयहेतुत्वं न सम्भवतीति । तन्न ; एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुत्रजन्मसाक्षात्कारेण तदसाधारणोत्सवत्व(त्सव ?)लिङ्गेन वा पुत्रजन्मविशेषनिश्चयसम्भवात् । साधारणतयावगतस्य हर्षहेतुविकासस्य पुत्रजन्मविशेषपर्यवसानसम्भवे सति अनिर्धारित-हेत्वन्तरविषयत्वशङ्कानुपपत्तेश्च ।

किञ्च गामानयेत्यादिवाक्यसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यस्यानुषङ्गिकानेकव्यापारसम्भवात्कार्य-विज्ञानमपि सामान्येनावगतमिति तत्र विशेषावधारणं दुश्शकमेव । अपि चायं व्युत्पित्तुः स्वस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतायाः कार्यावगतेः पदार्थविज्ञानपूर्वकत्वावगमात्प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्यापि प्रयोज-कवाक्यं पदार्थज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति निश्चिनोति । तस्माद् वृद्धव्यवहारेऽपि सिद्धार्थेष्वेव शब्द-स्याभिधानमिति निश्चयः ।

किञ्च प्रकारान्तरेणापि शब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणं प्रचुरमुपलभ्यते । तथाहि—बालाः पितृमातुलादिभिः शशिपशुपक्षिप्रभृतीनर्थानुद्दिश्य १ ‘एनमवेहि, २ इममवगच्छ’ इत्यभि-प्रायेणाङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तत्तच्छब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यमानैर्बहुशः शिक्षिताः, पुनश्च काव्य-नाटकाभिज्ञपुरुषसकाशमुपगम्य पदविच्छेदं कृत्वा अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थ इति शिक्षिताः, सर्व-शब्दानामर्थमवगम्य तत्तच्छब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्धघुत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनात्सङ्केतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च तेषु तेषु तेषां (तेषां तेषां?) शब्दानां प्रयोगो-बोधकत्वनिबन्धन इति निश्चिन्वन्ति । अतः सिद्धार्थं व्युत्पत्तेस्तस्मिन् शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं सम्भवतीति वेदान्तवाक्यानि ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्यन्त एव ।

अपर आहुः—

जगत्सावयवं कार्यं तच्च स्वोचितकर्तृकम् ।

कर्ता च कल्प्य एकोऽतो नासौ शास्त्रप्रमाणकः ॥

१. एनं शब्दम्—पा०.

२. इममर्थम्—पा०.

अस्तु सिद्धार्थेऽपि शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्, तथापि जगत्कारणभूत ईश्वरो न शास्त्रप्रमाणकः ; शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्रामाण्यविषयत्वात् । अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तृसिद्धेश्च । तथाहि—विचित्र-सन्निवेशं भूभूधरादिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् सावयवत्वात् कार्यं भवितुमर्हति । कार्यश्च स्वोपादानोप-करणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनाद्यभिज्ञकर्तृकं दृष्टम् । न चेदमशक्यक्रियमशक्योपादानादिविज्ञानम् ; कर्तृस्वरूपवज्ज्ञानशक्त्योरपि कार्यानुमेयत्वात् । न च जीवानां कर्तृत्वकल्पनं युक्तम् ; तेषां १प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां प्रलीनकरणकळेवरतया अचित्कल्पानां ज्ञानशक्तिवैकल्येन विचित्र-जगन्निर्मातृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

यदपि तेषामेव कर्मद्वारेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति, तदपि न ; युगपदुत्पद्यमान-२ जगन्निर्माणप्रयोजनतया अनन्तैर्जीवैरेकदानुष्ठितानामनन्तानामेकरूपाणां कर्मणां सम्भवे प्रमाणाभावात्ततो विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्त एकः कर्ता भवितुमर्हति ।

अथ विचित्रसन्निवेशगोपुरप्राकारादेर्विलक्षणज्ञानशक्तियुक्तानेककर्तृकत्वदर्शनादत्यन्त-विचित्ररचनस्य जगतो निरतिशयज्ञानशक्तियुक्तबहुकर्तृकत्वकल्पनं युक्तमिति चेत्, तच्चा-युक्तम् ; कर्तृकल्पनायामनेककल्पनादेककल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात् । न च जगत्कर्तुरनुमेयत्वे व्यासिबलेन कर्मवश्यत्वादिप्रसङ्गः ; तेषां कर्मवश्यत्वादीनां जगत्करणेऽनुपयोगात् । अनुप-योगा(गि?)नामपि व्यासिमात्रेण पक्षप्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गाच्च । अतो जगत्कर्तुरनु-मानसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

जगतः कर्तृमत्त्वञ्च सिद्धयत्येवानुमानतः ।

विशिष्टकर्तृकत्वंतु शास्त्रादेवावगम्यते ॥

यदुक्तं विचित्ररचनस्य जगत्कार्यस्य विचित्रलक्षणैककर्तृकत्वं सिद्धयतीति, तदयुक्तम् ; विचित्र-रचनस्य रथगोपुरप्रासादादेर्बहुकर्तृकत्वदर्शनात् । तत्र यदुक्तमनेककर्तृकल्पनादेककल्पनं लघीय

१. प्रतिसर्गः—प्रलयः.

२. युगपदुत्पद्यमान—पा०.

इति, तदप्यसाधु ; पूर्वोक्तादेव च हेतोर्बहुकर्तृकल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात् । कार्यसिद्धये हि कर्तृमत्त्वं कल्प्यते तद्यथोपपद्यते तथैव हि कल्पनीयम् ।

किञ्च अनुमानेन जगत्कर्तारं साधयतो यत्कर्तुर्कर्मवश्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिकं सिषाधयिषितम्, तदपि विरुद्धमापतेत्; व्याप्तिबलेन तस्य कर्तुः कर्मवश्यत्वाल्पज्ञानत्वादेः साधकत्वाद्धेतोः । तत्र यदुक्तं सपक्षे सहदृष्टानां धर्माणां दर्शनमात्रेण पक्षे प्राप्तौ सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इति ; नैतदस्ति । व्याप्तिबलेन पक्षे प्रसज्यमानानां येषां प्रमाणान्तरेण न प्रतिहतिर्भवति, तेषामेवानुमापकत्वाल्लिङ्गस्य ।

अथ कर्मवश्यस्य अल्पज्ञस्य सकलजगन्निर्माणानुपपत्तेः पक्षधर्मत्वबलादेवाकर्मवश्यः सर्वज्ञ एव जगत्कर्ता सेत्स्यतीति मतम्, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अकर्मवश्यस्य शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणाभावेन जगत्कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणरहितस्यापि सङ्कल्पमात्रेण कर्तृत्वमुपपद्यत इति चायुक्तम् ; अशरीरस्य सङ्कल्पायोगात् । अत एवेच्छानिमित्तशरीराद्युपकरणवान् जगत्करोतीत्युत्प्रेक्षितुमपि न शक्यम् ।

अथ नित्यानि जगत्कर्तुः शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणानि ; अतस्तस्य जगत्करणं सुशकमिति मन्वीत, तदपि न साधीयः ; नित्यत्वेन तस्य शरीरादीनां सावयवत्वहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वात् । अतोऽनुमानेन जगत्कर्ता न सेत्स्यति । जगतो विलक्षणैककर्तृमत्त्वे सिद्धेऽपि निमित्तोपादानशक्तियुक्तेनैकेन पुरुषेणैकदैव सङ्कल्पपूर्वकं निखिलजगत्करणं शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकमिति वेदान्तवेद्यं ब्रह्म ।

अन्ये पुनराहुः—

प्रयोजनपरं वाक्यं प्रमाणं नेतरद्भवेत् ।

तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव साध्यं प्रयोजनम् ॥

त्रय्यन्तस्याक्रियार्थत्वान्न स्यात्तस्य प्रमाणता ।

सर्वं हि वाक्यजातं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव प्रमाणं भवति ; लोके प्रयोजनशून्यानां प्रमाणतया कचिदप्यनुपलब्धेः ।

ननु प्रत्यक्षादीनि हि हेयोपादेयापेक्ष(योपेक्ष?)णीयस्य(यस्व?)विषयावबोधनं कुर्वन्ति प्रमाणानि दृश्यन्ते । शब्दस्य को विशेषः, येन प्रयोजनवदर्थवबोधकत्वमाश्रीयेत । उच्यते— परप्रत्यायनार्थं हि वाक्यं प्रयुज्यते । परश्च न निष्प्रयोजनानि वाक्यानि श्रावयितुं शक्यः । तस्मात्प्रयोजनशून्यानामुदय एव दुर्लभः । अतः शास्त्रं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव । प्रमाणप्रयोजनञ्च द्विविधम् । सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेति । तद् द्विविधं प्रयोजनं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव लभ्यते ; यथा कामिनीपरिष्वङ्गेन कामावाप्तिः, अपथ्यसेवानिवृत्तेरभिमान्धनिवृत्तिः; यथा(तथा?)ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गावाप्तिः, अपगोरणनिवृत्त्या शतयातनानिवृत्तिः । अतः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसाध्यं प्रयोजनम् ।

न च वाच्यं 'स्ववेष्टमनि निधिरस्ति' 'नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिवस्तुस्वरूपोपदेशपरवाक्य-श्रवणसमनन्तरं निधिसद्भावसर्पनिवृत्तिभ्यां हर्षभयनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्तेषामपि वाक्यानां प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमस्तीति । तत्राप्यज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावाज्ज्ञानविधिपरत्वस्यैवाश्रयणीयत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव पुरुषार्थ इति प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहिणां वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यं दुर्लभमिति, न वेदान्तप्रमाणं ब्रह्मेति ।

अत्र ब्रूमः—

निध्याद्यवगतेश्चापि सिद्धयत्येव प्रयोजनम् ।

तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमनपोदितम् ॥

यत्तावदुक्तं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव शब्दः प्रामाणमिति, (तत् ?) तथैव । यत्पुनरुक्तं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यामेव प्रयोजनावाप्तिरिति, नैतन्नियतम् ; निधिसद्भावादिप्रतिपादनपराणामपि वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थावाप्तिहेतुत्वदर्शनात् ।

तत्र यदुक्तं अज्ञातस्य निधिसद्भावादेः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वाभावेन ज्ञानविधिपरत्वमेवाश्रयणीयमिति, तदयुक्तम् ; ज्ञानस्यापुरुषतन्त्रत्वेन विधेयत्वासम्भवात् । न च ज्ञानार्थव्यापारस्य विधेयत्वेन तेषां ज्ञानविधिपरत्वं युक्तं वक्तुम् ; तत्तद्वाक्यजन्येन निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानेन हर्षभयनिवृत्त्योर्दर्शनात् । बालातुराद्युपच्छन्दनवाक्यवदसत्येऽप्यर्थे निधिसद्भावादिज्ञानमात्रेण हर्षादीनां सम्भवान्नार्थपरत्वं सिद्धयतीति च न शङ्कनीयम् ; उपच्छन्दनवाक्येऽप्यर्थसद्भावभ्रान्त्या


पुरुषार्थावाप्तिः । अत एव ह्यर्थस्याभावे निश्चिते सति तदानीमेव हर्षादयो निवर्तन्ते । अतो निध्यादिसद्भावप्रतिपादनपराणां वाक्यानां पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वं सम्भवत्येव ।

किञ्च 'विश्वजिता यजेत' 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्' इत्यादीनां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणां वाक्यानां क्रियाफलसम्बन्धाश्रवणात्प्रथमं प्रयोजनान्वयो न ज्ञायते । यदा विज्ञायते, तथा-
(दाः) पि प्रयोजनं मन्दतरञ्च । वेदान्तवाक्योक्तं तु निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म श्रवणवेळायामेव प्रतिपन्नमिति तेषां वाक्यानामेव साक्षात्प्रयोजनपर्यवसानमिति वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामा-
ण्यमुपपन्नम्

इति नीतिमालायां वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारो द्वितीयः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां तृतीयाधिकार आरभ्यते.



इदानीं ब्रह्मस्वरूपं निरूप्यते ॥ अत्र केचिदाहुः—

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसकारणं ब्रह्मशब्दितम् ।

तच्च सच्चित्सुखाद्वैतस्वरूपं श्रुतिषूदितम् ॥

“ यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति, तद्वि-
जिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म ’ इति इति श्रुत्या जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादितम् । तच्च ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं
ब्रह्म’, ‘विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म’ ‘आनन्दो ब्रह्म’ इति श्रुतिभिः सच्चिदद्वितीयानन्दस्वरूपं
प्रतिपादितम् । एवं निर्विशेषस्वयम्प्रकाशसुखस्वरूपस्य सन्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मण एव अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहि-
तस्वरूपतया सुख्यहं, दुःख्यहं, देहोऽयं, मनुष्योऽयं, घटोऽयं, पटोऽयम्, इत्याद्यान्तरबाह्यवि-
विधाध्यासोपादानतया जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति । ते प्रतिक्षिप्यन्ते ।

सत्तादेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तिरोधेरप्यसम्भवात् ।

कारणत्वस्य वा सिद्धेः पक्षोऽयं नोपपद्यते ॥

सच्चित्सुखाद्वितीयस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति वदद्भिः सदादिशब्दानां ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तानि
वक्तव्यानि । न तानि वक्तुं शक्यन्ते ; सत्तादीनां दुर्निरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—न तावत्सत्ता
जातिः सद्ब्रह्मभेदाभावात् । न च प्रमायाः सम्बन्धयोग्यत्वं सत्त्वम् ; ब्रह्मणः
प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात् । अथोसद्ब्रह्मावृत्तिः सत्त्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न । सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्च-
स्याप्यसद्ब्रह्मावृत्तत्वेन सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ सत्तैव सच्छब्दस्यार्थो वर्ण्यते, तदप्यसाधु ; लोके
सत्तायां धर्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात् ब्रह्मणः कञ्चन धर्मिणं प्रति धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्सुदुर्नि-
रूपम् ।

एवं चैतन्यगुणयोगिनि वस्तुनि चिच्छब्दस्य प्रसिद्धेः ब्रह्मणश्चैतन्यगुणानङ्गीकारा-
त्तस्य चित्त्वमपि न निरूपणमर्हति । यदि तु चैतन्यमेव चिच्छब्दवाच्यं स्यात्, तदा प्रमीण-
ज्ञानानामपि ब्रह्मत्वं भवेत् । अथ प्रमाणज्ञानं न चैतन्यम्, अपि त्वन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वाज्जड-
रूपमिति चेत्, तर्ह्यन्तःकरणवत्तस्मादपि विषयोपलब्धिर्न स्यात् । अथ जडव्यावृत्तत्वं चित्त्वम्,
तच्च स्वाधीनस्वप्रकाशत्वमिति मतम् ; तच्च नैवम् ; स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानभ्युपगमेन स्वाधीन-
प्रकाशत्वाभावात् । तस्माच्चित्स्वरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणो दुर्विवेचम् ।

एवं सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो न निरूपयितुं शक्यम् । सुखं मे स्यात्, सुखो भूयास-
मिति ह्यात्मगुणत्वेन तदनुभूयते । तथा पदार्थविदोऽपि बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामात्मगुणत्व-
माचक्षते । तस्मात्तस्य गुणत्वप्रसिद्धेर्न सुखरूपं ब्रह्म भवितुमर्हति ।

अथ अनुकूलत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति मतम्, तदा (थाः) पि वक्तव्यं, ब्रह्म कस्यानुकूलं
भवतीति । न तावज्जीवानाम् ; ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तानां तेषामनभ्युपगमात् । स्वस्यैवेति चेत्, तत्रापि
वक्तव्यम्, किमिदमानुकूल्यन्नाम् । भोग्यत्वमिति चेत्, तदपि न सिद्धयेत् ; स्वस्य भोक्तृत्वा-
भावेन भोग्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वमिति च न वाच्यम् ; ब्रह्मणो निवृत्तिरूपत्वेना-
भावात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । निरपेक्षत्वं सुखरूपत्वमिति चायुक्तम् ; काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि निरपे-
क्षत्वेन सुखरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्सुखरूपत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो दुरुपपादम् ।

यदिदमद्वितीयत्वं ब्रह्मण उक्तं, तदपि चिन्त्यम् । किं सदृशद्वितीयरहितत्वं तद्युक्तम् ;
ब्रह्मद्वित्वासम्भवात् । स्वकार्येण प्रपञ्चेन सद्वितीयं न भवतीत्यद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति चेत्, तदपि न
विरुद्धम् ; कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वात् ।

अथ 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सन्मात्रस्य
ब्रह्मणः सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदरहिततयाभिधानात् 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' 'अथात
आदेशो नेति नेति' ब्रह्मणि नानात्वनिषेधात् 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव
सत्यम्' इति घटादिकार्यस्यासत्यताप्रतिपादनमुखेन ब्रह्मकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपाद-
नात् 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्यात्, 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इति प्रमा-
त्रादिलक्षणस्य संसारस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशेन मिथ्यात्वावगमाच्च निर्धूतनिखिलविशेषमद्वि-

तीयं ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते । न च भेदावलम्बिभिः शास्त्रैः प्रत्यक्षादिभिश्चासां श्रुतीनां विरोधः शङ्कनीयः^१; भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन तासां दौर्बल्यात् । प्रत्युताद्वैतश्रुतीनां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन परत्वात्ताभिर्भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्राणामेव बाध्यत्वं भवति ।

अनुमानादप्यद्वितीयत्वं प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वञ्च साधयितुं शक्यम् । तथाहि—विगीतो भेदव्यवहारोऽद्वैतवस्त्ववलम्बनः, भेदव्यवहारत्वात्, चन्द्रभेदव्यवहारवत् ; विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वाच्छ्रुक्तिरूप्यतादात्म्यवत् इति । तस्मान्निरस्तविशेषमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति ।

तदसाम्प्रतम् ; प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्यानेकपदार्थसंसर्गावबोधकत्वेन कस्यचिदपि वाक्यस्य निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनासामञ्जस्यात् । शास्त्रं तावन्नाद्वैतवस्तुनि प्रमाणम् । ‘सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इति वाक्यमपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतिपादयति । तथाहि—अग्र इति कालविशेषः प्रतीयते । आसीदिति क्रियाविशेषः । इदं सदिति जगतः सदात्मकत्वम् । एकमेवेति नामरूपविभागाभाववचनेन सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य ब्रह्मण उपदानत्वम् । अद्वितीयमित्यधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिराकरणेन निमित्तत्वम् । अत एवानन्त-शक्तियोगश्च । अतो नानेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः ।

‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’ इति वाक्यमपि तत्त्वोपदेशपरमुपासनोपदेशपरं वा । उभय-थापि सर्वभेदनिषेधो नानेन शक्यते वक्तुम् । प्रमात्राद्यभावेनोपदेशानुपपत्तेः । अत इदं वाक्यमब्रह्मात्मकनानावस्तुनिषेधपरम् । उपबृंहितञ्चैतद्भगवता

‘न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यान्मया भूतञ्चराचरम्^१’ इति ।

‘अथात आदेशो नेति’ इति वाक्यमपि ब्रह्मणः पूर्वं प्रस्तुतमाहात्म्येयत्तानिषेध-परम् ; उत्तरत्रापि तन्माहात्म्यकथनाय (नात् ?) निरणैषीच्च भगवान्बादरायणः ‘प्रकृतैता-वत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः^२’ इत्यत्र । अत इदमपि वाक्यं न निर्विशेषपरम् ।

१. गी. X. ३९.

२. ब्र. सू. ३. २. २१.

‘वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ इति वाक्यमपि न कार्यघटा-
देर्मिथ्यात्वं ब्रूते, किन्तु तस्य कारणभूतमृदद्रव्यादनन्यत्वं वक्ति। अतस्तेनापि प्रपञ्चस्य
ब्रह्मकार्यतया ब्रह्मात्मकत्वमवगतमिति न ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषत्वमवगम्यते। नापि प्रपञ्चस्य
मिथ्यात्वम्। अन्येषामप्येवञ्जातीयानामियमेव गतिः।

यदुक्तं भेदावलम्बिनां शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षाणां भेदवासनादोषमूलत्वेन दौर्बल्यात्तेषां तैर्बाध्य-
त्वमिति, तदयुक्तम्; भेदवासनाया दोषत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वेन तज्जन्य-
वासनाया दोषत्वं निश्चीयत इति चेन्न; अन्योन्याश्रयणात्। भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वे निर्णय-
तद्वासनाया दोषत्वनिर्णयः, तद्वासनाया दोषत्वे निर्णयः भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णय इति॥

अथ वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयेन भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमरूपत्वनिर्णय
इति नान्योन्याश्रयणमिति मतम्, तदा चक्रकाश्रयापत्तिः। भेदावलम्बिनां भेदवासनामूलत्वेन
दौर्बल्ये निर्णयः वेदान्तवाक्यानां निरस्तसमस्तभेदवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयः; तेषां निरस्तसमस्तभेद-
वस्तुपरत्वनिश्चये भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिश्चयः; भेदज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वनिर्णये तद्वासनाया दोष-
मूलत्वेन भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां दौर्बल्यमिति।

यत्पुनरुक्तमद्वैतवस्तुपराणां शास्त्राणां द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेन बलीयस्त्वमिति, तदप्यसङ्ग-
तम्; निषेधात्मकस्य परस्यैवाप्रामाण्यदर्शनात्। चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञाते सत्येवावष्टम्भादिना अनेकचन्द्र
इति मनीषा समुन्मिषति। न च सा प्रमाणम्। तस्माद्भेदावलम्बिनां प्रमाणानां न दौर्बल्यम्॥

यदुक्तं ‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ इति बाधितार्थसामानाधिकरण्याद्विलक्षणस्य प्रपञ्चस्य
मिथ्यात्वं सिद्धयति इति, तदपि न सिद्धयेत्; तज्जलानीति तज्जत्वतलत्वतदनत्वैः प्रपञ्चस्य
ब्रह्मात्मकत्वोपदेशपरत्वात्; नेदं रजतमितिवद्वाधस्याप्रतिसन्धानाच्च।

यत्तु प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वोपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमवगम्यत इति, तदपि
मनोरथमात्रम्; वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य संसारनिवर्तकत्वाभावात्। उपासनोपदेशपरत्वात्तेषां
वाक्यानाम्। तस्माच्छ्रुतिभिर्वा श्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या वा न निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः।

यच्चेदमद्वितीयत्वे प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वे चानुमानद्वयमुपन्यस्तम्; तत्सर्वप्रमाणबाधितत्वा-
त्कालात्ययापदिष्टम्। किञ्चैवमप्यनुमानं शक्यम्—असद्ब्रह्म, अदृश्यत्वाच्छशविषाणवत्;
विप्रतिपन्नः प्रपञ्चसत्यः, अबाधितत्वादात्मवदिति।

किञ्च 'सर्वज्ञस्सर्ववित्' 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिभिर्वस्तुस्वरूपोपदेश-
परैश्शस्त्रैः ज्ञानादिगुणविशिष्टतया ब्रह्मणोऽवगतस्य निर्विशेषत्वमनुपपन्नम् । न चैते
गुणाः काल्पनिकास्सत्यवचनाः ; प्रमाणान्तरात् (राद ?) प्राप्तानां तेषामुपदेशानुपपत्तेः ।

अथ स्यात् 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति न विशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति ; अख-
ण्डैकरसब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्तस्य । तात्पर्ये हि शब्दः प्रमाणं भवति । समानाधि-
करणपदसमूहात्मकस्य वाक्यस्यार्थैकत्वे तात्पर्यमिति सर्वसम्मतम् । न च विशिष्टवस्तुवैक्यस्य
प्रतिपादनं सामानाधिकरण्यस्य युक्तम् ; विशेषणसम्बन्धे प्रमाणाभावात् । इदमेव विशेषण-
सम्बन्धं विशिष्टैक्यञ्च प्रतिपादयतीति न युक्तम् ; वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गेनोभयविधानस्या-
शक्यत्वात् । विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपादने विशेषणानां व्यावर्तकत्वस्वाभाव्याद्विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्य-
भेदप्रसङ्गः । नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिषु नीलिमादिसम्बन्धस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद्विशिष्टैक्यप्रति-
पादनमविरुद्धम् । सत्यादिपदानां स्वार्थप्रहाणेन वस्तुस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वे लक्षणादोषो
भवतीत्युत्प्रेक्षा चायुक्ता ; प्रामाण्यानुगुणत्वाल्लक्षणायाः । न च पदानां पर्यायता ; सत्य-
त्वादिविरोध्यसत्यत्वादिव्यावृत्तिरूपब्रह्मस्वरूपोपस्थापनेन तेषामर्थवत्त्वात् । अत एव तेषां
प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽप्युपपन्नः ; न च व्यावृत्तीनां धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषणत्वप्रसङ्गः ;
सकलेतरव्यावृत्तिरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः ; यथा गुणजातिक्रियादिविशेषाणां स्वेतरविशेषव्यावृत्तिः
स्वरूपमेव भवति । तस्मादेतद्वाक्यं निर्विशेषं वस्तु प्रतिपादयतीति न सगुणब्रह्मप्रतिपादन-
परत्वमस्य वाक्यस्येति ॥

तदेतदसाम्प्रतम् ; विशिष्टवस्तुवैक्यपरत्वादेव समानाधिकरणपदसङ्घातरूपवाक्यस्य
प्रामाण्योपपत्तेः । न च वाक्यस्वोभयविधानम्, येन वाक्यभेदो भवेत् । व्युत्पत्तिवशेन पदा-
नामेव विशिष्टार्थाभिधायित्वात् । न हि नीलमित्युक्ते नीलिमगुण एव प्रतीयते, किन्तु
तद्विशिष्टं द्रव्यम् । सत्यमुभयोरपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । गुण एव शब्दात्प्रतीयते । अर्थस्य [द्रव्य-
स्य ?] प्रतीतिस्तु तत्सामर्थ्यसिद्धेति न युक्तं वक्तुम् ; नियमहेत्वभावात् । तस्मात्पदैरेव
विशिष्टार्थाभिधानाद्विशिष्टैक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयम् ।

न च विशेषणभेदेन विशेष्यभेदप्रसङ्गः ; विरुद्धविशेषणानामेव विशेष्यभेदकत्वात् ।
अत एव खण्डो मुण्डः पूर्णशृङ्गो गौरित्यत्र व्यक्तिभेदप्रतीतिः । नीलं सुगन्धिं महदुत्पल-

मित्यत्र विशिष्टैक्यप्रतिपत्तिश्च । अखण्डवस्तुस्वरूपे तु (स्वरूपपरत्वे तु ?) वाक्यस्य, पदानां स्वार्थपरित्यागेन लक्षणादोषोऽवर्जनीयः । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदाभावेन सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । पदानां पर्यायता च । अभिधेयविरोधिव्यावृत्तिपरत्वेऽप्यभावरूपैर्धर्मैः ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वं प्रसज्येत ।

तत्र यदुक्तं जात्यादिविशेषाणामे[मि ?]व व्यावृत्तीनां ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्न ब्रह्मणस्सविशेषत्वमिति ; तदपि न शोभनम् ; जात्यादीनां धर्मस्वरूपत्वात् धर्माणां धर्मान्तरासम्बन्धाच्च तेषामितरव्यावृत्तिस्वरूपत्वं युक्तम् ; न द्रव्याणाम् । न हि घटस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः स्वरूपम् । घटत्वजातिर्हि तस्य पटाद्यावृत्तिः । ब्रह्मणो द्रव्यत्वादसत्यादिव्यावृत्तयो धर्मा भवेयुरिति तैस्सविशेषमेव ब्रह्म भवेत् । तस्मात् ‘ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ’ इति वाक्यं सत्यत्वादिगुणविशिष्टं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयतीति निर्विशेषत्वं विरुद्धमेव ॥

किञ्च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमिदमद्वितीयत्वम् ; घटपटादिभेदानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । अथ मतं न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । तथा हि—इतरेतराभावो वार्थान्तरं वा भेदः । उभयथापि तत्स्मरणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिस्मरणसव्यपेक्षत्वात् प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विळम्बासहत्वाच्च अनेन न भेदो ग्रहीतुं शक्यते । ‘ इदं तन्न सम्भवति ’ इत्येवं रूपो हीतरेतराभावः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षमिदमिति किं विदधाति ? एतन्न भवतीति व्यवच्छिन्नति वा ? विदधदिदं प्रत्यक्षं तत्रैव क्षीणशक्तिकत्वान्न व्यवच्छेदसमर्थम् । नापि व्यवच्छिन्नति ; विधिपूर्वकत्वाद्यवच्छेदस्य ॥

नापि युगपदेव विधिव्यवच्छेदौ करोति ; क्षणिकत्वादेव तस्य क्रमभाव्युभयहेतुत्वासम्भवात् । अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि भेदस्येतेतराभावग्रहणपूर्वकत्वात्तद्ग्रहणस्योक्तदोषस्समानः । तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थम् । प्रत्युत देशकालानवच्छिन्नस्य सन्मात्रस्य ग्राहकम् । तथा हि—चाक्षुषज्ञानसमनन्तरं सन्घटस्सन्पट इत्यादयो व्यवहाराः प्रतीयमाना दृश्यन्ते । तत्र सर्वत्र सदर्था घटादयश्च व्यवहियन्ते । तत्र क्रमभाविनोरुभयोरपि व्यवहारयोर्न प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वं सम्भवति ; तयोर्भिन्नकालज्ञानफलत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तयोरेकः प्रत्यक्षमूलः, इतरो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयः । इदं रजतमित्यनुवर्तमानस्येदमर्थ-

स्यावभासोऽक्षमूलः । व्यावर्तमानरजतादेरवभासो भ्रान्तिमूल इत्यवगतम् । एवमत्राप्यनुवर्तमानं सदेव प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । व्यावर्तमाना घटादयो भ्रान्त्या अवभासन्त इति निश्चीयते । न च रजतादीनामिव बाधो न दृश्यत इति तत्तदवभासानां कथं भ्रान्तित्वमिति शङ्का युक्ता ; बाधफलभूतानां व्यावृत्तीनामितरेतरबुद्धयोर्दृष्टत्वाद्बाधस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । अयं घट इति हि बुद्धौ पटव्यावृत्तिर्भवति । तथा अयं पट इति बुद्धौ घटव्यावृत्तिः । तस्मात्सन्मात्रग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमिति न प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमद्वैतमिति ॥

नैतदुपपद्यते ; भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वाच्च । तत्र यदुक्तं भेदग्रहणस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसापेक्षत्वात्प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वेन विधिव्यवच्छेदव्यवहारहेतुत्वासम्भवान्न भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति ; तद्वेदस्वरूपापरिज्ञानविजृम्भितम् । न ह्यस्माकमितरेतर- (रा ?) भावः तद्ग्रहणपूर्वकं इतरेतराभावो वा [कं अर्थान्तरं वा ?] भेदः । किन्तु वस्तुनः प्रकारभूता जात्यादयः । ते प्रकारत्वादेव प्रकारिणा सह प्रथन्ते । प्रकारि वस्त्वपि तैर्विना न प्रथते ; अनुपलब्धेरनुपपत्तेश्च । गौरयं शुक्लोऽयं गच्छत्ययमिति हि सर्वे प्रतियन्ति । नत्विदमर्थमात्रविषया कस्यचिदपि कदाचिदपि प्रतीतिरस्ति । नापि संस्थानेन विना गवाद्यर्थः प्रतीतिगोचरतामासादयति । किञ्च प्रथमत एव सकलेतरव्यावृत्ततयावभासनादेव हि प्रतियोगिस्मरणनिरपेक्षं पुरोवर्तिवस्तुनि तदर्थी प्रवर्तते । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षं भेदग्रहणसमर्थमेव ।

ननु अयमस्माद्भिन्न इति धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणसव्यपेक्षं भेदग्रहणं दृश्यते । तत्कथं प्रथममेव भेदो गृह्यत इति । उच्यते—नेदं भेदग्रहणम् ; तस्य प्रतियोग्यपेक्षाभावात् । किन्तु अयमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारवत् कश्चिद्वेदव्यवहारः । किमुक्तं भवति ? यथा अयमिति स्वरूपाभेदव्यवहारादृते रूपतः परिणामतः संस्थानतश्च सौसादृश्याभिप्रायेणायमस्मादभिन्न इत्यभेदव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते ; तथायं गौरित्यादि भेदव्यवहारादन्यो द्वयोर्वस्तुनोः परिणामादिनिमित्तवैसादृश्यनिबन्धनोऽयमस्मद्भिन्न इति भेदव्यवहारो भवतीत्युक्तं भवति । तस्माद[द् ?] भेदग्रहणं धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणस्मरणानपेक्षमिति न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

यत्पुनरुक्तं सन्मात्रविषयं प्रत्यक्षमिति ; तदपि स्थवीयः ; तस्य प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात्, चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य रूपरूपितदेकार्थसमवायिषु क्लृप्तशक्तिकत्वाच्च । यदुक्तं सन्घट इति सद्भूयं प्रतीयत इति ; तत्र यद्वक्तव्यं, तच्छक्तिविक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

यत्तु व्यावर्तमानत्वाद्वटादीनां रजतादेरिव काल्पनिकत्वमुक्तम्, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अप्रयोजकत्वाद्धेतोः । बाधितत्वादेव हि रजतादेः काल्पनिकत्वम् ; न व्यावर्तमानत्वात् । न च व्यावृत्तिमात्रं बाधफलम्, अपि तु यद्देशकालयोर्बद्धस्तु भासते तद्देशकालव्यावृत्तता बाधफलभूता दृष्टा ; तस्माद्धेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादबाधितत्वादद्वैतं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेव ॥

यदुक्तं अद्वितीयं ब्रह्म अनाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपं विविधाध्यासोपादानमिति ; तत्र अज्ञानं नाम किमिति वक्तव्यम् ? न तावज्ज्ञानाभावः ; तस्य वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधायक-त्वासम्भवादध्यासहेतुत्वासम्भवाच्च । न अन्यथा ज्ञानमज्ञानम् ; तत एव ।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानप्रागभावातिरिक्तं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं तमोमायादिशब्दवाच्यं वस्तुया-थात्म्यज्ञाननिवर्त्य भावरूपं किञ्चिद्वस्त्वज्ञानम् । तच्च श्रुतितदर्थपत्त्यनुमानप्रत्यक्षैरवसीयते । तथाहि—‘ नासदासीन्नोसदासीत्तदानीम् ’ इत्युपक्रम्य ‘ तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे ’ इत्यु-क्तलक्षणमज्ञानमभिधीयते । श्वेताश्वतराणामुपनिषदि ‘ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् ’ इति मायाशब्देनाज्ञानमभिधीयते ।

‘ तत्त्वमसि ’ इति सामानाधिकरण्यावगतजीवैक्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदवगम्यते । विरुद्धयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यमज्ञानरूपदोषमूलमन्यतरमिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते ।

प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावदित्यनुमानेनाज्ञानं सिद्धयति ।

तथा ‘ अहमज्ञो मामन्यच्च न जानामि ’ इति प्रत्यक्षेणाज्ञानं प्रतीयते । न चेदं ज्ञानप्रागभावविषयम् ; तस्याभावप्रमाणगोचरत्वात् । अस्य ज्ञानस्याहं सुखीतिवदपरोक्षा-कारत्वाच्च । अस्त्वभावः प्रत्यक्षः, तथापीदं न ज्ञानाभावविषयम् ; ज्ञानाभावानुभववेलायाम-हमर्थस्याश्रयतयाभावस्य विषयतया ज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगितया चानुभवस्यावश्यम्भावात् । अनुभवेन सह तदभावस्यावस्थानासम्भवाच्च । अथ आश्रयप्रतियोगिनोरनुभवो नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा तत्सम्बन्धिज्ञानाभावस्वा[स्या ?]नुभवो न सम्भवतीति सुतरां न ज्ञानाभावविषयं प्रत्यक्षम् । अज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे तु न धर्मिप्रतियोग्यनुभवापेक्षा तदनुभवस्य । न हि तमःप्रतिपत्तौ वस्त्वन्तरानुभवोऽपेक्षितः । अथ भावरूपमप्यज्ञानं वस्तुयाथात्म्यावभासरूपेण साक्षिचैतन्येन

विरुद्धमित्यस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य तद्विषयत्वमप्ययुक्तमिति चेत्, तन्न ; वस्तुनः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन साक्षिधैतन्याविषयत्वात् । अतो न निष्प्रमाणकमज्ञानमिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते । यदुक्तं 'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे' इति श्रुतिसिद्धमज्ञानमिति, तदसत् ; तमश्शब्दस्यान्धकारे चोद्भूततमोगुणे प्रकृतितत्त्वे च लोकशास्त्रयोः प्रसिद्धत्वात् ; अज्ञाने प्रसिद्ध्यभावाच्च । आच्छादकत्वगुणयोगात्तमश्शब्दोऽज्ञाने वर्तते इत्युत्प्रेक्षामात्रम् ; आच्छादकत्वासम्भवस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' इत्यत्रापि नाज्ञानसम्भव उच्यते ; अपि तु प्रकृतेर्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । विचित्रसर्गकरवस्तु मायाशब्दवाच्यम् । तच्च द्विविधम्—किञ्चिद्विचित्रं भ्रान्तिज्ञानकरम्, यथा ऐन्द्रजालिकानां मणिमन्त्रौषधादि, किञ्चिद्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरम्, यथा असुरराक्षसास्त्रादि । तस्मात्प्रकृतिरपि महदादिविचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वान्मायेत्युच्यते ।

यच्चोक्तं तत्त्वमसीत्यैक्योपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या अज्ञानं कल्प्यते इति ; तदपि जगत्कारणत्वविशिष्टस्य जीवप्रकारविशिष्टस्य च ब्रह्मण ऐक्योपदेशपरत्वेनान्यथैवोपपन्नत्वादयुक्तम् । किञ्च सर्वज्ञे ब्रह्मणि विरुद्धाज्ञानपरिकल्पनहेतुभूता न काचिदनुपपत्तिर्दृश्यते, येनाज्ञानं कल्प्येत ॥

यच्च भावरूपाज्ञानसाधनतया अनुमानमुपन्यस्तम् ; तदपि न शोभनम् ; तेनैवानुमानेनानैकान्तिकत्वाद्धेतोः । न हि तस्यानुमानप्रमेयस्याज्ञानस्यावारकं भावरूपमज्ञानान्तरमस्ति ; अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानासम्भवेन जगत्प्रतिभासानुपपत्तेश्च । प्रदीपप्रभायाः प्रकाशकत्वाभावात्साधनविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः । ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशकम् ; तदुत्पत्तिहेतुभूतानामिन्द्रियाणां विरोधिसन्तमसनिरसनमात्रेणोपकारकत्वमेव हि प्रदीपप्रभायाः । तस्मादनुमानमपि नाज्ञानसाधनम् ।

यच्चोक्तं 'अहमज्ञ इति प्रत्यक्षेणाभावरूपमज्ञानं प्रतीयत इति, तच्च नैवम् ; अज्ञानानुभवस्याश्रयविषयभूतप्रत्यगर्थानुभवपुरस्सरत्वात् । मम मद्विषयमज्ञानमस्तीति

ह्यज्ञानमनुभूयते । तच्च तत्स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानं तस्मिन् प्रतिपन्ने कथमिव सम्भवति ? अथ विशदस्वरूपावभासोऽज्ञानविरोधी । अविशदस्वरूपेणास्मदर्थस्य प्रतिपन्न-तया अज्ञानानुभवो न विरोत्स्यत इति मतम् , तत्ज्ञानप्राग्भावेऽपि समानम् । यच्च भाव-स्वरूपस्यानुभवे तमःप्रतिपत्ताविवाच्यापेक्षा नास्तीति, तदापातरमणीयम् ; दृष्टान्तस्य विषमत्वात् । तमसः स्वरूपेणोपलम्भसम्भवात् । अज्ञानस्य तथाभावाभावात् । अज्ञानस्य तदन्यतद्विरोधितदभावानामन्यतमत्वात्सर्वथापि ज्ञानोपलब्धिपूर्वकस्तदुपलम्भः । तमस-श्चालोकविरोधीत्यनेनाकारेण प्रतिपत्तौ आलोकप्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षत्वमस्त्येव । तस्मान्न केनापि प्रमाणेन भावरूपाज्ञानसिद्धिः ॥

किञ्च आश्रयोऽस्याज्ञानस्य निरूपणीयः । न तावज्जीवाश्रयत्वं तस्य सम्भवति ; अज्ञानकल्पितत्वाज्जीवानाम् । नापि ब्रह्माश्रयत्वम् ; तस्य ज्ञानसमानाश्रयत्वात् ; ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वानभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञानाश्रयत्वविरहिणां घटादीनां हि नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वं दृष्टम् ।

अपि चाज्ञानेन ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानञ्च अशक्यप्रतिपादनम् । आच्छाद्यविषयज्ञानोत्पत्ति-निरोधो ह्याच्छादनशब्दार्थः । अत्र त्वाच्छाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्तदुत्पत्ति-निरोधरूपमाच्छादनञ्च सम्भवति । एवमपि प्रकाशस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानेन तिरोधानं वक्तव्यं चेत् , स्वरूपनाश एव तिरोधानशब्देनोक्तस्स्यात् ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानमननुभूतं सद्ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, किं वा तिरस्कृत्य (स्कृत्य ब्रह्म?) अनुभव-विषयं भवति । न प्रथमः कल्पः , अज्ञानतत्तिरोधानकल्पनयोर्वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । प्रपञ्च-प्रतिभासार्थमज्ञानतिरोधाने कल्प्यते । अतिरोहितस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानसाक्षित्ववदज्ञानतिरो-धानाभ्यां विनाप्यज्ञानकार्याभिमतप्रपञ्चदर्शनसम्भवात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; काचादिवत्स्व-सत्तया तिरस्कृतिकरस्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञानवाध्यत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् । को दोष इति चेत् , अज्ञानकार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वमेव दोषः ॥

किञ्चेदमज्ञानं केन निवर्त्यते ? ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवेनेति चेत् , ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवः किं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्मैव ? उत तद्विषयं ज्ञानान्तरं वा ? ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेवेति चेत् ; स्वरूपनिवृत्त्या ज्ञानस्य [अज्ञानस्य ?] स्वस्मिन्नसम्भवात् । अथ ज्ञानान्तरमिति चेत्तदपि न ; निर्वि-

शेषस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानविषयत्वासम्भवात् । अनभ्युपगमाच्च ।

“ अथ ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकमिति मतम्, तदपि विकल्पनीयम् ।
अद्वितीयत्वं किं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपम् ? उत धर्मः ? प्रथमे कल्पे पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तिः ।
उत्तरस्मिन् कल्पे ब्रह्मणस्सद्वितीयत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

स्यान्मतं, प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानं तन्निवर्तकमिति ; तदप्यसङ्गतम् ; ब्रह्मविषयेणा-
ज्ञानेन तस्य विरोधाभावात् । प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानस्य तत्सत्यत्वाज्ञानेन विरोधः, न ब्रह्म-
विषयेणाज्ञानेन ।

यदि मन्वीत प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानम्, तस्मात्तेन तदज्ञानस्य
विरोधो युक्त इति प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानेन ब्रह्माज्ञानं निवर्तत इति, तदपि हास्यम् ; प्रपञ्च-
मिथ्यात्वस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वासम्भवात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मतिरोधायकं तदाश्रयं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्य भावरू-
पमज्ञानं न सिद्ध्यति ।

यच्चोक्तं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म अविद्याशबलं सज्जगदुपादानकारणमिति, तद्विवेचनीयम् ।
तत्र किं ब्रह्मोपादानं जगदुत अविद्योपादानमथोभयोपादानम् ? न तावत्प्रथमः कल्पः ;
कारणानुरूपत्वात्कार्यस्य जगतो ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः ; ब्रह्मो-
पादानत्वश्रुतिव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात् । नापि तृतीयः ; जगतो जडाजडात्मकत्वसत्यत्वासत्यत्वादि-
विरुद्धस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अथ स्यात् ज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मण्यविद्यादोषवशाज्जगदध्यस्तम् । अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमेव
ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वम् । उपपन्नञ्चैतत् । दृश्यते हि शुक्तिकाशकले रजतमित्यपरोक्षावभासः ।
नायं सम्यग्रजतविषयः ; असन्निहितत्वात्तस्य । न च निर्विषयः ; विषयशून्यज्ञानस्य
क्वचिदप्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि स्वविषयम्(यः?) ; परत्वा[त्वेना?]वभासात् । न चासद्विषयः ; रजता-
वभासात् । न चेदं स्मरणम् ; अनुभवरूपत्वात् । न च शुक्तिकाविषयः ; अतद्रूपत्वात्प्रति-
पत्तेः । भासमानं हि विषयो भवति । तस्मादपूर्वं रजतं दोषवशाच्छुक्तिकायामुत्पन्नमव-
भासते । नेदमसत् ; भासमानत्वात् । न च सत् ; बाधितत्वात् । अतस्सदसद्विलक्षणं
तदभ्युपगमनीयम् । एवं सदसदनिर्वचनीयं जगदविद्ययोत्पन्नमवभासते । निरधिष्ठान-
भ्रमानुपपत्तेस्तस्य ब्रह्माधिष्ठानमवगम्यते । अधिष्ठानत्वमेव तस्योपादानत्वमिति ॥

University Notes

UNVEILING OF THE PORTRAIT OF THE FOUNDER-PRO-CHANCELLOR

On the 4th of December, 1937, M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur K. Sundaram Chettiar, B.A., B.L., Retired High Court Judge, unveiled a portrait of the Founder-Pro-Chancellor, Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar of Chettinad, at the New Convocation Hall. The following is the gist of the speech delivered by Mr. Sundaram Chettiar.

He said that the unveiling of the Founder's portrait in this magnificent Hall symbolised the feelings of gratitude towards him swelling up in the hearts of the public of the southern Presidency. This portrait would also serve to inspire the present and future generations to emulate him in acts of generosity and charity. This University was the greatest of his benefactions. What was a barren tract before 1920 had been metamorphosed into a beautiful and picturesque colony of magnificent buildings. The Rajah of Chettinad had viewed the great wealth which God bestowed on him as a sacred trust not only for his own enjoyment and the enjoyment of his family but also for the good of his fellowmen. His benefactions were many-sided. He had kept up the ancient traditions of Hinduism in the selections of his charities and had also adapted himself to the needs of modern civilisation. The speaker prayed to God Almighty to give the Rajah of Chettinad many more years of life, happiness and prosperity, so that he might not only see his magnificent charities flourish in this world but also augment them and find fresh avenues for his generosity.

OPENING OF THE CONVOCATION HALL

On the 4th of December, 1937, the new Convocation Hall was opened and named "The Srinivasa Sastri Hall" by Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Founder-Pro-Chancellor. The Founder delivered the following speech on the occasion :

"To the Syndicate of this University many thanks are due for enabling me to associate myself with this opening function. This is a task which gives me particular pleasure as there is nothing which I like more than to join in any tribute to the worth and personality of our distinguished Vice-Chancellor. I think it was a happy thought of the Syndicate to decide to associate the name of the Rt. Hon'ble Srinivasa Sastriar with

this building. The Rt. Hon'ble Sastriar, the guiding spirit of this University, is an embodiment of the best in the culture of the East and the West. I venture to think that this Hall will serve to perpetuate his connection with the University as nothing else can. I am sure, you will agree with me when I say that the Srinivasa Sastriar Hall will be a living reminder of his new ideal of Service and Sacrifice suited to modern conditions of life. You, the present batch of students, are, I should think, peculiarly fortunate in having him, a deep scholar and a perfect master of the English language, as your Vice-Chancellor to teach you and guide you to a purposeful life of endeavour and achievement. What I would call the Sastri Spirit will always hover over here and silently but surely influence and inspire many a young man to make service of country the dominant ideal of his life. Agreeable to the wishes of the Syndicate to give a visible emblem to his name and keep it alive in the minds of generations yet unborn I declare this Hall open and name it The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar Hall or to be brief "The Srinivasa Sastri Hall".

CONVOCATION

Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Founder-Pro-Chancellor of the University, presided over the Seventh Annual Convocation of the University on the 4th December, 1937. The Convocation was held in the Srinivasa Sastriar Hall. The Rt. Hon'ble Sastriar, P.C., CH., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor, delivered the Convocation Address. The number of candidates admitted to the several degrees and titles was as follows :—

Name of Degree or Title.	In Person.	In Absentia.	Total.
M.LITT.	1	..	1
M.A.	4	7	11
B.A. (HONS.)	19	1	20
B.A.	16	3	19
M.Sc.	3	..	3
B.Sc. (HONS.)	9	3	12
B.Sc.	25	15	40
Vidvan	3	1	4
Siromani	10	1	11
Sangita Bhushana	5	2	7
Total	95	33	128

CONFERENCES AND CONGRESSES

The following members of the staff of the University were delegated to attend the Conferences noted below :—

Prof. R. Ramanujachariar	..	The Philosophical Conference at Nagpur.
Prof. Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar	..	The All-India Oriental Conference at Trivandrum.
Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar	..	Do.
Mr. A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar.	..	Do.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu.	..	The 21st All-India Economic Conference at Hyderabad.
Prof. A. Narasinga Rao	..	The Indian Science Congress, Calcutta.
Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao	..	Do.
Mr. V. Pasupati	..	Do.
Dr. T. S. Raghavan	..	Do.
Dr. B. Ramamurti	..	Do.
Mr. P. S. Varadachari	..	Do.
Mr. S. Sriraman	..	Do.
Mr. G. V. Krishnaswami Ayyangar.	..	The First Statistical Conference at Calcutta.
Mr. K. Nagaraja Rao	..	The All-India Library Conference, Delhi.

STUDENTSHIPS

The following studentships were awarded during the year :

Senior Studentships

Mr. V. Vriddhagirisan	..	History.
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Junior Studentships

Mr. R. Mahadevan	..	Philosophy.
Mr. K. Krishnamachari	..	History.
Mr. S. R. N. Badri Rao	..	Economics.
Mr. P. Vaidyanathan	..	Economics.
Mr. B. R. Venkataraman	..	Mathematics.
Mr. B. C. Lingam	..	Tamil.
Mr. S. Venkatakrishnan	..	Sanskrit.

Conferment of Degrees

The University of Allahabad at a special Convocation held in December, 1937 conferred on the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, Vice-Chancellor of the University, the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws.

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BUILDINGS

The construction of the following buildings was completed during the year :—

1. The Library and the Administrative Buildings and the Srinivasa Sastri Hall.
2. Music College and Dormitory.
3. The Gokhale Hall for conducting the Union and other meetings.
4. Three additional buildings to the Hostel for lodging students and a dining hall.
5. Twenty-four houses for pandits.
6. Men's Club and Guests' Quarters.

The President of the Indian Philosophical Congress has nominated Prof. R. Ramanujachariar to serve on the Executive Committee for a period of three years.

Reviews

Physics : An Introductory Text-Book by H. J. Taylor. Oxford University Press. 448 + x pages, price Rs. 5.

This book has been prepared to cover the scope of the Intermediate syllabus of the University of Bombay. The aim of the author has been to give in reasonable compass the fundamentals of the subject and he must be congratulated on having attained this object with much success. The exposition is clear and simple and only an elementary acquaintance of mathematics on the part of the readers has been assumed. The subject matter covered in the book is much wider than the syllabus prescribed for the Madras or the Annamalai University. It is doubtful therefore whether the book under review can replace the well known text-books now studied by our Intermediate students.

An important problem has been raised by the author in his preface. He seems to be of opinion that a text book should not usurp the function of a course of lectures on the one hand and experimental work on the other. One is inclined to take the view that at the Intermediate stage the text-book must aim at some completeness. It must be remembered that the Physics taught for the Intermediate classes is based purely on experimental methods and hence the text-book should aim at a treatment from this point of view. Full practical details and important applications should be given. The solution of simple problems intended to give concreteness to the abstract presentation of theory should also be a guiding factor. The standard text-book of Glazebrook has kept in view all these fundamental requisites.

It would however be unfair to judge a book by standards other than those maintained by the author. Judged from this point of view, the book has succeeded eminently. The theoretical aspects are set forth in the clearest manner. The convention of signs adopted in geometrical optics is based on a recent report on the subject by the Physical Society. The principles of electrostatics are detailed at some length and the more difficult conceptions of electrodynamics are treated with ease and elegance. A chapter on the structure of matter gives useful information about the nucleus and the electron constituting an atom.

The general impression produced by reading the book is one of amazement that the University of Bombay should expect so much from the *poor* Intermediate students !

S. R. R.

'Maha Yoga', or the Upanishadic Lore in the Light of the Teachings of Maharshi Ramana by 'Who'. Pudukottah: The New Light Publishing Co., 1937. pp. 119. Price Re. 1.

In the ten chapters of this handy volume, dealing with such profound subjects as Ignorance, The World, The Soul, The Egoless state, Devotion, etc., the author, as indicated in the sub-title, makes an attempt to interpret the life and realisations of the Great Sage of Arunachala.

Starting with the position that, 'knowing the *Truth* alone can make one free', and that Sri Ramana Maharishi is one of those rare *Jnanins* who have thus become free, the author proceeds to show that *ignorance* is the root of bondage. There is a very refreshing interpretation of 'Authority' in the fifth chapter of the book. Casting aside the usual mediaeval interpretation, the author says, that the scriptures acquire special authority when the living experience of a living Rishi in our midst testifies to the truth of the scriptural sayings.

Sri Ramana Maharishi's teachings about the World, the Self, and the Over-self are set forth succinctly and lucidly. The bewildering question, whether one who has reached the final egoless state, can yet maintain the individuality implied in possessing a material body, is handled in a commendable manner. 'The sage has neither ego nor mind . . . he is really bodiless, and the body which we see and ascribe to him is an illusion, a part of the world illusion.'

The topic *par excellence* is dealt with in chapters VII to IX. The various stages through which the seeker after truth has to pass are graphically described with several useful practical hints. The Maharishi's answers to questions, judiciously chosen by the author, are very illuminating in this connection. The nature of devotion, of Divine grace and of relationship between the master and his pupil are discussed in the eighth chapter. The last chapter resolves the doubts and perplexities but beset the path of the *sadhaka* in the early stages of his quest for truth.

The addition of this volume to the brilliant but limited list of works on the teachings of the renowned sage of Arunachalā by Messrs. B. N. Narasimhaswami, T. V. Kapali Sastri and Paul Brunton, is to be welcomed. It is gratifying to note that through the selfless labour of his devotees, the influence of Sri Ramana Maharshi is gradually spreading in South India.

Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi of Vāñcheśvarayajvan, a Commentary on Khaṇḍadeva Miśra's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, chapters I, II and III (1-3 pādas—nivītānta—only), edited by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Śāstraratnākara Mīmāṃsāratna Venkatasubrahmanya Sastrigal, Avl., Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore, Madras. 1934. [Price Rs. 6—0—0.]

Khaṇḍadevamiśra's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is an authoritative work on the *Adhikaraṇaprasthāna* of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra. No advanced student of this Śāstra ever fails to study this book. Unlike his two other works—the *Bhāṭṭakaustubha* and the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, this work is brief and terse in style, so much so that a full and proper understanding of the work requires the help of a good and reliable commentary. Fortunately we have in Śambhubhaṭṭa (a disciple of Khaṇḍadeva Miśra) a reliable commentator, whose commentary *Prabhāvali* contains not only a complete exposition of Khaṇḍadeva Miśra's views as embodied in his *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and other works but also refutations of the views of the authors presupposed by his revered master (pūjya-pāda) Khaṇḍadevamiśra.

Other commentaries have also been written on this work by later authors, of whom two are known, one being the prolific writer Bhāskara-rāya and the other, Vāñcheśvarayajvan, a part of the latter's commentary having now for the first time been published. It is noteworthy that both the commentators presuppose and comment on some text of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* on the *tarkapāda* (i.e.) the first pāda of the first adhyāya, which was many years ago incorporated into the Mysore edition of this work; but *its genuineness is doubtful*. Firstly, Śambhubhaṭṭa, the disciple of Khaṇḍadeva, has not commented on it and has summarised the contents of the *tarkapāda* (as explained by the pre-Khaṇḍadeva writers) as a fitting introduction to his commentary on the second pāda of the first adhyāya. Secondly, the major portions of the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa I-1.1 and the part in the Vākyādhikaraṇa I-1.7 containing the definitions of the three vidhis are only a *verbatim* reproduction of the corresponding portions in the *arthavādādhikaraṇa* I.2.1 and *Mantrādhikaraṇa* I.2.4, respectively. To the credit of the commentaries of Bhāskara-rāya and Vāñcheśvarayajvan it must however be said that they explain the difficult text of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* in a lucid manner and are more helpful to the student than Śambhubhaṭṭa's *Prabhāvali*, though the former two are deficient in informativeness as compared with the latter. Unfortunately, Bhāskara-rāya's commentary available in Ms. extends only to the first adhyāya and a part of the second. Vāñcheśvarayajvan's commentary, the latest of the three, is in the first instance explanatory and in some places elaborate too; but it contains explanations of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* text which are in some instances *not quite satisfactory*. To take here one instance only: the phrase in the

pūrvapakṣa of the arthavādādhikaraṇa—sad-asadrūpa-siddhārtha-bodhakatvāt—is interpreted by the commentator thus: *sat* means *adhigata* (already known) like *vāyukṣepiṣṭhatva*; *asat* conveys *bādhita* like *grāvaplavana* and *siddha* is taken in the essence of *sāddhyetara* like *svarga* and *brahman*. This explanation as related to arthavādas is no doubt based on the three well-known kinds—*anuvāda*, *guṇavāda* and *bhūtārthavāda*. But does Khaṇḍadeva divide arthavāda here into three? He has inserted the word *rūpa* between *sadasat* and *siddha* with a view to dividing them into two—*sat* and *asat*, which are again brought under one category of *siddha* meaning *sāddhyetara* (that which is different from *sādhya*, the chief import of the *vidhi* and *niṣedha* vākyas).

Vāñcheśvarayajvan was a Kanarese brahmin who settled in the Tanjore district in South India. His paternal great-grandfather was Vāñcheśvarasudhī, otherwise known as Kuṭṭikavi, the famous author of the *Mahiṣaśataka* in which he has vehemently satirised a Maratha ruler at Tanjore, most probably Tulaja I *alias* Tukkoji, who patronised poet Ghanaśyāma and other great poets. Kuṭṭikavi is said to be the son of the grand-daughter of Govinda Dikṣita, the famous prime minister of the Nayak Kings in Tanjore. So the author of the commentary, the *Bhāṭṭa-Cintāmaṇi*, inherited high traditions of sanskritic learning and culture. The late MM. T. Venkatasubrahmanya Sastrigal was a son of the daughter of this commentator; and it is in the fitness of things that he undertook to edit this work, and on his sad demise it was completed by his disciples under the patronage of His Holiness Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñchi Kāma Koṭipīṭha (Kumbakonam).

The Sanskrit introduction by Pandit N. Ayyaswami Sastri (one of the editors), gives a reliable account of the life and literary career of the commentator who flourished at Tanjore under the reign of Serfoji II during the former half of the 19th Century. The *Viṣayā-nukramaṇikā*, the *sūtrānukramaṇikā*, the *anukramaṇikā* of the quotations cited by the commentator and the *adhikaraṇānukramaṇikā*—all these enhance the usefulness of this edition. The list of errata (appended at the end of this Volume), though formidable for its length, is exhaustive and is highly necessary for those who have to constantly use the work for reference or for special study.

V. A. R.

Oriental Literary Digest, Poona—edited by Dr. S. M. Katre, in collaboration with a committee—published by the O. L. D. Association, Poona, Vol. I. Nos. 1-7.

This is a monthly journal devoted to reviews of current publications in all branches of Indology and of Oriental learning which issued its first

number in July, 1937. It aims to give prompt and critical notices of books published in the various branches of Oriental studies, in India as well as outside, and claims "to serve as an indispensable clearing-house of Oriental Learning." Each number has about 8 to 12 book-notices at the hands of reviewers with apt reputation for scholarship in the different branches. Among them are Dr. B. A. Saletore and Prof. B. D. Verma for historical and quasi-historical publications, Dr. S. K. De, Dr. V. S. Sukthankar and Prof. A. N. Upadhye for Sanskrit and Sanskrit learning. We should suggest that greater attention be paid to the reviews of important and comprehensive works, together with a larger evaluation of their merits. Such attention marks the reviews of works like Sankalia's *University of Nalanda* and Mohan Singh's *Goraknath and Mediæval Hindu Mysticism*; but not to books like the *Srikara Bhashya* and Narayana Rao's *History of the Telugu Language*. In passing, it may be pointed out that a mistake like Edward Thompson instead of Edward Thomas, as the author of 'The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi'—in column 11 on p. 10 of No. 5, should not have been allowed to get in. If it may be permitted, it can be well recommended that a *subject-war* arrangement of the reviews be adopted in the *Journal* which, we are sure, satisfies the needs of both scholars and librarians.

C.S.S.

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'On the use of *Analysis Situs* in Contemporary Psychology'

By

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Since the days of Weber and Fechner, when the first successful application of mathematics to the manipulation of results obtained from psychological (psycho-physical) experiments was made, the mathematical treatment of mental phenomena has been developing slowly sometimes, rapidly at other times, but certainly at all times. The London School, which has advanced from the correlational methods to the more rigorous tetrad-difference criteria,¹ has raised the status of mathematics, in the special field of its investigations, almost to that which it occupies in mathematical physics. Experimental psychology is becoming more and more mathematical in all its departments. Even in estimating the dimensions of personality attempts are being made to interpret the results with the help of correlational formulae.² The success that has attended the efforts of the psychologists to introduce mathematical conceptions in the interpretation of psychological phenomena, it is said, augurs well for the future of our science, for if psychology is to become a pure science, it cannot but use the mathematical method at certain stages of explanation. But there are some eminent leaders of psychology who seem to be calling a halt to mathematical psychology. They seem to cast grave doubt on the validity of the very conceptions which underlie the entire procedure of mathematical psychology.³ At the same time, there are other equally eminent

1. Thomas, F. C., *Ability and Knowledge*, pp. 223, 282, 284.

2. Freyer, *Measurement of Interests*.

3. Carr, H. A., *The Search for Certainty*, *Psychol. Rev.*, 44. '37., 274-296.

leaders whose faith in mathematics is unshaken, and who seem to believe that psychology can make no progress as a science unless it employs mathematical method.⁴ The object of this paper is to survey, very briefly, the nature of the mathematical method in psychology and to assess the value of the latest development in mathematical psychology, namely, Topological Psychology.

It goes without saying that the data gathered from any field of investigation should be quantitative before they can be manipulated mathematically. These data should be measurable and expressible in numbers. In the last analysis number turns out to be the desideratum for the mathematical treatment of facts. What then is the relationship between number and fact? Three conceivable modes of relationship exist between facts, and numbers professing to represent facts. The first is a purely arbitrary relationship similar to the relationship that exists in the Pythagorean system between numbers and the facts of the external world which they purport to represent. The second, which may be called the Monitorial, consists in arranging things, properties or events in an ascending or descending order, and then attaching the cardinal numbers to them. These two modes, the Pythagorean and Monitorial, do not lend themselves to mathematical treatment, because they are not based on the property of measurability. In the third or Mathematical mode of relationship the things, events and properties with which cardinal numbers are associated, bear among themselves the relationship which these numbers bear among themselves; in other words, they are additive. They are measurable in terms of suitably selected units or standards of measurement.

Are psychological facts capable of measurement in terms of a rigid objective unit? Some facts are measurable; some are not. Facts of sensation, for example are measurable, but those of drives, personality etc., are not measurable. In one important field, namely in Intelligence, elusive facts have been reduced to mathematical order by the application of a special technique. The manipulation of the statistical data obtained from experimental testing of intelligence and learning by the correlational method and the method of tetrad-difference, has yielded very fruitful results, and judged by their success in the practical field, these results must be considered to be thoroughly reliable and objective. Yet an experienced psychologist questions the validity of these methods even in the field of learning.⁵ 'The use of mathematical data', says

4. Johnson, H. M., Pseudo-mathematics in the Mental and Social Sciences, *Am. J. of Psychol.*, xlviii, 1936, 342-351.

5. Kantor, J. R., Concerning Physical Analogies in Psychology. *Am.J. of Psychol.*, xlviii, 1936,

Professor Carr⁶ 'in the solution of any psychological problem does not guarantee in any manner the truth of an interpretation of these data.' 'To attain any psychological conclusion from mathematical data, we must intrepert these data in terms of the purpose and conditions of our experiment. In making this interpretation, we at once leave the field of mathematics and enter that of psychology.'

Professor Carr's observation is perfectly true, but his remark is applicable to all sciences that use the mathematical method, not excluding physics. There is first an abstract analysis of data to enable the investigator to apply mathematical formulae to them, and then the formulae are developed purely mathematically. The final result has then to be interpreted in terms of the particular science concerned. Surprising discoveries and forecasts of real events are made on the basis of pure mathematical calculations. Maxwell 'legislated' in this way for the wireless waves long before they were known, and similarly 'matrix' equations were worked out before they were needed by the physicist; in a small way in one of our local laboratories the solution of a particular equation turned out to be negative. This pointed to the fact that the electrical connection had to be made with the negative terminal. These facts, great and small, serve to indicate that the structure of the human mind, as well as the structure of the world which that mind knows, is mathematical. One need not, therefore, take objection to the use of mathematics in psychology on that ground.

Objection is taken to the application of the statistical method on another ground. The statistical average is unreal. It depends too much on the past and hazards a vague guess about the future. Besides, it is well known that 'figures' may be made to tell any tale. It is possible to manipulate the figures in such a manner as to make them yield just the result desired by the investigator.

We do not fail to see the force of these arguments, but it is worth noting at the same time that physics has passed from the stage of the so called strict measurement to the statistical stage. Statistical averages and probabilities are considered to be perfectly orthodox in pure science. Psychology does not stand to lose by using these methods.

The main point of the argument against mathematical psychology seems to be this. Psychological facts are not quantitative, hence the mathematics used in psychology is merely pseudo-mathematics. Professors Carr and Kantor are very vehement in denouncing the intentions of the psychologist which prompt him to apply mathematics to his

science. The former says, 'I suspect that many of us are somewhat inclined to use mathematical operations,, in the fond hope that our experiments will thereby become suffused with some of the dignity and respectability of that science. (and) as a means of compensating for the well-known inferiority-complex of our science.' ⁷ The latter writes, 'Unfortunately psychologists. imagine that their discipline can attain full scientific maturity merely by measuring, experimenting or quantifying. ' ⁸ If this is the attitude of contemporary psychology towards the prevalent method of treatment of psychological facts, then the situation is desparate, for mere accumulation of facts without an orienting concept is not scientific, and will not be helpful for intelligent research. We must have a fundamental or basic category for our science, in the light of which the investigator can orient himself in the vast field bristling with facts. It is at this critical juncture that the youngest discipline in mathematics, namely Topological Geometry, comes to our aid. It does not claim to solve the problem for us, but only points to the direction in which we should proceed in order to find the solution.

If metrical methods are inapplicable to psychological facts, then we should employ non-metrical methods of handling our data. *Analysis Situs* is non-metrical. It is qualitative, not quantitative. Professor Kurt Lewin has made a systematic application of *Analysis Situs* to the study of the behaviour of the organism in the environment in his book, 'Principles of Topological Psychology'. Now Topology is itself an infant science; it is being applied to psychology which is also considered to be an infant science, and Professor Lewin's attempt is the first of its kind. So we can only consider whether this new branch of our science, in its triple infancy, shows signs of a more promising future than the other branches.

The Gestalt school in general, (and Professor Lewin in particular) has familiarised us with the 'field' concept in psychology, and also with the re-formed definitions of 'force', which have been forced on the mathematical physicist as the result of the latter's abandonment of the aether hypothesis and of the space-time dualism. The new concepts operate quite successfully in physics. But could they be made to operate with equal success in psychology? We shall mention two objections.

Consider the behaviour of a thing X in its structured field, for example the behaviour of a magnetic needle in a structured electromagnetic field, whose structure S_1 it is proposed to determine by the

7. Kantor, J. R.. Concerning Physical Analogies in Psychology.

8. Kurt Lewin: *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, 1935.

introduction of the needle. Now the introduction of the needle which has a field of its own S_n produces a modification in S_1 and the resultant ($S_1 \times S_n$) is S_2 . For all practical purposes the physicist considers S_2 to be identical with S_1 since the quantitative difference between the two is negligible as compared with S_1 . Physical measurements are invariably subject to this indeterminacy, which is merely the result of a generalised form of Heisenberg's principle of Indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is negligible in physics, since only the quantitative aspects of phenomena are considered. In psychology on the other hand, the inter-action between S_n and S_1 may be so revolutionary qualitatively as to destroy the structure of S_1 almost completely. Hence the 'field' concept is workable in psychology only within very rigorous limits, and it is very doubtful whether it would be workable at all where qualitative considerations count most.

The concepts of *force*, *stress*, *tension* and *direction* depend on measurement. Our object is to get away from the metrical to the non-metrical.

Is *Analysis Situs* more helpful to us? When we consider the early origin of the Topological concept in the manipulation of knots, we seem to receive considerable encouragement. A loop is made in a rope, the two ends of which are fixed. In how many ways can the loop be manipulated? Can the knot be untied? What general principles of manipulation can be formulated? Now psychological problems dealing with the behaviour of the organism appear to bear considerable resemblance to these problems of the 'knot'. Heredity and environment being fixed, in how many different ways can the behaviour-pattern of the individual be changed? Can heredity be annihilated? What are the psychological laws controlling behaviour?

'In this branch of mathematics (*analysis situs*) shape and size are unimportant. Analysis situs, is interested only in those properties of figures. which are not changed when the figures are subjected to continuous motion in a fluid medium. Thus it is easy to conceive of a fluid motion carrying a circle into an ellipse, and thence into a square, even though the areas enclosed by these figures differ greatly. From the stand-point of Analysis Situs, then, there is no essential difference between these figures—the differences in their size and shape are unimportant.'⁹ Topology permits us to stretch, twist, pull, puff or otherwise do anything with the geometrical figure so long as we do not tear it up or do not link up what is unlinked or unlink what is already linked. For the Topologist a point and the earth are alike. And what is most appealing to us is that 'mathematical relationships may be determined

without measurement.' Eliminating measurement and quantity, which are stumbling blocks in psychological experimentation, the new discipline introduces such concepts as *point sets*, *limit points*, *proximity*, *boundary*, *path*, *homeomorphism* etc., which are welcome to the psychologist. Topology is qualitative mathematics for whose advent the psychologist has been eagerly looking forward.

Professor Lewin in applying analysis situs to the study of behaviour derives, in the first instance, a very important equation :

$$B = F (PE)$$

where B, P and E stand for behaviour, person and environment respectively. This is not a mere symbolic representation of the old formula that behaviour is determined by the organism acting in an environment. To understand this equation we should first understand Professor Lewin's definition of causation and his new concept of 'LIFE-SPACE'. Like Spinoza Professor Lewin discards both mechanical and teleological concepts of causation. For the Professor only the present counts, past antecedents and future purposes do not have meaning. Like Spinoza the Professor too employs geometrical and logical concepts in the analysis of events. The law of causation is merely the expression of the relationship of logical ground and consequence. Besides this rigorous logical and mathematical definition of causation, Professor Lewin stresses the need for introducing spatial concepts in psychology. Temporal concepts have had their day and have played out their parts. Spatial concepts have been neglected so far. We must now give them the consideration that is due to them. For this purpose the expression 'Life—Space' has been introduced. Space in this connection should be understood in the purely mathematical sense. For contemporary mathematics space is n-dimensional, non-metrical and curves round on itself. For mathematics it matters little what this space represents. It may be smell, colour, drive or interest. Physical interpretations are ruled out.

When we analyse the concept of Life-Space, we find that it is merely a cross section in the concrete behavioral stream. It may be compared to the microtomic sections of organisms made for zoological purposes. The successive aspects of life-space are like the successive sections made on the microtome. Each slide gives us a clear and accurate picture of one small proportion of the organism. But to understand the organism as a whole we have to reconstruct the whole by synthesising the sections. Each 'Life Space' study is perfect in itself. But for a knowledge of the organism as a whole we shall have to synthesise these partial studies. Such synthesis will lead us to the drives or propensities which move the organism. In other words Gestaltic psycho-dynamic studies will find their culmination in Hormic Psychology.

The Diamagnetic Susceptibility of Formic Acid-Water Mixtures

By

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1. INTRODUCTION.

The study of the magnetic susceptibility of binary mixtures of organic and inorganic liquids has engaged the attention of many workers in recent years.¹ The general conclusion appears to be that when the molecules of two liquids mix with each other without the production of any chemical reaction, the additive law holds good. When the molecules combine with each other resulting in the formation of new compounds, departures from the additive law are noted. These cases do not include solutions of salts in water. Investigations by the authors² have shown that when some salts are dissolved in water, departures from the additive law may be observed. In these cases, the percentage changes appear to be independent of concentration and have been attributed to (1) interaction between the ions and water molecules (2) depolymerisation of water (3) release of constraints within the molecules due to their breakage into ions and (4) change of valency of any of the ions when the salt is dissolved. While the first two causes do not produce more than 1 % change from the additive law, the other two causes give rise to much larger changes. Hoare and Brindley³ have recently determined the susceptibilities of salts composed of ions with inert gas configurations and found that for the halides of lithium and caesium, the additive law breaks down. Flordal and Frivold⁴ obtained large changes of susceptibility when some alkaline earth halides were dissolved in water. Similar results were also noted by Subramaniam⁵ who discussed the magnetic effects accompanying ionic deformations in the solid salts studied. Varadachari⁶ had previously drawn attention to such effects in his study of sulphuric acid-water mixtures. He investigated also acetic acid-water mixtures and obtained no departure from the additive law in this case.

1. For references see *Ind. Jour. Phys.*, 8, 483, 1934.

2. *Phil. Mag.*, 24, 1025, 1937.

3. *Proc. Roy. Soc.*, 147, 88, 1934 ; 152, 342, 1935.

4. *Ann. der Phys.*, 23, 425, 1935.

5. *Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc.*, 4, 404, 1936.

6. *Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc.*, 2, 161, 1935.

Formic acid is well known to be highly polar. During the recent investigations of aqueous solutions of formates and acetates, the authors found a strict adherence to the law of additivity. On making similar investigations with formic acid, however, definite departures were found. Since this result is at variance with that of Kido,⁷ we have thought it advisable to record our conclusion.

2. EXPERIMENT.

The formic acid used was the purest (100 %) available from Kahlbaum. It had a density of 1.220 grams per c.c. at 26°C. The water used was obtained by repeated distillation in an all-glass apparatus. The densities of the aqueous solutions prepared were determined by the hydrostatic method. A glass piece was suspended from one arm of a sensitive balance by a fine gold wire and weighed in air, in pure water and in the solution. The concentrations were found from the known concentration-density data given in International Critical Tables.⁸

Measurements of susceptibility were made with a Curie balance.⁹ The position of the test bulb at which the magnetomotive force on it was maximum was carefully determined by studying the deflections obtained with the bulb at different places along the horizontal line of symmetry between the pole pieces. At the place where this force was maximum, investigations were also made in a vertical direction and in this manner the volume wherein the force was uniform was definitely fixed. The size of the bulb used was in every case arranged to be less than the volume thus obtained.

The magnetomotive force on a bulb of mass m_g containing a liquid of mass m_l is given by

$$m_g \chi_g H \frac{dH}{dx} + m_l \chi_l H \frac{dH}{dx}$$

where χ_g and χ_l are the specific susceptibilities of the glass and liquid respectively. The force on the bulb alone $m_g \chi_g H \frac{dH}{dx}$ was determined separately. The force (in this case the deflection which is proportional directly to the force) on the liquid $m_l \chi_l H \frac{dH}{dx}$ becomes known. In the same manner if water is studied, the force on a mass m_w becomes

7. Sc. Rep. Tohoku Imp. Univ., 21, 385, 1932.

8. It. Crit. Tables, 3, 122.

9. For details, see Varadachari, Annamalai University Journal, 4, 73, 1935.

$m_w \chi_w H \frac{dH}{dx}$. If d_l and d_w are the deflections obtained for the liquid and water respectively, then χ_l is determined from the equation,

$$\frac{m_l \chi_l}{m_w \chi_w} = \frac{d_l}{d_w}.$$

The susceptibility of water at 26°C was assumed to be 0.720.*

The containers were thin spherical bulbs blown from glass tubing having a very low diamagnetic susceptibility. The deflections obtained with the bulbs were about 2 mms. while for the mixtures, they were nearly 15 cms. The retorsion method was employed, the specimen being brought to the identical position in presence of the magnetic field. The weights of the bulbs with and without the liquids were determined with a Sartorius balance correct to the tenth of a milligram. A careful estimate of the various errors involved in these observations indicates a probable error of 1/2 per cent in the susceptibility values.

3. RESULTS.

The specific diamagnetic susceptibility of pure formic acid was found to be 0.4464. This value compares favourably with 0.432 given in the International Critical Tables¹⁰ and 0.434 given by Kido.⁷

The values of the diamagnetic susceptibility obtained at different concentrations are given in the following table. The concentrations of the mixture are given as the number of grams of formic acid in 100 grams of the mixture.


TABLE I.

No.	Density.	Concen- tration. C	χ_1 Observed.	χ_2 Calculated.	$\chi_2 - \chi_1$	$\frac{\chi_2 - \chi_1}{C} \times 100$
1.	1.063	29.0	0.6292	0.6408	0.0112	0.039
2.	1.080	36.0	0.6105	0.6217	0.0112	0.031
3.	1.108	49.0	0.5701	0.5863	0.0162	0.033
4.	1.112	51.0	0.5705	0.5808	0.0103	0.020
5.	1.127	57.5	0.5434	0.5630	0.0196	0.034
6.	1.126	57.5	0.5414	0.5630	0.0216	0.037
7.	1.152	69.5	0.5055	0.5303	0.0248	0.036
8.	1.155	71.0	0.5058	0.5261	0.0203	0.029
9.	1.171	79.0	0.4834	0.5043	0.0209	0.026

* All susceptibility values in this paper are given in 10^{-6} units and are diamagnetic unless otherwise mentioned.

10. Int. Crit. Tables, 6, 356.

In figure 1 is shown the graph between concentration and diamagnetic susceptibility. It will be seen that there is much deviation between the observed values and those calculated on the basis of the additivity



law. The departures from additivity are examined by drawing the difference graph at various concentrations. The maximum departure is found to be 5 % and occurs at a concentration of nearly 70 %. At this concentration, formic acid and water exist nearly in equimolecular proportions. This suggests the formation of the monohydrate $\text{HCOOH} \cdot \text{H}_2\text{O}$ and the consequent departure from the law of additivity.

4. DISCUSSION.

An examination of figure 1 suggests the probable formation of the monohydrate of formic acid. There is indeed some evidence for the existence of such a compound. Colles¹¹ has recorded that when a mixture of formic acid and water having the composition 4HCOOH , $3\text{H}_2\text{O}$ is rapidly cooled, crystals having 76.7 and 77.2 per cent of formic acid are deposited. The hydrate formed in this manner at -54°C seems to be also produced at higher temperatures from a mixture of the

11. Chem. Soc. Trans., 89, 1251, 1906.

composition 2HCOOH , H_2O . It is however open to doubt whether at the temperature of our investigations (26°C) the monohydrate exists in such a stable manner as to affect the magnetic susceptibility by 5%.

There is however another method of accounting for the observed deviation. It was pointed out by the authors in a recent paper that the molecular susceptibility of formic acid is 20.5 while the susceptibility of the formate ion is 17.3. If we assume with Kido¹² that the hydrogen attached to the formate ion does not contribute anything to the molar susceptibility of the acid, then it is difficult to account for the higher value of the acid.

Investigations¹³ on the electrical moments of the fatty acid molecules show definitely that these exist mainly as double molecules even in dilute benzene solutions. It would appear that the doublets of the carboxyl groups cancel one another giving practically zero moment to the molecule as a whole. Smyth and Rogers¹⁴ studied solutions of acetic acid in ether and have concluded that in solution, single and double molecules of acetic acid are in equilibrium. It is likely that such a condition may also exist in aqueous solutions of formic acid. When the double molecules break into single ones, the susceptibility will tend to approach that of the formate ion and hence shows a decrease in value. In table I it will be found that the change of susceptibility for 100 grams of the acid (given in the last column) remains nearly constant showing a tendency to decrease at higher concentrations. This is exactly what would happen if a change of susceptibility occurs when some of the double molecules of formic acid break into single molecules when the acid is added to water. When the concentration of formic acid is increased it is natural to expect that the percentage of molecules suffering disruption would be smaller. This is exactly what is suggested when one observes the last column in table I.

This argument would indicate that if in formic acid all the molecules were to exist as single molecules, the susceptibility would be the same as for the formate ion. But since the molecules exist in pairs, we have for formic acid a value larger than that for the formate ion. Such a conclusion should be true for acetic acid also.

Experiments of Varadachari¹⁵ show that when acetic acid is heated from 28° to about 60°C , there is no change of susceptibility. It might be possible that the change actually taking place in this range of tem-

12. Sc. Rep. Tohoku Imp. Univ., 22, 835, 1933.

13. Smyth, Dielectric Constant and molecular structure, 94, 1931.

14. Jour. Am. Chem. Soc., 52, 1824, 1930.

15. Proc. Ind. Acad. Ss., 2, 166, 1935.

perature is too small to be measured. For the difference between the susceptibilities of acetic acid and of the acetate ion is only 7%. In the limited range of temperature in Varadachari's experiments, the number of double molecules breaking up into single molecules may be so few that the change of susceptibility may be less than $\frac{1}{2}\%$, the limit of accuracy in these investigations.

Formic acid and acetic acid behave differently from other liquids from the point of view of optical scattering. Ramakrishna Rao¹⁶ found that in all the organic substances studied by him, the optical anisotropy in the liquid state was less than in the state of vapour. The significant exceptions were formic and acetic acids. Here the anisotropy in the liquid state was found to be greater than in the state of vapour. Experiments on the variation of the anisotropy conducted by Rao¹⁷ showed definitely that such an effect was due to association. The anisotropy in the case of acetic acid showed a small decrease in the range 30° to 60°C but at higher temperatures the decrease was much greater. More recent experiments of Krishnan, Sundara Rama Rao¹⁸ and Jogarao¹⁹ have in general verified the above observations. Krishnan²⁰ infers the presence of molecular clusters in formic and acetic acids of dimensions not small compared with the wavelength of light. It is obvious that in magnetic considerations we are not concerned with such large clusters even if they are present within the liquids. Experiments are being instituted to study the susceptibility of formic acid and acetic acid at much higher temperatures and of solutions of fatty acids in organic solvents like benzene and ether.

It is well known that aqueous solutions of formic acid and formates are very weak electrolytes. Experiments with aqueous solutions of formates of sodium, barium and calcium show that no change of magnetic susceptibility takes place when these salts are dissolved. In the case of formic acid, the decrease in susceptibility on dissolving it in water molecules of the acid. This would suggest that in the double molecule, there should be something more than mere association in the sense that only electrostatic forces keep the two acid molecules together. There has been explained as being due to the break-up of some of the double should be a large release of constraints when the double molecule is

16. Ind. Jour. Phys., 2, 61, 1927.

17. Ind. Jour. Phys., 3, 1, 1928.

18. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 369, 1936.

19. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 377, 1936.

20. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 3, 126, 1936.

formed resulting in an increase in the diamagnetic susceptibility. Or some more fundamental process should occur. More experimental work is needed to settle these questions and investigations on these lines will be taken up shortly.

5. SUMMARY

The magnetic susceptibility of aqueous solutions of formic acid has been studied at different concentrations. The results suggest the formation of a monohydrate of formic acid at a concentration of nearly 70% of the acid. An alternative explanation for the decrease of susceptibility is also presented. The formic acid contains ordinarily double molecules and on dissolving in water, some of these may break up into single molecules. This phenomenon may account for the decrease of susceptibility observed when the acid is dissolved in water. This explanation gains interest from the fact that the formic acid has a molar susceptibility of 20.5 while the ionic susceptibility of the formate (which should be the same as that of the molecule) is 17.3. The higher value of the acid is to be attributed to the existence of double molecules. More detailed experiments are being instituted.

The Infinitesimal Flow on the Projective Plane

By

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INTRODUCTION

Let G_r be a continuous r -parameter group of point transformations which carries a manifold S_n into itself. With every linear operator ξ^i of the group may be associated an infinitesimal displacement of the points of S_n given by

$$x'^i = x^i + \xi^i \delta t$$

which may be supposed to take place in the short time interval δt . If S_n carries a metric, every such infinitesimal transformation of G_r determines a velocity field \mathbf{V} in S_n , which is characteristic of the group G_r from which it is derived. In this paper, the velocity field due to the infinitesimal transformations of the projective group is studied by the methods of Euclidean vector analysis.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE FLOW VECTOR

2. The projective group G_8 in the Cartesian plane, has the eight independent infinitesimal operators

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, x \frac{\partial}{\partial x}, y \frac{\partial}{\partial x}, x \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, y \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, x^2 \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + xy \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, yx \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + y^2 \frac{\partial}{\partial y}$$

on which every other infinitesimal operator of G_8 is linearly dependent. Hence χ being any infinitesimal operator of the group we may write,

$$\begin{aligned} \chi = [a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + x(\lambda x + \mu y)] \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \\ + [b_0 + b_1x + b_2y + y(\lambda x + \mu y)] \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \end{aligned}$$

where $a_0, a_1, a_2, b_0, b_1, b_2, \lambda, \mu$ are all constants. Thus the velocity field $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{i}v_1 + \mathbf{j}v_2$, due to a general infinitesimal transformation of the group corresponding to the operator χ is given by

$$\left. \begin{aligned} v_1 &= a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + x(\lambda x + \mu y) \\ v_2 &= b_0 + b_1x + b_2y + y(\lambda x + \mu y) \end{aligned} \right\} \quad \dots (2.1)$$

From (2.1) we have,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Div } \mathbf{V} &= \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial x} + \frac{\partial v_2}{\partial y} = 3\lambda x + 3\mu y + a_1 + b_2 \\ \text{Curl } \mathbf{V} &= \left(\frac{\partial v_2}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial v_1}{\partial y} \right) \mathbf{N} = (\lambda y - \mu x + b_1 - a_2) \mathbf{N} \end{aligned} \right\} \dots (2.2)$$

where \mathbf{N} is a unit vector normal to the plane.

From (2.2) we see that,

the locus of points at which Div \mathbf{V} is constant is a system of parallel lines, and the locus of points at which Curl \mathbf{V} is constant is another system of parallel lines perpendicular to the former.

Thus there is a unique point in the plane at which the divergence and curl take given values and in particular a point O where they both vanish. Taking the lines L, L' , along which the divergence and curl respectively vanish, for axes of co-ordinates, the expression for v_1, v_2 may be written in simpler form,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} v_1 &= a_0 + a_1x + a_2y + \mu xy \\ v_2 &= b_0 + a_2x - a_1y + \mu y^2 \end{aligned} \right\} \dots (2.3)$$

The eight velocities of which the field vector \mathbf{V} is composed may be grouped as follows. Firstly a velocity $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{I}a_0 + \mathbf{J}b_0$ due to a pure translation; secondly a velocity $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{I}(a_1x + a_2y) + \mathbf{J}(a_2x - a_1y)$ due to a homogeneous strain of zero divergence and zero rotation, the axes of strain being the lines L, L' turned about O through an angle θ given by $\tan 2\theta = a_2/a_1$; thirdly a radial flow, in which each point P has a velocity along OP of magnitude μry , whose divergence and curl are equal to $3\mu y$ and $-\mu xN$ respectively. It should be noticed that this radial flow is peculiar to the projective group, in the sense that it does not belong to the Euclidean or affine sub-groups of the projective group.

3. Every projective transformation on a plane leaves three points A, B, C invariant. From (2.3) it is evident that

the locus of points at which the vector \mathbf{V} is parallel to a fixed line $y = \lambda x$ is a conic C_λ passing through A, B, C , having one asymptote parallel to $y = \lambda x$ and the other parallel to the line L along the points of which Div \mathbf{V} vanishes.

In particular when $\lambda = 0$, C_λ is a parabola whose axis is parallel to the line L . When the fixed direction is parallel to the y -axis, i.e., to the line L' , C_λ is a rectangular hyperbola whose asymptotes are parallel to the axes, i.e., to the lines L and L' .

Again, since the expressions for $\text{Div } \mathbf{V}$ is linear in x and y , it follows that the divergence of the vector at the centroid of any number of points $P_1 P_2 \dots P_n$ is the mean of the divergences of the vectors at these points. A similar result is true of the curl of the field. Using homogeneous co-ordinates referred to the triangle ABC formed by the fixed points, the equations of an infinitesimal transformation may be written,

$$x' = \varrho(1 + \varepsilon_1)x, \quad y' = \varrho(1 + \varepsilon_2)y, \quad z' = \varrho(1 + \varepsilon_3)z,$$

where the ε 's are infinitesimals. If the identical relation between the homogeneous co-ordinates be $\alpha x + \beta y + \gamma z = 1$, assuming the displacement to have taken place in a time δt , the expressions for the divergence and curl of the vector at $P(x, y, z)$ may be written,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Div } \mathbf{V} &= \alpha(k_2 + k_3 - 2k_1)x + \beta(k_3 + k_1 - 2k_2)y \\ &\quad + \gamma(k_1 + k_2 - 2k_3)z \\ \text{Curl } \mathbf{V} &= [\alpha(k_2 - k_3) \cot A. \ x + \beta(k_3 - k_1) \cot B. \ y \\ &\quad + \gamma(k_1 - k_2) \cot C. \ z] \mathbf{N} \end{aligned} \right\} (3.1)$$

where $k_r = \lim_{\delta t \rightarrow 0} \varepsilon_r / \delta t$ ($r = 1, 2, 3$) and \mathbf{N} is the unit vector normal to the plane. Also the direction of the vector at the point $P(x_1, y_1, z_1)$ is along the line

$$(k_2 - k_3) \frac{x}{x_1} + (k_3 - k_1) \frac{y}{y_1} + (k_1 - k_2) \frac{z}{z_1} = 0. \quad \dots (3.2)$$

From (3.2) it follows that the lines of flow (the W -curves of the projective group) are given by

$$x^{k_2 - k_3} y^{k_3 - k_1} z^{k_1 - k_2} = \text{constant.}^* \quad \dots (3.3)$$

From (3.1) it follows that

$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at the centroid of the triangle ABC and $\text{curl } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at the orthocentre of ABC .

Further, since the lines L, L' are at right angles, we see that the locus of points O at which the divergence and curl of the vector vanish for various infinitesimal transformations which keep the same three points A, B, C invariant, is the circle on PG as diameter where P, G are respectively the orthocentre and centroid of the triangle ABC .

From (3.2) we see that the locus of points at which the direction of the vector \mathbf{V} passes through a fixed point P is a conic passing through A, B, C and P . Dually, it is found that the envelope of the directions of the vectors at points of a fixed line l is a conic touching l and the sides of the triangle ABC . If the point O at which the divergence and curl

* *Encyklopadie der Math. Wiss.* III D 4, page 207.

vanish coincides with one of the three fixed points say A , it may be inferred from (3.1) or directly verified that the triangle ABC is right angled at A . In this case if C_λ be the conic which is the locus of points at which the vector \mathbf{V} is parallel to a fixed direction λ and C_μ be similarly defined it is found that the angle of intersection of the conics C_λ and C_μ at A is equal to the angle between the direction λ and μ . Also the lines of flow are all conics having double contact at B and C and having as tangents the sides AB , AC of the triangle ABC .**

At all points on the line at infinity except those on L and L' the magnitude of the field vector, its divergence and curl are all infinite, the direction of the vector being, however, definite. The behaviour at the points at infinity on L and L' is somewhat peculiar. Since all the conics C_λ pass through the point at infinity on L and also all the lines of constant divergence are all parallel to L , the direction of the vector and its divergence are both indeterminate at this point. The curl of the field has an infinite value. Similarly, since all the lines $\text{Curl } \mathbf{V} = \text{const.}$ are parallel to L' , the curl of the vector field at the point at infinity on L' is indeterminate. The direction of the vector at this point is parallel to L' and its divergence is infinite.

EXTENSION TO n -DIMENSIONAL SPACE

4. Many of these results may be extended to a Euclidean space S_n of n dimensions. In S_n , the projective group G_r where $r = n(n+2)$ has the $n(n+2)$ independent infinitesimal operators,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}, \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial x^j}, \quad x^i x^j \frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}, \quad (i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n)$$

the tensor summation convention being followed. Hence, if χ be any infinitesimal operator of the group, since it is linearly dependent on the above $n(n+2)$ operators, we may write,

$$\chi = (a^i + l_j^i x^j + p_j x^j x^i) \frac{\partial}{\partial x^i}$$

where the a 's, b 's and the p 's are constants. Hence the components v^i of the velocity field \mathbf{V} due to the infinitesimal displacement corresponding to the operator χ are given by

$$v^i = a^i + l_j^i x^j + p_j x^j x^i \quad \dots \quad (4.1)$$

The fundamental tensor g_{ij} being chosen so that $g_{ij} = \delta_{ij}$, where the Kronecker deltas δ_{ij} are given by equations,

$$\delta_{ij} = 0 \text{ if } i \neq j \text{ and } \delta_{ij} = 1 \text{ if } i = j.$$

** This is a consequence of $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ at A so that $k_2 + k_3 = 2k_1$. The curves (3.3) now become $x^2 y^{-1} z^{-1} = \text{const.}$

we have from (4.1),

$$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial x^i} = l_i^i + (n+1)p_i x^i$$

Hence the locus of points at which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$ is the prime

$$p_i x^i + l_i^i / (n+1) = 0.$$

The components of the Stoke's tensor† of \mathbf{V} in S_n which corresponds to the curl of the field in S_2 or S_3 , are given by

$$[ij] \equiv \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial x^j} - \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial x^i} = b_j^i - b_i^j + p_j x^i - p_i x^j \quad (i \neq j; i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n)$$

From the above equations we deduce

$$p_i[jk] + p_j[k i] + p_k[ij] \equiv \lambda_{ijk} \quad \dots (4.3)$$

where the λ 's are constants. In virtue of the identities (4.3), only $(n-1)$ of the components of the Stoke's tensor of \mathbf{V} are independent, such sets being of the form $[k1], [k2] \dots [k(k-1)], [k(k+1)] \dots [kn]$; also, since each component of this tensor is linear in the co-ordinates x^i , it follows that the locus of points at which the components of the Stoke's tensor \mathbf{V} are given constants satisfying (4.3) is a line L whose direction is given by

$$\frac{dx^1}{p_1} = \frac{dx^2}{p_2} = \dots = \frac{dx^n}{p_n} \quad \dots (4.4)$$

From (4.2) and (4.4) it is evident that *the line L is orthogonal to the prime at the points of which $\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = 0$.*

The projective transformation in S_n leaves $n+1$ points invariant. Taking these as the vertices of the simplex S of reference, the expression for the divergence of the vector \mathbf{V} may be written in the form,

$$\text{Div } \mathbf{V} = \sum_{r=1}^{n+1} k_r - (n+1) \sum_{r=1}^{n+1} a_r k_r x_r \quad \dots (4.5)$$

where $\sum_{r=1}^{n+1} a_r x_r = 1$ is the identical relation satisfied by the homogeneous co-ordinates of every point of S_n and the k 's are constants depending on the infinitesimal transformation. From (4.5), it is evident that *the divergence of the vector v vanishes identically at the centroid of the simplex S which is given by the equations,*

$$a_1 x_1 = a_2 x_2 = \dots = a_{n+1} x_{n+1} = 1/(n+1)$$

† Eisenhart: *Riemannian Geometry*, Page 27.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

By

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குத்திரம் 41.

எஞ்சி யோர்க்கும் எஞ்சுத லிலவே.

இது, முன் குத்திரங்களிற் கூறப் பெறப் பிறரும் கூற்றுக் குரியராதல் உண்டு என்று எய்தாத தெய்துவிக்கின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) எஞ்சியோர்க்கும் = இதுவரை குறித்துக் கூறப்படாத, செவிலி, பாங்கர், ஆயத்தார், பரத்தையர், வாயிலாவார், பாகன் பாணன் போன்ற பிறர்க்கும்; எஞ்சுதலில் = அகத்துறைகளில் கூற்று ஒழிதல் இல்லை.

(வி-ரை.) ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை. இவ்வியலில் தலைமகள் கூற்று, தனித்துக் கூறப்படாதது சிந்திக்கத்தக்கது. உரைமுகிரியர் இளம்பூரணர் 'தலைமகள் கூற்று உணர்த்திய குத்திரம் காலப்பழமைமால், ஏடு பெயர்த்தெழுதுவார் வீழ எழுதினர் போலும்' எனக்கூறித் தலைமகள் கூற்றுவரும்பல இடங்களைச் சுட்டி விளக்கியுள்ளார். அகத்துறைப் பாட்டுக்களில் தலைவி கூறுமிடங்கள் பலபடியாகப் பாராட்டப்படுதல் பண்டைப் பாட்டுக்களில் பரக்கக் காணலாம். ஆதலின் அக்கூற்றுக்களுக்கு ஈண்டு உதாரணம் வேண்டற்பாற்றன்று.

செவிலி கூற்றுக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“முனிதயிர் பிசைந்த கார்தண் மெல்விரல்
கழுவுறு கலிங்கங் கழாஅ துடிஇக்
குவளை யுண்கண் குய்ப்புகை கமழத்
தான்றுழந் தட்ட தீம்புளிப் பாகர்
இனிதெனக் கணவ னுண்டலின்
துண்ணிதின் மகிழ்தன் றெண்ணுதன் முகனே”. (குறு. 167).

“கானங் கோழி கவர்குரற் சேவல்
ஒண்பொறி யெருத்திற் றண்சித ருறைப்பப்
புதனீர் வாரும் பூநாறு புறவிற்
சீறாரோளே மடந்தை; வேலார்
வேந்துவிடு தொழிலொடு செலினும்
சேந்துவர லறியாது செம்ம நேரே”. (குறு. 242).

பாங்கன் கூற்றிற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“காமம் காம மென்ப காமம்
அணங்கும் பிணியு மன்றே; நினைப்பின்,

முதைச் சுவற் கலித்த முற்று விளம்புல்
முதா தைவர் தாங்கு
விருந்தே காமம் பெருந்தோ ளோயே ”.

(குறு. 204).

இது, தலைமகற்குப் பாங்கள் உரைத்தது.

“ இடிக்குங் கேளிர் நுங்குறை யாக
நிறுக்கலாற் றினோ நன்முமற் றில்ல
ஞாயிறு காயும் வெவ்வறை மருங்கிற்
கையி லாமன் கண்ணிற் காக்கும்
வெண்ணெ யுணங்கல் போலப்
பரந்தன் றிந்நோய் நோன்றுகொளற் கரிதே ”.

(குறு. 58).

இக் குறுந்தொகை (58) ஆம் பாட்டு, கழறிக்கூறியபாங்கற்குத் தலைவன் மாறிக் கூறுதலாம்.

ஆயத்தார் கூற்றுக்கு உதாரணம் :—

“ தாதிற் செய்த தண்பனிப் பாவை
காலே வருந்தும் கையா றேம்பென
ஓரை ஆயங் கூறக் கேட்டும் ”.

எனங் குறுந்தொகை (48) ஆம் செய்யுளில் ஆயத்தின் கூற்று நிகழ்ந்தமை காண்க.

பரத்தையர் கூற்றிற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ கூந்த லாம்பன் முழுநெறி யடைச்சில்
பெரும்புனல் வந்த விருந்துறை விரும்பி
யாமல் தயர்கஞ் சேறுந் தானல்
தஞ்சுவ துடையளாயின் வெம்போர்
நுகம்படக் கடக்கும் பல்வே லெழினி
முனையான் பெருநிரை போலக்
கிளையொடுங் காக்கதன் கொழுநன் மார்பே ”.

(குறு. 80).

“ கணைக் கோட்டு வாளை கமஞ்சுன் மாமழை
துணர்த்தேக் கொக்கின் றீம்பழங் கதூஉம்
தொன்றுமுதிர் வேளிர் குன்றுர்க் குணது
தண்பெரும் பவ்வ மணங்குக தோழி
மனையோண் மடமையிற் புரக்கும்
அனையே மகிழ்நற்கியா மாயின மெனினே ”.

எனங் குறுந்தொகை (164) ஆம் செய்யுள் காதம்பரத்தை, தலைமகட்குப் பாங்காயினர் கேட்ப உரைத்தது.

“ அரிப்பவர்ப் பிரம்பின் வரிப்புற நீர்நாய்
 வாளை நாளிரை பெறுஉ மூரன்
 பொற்கோ லவிர்தொடித் தற்கெழு தகுவி
 எற்புறங் கூறுமென்ப ; தெற்றன
 வணங்கிறைப் பணைத்தோள் எல்வளை மகளிர்
 துணங்கை நாளுந் வந்தன அவ்வரைக்
 கண்பொர மற்றதன் கண்ணவர்
 மணங்கொளந் கிவரும் மள்ளர் போரே ”.

எனும் குறுந்தொகை (364) ஆம் செய்யுளில் இப்பரத்தை பாங்காயினர் கேட்பக் கூறியது காண்க.

“ நகைநன் குடையன் பாணதும் பெருமகன்
 மனைவலி சிதையக் களிறுபல பரப்பி
 யரண்பல கடந்த முரண்கொ டானை
 வழுகி வாழிய பலவெனத் தொழுதிண்டு
 மன்னையி லுடையோர் போல வந்தியா
 மென்னலும் பரியலோ விலமெனத் தண்ணடைக்
 கலிமா கடைஇ வந்தெஞ் சேரித்
 தாருங் கண்ணியுங் காட்டி யொருமைய
 நெஞ்சங் கொண்டமை விடுமோ வஞ்சக்
 கண்ணுடைச் சிறுகோல் பற்றிக்
 கதம்பொரி துடையளயா யழுங்கலோ விலனே ”.

எனும் நற்றிணை (150) ம் செய்யுளும் பரத்தை கூற்றிற்கு உதாரணமாம்.

பாகன் கூற்றிற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ விதையர் கொன்ற முதையற் பூழி
 யிடுமுறை நிரப்பிய வீரிலை வரகின்
 கவைக்கதிர் கறித்த காமர் மடப்பிணை
 யரலை யங்காட் டிரலையொடு வதிகும்
 புறவிற் றம்மநீ நயந்தோ ளூரே.
 எல்லிவிட் டன்று வேந்தெனச் சொல்லுபு
 பரியல் ; வாழ்க நின் கண்ணி. காண்வர
 விரியுளைப் பொலிந்த வீங்குசெலற் கலிமா
 வண்பரி தயங்க வெழிஇத் தண்பெயற்
 கான்யாற் றிடுமணற் கரைபிறக் கொழிய
 வெவ்விருந் தயரு மனைவி
 மெல்லிறைப் பணைத்தோட் டுயிலமர் போயே ”.

பாணன் கூற்றிற்கு உதாரணம் வருமாறு :—

“நினக்கியாம் பாணரு மல்லே மெமக்கு
நீயும் குருசிலை யல்லை மாதோ ;
நின்வெங் காதலி தன்மனைப் புலம்பி
ஈரித முண்கண் உருத்த
பூசல் கேட்டு மருளா தோயே”.

(ஐங். 480).

கீழ் வரும் அயலோர்கூற்று ‘ஊரும் அறஹம்’ (503) என்னும் செய்யுளியற் சூத்திரத்திற்கு மாறான பிற்காலத் தெழுந்த வழக்காகும்.

“துறந்ததற் கொண்டு துயரடச் சாஅ
யறம் புலந்து பழிக்கு மனாகணாட்டி
எவ்வ நெஞ்சிற் கேம மாக
வந்தன னோரின் மகளே
வெந்திறல் வெள்வேல் விடலை முந்தறவே”.

(ஐங். 393).

இது, உடன்போப்த் தலைமகள் மீண்டுவந்துழி அயலோர் அவள் தாய்க்குச் சொல்லியது.

சூத்திரம் 42.

நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தற் கேதுவு மாறும்.

இஃது ஐந்திணை இலக்கணம் விளக்கிய முன்னைய சூத்திரத்தின் அடங்காமல் திணைக்குறிப்பொருளாய் அகத்துறைகளில் வந்து பயில்வனவற்றுள் பிறிதொரு செய்தி கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தற்கு = தலைமக்கள்பால் முன் நிகழ்ந்த செய்திகள் பின் ஏற்றபெற்றி நினைவுறுத்தற்கு ; ஏதுவுமாகும் = ஏற்புடை ஏதுக்களாதலுமுண்டு.

(வி-ரை.) முன், ‘புணர்தல், பிரிதல்’ என்னும் (14) ஆம் சூத்திரத்தால் திணைக்குறிப்பொருள் ஐந்தையும் விளக்கினார். அவற்றுள் அடங்காமல் திணைக்குறிப்பொருளாகச் செய்யுளில் ஆட்சி பெறுவன வேறு சிலவும் உளவாதலின் அவற்றை “உரிப் பொருளல்ல” எனும் சூத்திரத்தால் சுட்டி, அவற்றுள் கொண்டு தலைக்கழிதல் முதலிய சிலவற்றை இயைபு நோக்கி ஐந்திணை இலக்கணச் சூத்திரத்தை அடுத்தே கூறிய ஆசிரியர், அவ்வாறு உரிப் பொருளாகும் பிற சிலவற்றை இச் சூத்திரத்தானும் எதிர் சூத்திரத்தானும் விளங்க வைத்தார்.

முன் நிகழ்ந்தது காதலர்பால் நினைப்பிற்கு ஏதுவாதல் அகத்துறையில் இயல்பாம் என்பதை இச் சூத்திரத்தானும், அவ்வாறு நினைத்துக் கூற்று நிகழ்தலும் அகத்துறையின் பார் பட்டதே என்பதை வருஞ் சூத்திரத்தானும் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கினார்.

இனி, இச் சூத்திரமும் எதிர் சூத்திரமும் காதற்கூற்றுக்குப் பொருளாமாயினும், கொண்டு தலைக்கழிதல் காட்சி முதலியன போலப் பெருவரவின்மையான் அவற்றொடு கூறுது ஈண்டுக் கூற்று வகைகூறும் சூத்திரங்களை அடுத்து இவற்றை ஆசிரியர் கூறினாரென்க.

நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தற்கு உதாரணம் வருமாறு :—

“ யாருமில்லைத் தானே கள்வன்
தானது பொய்ப்பின் யானெவன் செய்கோ
நினைத்தா ளன்ன சிறுபசங் கால
ஒழுகுநீர் ஆரல் பார்க்கும்
குருகு முண்டுதான் மணந்த ஞான்றே ”.

(குறு. 25).

இது, தலைவி நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தற்குச் செய்யுள்.

இனி, தலைவன் நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இரண்டறி கள்விநங் காத லோனோ
முரண்காள் துப்பிற் செவ்வென்மலையன்
முள்ளூர்க் கான நாற வந்து
நள்ளென் கங்கு னம்மோ ரன்னள் ;
கூந்தல் வேயந்த விரவு மலருகிர்த்துச்
சாந்துளர் நறுங்குதுப் பெண்ணெய் நீவி
அமரா முகத்த ளாகித்
தமரோ ரன்னள் வைகறை யானே.”

(குறு. 312).

“ அயத்துவளர் பைஞ்சாய் முருந்தின் ஆன்ன
நகைப்பொலிந் திலங்கு மெயிறுகெழு துவர்வாப்
ஆகத் தாழ்ம்பிய முலையன் பனைத்தேதான்
மாத்தாட் குவளை மலர்பிணைத் தன்ன
மாயிதழ் மழைக்கண் மாஆயோ னொடு
பேயு மறியா மறையமை புணர்ச்சி
பூசற் றடியிற் புணர்வுபிரிந் திசைப்பக்
கரந்த கரப்பொடு நாஞ்செலற் கருமையிற்
கடும்புனல் மலிந்த காவிரிப்பேரியாற்று
நெடுஞ்சுழி நீத்த மண்ணுநர் போல
நடுங்குநர் தீர முயங்கி நெருநல்
ஆக,மடைதந் தோனோ வென்வேல்
களிறு கெழு தானைப் பொறையன் கொல்லி
ஒளிறு நீ ரடுக்கத்து வியலகம் பொற்பக்
கடவு ளெழுதிய பாவையின்
மடவது மாண்ட மாஆயோனே ”

என்றும் அகம் (62) ஆம் செய்யுளுமது.

குத்திரம் 43.

“ நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி நிலையலுந் திணையே ”

இதுவும், முற் குத்திரத்தைப்போலவே, ஐந்திணைச் குத்திரங்களி னடங்காது, அவற்றின் வேறுமாகாது, திணைக்குரிப் பொருளாய் அகத்துறையில் வந்து பயிலும் பிறி தொன்று கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி = காதலர் தம்முள் நிகழ்ந்த செய்தியை எடுத்துக் கூறி நிலையலுந்திணையே = நிலைபெறுதலும் அகத்துறைத் திணையேயாம்.

(வி-ரை.) உரைகாரர் இவ்விரு குத்திரங்களையும் பாலைத்திணைக்கே உரியனபோலக் கொள்ளுதல் அமைவுடைத்தன்று; பாலைல்லாப் பிற திணைகளிலும் நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தலும், நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி நிலையலும் வருதலின், எல்லாத்திணைக்கும் உரியவாய் அமையு மென்க. அது பற்றியே பாலைத்திணை இயல்புகளோடு இவற்றைக் கூறுது அவைமுடிந்து பொதுவியல் கூறும் இவ்விடத்து இச்சுத்திரங்கள் வைக்கப்பட்டன. புணர்ச்சி முதலிய ஐந்தனுள் எதனினும் அடங்காமல் உரிப்பொருளாயமைதலின், “ நிலையலும் பாலை ” — “ நிலையலும் ” “ நிலையலும் பிரிவு ” என்னுது, ‘திணையே’ எனப் பொதுப் படக்கூறிய பெற்றி அறிக.

தலைவி நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி நிலையலுக்கு உதாரணம் வருமாறு :—

“ கேட்டிசின் வாழி தோழி யல்கற்
பொய்வ லாள் மெய்புற மரீஇ
வாய்த்தகைப் பொய்க்கொ மருட்ட வேற்றெழுந்
தமளி தைவந் தன்னே குவளை
வண்டுபடு மலரிற் சாஅய்த்
தமியேன் மன்ற வளியேன் யானே.” (குறு. 30).

“ துறுக லயலது மாணை மாக்கொடி.
துஞ்சுகளி றிவருங் குன்ற நாட
நெஞ்சுகள னாக நீயலேன் யானென
நற்றோண் மணந்த ஞானறை மற்றவன்
தவாஅ வஞ்சின முரைத்தது
நோயோ தோழி நின்வயி னானே.” (குறு. 36).

இதுவுமது.

“ கொடியவுங் கோட்டவும் நீரின்றி நிறம்பெறப்
பொடியுழற் புறந்தந்த பூவாப்பூம் பொலன்கோதைத்
தொடிசெறி யாப்பமை யரிமுன்கை யணைத்தோளா
யடியுறை யருளாமை யொத்ததோ நினைக்கென
நரந்தரா றிருங்கூந்தல் எஞ்சாது நனிபற்றிப்

பொலம்புனை மகரவாய் நுங்கிய சிகழிகை
 நலம்பெறச் சுற்றிய குரலமை யொருகாழ்
 விரன்முறை சுற்றி மோக்கலு மோந்தன
 னொ அவிழ்ந்தன்ன என் மெல்விரற் போதுகொண்டு
 செறாஅச் செங்கண் புதைய வைத்துப்
 பறாஅக் குருகி னுயிர்த்தலு முயிர்த்தனன்
 ரெய்யி விளமுலை யினிய தைவந்து
 தொய்யலந் தடக்கையின் வீழ்பிடி யளிக்கு
 மையல் யானையின் மருட்டலு மருட்டினன்
 அதனால் அல்லல் களைந்தனன் தோழி”

எனவரும் குறிஞ்சிக்கவி (18) ஆம் செய்யுளடிகளும் நிகழ்ந்ததனைத் தலைவி கூறி
 நிலையலேயாம்.

“ மின்னொளி ரவிரற ளிடைபோமும் பெயலேபோற்
 பொன்னகை தகைவகிர் வகைநெறி வயங்குட்டுப்
 போழிடை யிட்ட கமழ்நலும் பூங்கோதை
 யின்னகை யிலங்கெயிற்றுத் தேமொழித் துவர்செல்வாய்
 நன்றுதா னினக்கொன்று கூறுவாங் கேளினி
 நில்லென நிறுத்தா னிறுத்தே வந்து
 துதலு முகனூந் தோளுங் கண்ணு
 மியலுஞ் சொல்லு நோக்குபு ரினைஇ
 யைதேயந் தன்று பிறையு மன்று
 மைதீர்ந் தன்று மதியு மன்று
 வேயமன் றன்று மலையு மன்று
 பூவமன் றன்று சுனையு மன்று
 மெல்லவியலு மாயிலு மன்று
 சொல்லத் தளருங் கிளியு மன்று ;

எனவாங்கு ;

அணையன பலபா ராட்டிப் பையென
 வலைவர் போலச் சோர்பத னொற்றிப்
 புலையர் போலப் புன்க ணைக்கித்
 தொழலுந் தொழுதான் றொடலுந் தொட்டான்
 காழ்வரை நில்லாக் கடுங்களி றன்னோன்
 தொழுஉம் தொடுஉ மவன் றன்மை
 யேழைத் தன்மையோ வில்லை தோழி.”

(குறி. 19).

என்பதும், தலைவி நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி நிலையலேயாம்.

தலைவன் நிகழ்ந்தது கூறி நிலையலுக்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அளிநிலை பொறாஅ தமரிய முகத்தன்
விளிநிலை கொள்ளாள், தமிழண் மென்மெல
நலமிகு சேவடி நிலம்வடுக் கொளாஅக்
குறுக வந்துதன் கூரெயிறு தோன்ற
வறிதகத் தெழுந்த வாயல் முறுவலள்,
கண்ணிய துணரா வளவை யொண்ணுதல்
வினைதலைப் படுதல் செல்லா நினைவுடன்
முளிந்த வோமை முதையலங் காட்டுப்
பளிங்கத் தன்ன பல்காய் நெல்லி
மோட்டிரும் பாதை யீட்டுவட் டேய்ப்ப
உதிர்வன படுஉங் கதிர்நெறு கவாஅன்
மாய்த்த போல மழுகுதுனை தோற்றிப்
பாத்தி யன்ன குடுமிக் கூர்ங்கல்
விரனுதி சிதைக்கும் நிரைநிலை யதர
பரன்முரம் பாகிய பயமில் கான
மிறப்ப வெண்ணுதி ராயி னறத்தா
றன்றென் மொழிந்த தொன்றுபடு கிளவி
யன்ன வாக வெண்ணுந் போல
முன்னங் காட்டி முகத்தி னுரையா
வோவச் செய்தியி னென்றுநினைந் தொற்றிப்
பாவை மாய்த்த பனிநீர் நோக்கமொ
டாகத் தொடுக்கிய புதல்வன் புன்றலைத்
தூநீர் பயந்த துணைபமை பிணையன்
மோயினள் உயிர்த்த காலை மாமலர்
மணியுரு விழந்த வணியழி தோற்றங்
கண்டே கடிந்தனஞ் செலவே ; யொண்டொடி
புழைய மாகவும் இணைவோள்
பிழையலண் மாதோ பிரிதுநா மெனினே.

(அகநா. 5).

சூத்திரம் 44.

“ மரபுநிலைதிரியா மாட்சிய வாகி
விரவும் பொருளும் விரவும் என்ப ”

இது, மேற்கூத்திரங்களி லடங்காதுவரும் அகத்துறைப் பகுதிகளுள் ஐந்தினை அல்லாத உரிப் பொருட்கெல்லாம் ஓர் புறனடை கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) மரபு நிலைதிரியா மாட்சிய வாகி = முறைமை இயல் கெடாமலும், மாண்பு தருவனவாயும் ; விரவும் பொருளும் விரவும் என்ப = திணைக்குரிப்பொருளாய் ஐந்த்

ஒழுக்கத்தோடு அமைய அகத்துறைகளில் கலந்து வரத்தகுவன வந்து பயிலும் என்று கூறுவர் இலக்கணநூலார்.

(வி-ரை.) இவ்வாறு கொள்ளாமல் இச்சுத்திரத்திற்கு “முல்லக்குரிய முதற் பொருளும் கருப்பொருளும் விரவுதலாமென” இளம் பூரணர் கூறும் பொருள் சிறவாது. ‘திணையக் குறுதலும்’ என்னும் இவ்வியல் முன் (12) ஆம் சுத்திரத்தால் முதலொடு உரிப்பொருள் மயங்குதற்கும், ‘உரிப் பொருளல்லன மயங்கவும் பெறுமே’ என்னும் (13) ஆம் சுத்திரத்தால் ஐந்திணை இலக்கணத்தி லடங்காத அகத்திற்குரிய பொருளெல்லாம் முதற்பொருளொடு மயங்குதற்கும், ‘எந்நிலமருங்கில் பூவும் புள்ளும்’ என்னும் (19) ஆம் சுத்திரத்தால் கருப்பொருள்கள், தம்முள்ளும், முதல் கருப் பொருள்களோடும் விரவுதற்கும் புறனடைச் சுத்திரங்கள் தனித்தனிபே கூறிவைத்தா ராதலால், ஈண்டு மீண்டும் முன்கூறிய முதற்பொருள் கருப்பொருள் விரவுதலையே கூறினாரென்பது கூறியது கூறலா மாதலின் அது பொருந்தாதென்க.

தலைமக்களின் மனையற மாட்சியைச் செவிலி வியந்து பாராட்டல், கற்பறக் காதலால் இற்சிறப்பின்பம் தலைவன் பாராட்டல், தலைவன் வரவு கூறவாரைத் தோழி வாழ்த்தல், தலைவி வாழ்த்தல், இயற்பட மொழிதல், பரத்தை தலைவி பாங்காயினார் கேட்பக் கூறலாகிய இவையும், இன்னபிறவும் இப்புறனடைச் சுத்திரத்தால் அமையு மென்க.

மனையற மாட்சியைச் செவிலி வியத்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“முனிதயிர் பிசைந்த காந்தண் மெல்விரல்
கழுவுறு கலிங்கங் கழாஅ துடிஇக்
குவளை யுண்கண் குய்ப்புகை கமழத்
தான்றுழந் தட்ட தீம்புளிப் பாகர்
இனிதெனக் கணவ னுண்டனின்
நுண்ணிதின் மகிழ்ந்தன் றெண்ணுதன் முகனே” (குறு. 167).

“பிரசங் கலந்த வெண்கவைத் தீம்பால்
விரிகதிர்ப் பொற்கலத் தொருகை யேந்திப்
புடைப்பிற் சுற்றும் பூந்தலைச் சிறுகோ
லுண்ணென் றோக்குபு புடைப்பத் தெண்ணீர்
முத்தரிப் பொற்சிலம் பொலிப்பத் தத்துற்
றிரைரைக் கூந்தற் செம்முது செவியிர்
பரீஇ மெலிற் தொழியப் பந்த ரோடி
ஏவன் மறுக்குஞ் சிறுவனை யாட்டி
அறிவு மொழுக்கமும் யாண்டுணர்ந் தனன்கொல்
கொண்ட கொழுநன் குடிவற னுற்றெனக்
கொடுத்த தந்தை கொழுஞ்சோ றுள்ளாள்
ஒழுஞ்சூர் நுணங்கறல் போலப்
பொழுது மறுத்துண்ணுஞ் சிறுமது கையனே.”

(நற். 110)

என்பது மது.

தலைவன் பாராட்டற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ விரிதிரைப் பெருங்கடல் வளைஇய உலகமும்
அரிதுபெறு சிறப்பின் புத்தேள் நாடும்
இரண்டுந் தூக்கில் சீர்சா லாவே
பூப்போ லுண்கண் பொன்போல் மேனி
மாண்வரி யாகக் குறுமகள்
தோள்மாறு படுஉம் வைகலோ டெமக்கே.” (குறு. 101).

இக் குறுந்தொகைப் பாட்டு இல்லற நடத்தும் தலைவன் தான் தன் கற்புயர் காதல் மனைவியாலெய்தும் இன்பத்தைப் பாராட்டியது.

தலைவன் வரவு கூறுவாரைத் தோழிவாழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அரும்பெற லமிழ்த மார்பத மாகப்
பெரும்பெய ருலகம் பெறீஇயரோ வன்னை
தம்மில் தமதுண் டன்ன சினைதொறும்
தீம்பழந் தூங்கும் பலவி
னோங்குமலை நாடனை வருமென் றோளே ”. (குறு. 83).

அயலிலாட்டியைத் தலைவி வாழ்த்தற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ அமிழ்த முண்கநம் மயலி லாட்டி
பால்கலப் பன்ன தேக்கொக் கருந்துபு
நீல மென்சிறை வள்ளுகிர்ப் பறவை
நெல்லி யம்புளி மாந்தி யயலது
முள்ளி லம்பனை மூங்கிலிற் றாங்குங்
கழைநிவந் தோங்கிய சோலை
மலைகெழு நாடனை வருமென்றோளே.” (குறு. 201).

இயற்பட மொழிதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“ இதுமற் றெவனோ தோழி துனியிடை
இன்னர் என்னு மின்னாக் கிளவி
யிருமருப் பெருமை யீன்றணிக் காரா
உழவன் யாத்த குழவியி னகலாது
பாற் பெய் பைம்பயி ராரு முரன்
திருமனைப் பல்கடம் பூண்ட
பெருமுது பெண்டி ராகிய நமக்கே.” (குறு. 181).

“ நிலத்தினும் பெரிதே வானினுமுயர்ந்தன்று
நீரினுமாரள வின்றே சாரற்

கருங்கோற் குறிஞ்சிப் பூக்கொண்டு
பெருந்தே னிழைக்கு நாடனெடு நட்பே.”

(குறுங். 3).

என்பதும்.

பரத்தை தலைவி பாங்காயினார் கேட்பக் கூறியதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“கழனி மாத்து விளைந்துகு தீம்பழம்
பழன வாளை கதூஉ மூர
னெம்மிற் பெருமொழி கூறித் தம்மிற்
கையுங் காலுந் தூக்கத் தூக்கு
மாடிப் பாவை போல
மேவன செய்யுந்தன் புதல்வன் தாய்க்கே.”

(குறுங். 8).

கணைக்கோட்டு வானை கமஞ்சூன் மடநாகு
துணர்த்தேன் கொக்கின் தீம்பழங் கதூஉந்
தொன்றுமுதிர் வேளிர் குன்றுர்க் குணது
தண்பெரும் பௌவ மணங்குக கோழி
மனையோண் மடமையிற் புலக்கு
மனையே மகிழ்நற்கியா மாயின மெனினே”

என்னும் குறுந்தொகை (164) ஆம் செய்யுள் காதற்பரத்தை தலைமகட்குப் பாங்காயினார் கேட்ப உரைத்தமைக்கு உதாரணமாகும்.

குத்திரம் 45.

உள்ளுறை உவமம் ஏனை உவமமெனத்
தள்ளாதாகும் திணையுணர் வகையே.”

இது, அகத்துறைச் செய்யுட்களில் வரும் உரிப்பொருட் பகுதிகள் எல்லா வற்றிற்கும் சிறப்பாக உரித்தாம் உவம வகை கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) திணையுணர் வகையே = ஐந்திணைஉணர்த்தும் உரிப்பொருட் பகுதிகளில் ; உள்ளுறை உவமம் = உள்ளுறை உவமமானது ; ஏனை உவமமெனத் தள்ளாதாகும் = மற்றைய உவமத் தோற்றம்போல அருகாமல் வந்து பயிலும்.

(வி-ரை.) ஈற்றேகாரம் அசைநிலை. உவமம், வெளிப்படத் தோன்றும் உவமமும், உள்ளுறை உவமமுமென இருவகைத்தாம். இவற்றுள் உள்ளுறை உவமமே திணையுணரும் உரிப்பொருட் பகுதிகளைச் சிறப்பித்தற்கு உரித்தாகும். ஏனைய உவமம் அவ்வாறு அகவொழுக்க வகைகளுக்குச் சிறவாதாகையால், அகத்துறைகளில் திணையுணரும் பகுதிகளுக்கு அத்துணையா ஆட்சி பெருதலில்லை. ‘தள்ளாதாகும்’ என்பதனால், ஏனை உவமம் அருகிப் பயிலும் என்பதும், உள்ளுறை உவமம் அவ்வாறன்றிப் பெருவரவிற்கும் என்பதும் பெறப்படும்.

உள்ளுறை, உவமத்தின் ஒருபகுதியா யடங்குமேனும், புறத்திற்கே பெரிதும் உரிமை கொள்ளும் ஏனை உவமம் போலாது, அகத்திற்கே சிறந்து உரியதாதலின், இது உவம இயலிற் கூறப்பெறுது அகவொழுக்கம் கூறும் இத்திணையில் கூறப்பட்டது. ஏனை உவமத்தை ‘அகத்திணைக்குரித்தல்லாதது’ என ஏனை உவமச் சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ் விரிவுரையில் நச்சினூக்கினியர் கூறுவர். பண்டை இலக்கியத்தில் அருகிய ஆட்சி அகத்திணையிலும் ஏனை உவமம் பெறுதலின், அதனை அறவே அகத்திணைக்கு உரித்தில்லை என விலக்குதல் பொருந்தாது.

இளம் பூரணர், உள்ளுறை உவமம், ஒழிந்த உவமம், என இருவகையாலும் ‘திணை யுணர்வகை தப்பாதாகும்’ எனக் கூறுவதாலும், ஏனை உவமத்திற்கும் அருகியேனும் அகத்திணைக்கண் ஆட்சி உண்மை தெளியப்படும்.

சூத்திரம் 46.

உள்ளுறை தெய்வம் ஒழிந்ததை நிலனெனக்
கொள்ளு மென்ப குறியறிந் தோரே.”

இஃது, உள்ளுறை உவமத்திற்கு நிலைக்களம் உணர்த்துகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) உள்ளுறை = அகத்திணையிற் பயிலும் உள்ளுறை உவமம்; தெய்வம் ஒழிந்ததை நிலனெனக் கொள்ளும் = கருப்பொருள்களுள் தெய்வம் நீக்கி மற்றைய வற்றைத் தனக்கு நிலைக்களமாகத் தழுவி வரும்; என்ப குறியறிந்தோரே = என்று கூறுவர் இலக்கண மறிந்தோர்.

(வி-ரை.) ஈற்றேகாரம் அசை.

சூத்திரம் 47.

உள்ளுறுத் திதனோ டொத்துப் பொருண் முடிகென
வுள்ளுறுத் திறுவதை உள்ளுறை உவமம்.

இது, உள்ளுறை உவமத்தின் இயல்பு கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) உள்ளுறுத்திதனோடு ஒத்துப் பொருள் முடிகென = வெளிப்படக் கூறும் பொருளோடு உள்ளும் பொருளும் ஒத்து முடியுமாறு; உள்ளுறுத்திறுவதை உள்ளுறை உவமம் = உள்ளத்து ஊன்றி உணர அமைந்து முடிவது உள்ளுறை உவமமாகும்.

(வி-ரை.) இறுவதை என்பது ஏற்றை என்பது போல ஐகான் பெற்று முடிந்த குற்றகர ஈற்றுப் பெயர்.

“எற்றோ வாழி தோழி முற்றுபு

கறிவளர் அடுக்கத்து இரவின் முழங்கிய

மங்குன் மாமழை வீழ்ந்தெனப் பொங்குமயிர்க்

கலைதொட விழுக்கிய பூநாறு பலவுக்கனி

வரையிழி யருவி உண்டுறை தருஉம்

குன்ற நாடன் கேண்மை

மென்தோள் சாய்த்தும் சால்பின் நன்றே”.

(குறு. 90).

மிளகுக் கொடி வளரும் மலையில், இரவில், இடிமுழங்கும் கார்தரு மழையில் உயிர் நிறைந்த முசுக்கடுவன் விரும்ப அதன் கையகப்படாது திளையினின்று நழுவிய மண முள்ள பலாக்கனியை மலையருவி உண்ணத்தகுந்த சூறையில் கொண்டு தரும் சூன்ற நாடன் 'கேண்மை மெல்லிய தோளேச் சிறிது வருத்தினும் அமைதியை அளித்தது' என்றது புலப்படக்கூறும் பொருள். இதனால், செல்வம் செறிந்த அயலார் தலைவியை வரைய வொண்ணாமல், ஊரெழுமலரை அஞ்சிக் காவல் நிறைந்த இப்புறத்தில் இரவில் தோழி கொண்டுதர, தலைவன் உடன்கொண்டு ரென்று அவளைத் தன்மனையில் கற்பனம் சிறக்கக் காதலால் மணந்து நன்மையைத் தந்தான்-என்பது உள்ளுறுத்து ஒன்று முடிவ தால், இது உள்ளுறை உவமமாமாறு காண்க.

குத்திரம் 48.

ஏனை உவமம் தானுணர் வகைத்தே

இஃது உள்ளுறை ஒழிந்த மற்றைய உவமத்தோற்றம் உணர்ந்துகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஏனை உவமம் = உள்ளுறை ஒழிந்த பிற உவமம் ; தானுணர் வகைத்தே = உள்ளுறுத்துணரவேண்டாது, பட்டாங்கே சொல்வழிப் பொருளறியக் கிடக்கும் கூறு பாட்டை யுடைத்து.

(வி-ரை.) அகத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்தூரிய உள்ளுறையைக் கூறிய ஆசிரியர், ஒப்பக் கூறல், ஒன்றென முடித்தல், தன்னின முடித்தல் என்னும் உத்திகள் பற்றி, உள்ளுறுத் துணரும் உள்ளுறை உவமம் போலாகு, பட்டாங்குணரும் பான்மைத்து ஏனை உவமம் என்பதையும் சுண்டுக் கூறினார்.

உருவகத்தை உள்ளுறை உவமமென மயங்கவைக்கும் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் சிறப்புரை பொருளன்மை அறிக.

குத்திரம் 49.

காமஞ்சாலா இளமை யோள்வயின்

எமஞ்சாலா இடும்பை எய்தி

நன்மையும் தீமையும் என்றிரு திறத்தால்

தன்னொடு மவளொடும் தருக்கிய புணர்த்துச்

சொல்லெதிர் பெறாஅன் சொல்லி இன்புறல்

புல்லித் தோன்றும் கைக்களைக் குறிப்பே”.

மேல், நடுவணைத் திணைக்குரிய இயல்புகள் கூறிய ஆசிரியர், எஞ்சி நின்ற கைக்களைப் பெருந்திணைகளின் இயல்பு கூறுவான் தொடங்கி, இதில் கைக்களை கூறுகின்றார்.

(இ-ள்.) காமஞ் சாலா இளமையோள் வயின் = காதற் செவ்வி கனியும் பருவம் வராத இளையோள் ஒருத்தியிடம் ; எமஞ்சாலா இடும்பை எய்தி = ஒரு தலைவன் தனக்கு மருந்து பிறிதில்லாப் பெருந்துயராம் காதலேய் கொண்டு ; நன்மையும் தீமையும் என்ற இரு திறத்தால் தன்னொடும் அவளொடும் தருக்கிய புணர்த்து = பட்டாங்கு புகழ்தலும் (ஆற்றமையால்) பழிப்பதுபோலப் புகழ்தலுமாகிய இருவகையானும் தன்பாலும் அவ்

வினையாள்பாலும் வீறுபெறத் தக்கன சாற்றி; சொல்லெதிர் பெறாஅன் சொல்லி இன்புறல் = மறுமாற்றம் பெறாத வழியும் தன்னுணர்ச்சி புரைத்து மகிழ்வது; புல்லித் தோன்றும் கைக்கிளைக்குறிப்பு = பொருந்தி வெளிப்படும் கைக்கிளைத் திணையின் குறிப்பு.

(வி-ரை.) 'கைக்கிளை' என்பது குற்றமற்ற ஒருமருங்கு பற்றிய காதலாகும். காமச்செவ்வி அறியாச் சிறுமியிடம் தலைமகனொருவனுக்குத் தன்னலமறந்து 'அவள் பொருட்டே வாழ்வு' எனக் கொள்ளும் காதற் பெற்றி தோன்றுங்கால், அது கைக்கிளை எனப்படும். காதலுணரும் பருவமுற்றான் தன்னைக் காதலியாத வழிதான் அவளைக் காதலிப்பது ஆடவனுக்கு 'நோர்திறம்' பெருந்திணையாக் கொள்ளப் படுவதல்லது செந்திகக் காதல் வகையாகப் பாராட்டுதல் தமிழ் மரபன்று. பருவமன்மையால் தன்னைக் காதலிக்க ஒல்லாத சிறுமியாயினும், அவள் தன் காதலுக்கு உரியளாதலின் காதலன் எனேத்து வகையானும் அவள்நலம் பேணுவதும், அப்புரைதீர் காதலால் தன்னொடும் அவளொடும் 'கொள்ளாத கொள்ளாமல்' பெருமை பேணும் பெற்றியினவே சார்த்திக் கூற்று நிகழ்த்துவதும், தனக்குத் தந்த காதல் நோக்கி அணியிழை (காமஞ்சாலாமையின்) தானே மருந்தாக வொல்லாமையால் அவன் இடும்பைக்கு எம்ம் பெருமையினும் தன் காதலுணர்ந்து அவன் அதற்கேற்ற பெற்றி மறுமாற்றம் கூறவொண்ணையினும், அவன் பால்தன்னுணர்வு கூறித் தானே மகிழ்வதும், குற்றமற்ற கைக்கிளையின் குறிகளாகும் என்பது இச்சூத்திரத்தில் வற்புறுத்தப்படுகிறது.

அத்தகைய கைக்கிளையும் ஆடவர்க்கே அமைவதன்றி மகளிர்க்கு மரபன்று. மகளிர் பால் ஒருதலைக் காமம் அவர்தம் பெண்ணீர்மைக்குப் பொருந்திய பொற்புடை நெறியாகா மையின், அதனைக் கைக்கிளையின் பாற்படுத்தாமல் பெருந்திணையில் அடக்குவதே புலனெறி வழக்கில் பண்டைத்தமிழ் மரபாம்.

கைக்கிளைத் தலைவனுக்கும் அவன் காமஞ்சாலாக் காதற் சிறுமிக்கும் வீறுபெற வைப்பனவே அவன் கூற்றாகும்; அல்லாதன அவன் வாய்ப்பிறவா என்பதை வற்புறுத்தற்கே 'தருக்கிய புணர்த்து' என்றசிரியர் கூறி வைத்தார். 'தருக்கிய சிறை' எனும் கம்பர் சொற்றொடரும் இத்தருக்கின் பெற்றியை வலியுறுத்தும்.

பண்டைத்தமிழ்ப் புலவர் கொண்ட இக் கைக்கிளையின் பெற்றியும் பெண்மைப் பண்பும் பாராட்டாது பிறர் பிற்காலத்துப் பெருந்திணையின்பாற்படும் புரையுள்ள பீழைப் பெண்மரின் ஒரு தலைக் காமத்தையும் கைக்கிளை எனக் கொள்வாராளுர். தாம் கொண்ட கொள்கைக்குத் தொல்காப்பியத்தில் இடமின்மை கண்டுவைத்தும், 'புல்லித் தோன்றும் கைக்கிளை' எனலால், "புல்லாமல் தோன்றும் கைக்கிளையும் கொள்ளப்படும்; அது காமஞ்சான்ற தலை மகள் மாட்டு நிகழும்" எனவும், அது களவியலிற் கூறப்படுவது போலவும் உரைகாரரிருவரும் கூறுவர். அவரைப் பின்பற்றி நாற்கவிராஜ நம்பியார் தன்னகப்பொருளில் 'காமஞ் சான்ற இளமையோள் வயின்' என்றே கைக்கிளைக்கு இலக்கணம் வகுத்து, காமஞ்சாலா இளமையோள்பால் காதலைக் கூறதொழிந்தார்.

காட்சி முதலியவற்றை கைக்கிளை எனக் கொள்ளாமல், ஐந்திணை உரிப்பொருள் களின் பாற்படுத்தித் தொல்காப்பியர் இவ்வகத்திணையிலிலும், களவியலிலும் கூறுதலானும், களவு அன்பினைத்திணையின் பாற்பட்டங்குதலானும், களவினும் அன்பினைத்திணையினும் வேறுபட்ட பெருந்திணையிப்போலவே கைக்கிளையும் அவற்றின் அடங்காத

வேறு திணையாய்ப் பிரித்துக் கூறப்படுதலானும், களவியலிற் கூறப்படும் எதுவும் கைக் கிளை ஆகாமை ஒருதலை. இச்சூத்திரத்திற் கூறப்படும் கைக்கிளை குற்றமற்ற பெற்றியதாதலின், பொருந்தாக் காமமாகிய பெருந்திணைபோலாது கைக்கிளை பொருந்தும் காதலாம் எனற்கே “புல்லித் தோன்றும் கைக்கிளைக் குறிப்பே” என ஆசிரியர் கூறி விளங்க வைத்தார்.

“வாருதுவணரைம்பால்” எனும் குறிஞ்சிக் கலிபுள்,

“உளனா என்உயிரை உண்டியவு நோய்கைம்மிக
இளமையா னுணராதால் நின் தவறில்லானும்
களைநரின் நோய் செய்யும் கவினநிற் தணிந்துதம்
வளமையாற் போத்தந்த துமர்தவறில் லென்பாய்.” (1)

“நடைமெலிற் தயர்வுறீஇ நாளுமென் நலையு நோய்
மடைமையான் உணராதாய் நின்சுவ றில்லானும்
இடைநில்லா தெய்க்குநின் உருவறிந் தணிந்துதம்
உடைமையாற் போத்தந்த துமர்தவறில் லென்பாய்.” (2)

“அல்லல்கூர் தழிவுற அணங்காகி அடரு நோய்
சொல்லினு மறிபாதாய் நின்தவறில்லானும்
ஒல்லையே உயிர்வவ்வும் உருவறிந்தணிந்துதம்
செல்வத்தாற் போத்தந்த துமர்தவ றில்லென்பாய்.” (3)

என வந்தமை காண்க. இத்தாழிசைகளுள், தலைவன் தன்னை நலியும் காமநோடை ‘இளமையா னுணராதாய்’, ‘மடமையா னுணராதாய்’, ‘சொல்லினு மறிபாதாய்’ எனக் கூறுதலால், அவன் காமஞ்சாலா இளமையோன் என்பது (1) அறியப்படும். ‘களைநரின் நோய் செய்யும் கவின’ எனவும், ‘இடைநில்லா தெய்க்கு நின் உரு’ எனவும், ‘ஒல்லையே உயிர் வவ்வும் உரு’ எனவும் அவனைப் புகழ்வதாலும், இக்கலிபுள் சரிதகத்தில் ‘மான் மற்றிந்நோய் பொறுக்கலாம் வரைத்தன்றிப் பெரிதாயின், பொலங்குமாய், மறுத்திவ்வூர் மன்றத்து மடலேறி நிறுக்குவன்போல் வல்லான், நீ படுபழியே’ எனப் பழிப்பதுபோல அவன் பெற்றியைக் கூறுதலாலும், நன்மையும், சீமையும் என்றிரு திறத்தாலும் தன் னெனும் அவனொடும் தலைவன் தருக்கிய புணர்த்துச் கூறுதல் காண்க (2). இளையோன் தனக்கு மறுமாற்றம் கூறுவழியும், “துமர்தவறில்லென்பாய்” என விளித்து அவளிடம் சொல்லெதிர் பெறுத்தலைவன் தானே சொல்லி இன்புறுதலும் (3) காண்க.

குத்திரம் 50.

ஏறிய மடற்றிறம் இளமை தீர்திறம்
தேறுதல் ஒழிந்த காமத்து மிகுதிறம்
மிக்க காமத்து மிடலொடு தொகைஇச்
செப்பிய நான்கும் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பே.

இது, நிறுத்தமுறையானே, எழுதினைகளுள் இறுதி நின்ற பெருந்திணை இயல் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) ஏறிய மடற்றிறம் = மடலேறுவேன் என்பதனோடமையாது, தலைவன் மடலேறுதலும்; இளமை தீர்திறம் = இன்பம்துய்த்தற்கு உரிய பருவம் கழிந்த பிறகு எழும் விழைச்சு விருப்பமும்; தேறுதலொழிந்த காமத்து மிகுதிறம் = தெளிய வொண்ணாமல் அறிவழிக்கும் கழி காமமும்; மிக்க காமத்து மிடலொடு தொகைஇ = கரைகடந்த காமத் தால் விரும்பாரை வலிதிற புணரும் வன்கண்மையொடு கூட்டி; செப்பிய நான்கும் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பே = கூறப்பட்ட இந்த நான்கும் இழிவொழுக்கத்தின் வகை குறிப்பனவாகும்.

(வி-ரை.) திணை என்பது ஒழுக்கம். இங்குப் ‘பெருந்திணை’ என்பது சிறிய ஒழுக்கம் எனப் பொருள்படும். கழிகாமத்தைச் சிறுமை எனக் கூறும் மரபு, “செருக்கும் சினமும் சிறுமையும்” என்னும் குறளில் காமக் குற்றத்தைச் ‘சிறுமை’ எனலால் அறிக. அறிவுடை மக்கட்டன்மைக் கமையாத இவ்விழி ஒழுக்கத்தைப் பெரிய ஒழுக்கம் என்றது, அது ஒழுக்கத்தொடு படாதென்பது குறிக்கும் அவையல்கிளவி மறைக்கும் சொல்லாம். மங்கலமற்றதையும் இடக்கரையும் மறைத்து எதிர்முகப் பெயரால் வழங்குவது தமிழ் மரபு. தாலி பெருகிற்று, விளக்கைப் பெருக்கு, என்பவற்றுள் பெருமைச்சொல் மறு தலைப் பொருளில் வருவது போலவே, பொருந்தாச் காமத்தைப் பெருந்திணை என்பதிலும் பெருமை அடை ஒழுக்கமின்மையைச் சுட்டுவதாகும். பெருந்திணை என்பது அவையில் உரைக்கவொண்ண இழிவொழுக்கத்தை மறைத்துக் கூறும் செய்யுள் வழக்கச் சொல்லாகும்.

மடலேறுதலும் விரும்பாரை வலிந்து கூடலும் ஆடவர் மாட்டே நிகழும். மடன்மா கூறுதலே மகளிர்க்குப் பொற்புடை நெறியன்மையின், மடலேறுதல் எஞ்ஞான்றும் அவர்க்கின்மை தெளியப்படுமும். மிக்க காமத்து மிடல் தம்மின் வலியராய ஆடவர்பால் மெல்லியலார்க்கு ஒல்லாதாகும். இளமைதீர் திறமும் தேறுதலொழிந்த காமமும் இருபாலார்க்கும் பொதுவாகும்.

(1) ஏறிய மடற்றிறம் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பாதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“மடலே காமந்தந்த தலேர
மிடைபூ வெருக்கி னலர்தந் தன்றே
இலங்கு கதிர் மழுங்கி யெல்விசம்பு படரப்
புலம்புகந் தன்றே புகன்றுசெய் மண்டில
மெல்லார் தந்ததன் றிலையும் பையென
வடந்தை துவலை தாவக் குடம்பைப்
பெடைபுண ரன்றி லியங்குகுர லீனஇக்
கங்குலுங் கையறவு தந்தன்
றியாங்காகு வென்கொ ளளியேன் யானே.” (நற். 152).

“நாணாக நாறு நனைகுழலாள் நல்கித்தன்
பூணாக நேர்வளவும் போகாது—பூணாக
மென்றே னிரண்டாவ துண்டோ மடன்மாமே
னின்றேன் மறுகிடையே நேர்ந்து.” (திணை நூற், 16.)

“நாடுண்டு நல்லாண்மை பண்டுடையேன், இன்றுடையேன்
காமுற்றார் ஏறுமடல். (குறள் 1133).

‘எழின்மருப் பெழில்வேழம்’ என்னும் நெய்தற்கலி (21)-ம் ‘சான்றவிர்
வாழியோ’ என்னும் (22) ஆம் நெய்தற்கலியும் ஏறிய மடற்றிறத்தையே கூறிய பாக்க
ளாதல் காண்க.

(2) இளமைதீர் திறம் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பாதற்குச் செய்யுள் :—

“மின்சாயன் மார்பன் குறிநின்றேன் யானாகத்
தீர்த்தறைந்த தலையுந்தன் கம்பலுங்
காரக்குறைந்து கறைப்பட்டு வந்துநம்
சேரியிற் போகா முடமுதிர் பார்ப்பாணைத்
தோழிநீ போற்றுதி யென்றி யவனாகே
பாராக் குறழாப் பணியாப் பொழுதன்றி
யாரிவ ணின்னீ ரெனக்கூறிப் பையென
வைகாண் முதுபகட்டிற் பக்கத்திற் போகாது
தையா தம்பலந் தின்றியோ வென்றுதன்
பக்கழித்துக் கொண்ட யெனத்தாலும் யாதொன்றும்
வாய்வானே னிற்பக் கடிதகன்று கைம்மாறிக்
கைப்படுக்கப் பட்டாய் சிஹிநீ மற்றியா
னேனைப் பிராசரு னென்னை நலிதரி
னிவ்வூர்ப் பளிநீ பெறுஅமற் கொள்வோ
னெனப் பலவுந் தாங்காது வாய்பாடி நிற்ப
முதுபார்ப்பா னஞ்சினனாத லறிந்தியா னெஞ்சா
தொருகை மணற்கொண்டு மேற்றாவக் கண்டே
கடுதரற்றிப் பூச ரெடுடங்கன னாகே
யொடுங்கா வயத்திற் கொடுங்கெழ்க் கடுங்க
ணிரும்புளி கொண்டார் நிறுத்த வலையினோ
ரேதில் குறுநரி பட்டற்றூற் காதலன்
காட்சி யழுங்க நம்மூர்க் கெலாஅ
மாகுல மாகி விளைந்ததை யென்றுந்தன்
வாழ்க்கை யதுவாகக் கொண்ட முதுபார்ப்பான்
வீழ்க்கைப் பெருங்கருங் கூத்து.”

இக்குறிஞ்சிக்கலி (29)யுள், ‘தீர்த்தறைந்த தலையும்’ ‘வைகாண் முதுபகட்டில்
‘முதுபார்ப்பான்’ என வருதலால், இளமை தீர்ந்தான் ஒருவன் இணைவிழைச்சினை மேற்
கொண்டான் என்பது புலனாகும்.

(3) தேறுத லொழிந்த காமத்து மிகுதிறம் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பாதற்கு, தன்னை
விரும்பாப் பிறன் மனையாளைப் பெட்டொழுகும் பேதையான தென்னிலங்கை
அரக்கன் காதற் கதை சாலும்.

(4) மிக்க காமத்துமிடல் பெருந்திணைக் குறிப்பாதல்:—

என்றவ ளரசன்தன்னை நோக்கலன் இவன் கணுவஞ்
சென்றமை குறிப்பிற்றேறிக் கூத்தெலா மிறந்தபின்றை
நின்றது மனத்திற் செற்றம் நீங்கித்தன் கோயில் பக்கான்
மன்றல மடந்தை தன்னை வலித்திகொண் டொலிகொடாரான்.

(சிந்தா. 685-காந்.).

தேனுடைந் தொழுதுஞ் செவ்வித் தாமரைப் போதுபுல்லி,
ஊனுடை உருவக் காக்கை இதழுகக் குடைந்திட்டாங்குக்
கானுடை மாலைதன்னைக் கட்டியங்காரன் சூழ்ந்து
தானுடை முல்லையெல்லாம் தாதுகப் பறித்திட்டானே.

(சிந். 686-காந்.).

குத்திரம் 52.

முன்னைய நான்கும் முன்னதற்கென்ப. இது, கைக்கிளை, பெருந்திணைகள் ஆகிய இரு குத்திரங்கட்குமுன், ஐந்திணைகளுள் அடங்காமல் திணைக்கு உரிப்பொருள்களாய், அகப்பகுதியில் வரும் பொது இயல்களாகக் கூறப்பட்ட நான்கும், கைக்கிளை, பெருந்திணையாய் இரண்டனுள் முன்னதாய் கைக்கிளைக்கு உரியவாதல் கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) முன்னைய நான்கும் = மேல், கைக்கிளை, பெருந்திணைச் குத்திரங்கட்கு முன்னே கூறிய, (1) நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தல் (2) நிகழ்ந்தது கூறியிலையல் (3) மரபுநிலை திரியாது விரவும் பொருள் விரவல், (4) உள்ளுறை உவமம் திணையுணர் வகையாதல் என்ற நான்கும்; முன்னதற்கென்ப = கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணையாகிய இரண்டனுள் முற் கூறிய கைக்கிளைக்காம் எனக் கூறுவர் பொருள் நூற்புலவர்.

(வி-ரை.) 'நிகழ்ந்தது நினைத்தது' முதல், 'உள்ளுறை உவமம் திணையுணர் வகையாதல்' வரை கூறப்பட்ட நான்கும், அன்பினைத் திணைகளுக்குப் பொதுவாய்த் திணைக்குறிப் பொருளாய் அமைதலால், அன்பினைத் திணைகளின் இயல்புகூறும் பகுதிகளின் இறுதியில் இந்நான்கும் அமைவுபெறக் கூறப்பெற்றன. இவை, நடுவண்ணத்திணைகளுக்குச் சிறந்து உரியவாதல் போலவே, புரைதீர்ந்த செந்திரக் கைக்கிளையின் கண்ணும் வந்து பயிலும்; ஆனால் நோந்திறப் பெருந்திணையின்கண் இவை ஆட்சி பெறு.

தொல்காப்பியத்தில் குற்றமற்ற கைக்கிளை ஒன்றே கூறப்படுகிறது. நச்சினூர்க் கினியர் கைக்கிளையாகக் கருதும் தமிழ் வழக்கல்லாத தவறுடைய கூட்டமெல்லாம் பெருந்திணையாகக் கருதலே தமிழ் மரபாகும். குற்றமற்ற செந்திரக் கைக்கிளையில் நேரிய ஒருதலைக் காதுலுடையான் 'தருக்கிய புணர்த்துச் சொல்லி யின்புறாஉம்' காலத்துத் தன் காதலியைப் பற்றிய முன் நிகழ்ச்சிகள் நினைத்தற்கு ஏதுவாதலும், கூறி இன்புறப் பெறுதலும், பிற விரவும் பொருள் விரவலும், உள்ளுறை உவமம் ஆளுதலும், இயலியையும் இன்பமும் பயக்கும். நோந்திறப் பெருந்திணையிலோ முன் நிகழ்ச்சிகளை நினைத்தலும் கூறலும் நேராமையும், நேரின் இடம்பையன்றி இன்பந்தாராமையும் வெளிப்படா. ஆதலால் அவை பெருந்திணைக்கு பொருந்தாமை ஒருதலை. உள்ளுறை உவம

மும் ஒத்த காம ஐந்திணைகளிலும், புரை தீர்ந்த கைக்கிளையிலும் சிறந்து வருதல்போல், பெருந்திணைக்கு மாட்சிப் படாமை எளிதில் தெளியப்படும். அதனால் இச்சூத்திரச் செம்பொருள் மேற்கூறியதேயாம்.

இதற்குப் பழைய உரைகாரர் இருவரும் சூத்திரக் கருத்தொடு பொருந்தாவாறு இருவேறு பொருள் கூறுவர்.

அவர் கூறும் பொருளும், அவை பொருந்தாமைக்குரிய எதுக்களும், இவ்வாராய்ச்சி யுரை வெளியீட்டு ஐந்தாம் தொகுதி முதற் பகுதியில் (Annamalai University Journal, Vol. V, Part I) விளக்கப்பட்டிருத்தல் காண்க.

சூத்திரம் 53.

நாடக வழக்கினும் உலகியல் வழக்கினும்
பாடல்சான்ற புலனெறி வழக்கம்
கலியே பரிபாட் டாயிரு பாவினும்
உரியதாகும் என்மனார் புலவர்.

(இஃது உலகியல் வழக்கொடு பட்டதே புலனெறி வழக்கம் என்பதையும், அகத் திணைக்குச் சிறந்தாரிய பாட்டு வகைகளையும் கூறுகின்றது.)

(இ-ள்.) நாடக வழக்கினும் = உலகியலை உயர் குறிக்கோளொடு ஒட்டிச் சுவைபடக் காட்டும் பொருநுமன்ற மரபுகளோடும்; உலகியல் வழக்கினும் = உலக மக்களின் ஒழுக்கலாற்றோடும்; பாடல் சான்ற புலனெறி வழக்கம் = சிறப்புறப் புலவரால் அமைக்கப் படும் அகத்திணை மரபுகள்; கலியே பரிபாட்டாயிரு பாவினும் = கலி பரிபாடல் ஆகிய இருபாவகைகளிலும்; உரியதாகும் = சிறப்புரிமை கொண்டு பயிலும்; என்மனார் புலவர் = என்று கூறுவர் பொருள் நூற்புலவர்.

(வி-ரை.) புலவராம் பாடப்பெற்ற அகத்துறை மரபுகள் உலகியலைத் தழுவி அமை வதே இயல் நெறியின் இன்றியமையாக் குறிக்கோளும் பயனுமா மென்பதை இச் சூத்திரம் வற்புறுத்துகின்றது. மக்கள் வாழ்க்கையொடு தொடர்பற்ற புலனெறிப் பொய் வழக்கம் எதுவாயினும் பயனும் சுவையும் பயவாது. அதனால் உலகியல் வழக் கொடு அகத்திணைப் புலனெறி வழக்குத் தழுவி நடக்கும் எனக் கூறப்பட்டது.

நாடகம், மக்கள் வாழ்க்கையையே நல்ல குறிக்கோளொடு இயைத்துச் சுவைபட நடத்துக் காட்டும் நோக்குடைய தாதலின், அதுவும் உலகியலொடு பட்டு ஒழுகுவதே யாமாதலின், உலகியல் வழக்கொடு நாடகவழக்கும் உடன் கூறப்பட்டது. உலகியல் வழக்கு உள்ளவாறுலகத்தார் ஒழுக்கலாரும். அவ்வாழ் வொழுக்கச் சிறப்பைச் சுவைபட ஆடிக்காட்டுவதே நாடகவழக்காம். ஆதலால் இவ்விரண்டும் மக்களின் வாழ்க்கையொடு பட்ட இயல்களையே குறிப்பனவாம். அகத்திணைப் புலனெறிவழக்கம் எல்லாம் இம்மக்கள் வாழ்க்கையின் மெய் இயல்புகளைத் தழுவின நடத்தல் இன்றியமையாதனவாதலால் அவ்வாறு புலனெறி வழக்கஞ் செய்தலே தமிழ் மரபென்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர் இச் சூத்திரத்தில் வலியுறுத்தினார்.

பலவகைப் பாக்களில், புறத்திணைக்குச் சிறப்பனவும், புறத்திணைக்கும் அகத் திணைக்கும் பொதுவாய் வருவனவுமான வெண்பா அகவல் வஞ்சிகளினும், கலியும் கலியுறுப்புக்கொண்டு நடக்கும் பரிபாட்டுமாகிய இரண்டுமே அகத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்து பயிலும் பெற்றியன. அகத்திற்குரிய பல்வேறு உணர்ச்சிகளுக்கேற்பச் செவ்வி சிறந்த ஓசை வளமும், உள்ளியன உரைத்தற்கு வேண்டி யாங்கு திரிந்து விரவும் துள்ளற் பெற்றியுமுடையன அவ்விரு பாக்களுமாதலால், பண்டைத் தமிழ்ப் புலவர் அவற்றை அகத்திணைக்குரியனவாகக் கொண்டனர். பாவகைகள் செய்யுளியலில் பரக்க விளக்கப் படுமேனும், கலியும் பரிபாட்டும் அகத்திணைக்குரிய சிறப்புடைமையால் இவ்வியலில் அச் சிறப் புரிமை கூறப்பட்டது.

குத்திரம் 54.

மக்கள் நுதலிய அகனைத் திணையும்
சட்டி யொருவர் பெயர்கொளப் பெறார்.

இஃது அன்பினைத் திணைக்குச் சிறந்த ஒருமரபு கூறுகின்றது.

(இ-ள்.) மக்கள் நுதலிய அகனைத்திணையும் = மக்கள் மதிப்பிற்குரிய காதல் கண்ணிய நடுவணைத்திணைச் செய்யுட்களில்; ஒருவர் சட்டிப் பெயர் கொளப் பெறார் = தலை மக்கள் யாரும் தம்மியற் பெயர் சட்டிக் கூறப்பெறார்.

(வி-ரை.) காதல் கண்ணிய ஐவகை அகவொழுக்கமும், நாண், தன்னலமறக்கும் அன்பு, காதலாற் தவறுகாணு மடம் முதலிய பண்புகளாற் சிறந்த மக்கட் தன்மைக்கே இயைவதாதலின், “மக்கள் நுதலிய அகனைத்திணை” எனக் கூறப்பட்டது. ‘மக்கள் நுதலிய’ என்பது மக்கள் தாம் பொருளாகக் கருதிய எனவிரியும். இனி, மக்கள் என்பதை, மக்கட்டன்மை சட்டுதலாகக்கொண்டு அத்தன்மை நுதலிய எனக் கொள்ளுதலும் ஒன்று.

தலைமக்கள் இருபாலோருள் எவரும் தம் பெயர் சட்டிக் கூறப்பெறாதலின். இருபாற் கு முரித்தாகிய ‘ஒருவர்’ என்னும் பொதுப் பெயரால் அம்மரபு கூறப்பட்டது.

‘சட்டி ஒருவர் பெயர்கொளப் பெறார்’ என்பதனால், அளவளாவிற் சுட்டாது பிறவிடங்களில் தலைமக்கள் பெயர் கூறப் பெறுதல் தவறுகாதென்பதை, உரைகாரர் கொண்டபடி இதில் குறிப்பெச்சுத்தாற் கொள்ளவிட்டு ஐயத்திற்கிடம் வையாமல், தொல்காப்பியர் அடுத்த குத்திரத்தில் தெளியக் கூறுவர்.

சிலப்பதிகாரம், சிந்தாமணிபோன்ற பண்டைச்செய்யுட்களில், யாண்டும் தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் இயற்பெயர் சட்டி அளவளவுதல் கூறப்பெறுமையும், அவ்வாறு அளவுதல் குறி யாப் பிறவிடங்களில் தலைமக்கள் பெயர் கூறப்பெறுதலும் ஈண்டுக் கருத்தத்தக்கன.

காதலாற் கலந்தார்க்கு, ஈருயிரென்பர் இடைதெரியார்; அவர் தம்முள் ஒருயிராக உணர்வாராதலின், அவ்வுணர்ச்சி வயப்பட்டாருள் ஒருவர் தம்மில்வேறுபட்ட பிறர் போல மற்றவர் பெயர்சட்டியளவுதல் இருமைநீங்கிய அவ்வொருமைக் காதலுணர்ச்சி யோடு இயைவதன்று; ஆதலின் அவ்வாறு அளவுங்கால் ‘தன்னுயிர்’ ‘தன் கண்’

என்பன போன்ற வேறன்மையை விளக்குங் காதற்குறி யீடுகள் கூறியளவுதலே இயல்பாகும்.

(1) “ இவன்வயிற் செளினை யிவற்குடம்பு வறிதே ;
இவன்வயிற் செளினை இவட்கும் அற்றே ;
காக்கை யிருகனின் ஒருமணி போலக்
குன்றுகெழு நாடற்கும் கொடிச்சிக்கும்
ஒன்றுபோல் மன்னிய சென்றுவா முயிரே ”.

(2) “ காணு மரபிற் றுயிரென மொழிவேர்
நாணிலர், மன்ற பொய்ம்மொழிற் தனரே ;
யாஅங் காண்டுமெம் அரும்பெற னுயிரே ;
சொல்லும், ஆடும், மென்மெல இயலும்,
கணைக்கால் நுணுகிய நுசப்பின்
மழைக்கண் மாதர் பணைப்பெருந் தோட்டே ”

என்ற பழம் பாட்டுக்கள், காதலிற் கலந்தாரின் ஒருமை உணர்ச்சியை வலியுறுத்தும்.

அவ்வாறு ஒன்றுபட்ட காதற்றலைமக்கள், தம்முள் வேறாயினர்போல் ஒருவரை யொருவர் பெயர்கூறி யளவளவுதல் தம் காதற் செவ்விக் கிழையாதாகலானும், அதுவேயுமன்றி ஒத்த அன்புக்கு இன்றிமையாத நன்கு மதிப்பைப் பிற்றியால் தம்முள் பெயர்சுட்டி அழைப்பது வளர்க்குமாறில்லை யாகலானும், தலைப்படுங்கால் ஒன்றிய காதலர் தம் உள்ளத்துக் களியம் காதல் சமழும் மொழிகளால் ஒருவரை யொருவர் பாராட்டுவதன்றிப் பெயர் சுட்டுதல் மெய்க் காதற்குறிப்பெறுகலானும், அகவல்கிழற் கேற்பப் புலனெறி வழக்கில் தலைமக்கள் ஒருவரை யொருவர் ஐயகை அன்பொழுக்கத்தில் தம்முட் பெயர்சுட்டிக் கொள்ளுவதாகக் கூறுதல் மரபன்றென இதில் உத்ப்புறுத்தப் பட்டது.

இதுவும் இதனைமடுத்த கீழ்ச் சூத்திரமும் அகப்பகுதி அனைத்திலும் தலைமக்கள் பெயர்கூறப் பெருமையே மரபெனக் கூறுங் குறிக்கோளுடைய தோலக்கொண்டு, உரைகாரர் இவ்விருண்டத்கும் வேறுபொருள் சுண்டனர். அதுவே தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தாமேல், மக்கள் வதலிய அகத்திணை எழனன், தலைவனும் தலைவியும் பெயர்கூறப் பெறார் என்று இசைவிலும், “ அகத்திணை மருங்கில் வழக்காறில்லை ” எனக் கீழ்ச் சூத் திரத்திலும் தெளிபக்கூறி விளக்கியருப்பார். ‘ அகத்திணை எழனன் ’ அல்லது ‘ அகத் திணை மருங்கில் ’ என்னாது, “ அகநேந்திணையும் ” என்றும், “ தலைவனும் தலைவியும் பெயர்கூறப் பெறார் ” அல்லது “ மாண்டும் கிழவோர் பெயர்கூறப் பெறார் ” என்றாமல், “ சுட்டி ஒருவர் பெயர்கொளப் பெறார் ” என்றும் இச்சூத்திரத்திலும், “ அகத்திணை மருங் கில் வழக்காறில்லை ” என்றாமல், “ அகத்திணை மருங்கின் அளவதலிலவே ” என அடுத்த கீழ்ச் சூத்திரத்திலும் தொல்காப்பியர் கூறிப்போந்ததால், அவர்க்கு கருத்தன்மை தெளிதல் எளிதாம்.

ஒத்தகாதற் தலைமக்கள் அன்பளவுதலில் தம்முள் பெயர் சுட்டாராகையால், ‘ சுட்டி ஒருவர் பெயர்கொளப் பெறார் ’ என்றும் (1), அவ்வாறு காதலரிருவர் தம்முள் ஆதரவு

பட்டு அளவுதல் கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளிலின்மையால் அவ்விரண்டையும் விலக்கி “அக னைந்திணை” என்மெண் குறித்தும் (2), பெயர் சுட்டல் ‘அளவுதல்’ குறிக்கும் அனைத்துத் துறைகளிலும் வழக்காறன்மையால் “அகனைந்திணையும்” என முற்றும்மை கொடுத்தும் (3), இங்குத் தொல்காப்பியர் கூறின குறிப்புப் பேணற்பாற்று.

தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் அன்பின் அளவுதலளவே “சுட்டி ஒருவர் பெயர் கொளப் பெரூர்” எனவும், அவ்வாறு அவர்தம் அன்பளவுதலின் புறத்தே அகப்பகுதிகளில் ஏற்புடை இடங்களில் பெயர்கூறப் பெறுதல் கடியப்படாதெனவும், முறையே இவ்விரு சூத்திரங் களானும் தொல்காப்பியர் விளங்கவைத்தார்.

இனி, இதுவே தமிழ்கூறும் நல்லுலகத்து வழக்கினும் செய்யுளினும் அடிப்பட்டு வந்த ஆன்மரபா மென்பது, சான்றோர் செய்யுட்களானும் தமிழ்மக்கள் கையாளும் வழக்கானும் தேறப்படும்.

சிலப்பதிகாரம், சிந்தாமணி, இராமாயணம்போன்ற சான்றோர் செய்யுட்களில் இம்மரபாட்சி கண்டு அறிக.

“மாசறு பொன்னே, வலம்புரி முத்தே,
காசறு விரையே, கரும்பே, தேனே,
அரும்பெறற் பாவாய், ஆருயிர் மருந்தே,
பெருங்குடி வாணிகன் பெருமடமகனே,
மலையிடைப் பிறவா மணியே என்கோ ?
அலையிடைப் பிறவா அமிழ்தே என்கோ ?
யாழிடைப்பிறவா இசையே என்கோ ?
தாழிருங்கூர் நல் தையால் ! நின்னை”.

என்று சிலப்பதிகாரத்தின் தலைநாட் கூட்டத்துக்குப்பின் தன் தலைவியொடு அளவளாவும் கோவலன் அவள் நலம் பாராட்டும் குறிஞ்சித் திணையில் தலைவி பெயர் சுட்டாமல் அளவுதல், அகனைந்திணையில் தலைமக்கள் அளவளாவுமிடத்து ஒருவர் பெயரை மற்றொருவர் சுட்டா மரபு பேணியதாகும்.

அவ்வாறு தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் அளவுதலல்லாத பிறவிடத்தில், கணவன் மனைவி பெயர் கூறுதல்போலவே மனைவி கணவன் பெயர் கூறும் மரபுண்மையும் சிலப்பதிகார வழக்குரை காதையில்,

“ஏசாச் சிறப்பின் இசைனிளங்கு பெருங்குடி
மாசாத்து வாணிகன் மகனையாகி
வாழ்தல் வேண்டி ஊழ்வினை துரப்பச்
சூழ்கழல் மன்னா நின்னகர் புகுந்திங்
கென்காற் சிலம்பு பகர்தல் வேண்டி நின்பால்
கொலைக் களப்பட்ட கோவலன் மனைவி
கண்ணகி என்பது என்பெயரே”

எனக் கண்ணகி தென்னன் முன் கூறுதலால் அறிக,

இவ்வடிகளில் தலைமக்கள் இருவர் பெயருமே கூறப் பெறுதலும் அறிக.

இனி, தமிழகத்தில் உலகியல் வழக்கிலும் இம்மரபுண்மை, பண்டை மரபுநிந்து பெண்டிரைத் தாழ்த்தும் பிறநாகரிகம் புகுந்த பிற்காலத் தமிழகத்திற் போலனது அடிப்பட்ட பழந்தமிழ் மரபு பல வழுவாமற் பேணும் ஈழத்தில் இற்றை ஞான்றும் காணப்படும். நேரிற் பெயர் சுட்டா அறம் பெண்டிர்க்குப் போலவே ஆடவர்க்கும் உரித்தாய், கணவனும் மனைவி பெயர் சுட்டி அளவா வழக்கமும், ஒரு தலையாக இரு பாலோரும் பன்மைக்குரிய இருபாற் பொதுச் சொற்களால் பேணிப் பேசித் தம்முள் அளவுதலும், தம்முள் அளவளவா இடங்களில் ஒப்ப இருபாலோரும் ஏற்புழி ஒருவர் பெயரை மற்றவர் கூறலும், ஈழத் தமிழருள் இன்னும் வழங்கக் காண்பாம். சிங்களர் முதலிய அந்நாட்டுப் பிறமக்களுள் என்றும் இம்மரபின்மையால், இது தமிழர் அந்நாட்டில் கொண்ட புது வழக்கன்று; அதனால் இது தமிழர் ஆண்டுத் தம்மொடு கொடு போய்க் கையாளும் பழமரபேயாதல் வேண்டும்.

குத்திரம் 54.

புறத்திணை மருங்கிற் பொருந்தி னல்லது

அகத்திணை மருங்கில் அளவுதலிலே

மேலதற்கோர் புறனடையாய் இது எய்தாதது எம்மூலித்தது.

(இ-ள்.) புறத்திணை மருங்கிற் பொருந்தி னல்லது = (சுட்டி பொருவர் பெயர் கொள்ப பெறுதல்) மேற் குத்திரத்திற் கூறிய தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் அளவளவும் ஐந்திணை அளவளவும் “ஐந்திணைப் புறமாக” அமைவதல்ல. மல்; அகத்திணை மருங்கில் அளவுதல் இல் = அகவொழுக்கத்தில் அவர் தம்முள் அளவளவலில் இல்லை.

(வி-ரை.) சுட்டி பொருவர் பெயர்கொள்ப பெறுதல் என்னும் எழுவாய் மேற் குத்திரத்தினின்று தொடர்புபற்றி வருவிக்கப்பட்டது. இனி, ‘அளவுதலையே’ எழுவாயாக்கி, “பெயர் சுட்டி அளவுதல் இல்” என முடிப்பினும் அமையும்.

அகணந்திணையில் தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் இயற்பெயர் சுட்டி அளவளவல் மரபன் மென முற்குத்திரத்திற் கூறப்பட்டது. எனவே, அளவளவல் அல்லாத அன்பிணைத் திணை கூறுமிடங்களில் தலைமக்கள் பெயர் கொள்ப பெறுதலும் கடியப்படுமோ எனும் ஐயம் நீக்கற்கு இக்குத்திரம் எழுந்தமையால், இது முன்னதற்குப் புறனடையாய்ந்து இவ்வாறு காதலர் தம்முள் அளவளவுதல் ஒன்றொழிந்த எனை அன்பிணைந்திணை அகப் பகுதிகளில் அவர் பெயர் சுட்டப் பெறுதலும் ஒருவர் பெயரை மற்றவர் கூறுதலும் இழுக்கன்று என்பதை

“அரிமா சுமந்த அமலிமே லானைத்

திருமா வளவனெனத் தெறென் — திருமார்பின்

மானமாலென்றே தொழுதேன் தொழுததைப்

போனவா பெய்த வளை”

என்னும் பட்டினப்பாலத் தலைவன் திருமாவளவன் இயற்பெயர் சுட்டும் அகத் துறை வெண்பாவும்,

“நெடுவரைச் சந்தன நெஞ்சங் குளிர்ப்பப்
படுமடும் பாம்பேர் மருங்குல்—இடுகொடி
ஒடியமார்பன் உயர்நல் லியக்கோடன்
சூடிய கண்ணி சுடும்.”

என்னும் ஓய்மாநாட்டு நல்லியக்கோடன் இயற்பெயர்சுட்டும் வெண்பாவும் வலி
புறத்தும். இவ்விரண்டிடத்தும் தலைவி தலைவன் பெயர் கூறுதல் காண்க.

“தூஉஉத் தீம்புகை தொல் விசம்பு போர்த்ததுகொல்
பாஅஅய்ப் பகல் செய்வான் பாம்பின் வாய்ப்பட்டான்கொல்
மாஅ மிசையான்கொல் நன்னன் நறுதுதலார்
மாஅமை யெல்லாம் பசப்பு ”

என்னும் பழைய வெண்பாவும் பெயர் சுட்டுதல் காண்க.

இவை கைக்கிளைப் பாக்களாதலிற் பெயர் கூறப்பெற்றது என்பார்க்கு, பெண் பாற்
கைக்கிளை பிற்காலப் பிழை வழக்காவதன்றிப் பண்டைப் புலவர் கொண்ட ஆன்ற
வழக்கன்மையானும், தொல்காப்பியர் கைக்கிளையை ஆடவர்க்கே அமைத்து பெண்டின்
ஒரு தலைக் காமம் முதலிய மற்றனைத்தையும் பெருந்திணையிலடக்கியமைவாராதலானும்,
இப் பழைய வெண்பாக்கள் அன்பினைந்திணைத்துறையே கூறுவனவாமெனக் காட்டி
மறுக்க.

அகநானூறு கலித்தொகை முதலிய அகத்தொகைச் செய்யுட்களில் யாண்டும்
தலைமக்கள் பெயர் கூறப்படாமைகொண்டு அகத்திணைப் பகுதி கூறும் செய்யுட்களில்
இயற்பெயர்ச்சுட்டு யாண்டும் எஞ்ஞான்றும் கடியப்படுமெனக் கூறுவாருமுளர். யாரை
யுங் குறியாமல் அகத்தனித் துறைகளின் செவ்வியைப் புனைந்துரைப்பதையே குறிக்
கோளாகக்கொண்ட தனிச் செய்யுட்களின் தொகுதிகளில் எவர் பெயரும் சுட்டாதிட
மின்மை வெளிப்படை; அதுகொண்டு சிறப்புடையோரின் சீரிய காதல் பாடும் புலவர்
தம் செய்யுட்களில் யாண்டும் தலைமக்கள் பெயரே கூறுதலாகாது எனக் கொள்ளுதல்
அமைவுடைத்தன்று. அதற்கு விதியும் வழக்கும் இல்லை

இனி, தக்கோர் தலைவராய் அவர் காதற் செவ்வியே பொருளாக வரும் பாட்டெல்
லாம் அவர் பெயர் குறிப்பதனால்மட்டும் அகமாகாதென மறுக்குமாறில்லை. புறத்தறைப்
பகுதி மிகுதியுமுடைய பட்டினப்பாலை காதல் கண்ணிய முடிவு ஒன்றுகொண்டு அக
தூலாகக் கருதப்படுங்கால், காதலொழுக்கமே பொருளாய் வரும் செய்யுளில் காதலர்
பெயர் குறிக்கப்படுவதால் மட்டும் அதைப் புறமென விலக்க விதி எதுவும் தொல்காப்பியர்
கூறவில்லை. ஆதலால் பெயர்சுட்டுங் காரணம் ஒன்றுகொண்டு கோவலன்-கண்ணகி,
கோவலன்-மாதவி, மணிமேகலை-உதயகுமரன், சீதை-இராமன், ஜீவகன் காதல் மணங்கள்
முதலிய காதல் கூறும் பகுதிகளெல்லாம் புறத்திணையின் பாற்படுமென்பது பொருந்தாக்
கூற்றாகும்.

இனி, ‘புறத்தகம்’ என்றொன்றின்மையானும், ‘அகப்புறம்’ என்றொன்றமைப்பது
தொல்காப்பியர் யாண்டும் கருதாத புதிய திணையாமாதலானும், அதுவும் அமைவதன்று.

இச்சூத்திரத்தில், ‘புறத்திணை’ என்பதை மேற் சூத்திரத்திற் கூறிய அளவளவும் “அகணைந்திணைப்புறம்” என மாற்றிப் பொருள்கோடல் வேண்டும். அல்லாக்கால், ‘அகமல்லாப்புறத்திணைக்குரியதினை மயக்கத்திற்கிடமாக ஆசிரியர் இவ்வகத்தினையியலில் மறந்து கூறினாரென அவருக்கு மற்றொன்று விரித்த குற்றம் சுமத்துவதாக முடியும். ஆதலால் அஃது ஆசிரியர் கருத்தன்மை அறிக.

இனி, இங்குத் தொல்காப்பியர் புறத்திணையையே சுட்டுவதாகக் கொள்ளின், அளவளவாவிடத்து அகத்திணையுள்ளும் பெயர் சுட்டல் அமையுமென ஐயமகற்றக் கருதிய ஆசிரியர், அது கூறுமிச்சூத்திரத்தில், தலைமக்கள் சுட்டிப் பெயர் கொளப்பெறுதல் புறத்திணைக்கண் கடியப்படாதென்பதையும் “ஒன்றென முடித்தல் தன்னின முடித்தல்” என்னு முத்திகளால் ஈண்டு உடன் கூறினார் என அமைத்தல் வேண்டும்.

ஆகவே, அன்பினைந்திணை மருங்கினும் தலைமக்கள் தம்முள் அளவளவுதல் கூறுமிடத்து ஒருவரை ஒருவர் பெயர் சுட்டல் கடியப்படும் என்பதும், அவ்வாறு அளவுதற்பகுதியின் புறத்து ஐந்தகத்திணைத் துறைகளிலும், நடுவணைந்திணையின் புறம்பேகைக்கிளை பெருந்திணை என்னும் அகப்பகுதிகளிலும், புறத்திணையில் நன் மக்களின் காதல் கண்ணிய பாடாண் பகுதிக்கண்ணும், அவ்வாறு பெயர் சுட்டுதல் கடிதலில்லை யென்பதும், அவையே அவர்காலப் புலனெறி வழக்காமென்பதும், அம் இவ்விரு சூத்திரங்களாலும் அம்மரபுகளைத் தொல்காப்பியர் விளங்க வைத்தார் என்பதும் தேற்றம்.

Rajendra Chola III *

A. D. 1246 to A. D. 1278.

By

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Rājendra Chola III was perhaps the last monarch of the great Vijayālaya line and with him the mighty Chola Empire not only lost finally its importance and glory but also shrank into total insignificance as a political power. Even though there are inscriptions to show the continued existence of the Cholas as a minor power almost down to the end of the 15th century, yet the later members were few and far between and they did not enjoy even a tithe of the power as of old. The forces of disintegration which began soon after the death of Kulōttunga III, continued not only with unabated vigour during the reign of Rājarāja III but triumphed at last in the time of Rājendra III whose accession took place at a critical point that marked the emergence of powerful anti-royalist feudatories on the one hand and the rise to aggressive prominence of the Pāṇḍyan and the Hoysala powers on the other. Kāḍava Kōpperuṇṅingā, the rebel chief, who imprisoned Rājarāja III at Śendamangalam, established his independence in A. D. 1243 according to his Tripurāntakam and Aruḷāla Perumāḷ Inscriptions.¹ Māravarman Sundara Pāṇḍya II (acc. A.D. 1238) and the Hoysala Somēsvara were actually in occupation of the Chola territories near Trichinopoly.

Tribhuvanachakravartin Parakēsarivarman Rājendra III succeeded Rājarāja III in A.D. 1246. Dr. Kielhorn fixed his accession between 21st March and 20th April A. D. 1246, on the authority of the epigraphs 407, 415 and 418 of 1911. The Srirangam *praśasti* of Rājendra dated in his 7th regnal year works out A. D. 1246 for his accession. But we have records of Rājarāja to show that he had a long reign of 38 years i.e. till A. D. 1254.² The fact that Rājarāja's last years and Rājendra's early years of rule overlap each other has led some scholars to suggest that

* The subject matter of this paper which is slightly modified was presented as part of a chapter of the thesis submitted by the writer for his M.Litt. Degree, to the Annamalai University in January 1937, entitled "The Political and Social Condition of South India on the eve of the Muhammadan Invasions."

1. 197, 198 and 202 of 1905. A.R.E. 1906, pp. 45-6.

2. 266 of App. C. 1908 is dated in his 32nd year. 132 of 1913 is dated in the 30th year and 188 of App. C. 1920-21 is dated in his 38th year.

there were two rival claimants to the Chola throne at one time.³ The claim made both by Hoysala Somēsvara and Chōda Tikka as ‘the establisher of the Chola’, has been pressed into service in support of the argument that both interfered in Chola affairs, respectively taking sides with the opposing candidates to the throne.⁴ Some of the sanskrit *prasastis* of Rājendra, coming from Lepaka and Srirangam have been interpreted so as to postulate that there was a civil war, as a result of which Rājendra murdered Rājarāja and got the throne through bloodshed and feud.⁵ Some of the epithets which describe him as one who

3. It was the Srirangam epigraphs (64 and 65 of 1892) that led Mr. Venkayya to suggest that there were rivals to the Chola throne. A.R.E. 1900, Pt. II, para 30.

4. A.R.E. 1900, para 48. “The Chola king who was ruling at the time was Tribhuvanachakravarti Rājarāja” and para 49, “. . . it would establish that the Chola king who sought Tikka’s help was Rājarāja III.”

5. A.R.E. 1912, para 32. Also Dr. S. K. Aiyangar: “South India and her Muhammadan Invaders, pp. 37-8. The Srirangam epigraph has ‘. . . *Trivarsadārīta makutaḍvaya Rājarāja Sarvēśvara Saṇḍāna dūrta Pāṇḍya Kērala vijyamāna chāmarayugalaha* . . .’ Mr. H. K. Sastri has rendered this passage to mean ‘. . . the cunning hero who killed Rājarāja after making him wear the double crowns for three years; the subduer of the Pāṇḍyas and the Kēralas . . .’ in support of his theory that there was a civil war and an usurpation. However, the passage does not warrant the translation and there is nothing to show of Rājendra’s murder of Rājarāja. This passage will mean—if care is bestowed in its interpretation—either (1) a descendant of Rājarāja who was made to wear the double crowns for three years and who had the mischievous Pāṇḍya and Kērala rulers waving the parasols on either side or (2) who had the Pāṇḍya and Kērala rulers waving the parasols on either side and who were mischievous or rogues to the family of Rājarāja Sarvēśvara who was made to wear the two crowns for three years, if we read the passage beginning with *Trivarsadārīta* and ending with *chāmarayugalaha* with a stop at *Saṇḍāna* or reading it up to *dūrta*. I do not find any reason why the word *Saṇḍāna* (union) should not be taken to mean the family or *kula* in spite of the fact that the word contains only the fourth letter *dha* instead of the second *ṭa*. There is evidence in epigraphs to show that *dha* was invariably used in words to denote a family or a lineage. 132 of 1894 (S.I.I. Vol. V, p. 147, lines 15, 16, etc.) has the word *sandāna* instead of *santāna* when it refers to a person belonging to a lineage as ஸந்தானத்துவந்த.

If this rendering is correct then it means that Rājendra succeeded Rājarāja who was made to wear the two crowns, not necessarily by Rājendra. The question is whether a king who records a gift in his name enumerating all the pompous titles would call himself a “rogue” as suggested by the word *dūrta*. One would rather expect it to happen the other way. The word *dūrta* would induce us to doubt whether the record is a ‘regular’ one of this king. There is no reference to the ‘killing’ of Rājarāja and the word *sandāna* would either refer to family or to some kind of friendship. The latter perhaps suggested the idea of a civil war as is done by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar. Besides mention is made of two crowns. Did Rājarāja wear two crowns at any time between A.D. 1216 and A.D. 1246? The Pāṇḍyan inscriptions which refer to two Chola defeats and the Hoysala epigraphs and the literature which refer to the re-installation of Rājarāja answer in the negative. Then how

raised the race of Manu, the powerful one in removing the shame that belonged to the Chola family (*chōla kula paribāva nīrā karana viḥramaha*) are also used in support of this alleged civil war and to show that Rājendra's murder of Rājarāja was due to the former's anxiety to win back and to re-establish the glory of the Cholas which suffered a serious set back when the latter was held for a while a captive by one of his own feudatories. Unfortunately, the scholars who gave a start to this assumption of an alleged murder and civil war, failed to explain the existence of Rājarāja's inscriptions bearing a later date than A. D. 1246.

Special mention must be made of three of Rājendra's inscriptions as they contain long introductory portions giving him titles and enumerating his accomplishments. They come from Srirangam (64 of 1892 dated in his 7th regnal year), Tirukkannapuram (515 of 1922) and Lēpaka in the Cuddapah District (420 of 1911). The last two are undated. The Tripurāntakam record (201 of 1905) quoting the cyclic year, Raudri (equivalent to his 15th regnal year according to Dr. Kielhorn) also deserves our attention. The Srirangam *prasasti*⁶ which is mostly similar to the other records, says, that he 'who was the sole warrior and swordsmen for all the world, who was a Rama to the Northern Lanka occupied by Vira Rākshasas, who was the elevator of the Chola greatness and whose founder was Manu, who was victorious in war, who was powerful in removing the shame of the Cholas, who belonged to the family of Rājarāja who was made to wear the two crowns for

was it possible for Rājarāja to wear two crowns or strictly speaking how and when did Rājendra succeed in making Rājarāja wear the crowns? And why should he call himself a 'rogue' for this act of bravery? Besides the crown which Rājarāja inherited from Kulōttunga, the other will refer either to the Pāṇḍya or the Hoysala not to speak of the Kērala. But that it cannot mean the Pāṇḍyan crown is clear since the Pāṇḍyas under both Māravarman Sundara I and II did not seem to have suffered any defeat. There is besides nothing to support Rājendra's supposed victory over the Kēralas. Assuming his victory to be a fact and consequently his enabling of Rājarāja to wear the crowns; it is clear that there was nothing in the nature a civil war or political murder. As Rājendra is spoken of highly at the end of the epigraph, it would not call him a 'rogue'. So *dūrta* should be taken along with the succeeding line so as to form a compound (*Bahuvrīhi*). The passage then would suggest that Rājendra subdued the Kēralas and the Pāṇḍyas who must have been inimical to Rājarāja. But we know for certain that both of them did not suffer any defeat either at the hands of Rājarāja or Rājendra, but it was Kulōttunga who claimed victory over them. Under these circumstances it is not possible to give due consideration to this curious record as it contains mere empty boasts.

6. The translation differs from that of the Government Epigraphist. A.R.E. 1912, Pt. II, para 32. S.I.I. Vol. IV,

three years, who had the mischievous Pāṇḍya and Kērala rulers to wave on either side the two parasols (fly whisks), who had resembled a lotus to the Pāṇḍyamaṇḍala, who was a hostile rod to the Karnāta, who had no enemies as he had drowned all their prowess in the ocean, who had his feet adorned by the anklet of heroes placed by Vira Somēsvara, who was the chief among kings, the illustrious king of kings, the establisher of all sects (samaya) the wrestler with the elephant and the lion, the unequalled protector of the army, the master in the art of the king's music, and who was merciful towards the other kings; made a gift of land that lay fallow owing to a breach of a river.' The other two records contain in addition that Rājendra took the crowned head of a Pāṇḍya and that he assumed the title Mahārājādhirāja Tribhuvana chakravarti Rājendra Cholahādēva.

All of them refer to the fact that Somēsvara was hostile to him and that he was made to place the anklet of heroes at the feet of Rājendra and this could only mean that he was subdued by the Chola King. These high-sounding titles are rather perplexing and are not easy to comprehend, especially considering the period of rapid decline of the Cholas. Somēsvara was in occupation of Kaṇṇanūr Koppam between A. D. 1233 and A. D. 1256.⁷ He is called *Pāṇḍyākula Samrakshaṇa dakṣha* (*datta*) *dakṣinabhujaha* and all his records refer to him as *Pāṇḍyakula Samrakshanaha* and *Chōlaraḥyapraṭhiṣṭhāpanāchāryaha*. In A. D. 1240 he was marching against Gandagopala of Kāṇchi.⁸ That in A. D. 1252, Mannargudi in the Chōlamanḍalam was also, included in his dominions is evident as 97 of 1897 refers to a gift made to an image set up by his *Mahāpradhāni* Kampaya Daṇḍanāyaka. He lived probably till the year A. D. 1256.⁹ These are some of the records for a clear understanding of the Chola power, under Rājendra. Besides, 49 of 1893 of Rājendra dated in his 4th year, refers to an enquiry held into the temple affairs, in which some of the servants of Somēsvara acted as members of the usual Committee of Inquiry. When Rājendra ascended the throne there was Somēsvara ruling in the Tamil kingdom.¹⁰ Though the title 'the establisher of the Chola' might refer to Somēsvara's past achievements in the company of his father, yet he may be held as having

7. Epi. Car. Vol. VII, Sh. 57 refers to Somēsvara at Kaṇṇanur. Inscriptions of Somēsvara dated between his 6th and 21st years are conspicuously absent in the South. 205 of 1910 dated in his 15th year refers to Somēsvara's stay at Tagadainadu (Coimbatore Dist.). That his authority was felt is supported by 387 of 1906 which refers to a settling of a dispute in A.D. 1249-50 between the Vaishnavas and the Saivas by Appaṇṇa Daṇḍanāyaka in Pudukottah.

8. E. Car. Vol. VI, Kadur 100.

9. 215 of 1914 from Pudukkottah is dated in his 32nd year. Also 102 of 1892.

10. E.C. Vol. III, Kr. 76.

justified his assumption of it by protecting the Chola kingdom from annihilation. Moreover Rājendra calls Somēśvara by the endearing name of *māmā* in his records.¹¹

However, Rājendra's inscriptions bearing the 7th and 8th regnal years, describe him as *Karnāta rājya prathikūla kālādandaha* and *Vira Somēśvara Karāmukta pāda virābharaṇaha*, i.e., the hostile rod of death to the Karnāta kingdom and the wearer of the anklet laid at his feet by Somēśvara's own hands. About this year (A. D. 1253) Māravarman Sundara Pāṇḍya II died; and then there was ruling the most illustrious of the Pāṇḍya Kings; Jātavarman Sundara I (acc. 1251) one of whose records (166 of 1894) says that he "having captured and defeated the Karnāta King ruled the Kāvēri country as if it were the Kanni land (Pandyan land).

The foregoing pieces of evidence show that the Hoysala power was endured by Rājendra in his early years and that he could not have subdued that power afterwards. Then the question naturally arises how and when the Chola claim to have subdued Somēśvara could arise. Fortunately there are contemporary inscriptions of the Telugu Chōḍas which come to our help. The Telugu Chōḍas were the loyal feudatories of the Cholas from the time of Kuōttungā III.¹² We have seen already that Chōḍa Tikka¹³ also, like Somēśvara claimed the title of '*Chōlas-thapanāchārya*' and he was hostile to the Hoysalas. Somēśvara appears to have been on inimical terms with the Cholas in or about A. D. 1237 when he marched upon the Cholas.¹⁴ His expedition against Gandagopala in A. D. 1241 has already been mentioned. The previous epigraph gives the additional information that Rājendra's activities must have begun some years prior to the actual date of his accession i.e. during the reign of Rājarāja who is said to have sought the help of Tikka.¹⁵ Hence it may be suggested that the Hoysalas who had made 'diplomatic' interventions in the Chola affairs and had established themselves

11. 65 of 1892 from Srirangam dated in the 8th year of Rājendra. It was Vira Narasimha II who intervened in the Chola affairs and re-established Rājarāja on the throne. In commemoration of this he assumed the title *Chōla rājyapraṭhishtāpanāchārya* which was continued to be assumed by his son Somēśvara and grandson Rāmanātha.

12. See Cōlas, Vol. II, Pt. I, pp. 200-4.

13. 357 of 1919 and 446 of 1919. The *Nirvachanōttara Rāmāyanamu* of Tikkana Sōmayāji refers to the relations of the Kākāṭīya Gaṇapati with the Telugu Chodas and to the latter's authority over the Chingleput and other Northern territories of the Chola kingdom.

14. E.C. Vol. V, Arskere 123. Also Intro. p. xxv. Somēśvara is said to have uprooted Rājendra Chola in battle A.D. 1237.

15. A.R.E. 1900. paras 48 and 49.

near Kaṇṇanūr, became hostile to the Cholas in the last years of Rājārāja. The reasons for this hostility are not known. Perhaps Somēśvara took the opportunity of a weak king's reign to extend his dominions. Rājēndra, the lawful successor of Rājārāja, had to face the Hoysala aggression; and it was possibly also about this time that the Telugu chief, Chōda Tikka, joined the Cholas as against the Hoysalas. Since Somēśvara's epigraphs between A. D. 1238 and A. D. 1253 are not found in the Tamil country, it may be suggested that Somēśvara having been worsted retired to Mysore. Rājēndra now perhaps played a prominent part in re-establishing the Chola prestige and claimed a victory as a consequence of which he would have enabled Rājārāja to wear the two crowns.

Rājēndra claims to have also conquered the Northern regions as he is called a "very Rama to Uttaralankā which was noted for its Virarākshasās".¹⁶ Prof. K. A. N. Sastri says that 'this is clearly a reference to the campaign against the Śambuvarāyās some of whom called themselves Vira Rākshāsa and who held sway in the region of North Arcot.'¹⁷ The *Nirvachanōttara Rāmāyanamu* mentions that Tikka fought Kārṇāta, Somēśvara and Śambuvarāyā and other enemies and compelled all of them to acknowledge his supremacy. 'This would help us further in fixing satisfactorily the achievements of Rājēndra in the years long before his installation as the Chola monarch.'¹⁸ Since it is known that Choda Tikka fought against a Śambuvarāya, 'it is quite possible that in the wars he co-operated with Rājēndra in the restoration of the Chola power'.

Rājēndra in addition claims to have conquered the Pāṇdyas as well, in his *prasastis*. The Lepaka and the Tirukkannapuram epigraphs refer to his cutting off the head of the Pāṇdyā while the Tripurāṇtakam inscription calls him *Iruvar Pāṇdyar mudittalai Koṇḍaruliya* (one who was pleased to take the crowned heads of two Pandyas).¹⁹ But there is

16. *Virarākshasa vikiyātimat uttāra Lankārāma*. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar has identified Uttara Lanka with Māvilangai. H. K. Sastri's identification of this with the Lankās of the Gōdāvari delta (A.R.E. 1912, Para 32, also 1913 Para 43) is untenable as Rājēndra could not have made an advance far into the North as there was Kākatiya Gaṇapati ruling till A.D. 1261. The present record is dated in A.D. 1253. Vira Rākshasas are identified with the Śambuvarayas.

17. *Cōlas*, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 202. Also foot-note 82.

18. A.R.E. 1900. Paras 48 and 49. Also 53 of 1893. 34 of 1893 of Chōda Tikka is dated in Saka 1156 and comes from Arulāla Perumal temple at Kāṇchi.

19. A.R.E. 1912. Para 32. H. K. Sastri takes this statement in support of the two crowns (*Makutadvaya*) mentioned in the Srirangam inscription. This is untenable as they would refer to three instead of two: Two Pāṇḍyan crowns besides his own.

nothing in support of Rājendra's claim, in the contemporary Pāṇḍyan epigraphs. The Pāṇḍyan conquest of Rājarāja and his re-establishment in power by the intervention of the Hoysalas are well-known facts.²⁰ Māra-varman Sundara II's accession took place in A. D. 1238 and his latest regnal year so far available is his 15th year i.e. A. D. 1253. The Pāṇḍyan supremacy which began to assume shape under his immediate predecessor continued also under him. The Hoysalas were more friendly towards him as they claim to have given a helping hand in the protection of the Pāṇḍyan kingdom, while the Pāṇḍyan records show the exact position of the Pāṇḍya with Sōmesvara when they speak of the latter as *māmā* (uncle or father-in-law). Moreover a record from Tinnevely²¹ dated in the 11th year of Māra-varman Sundara II refers to a gift of a village which was named *Pōsala Sōmesvara Chaturvēdi-maṅgalam* after Sōmesvara. There are inscriptions of this Pāṇḍya to be found in the Chola territories. Since he had ruled till A. D. 1253 it is quite impossible for Rājendra to have defeated him even in his last days as we find in A. D. 1251 the accession of Jatavarman Sundara I, who by his extensive conquests assumed the well merited title of *Ellāṇḍalayānān*. The Srirangam epigraph of Jatavarman Sundara says that he levied tribute from the Chola. Then how was it possible for Rājendra to own two Pāṇḍyan defeats? and who was the co-ruler with Māra-varman Sundara II, whom he could defeat?²² Hence Rājendra's taking away the crowned heads of two Pāṇḍyas looks highly improbable and is nothing but an empty boast. If Rājendra did succeed in his exploits, how could Māra-varman Sundara II rule? Of him Prof. K. A. N. Sastri says "there is no reason to believe that the extent of the kingdom (Pāṇḍyan) suffered any diminution and the political relations among the Pāṇḍyas the Cholas and the Hoysalas seem not to have altered much since the time of Māra-varman Sundara I."²³

Hence a clear and close examination of Rājendra's inscriptions shows that there is absolutely nothing in support either of a civil war in the Chola kingdom or the alleged murder of Rājarāja. Moreover the statement that Rājendra was an abler ruler than Rājarāja as he is given high *birudas* would not stand the test of truth if attention is bestowed

20. Māra-varman Sundara Pāṇḍya I is described in his records as *Sonādukondaruliya* and *Sonāduvaḷangiyaruliya*.

21. 156 of 1894 dated in the 8th year and 988th day, line 12.

22. *The Cōlas*, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 198. 'The identity of the other Pāṇḍya perhaps, co-ruler with Māra-varman Sundara II remains obscure.'

23. *The Pāṇḍyan Kingdom*, p. 157. Subsequently Prof. Sastri has changed this view in his *Cōlas*, Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 197, 198 and 201 in order to support Rājendra's victory over the Pāṇḍyas. For the former there is some evidence in the numerous epigraphs.

upon the contemporary political history of the times. We have seen how he could not at all have conquered either the Pāṇdyas or the Hoysalas after his accession. But it may be said to his credit that he could have tried his best to maintain undiminished the waning Chōla power that had been rudely shaken and to re-establish it, even though his attempts ended in vain. The futility of his high ambitions is best read in the Pāṇḍyan and the Hoysala records.

Like his predecessors Rājendra had no distinguishing titles to mark him out really as a powerful ruler in spite of the glorious birudas that enrich his name. His inscriptions are found scattered all over the Tanjore, South Arcot and Trichinopoly Districts. He had no direct control over the Northern portions of the Chola territories as they were held by the Kāḍavarāyas and the Kākatiyes. In between the two the loyal Telugu Chōḍas held sway over a small strip of land. This would perhaps explain the presence of a few of Rājendra's inscriptions at Nellore and these were probably issued in his name by the Telugu Chōḍas and particularly by Manumasiddhi. The Empire was fast shrinking and Rājendra was left in his last days with a small territory which was nothing but a fragment of a great empire. Jayaṅḡonda-Śōlapuram referred to as Mummudisōlapuram in the Pāṇḍyan records of Māra-varman Sundara I and which had the fame of being one of the Chola capitals ceased to possess its magnificence and Paḷayāru a small village now in ruins in the Tanjore District became the seat of the Government.²⁴ The records²⁵ describe him a Tribhuvana chakravarti and a Parakēsari and also one who raised the lineage of Manu, the ancestor of the Cholas (Manukula meduṭṭa perumāl). The absence of anything significant of his rule and the large gaps in the events of his reign speak easily of the declining power. In an inscription dated A. D. 1263²⁶ there is a reference to one Śōlakulamādevi who was in all probability Rājendra's queen. A certain Chēḍiyarāyar (188 of 1908) who built a temple for the goddess at Kōvilur, Paiyulān Periyān Aḷagiya Perumal alias Śōlagāṅḡan who was an executive officer²⁷ Rājagambīra Pallavarāyan (209 of 1908) and Paiyulan Pallavarāyan alias Śōliavarayan figure as his feudatories. The last named chief who was an

24. 463 of 1908 from Konērīrājapuram (Tanjore Dt) refers to an order issued by the King from his palace at Paḷayāru situated on the banks of the Virasōlan. This was formerly a residence of Rājendra I as is seen from 463, 473 of 1908. A.R.E. 1910, Para 20.

25. 235 of 1928 and 185 of 1908. Also 46 of 1911 which refers to *Manukula meduṭṭa perumāl chaturvēdimangalam*.

26. 427 of 1911 from Tiruvannāmalai.

27. 202 and 205 of 1908. 515 of 1922 refers to one Sattivana Nāyaka alias Kāḍavarāya of Paḷayanur.

official appears in a record of Rājarāja and 211 of 1908 refers to a gift made to Vānarāyamaṭha built and named after him. Virasolappi-ramarāyan was his *Tirumandira olai* (Royal Secretary).

Rājendra continued his patronage to the temple at Chidambaram and he is called a worshipper of Lord Kanakasabāpati at Vyāgrapura (Chidambaram).²⁸ An undated record from Tirukkannapuram (515 of 1922) refers to his son Śēmappillai and with him the Chola independence and integrity vanished as we find him a feudatory paying tribute to Jatavarman Vira Pāṇḍya²⁹ the able co-adjutor of Jatavarman Sundara I. Śēmappillai is the last name we hear of this illustrious line and nothing more is known about him. Perhaps the Cholas ceased to be even Mahāmaṇḍalesvarās or provincial governors under the Pāṇḍyas.

My thanks are due to Rao Saheb Professor C. S. Srinivasacharyar for his keen interest in this work and to the authorities of the Annamalai University for the award of a studentship to me.

28. A.R.E. 1923, Para 48.

29. The Pudukkottah Ins. Also A.R.E. 1923, Para 45.

Economic Survey of the Weavers at Sulturpeta

By

N. S. K. and P. V.

INTRODUCTION.

Sulturpeta in the Nellore District is a famous weaving centre and a peculiar fabric known as the Madras Handkerchiefs is exported to foreign countries from that place. The weavers of Sulturpeta who are skilled artisans and who depend almost completely on weaving are in a miserable condition because their wages are meagre and consequently their standard of living is low. This state of indigence prompted us to survey the condition of the weavers. We have made a thorough study of some of the families of weavers and have collected family budgets. We have studied the nature of their troubles and have assessed the causes of their sufferings and their needs.

This work is only a part of the whole problem, *viz.*, the study of the condition of the weavers all over the Presidency. In almost all districts weaving and handloom industry exist. A comprehensive economic survey can be undertaken to collect statistics to study the position of the weavers. A party of a dozen or twenty members may be asked to work in every district to study the details and collect the statistics. A district economic surveyor can direct and supervise their work. The batches of workers can tour in the villages in their respective districts and collect the necessary information. In a village containing hundred weaving families it will take three or four days to collect the information. In two months every district can be toured. The help of the revenue officials, especially that of the village karnam and headman, will be of much use. The educated unemployed may find work in the collection of statistics. The investigation must be financed by the provincial government. When the investigation is over an organized programme of systematic relief should be commenced.

Our investigation of weavers in Sulturpeta extended over only forty-six families. There are many others occupied in several other vocations of an allied nature. But we have confined our attention to weavers only. Weavers are those skilled persons who are able to manufacture the cloth, which is marketed, from the yarn supplied. Weaving is done only with the help of the handloom. The weavers are concerned only with the weaving proper and giving the fabric the finishing touch. The

preliminary process of refining and making the yarn fit for weaving is done by some other workers of the place.

The investigation of the weavers was spread over a period of fifteen days. The collection of details regarding the income of the weavers, their earning capacity, expenditure, mode of life and economic status, is the outcome of a series of answers made by the weavers themselves to questions put to them. All the forty-six families are natives of the town. Most of them own houses. Some are immigrants from neighbouring places and they have settled in this village to eke out their livelihood. They live in rented houses.

We have examined in detail the relation between the middle-men and the weavers. We have suggested that the co-operative society should be developed to replace the middlemen, who are exploiting the weavers. While studying the working of the co-operative society for the weavers in the village we were handicapped to a certain extent by the lack of official records and reports.

We thank Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, Professor of Economics, who has directed and guided us throughout this investigation.

I.—IMPORTANCE OF HANDLOOM WEAVING

The East is the historic home of the cotton industry. But as a result of Carthwright's self-acting loom the Lancashire cotton industry had so developed that the influx of mill made goods in India cheapened the price of cloth and made it popular with the poorer classes with the result that it prejudicially affected the indigenous weaving classes. Even the upper classes preferred Manchester mulls to costly handwoven cloths of finer counts. But fortunately for the cottage weaver the demand for many of the specialised types of cloth on a small scale renders it difficult for the power loom to produce them at a profit. Fine and costly cloths, expensive garments with rich borders for ladies are produced throughout the Presidency. Even now the fashion of dress of the Indian women has not appreciably changed. So there is reason for the survival of handloom weaving. The deep-rooted belief of the poorest classes in the durability of the handwoven fabric may also have contributed to the survival of handloom weaving. Hence in out of the way rural parts of the Presidency where mill goods are not popular, cloths produced from handlooms find a ready market. Moreover, men and women of the upper and middle classes use costlier handwoven cloths of fine quality. The handloom weaver is also capable of catering for individual tastes. In addition to the limited inland trade, this

Presidency has luckily developed an export trade in coloured goods known as the Madras handkerchiefs and lungis.

The importance of the weaving industry lies in the fact that it gives occupation to a larger number of people than any other industry save agriculture. In 1910 the late Prof. Fox, Head of the Department of Technology at Manchester, said: "I hold the opinion that the handloom may remain for many years a commercial weaving machine, provided the industry is properly organized and that the loom is suited to the work to be done and is supplied with properly prepared material." The indigenous handloom weavers prefer mill made yarn to the hand product. For there are certain inherent limitations in the use of charka. To mention only two, the regularity of thread cannot be obtained from hand spinning and the weaver prefers mill yarn, particularly for the warp, to yarn from the charka. The average capacity of a spinner is limited and there is likely to be lack of supply if hand spun yarns are used. (This is not to decry the movement of Khadar. Khadar is at best a subsidiary occupation to the agriculturist. But where weaving is a primary occupation and where goods like the Madras handkerchiefs and lungis are exported on a large scale, mill made yarn should be used).

To encourage handloom weaving peripatetic demonstrations of improved processes and machinery have been recommended by the Indian Industrial Commission. The Government of Madras have adopted various measures to improve the processes of handloom weaving. Technical training in weaving was given in schools. Co-operative societies were started to help weavers. But these did not solve the problem of the weavers. "The crux of the problem," says Mr. Amalsad, "is (1) increased output with a view to lower the price of hand made fabrics and (2) for that purpose, enabling the weaver to add to the number of looms in the family by guaranteeing continuity of work for him throughout the year, by saving him and his family the unremunerative labour of sizing by supplying him ready made warps and wefts also if possible, and by marketing the products of the looms for him."

II.—PATTE MARAPPU OR THE MADRAS HANDKERCHIEFS

A special kind of coloured handwoven fabric is the Madras handkerchief, which forms a very important section of handloom weaving industry and affords a means of support to a large section of the weavers of this Presidency. Madras handkerchief is a trade name given to a kind of striped cloth made from grey and coloured warp and weft yarns. When orders are placed with the weavers for the manufacture

of particular patterns, the patterns are printed on a strip of paper in all colours required and are given to the weavers.

The manufacture of these fabrics dates back to the East India Company. Many generations of experience in the production of this cloth has led to various details pertaining to treatment of yarn, dyeing and weaving with the result the handloom weaver of this cloth is a highly skilled craftsman. The chief centres of manufacture of this cloth are Arni, Kavaraipttai, Gummudipundi, Sattiyavedu, Palipeta, Madarapakam, Palamenapetta, Kancherapalam, Illam Naidupeta, Lingam Naidupalam, Talarettu, Marathwada, Nellore, Sulurpeta, Polur, Kalahasti, Anakapallur, Chittoor, etc. The cloth is exported to London, Colombo and the Federated Malaya States.

Attempts have been made in Europe to produce the handkerchiefs on power looms. But the quality of the cloth compares very unfavourably with properly prepared handwoven fabrics of the old standard. Unfortunately there has been a gradual deterioration in the quality of handkerchiefs produced on handlooms. The yarns employed in the manufacture of these fabrics are generally imported from Europe though the mills of the Presidency meet the demand to a certain extent. The process of dyeing is carried on in the usual crude Indian methods by the dyers and is given to padugu making workers for preparing the warp threads. The refined yarn is given to the weavers for making the cloth. Handwoven handkerchiefs are better and costlier than the best power loom products. Though machine made products are better woven there is a partiality for handwoven fabric because of the peculiar feel of the latter. The gradual deterioration in the hand loom products should be checked. The Department of Industries are initiating improvements to accustom the weavers to the use of long warps and to give employment to additional members of the family.

III.—THE WEAVERS AT SULURPETA

Sulurpeta, a village in the district of Nellore, is situated at a distance of about fifty miles north of Madras. The village is on the Madras-Calcutta railway line. It is also a wayside village on the Madras-Bezwada Grand Northern Trunk Road. There is a village Union Board, a Deputy Tahsildar's Office and a Sub-Treasury in that village. A Local Fund Dispensary and a District Board High School are situated in the place. On the outskirts of the village flows the rivulet, Kalingi.

The village is one of the chief weaving centres of the Nellore district. Over 90 families live by weaving and about 15 families by working an allied process known as padugu work or warping. Out of the

forty-six families whose economic condition we studied forty-three own looms and the adult male members work on them. Three families owning looms have no workers in the families and labourers are employed to work on the looms. These owners of looms who hire labourers depend on the allowance they deduct from the wages of the labourers. The preliminary process of weaving, *viz*, twisting the yarn, winding it on the spindles and collecting it to fit into the looms is undertaken by the women.

The number of looms owned by the forty-six families is ninety. Only seventy-four weavers work on their own looms numbering seventy-two. They produce 3029 jodies of cloth per year. The 18 hired workers produce 712 jodies on 18 looms. Generally 41 jodies are produced every year on each loom. The average time taken to weave each jodi is $8\frac{1}{2}$ to 9 days. A jodi is the unit of cloth woven on a loom. The size of each jodi is 40 cubits by 45" or 32 cubits by 36". The manufacture of the cloth is adjusted to the demand by the middlemen who supply the capital to the weavers. The yarn used is bought from the Coimbatore and Madura mills and is of 60 and 40 counts. Coloured yarn is either bought direct or dyed at the village by some specialist in dyeing.

While thirteen families have engaged hired labourers, three families entirely depend on them. On an average each hired labourer produces 39 jodies annually. These hired weavers come from neighbouring villages to eke out their livelihood at Sulurpeta. A certain percentage of the wages of these labourers goes to the owners for renting out their looms. Some of these hired workers live with the family of the weavers paying boarding charges. Generally these labourers do not attach themselves to any family in particular. Whenever they want work they approach the owners of looms. They are too poor to own looms. So they entirely depend on the weaver-owners for work.

IV.—THE MIDDLEMEN AND THE WEAVERS

In the marketing of any produce the middleman plays an important part. "In the economic organization of the modern world," says the Royal Commission on Agriculture, "he fulfils essential functions and neither in India nor elsewhere is it possible to dispense with him." But public opinion is always suspicious of middlemen. This tendency may be due to the idea prevalent in certain minds that intermediaries carry no risks of production. But the costs and risks incidental to production are great. In most cases, in India, the middleman, by wresting nearly all the surplus profits from the producers, has become a danger. He lends the weaver at high rates of interest and compels him to sell the goods to

him at very cheap rates. The other alternative to the middleman is the co-operative organization. An intermediary for the distribution of goods cannot be avoided in any case. The cheaper of the two is, therefore, to be preferred.

In Sulerpeta the weavers entirely depend on the middlemen. There are about six middlemen in that village. They supply the capital to the weavers. The agency companies of Madras, which export the Madras handkerchiefs to London, Colombo and the F.M.S., place their orders with these middlemen. The patterns required are printed on a piece of paper indicating the various colours required and are given to the weavers. The yarns used in the manufacture of the cloth are from the mills of Coimbatore and Madura. The middlemen usually buy the yarns from merchants at Madras who are sole agents of the mills of Coimbatore and Madura. Before the yarns reach the weavers they have to go through various processes of refinement. A special class of dyers, who live by dyeing, first undertake to dye the yarns. Then they are given to another set of workers who have specialised in padugu making or warping. Finally the warp threads and the weft yarn are given to weavers.

Each middleman has dealings with a certain number of weaving families. The weavers are paid in advance their wages by the middlemen because they cannot wait till the cloth is sold at the best price. They are too poor to own any capital and depend on the middlemen for their maintenance. They have no direct dealings with the agency firms. Every time they hand over the finished products to middlemen they secure fresh orders from them.

The result is the weavers are entirely dependent on the middlemen not only for their work but for their living. Though the agency companies finally sell the goods to foreign consumers the middlemen are solely responsible for the production and supply of the cloth. The middlemen do not follow any principle in the fixing of wages. The wages paid are unrelated to the standard of living. The weavers have absolutely no hand either in the sale of the cloth or in the bargaining of their wages. As they have to depend for their work and food on these middlemen they submit without grumbling to the dictates of the middlemen. The middlemen have always an eye on their own profits and according to the demands made by the agency companies adjust the wages they have to pay to weavers. Thus the wages are always slightly changing. Out of forty-six families examined there are seventy-four weavers who actually work and the average income for each weaver is nearly Rs. 130 for a year. But each weaver has in his house many non-workers and in the

forty-six families there are 250 members. So per capita income from weaving alone is Rs. 38.

So the weavers are heavily indebted. The causes for the sorrowful plight of the weavers are lack of facilities of easy finance, absence of organization and incapacity to undertake the business directly. While on the one hand the agency companies have monopolised the right of exporting the goods, on the other the middlemen throughout the Presidency mobilize the supply and place it with the firms. Thus they form a link between the actual manufacturers, *viz.*, the weavers, and the agency companies. A direct connection between the weavers and the exporters cannot be established. There must be an intermediary to carry on the business of mobilizing the supply of goods. The only alternative is whether any cheaper organization could take the place of the middlemen. To retain the middlemen is to aggravate the sufferings of the weavers. But they cannot be easily replaced. For the middlemen advance wages to them, provide work for them, lend them when necessary, rent their houses to them and above all provide them employment. But the weavers must be educated to overthrow the middlemen and turn to the cooperative societies for help.

V.—THE CONDITION OF THE WEAVERS AND THEIR INDEBTEDNESS

The main source of income of the weavers is the wages they obtain from weaving. Where hired labourers are employed the owners of looms get an allowance from the wages of the labourers. This allowance ranges from 8 annas to 12 annas per jodi of cloth woven. Generally when a weaver is old and is not fit for work, he hires a labourer. In some cases where a weaver owns an extra loom he rents out the loom. Other sources of income are the boarding charges paid by hired weavers who live with the family of the weavers, income from cattle and earnings by other members of the family through occupations other than weaving. Regarding the last item only in one family (No. 34), a member is a clerk in the Weavers' Cooperative Society. His annual income is Rs. 180.

The total income of the 46 families amounts to Rs. 10,576-10-0. Income by weaving by owner weavers is Rs. 9,647. Income from allowance derived from hired weavers is Rs. 417. Other sources of income amount to Rs. 512-10-0. The average annual income for a family is Rs. 229-12-0. But per capita income is Rs. 42-4-0.

To obtain these scanty wages, the weavers work during all the days in the year, holidays and festival days excepting. New moon and full moon days are off days. They work from 6 a.m. in the morning to 6 p.m.

in the evening with short intervals for meals, etc. When work is to be turned out quickly they even work during nights.

There are three distinct groups of expenditure in each family. First come the primary expenses for food and maintenance including the cost of rice, dholl, oil, condiments, spices, salt, fuel, kerosine, betel and nuts and other necessities of food. The second group comprises of the clothing needed for the family for the year. The third group includes various items of expenditure which are necessary for every family. To mention only a few, repairs or rent for the house or rent for the ground, repairs to looms—including renewal of spare parts, dhoby and barber charges, maintenance of cattle, ceremonies, festivals etc., pilgrimages, travels etc., medical charges, amusements, house and ground tax and other expenses incidental for the maintenance of the family.

The daily needs of the family are for food and maintenance. The weavers generally cook twice a day and take three meals daily. Some families earning low wages take two meals a day and if they can afford have a third meal once in two or three days. The undernourishment is due to meagre earnings. Most of these weavers live in thatched sheds. A portion of the shed is utilised for cooking and dining while the remaining portion is occupied by the loom. The loom occupies an area of 6 feet by 4 feet. The walls are of mud and the floor is stiffened earth. There are no proper arrangements for drainage and latrine. For the whole village the supply of drinking water is from three or four wells. The weavers in particular have one.

The total annual expenditure for the 46 Families is Rs. 12,990-1-0. The average expenditure for each family is Rs. 283. The chief item of expenditure, food and maintenance, amounts to Rs. 8,416-15-0 for the 46 families. They spend on clothing Rs. 1,412 while Rs. 3,161-12-0 are to meet other items of expenditure. On an average each family spends Rs. 183 on food, Rs. 31 on clothing and Rs. 69 on other incidental expenses every year. Out of the 46 families only five have a surplus over their expenditure. The total income of these families amounts to Rs. 1932, while their annual expenditure is Rs. 1,723-12-0. The remaining families have run into debts while a few of those who have a surplus have run into debts because of some unforeseen expenditure. The forty-one families have run into debts because their income was not sufficient to maintain them. In this case the amount of debt is bound to accumulate every year.

Two families earn two annas a day by selling milk. But this earning is only seasonal. Some families owning cattle utilise the milk for themselves. For maintaining the cattle the weavers have to spend some money on hay or grass daily. The weavers do not own lands.

As they have no subsidiary sources of income to augment their poor earnings from weaving, the weavers are entangled in perpetual debt. Of the 46 families examined by us 43 are indebted. The total amount of indebtedness is Rs. 11,390-0-0. While income per head of population per year is Rs. 42-4-0, debt per head amounts to Rs. 45-9-0. The average income of the weaver is not enough to sustain him and there is no hope of his clearing his debts.

There are three kinds of loans. Loans are mainly by mortgaging immovable property like houses. Loans on pronotes or by keeping a running account with the middlemen are common. While interest is paid on mortgage loans and loans on promissory notes, hand loans do not bear interest. The middlemen always help the weavers with the hand loans and recoup them in instalments from the wages they advance to the weavers. Mortgage loans and loans on pronotes are supplied either by the Weavers' Cooperative Society or by the middlemen. The interest charged by the former is 9% while the usual rate of interest charged by the middlemen is 12%. Nineteen families have taken loans on immovable property to the extent of Rs. 4,070. Interest has accumulated to Rs. 1,395. A sum of Rs. 2,655 was borrowed on pronotes by 19 families. Interest on this amount has accrued to Rs. 935. Hand loans to the extent of Rs. 2,335 were given by middlemen who maintain a running account.

Though apparently these weavers are saved from the rapacity of the moneylenders, the nature of their indebtedness, when considered in relation to their income, is appalling. Considering the rates of interest prevalent in other places, the rates of interest charged by the middlemen cannot be said to be very high. But even this rate is exorbitant. Their indebtedness is a mill stone round their necks. It has made them continued victims of the middlemen. In addition to low incomes, others causes of indebtedness are expenses on marriages and funerals, house construction and the payment of interest on old debts as well as on debts newly contracted. We have examined some families and calculated the amount spent by them for various purposes. One member of a family has spent Rs. 1,000 on litigation regarding a partition question. Moreover he is extravagant. There is a vast divergence between his income of Rs. 84 only and his expenditure, which amounts to Rs. 285.

To relieve the weavers from the shackles of debt their income must be first increased. This can be achieved by paying them higher wages. This presupposes a thorough change in the system of production. The middlemen should be replaced by a cooperative organization of the weavers. This institution should have direct connection with the agency firms. The profits which are going into the pockets of the mid-

dlemen will then go to the weavers. The society should also promote thrift and prudence and regulate the spending of the weavers.

, Illiteracy forms a dominant cause for the backwardness of the weavers. In fact lack of education prevents the spread of the cooperative spirit among them. The weavers are not able to understand the bylaws of the society. Only a very few weavers know to read and write. One person is employed in the Weavers' Cooperative Society. Another is the secretary of the Society and he can read and write. Generally the boys are not sent to school. They are detained at home to help the elders in their work. Only in two or three families the boys are sent to the primary schools, where no fee is charged. In one family a boy is sent to Madras for study. The women are illiterate. Opening of night schools will go a long way in educating the weavers. If weaving is taught in the high school, the weavers may have an incentive to send their boys to the school for the additional attraction. If illiteracy is liquidated there is hope for progress.

VI.—THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION.

The importance of the cooperative movement as an agency for the development of cottage industries has been long recognized. The Royal Commission on Agriculture says "the difficulty of providing sufficient capital at reasonable rates of interest for carrying on village industries can be met by the organization of cooperative societies for the purpose.....Mention may be made of the weavers' societies which now exist in several provinces. These supply their members not only with the credit required but, where they are well developed, also purchase for them the requisite raw material and, in some cases, arrange for the sale of their finished products. We believe that development on these lines is essential, if the artisans are to reap a reasonable profit from their labour and if rural industries are to be placed in a position to survive the competition to which they are increasingly exposed." The Maclagan committee believes that the moneylenders should be replaced by the cooperative societies to enable weavers to obtain loans at cheap rates because "the weavers are a numerous and poor class whose earnings have in recent years been seriously diminished by the competition of the mills and also because any method by which the cottage industry of the country can be preserved would deserve a prolonged trial."

In the Madras Presidency Weavers' Cooperative Societies have not made much headway although the movement has been fairly successful in other directions. The unsatisfactory results of these societies are due not only to the weavers but to the societies. Often the societies begin with a big nominal capital while the amount actually collected

is too poor to cover the cost of materials and yarns necessary to keep the weavers at work. As their borrowing capacity from the central banking unions is limited, they borrow at a high rate of interest from private capitalists. Lack of interest in finding a ready market for the cloth of the weaver members of the societies has often resulted in their desertion from the societies.

Lapses on the side of the weavers are many. They take more yarn than they are in a position to pay for on the security of the paid up portion of the share capital and finally they default. When the market is a little brisk and when they think they could get a higher price by bargaining they forget all their obligation to the society, and without producing to the society the goods, sell them on their own responsibility. Sometimes they grudge the small payments charged by the society for storing and disposing of the goods. They are in the habit of taking work surreptitiously from outsiders if they promise to pay them a higher wage. Frequently they deceive the society by substituting cheap and coarse yarn for the cloth they intend to hand over to the society for sale. They fail to understand that such practices would lead to their ruin. Well-to-do weaver members take undue advantage of their status and buy the major portion of the raw materials possessed by the society for their own use while the less fortunate weavers are left to shift for themselves.

Another reason for the slow progress of cooperation is the dependence of the weavers on the middlemen who have been supplying them with funds and providing them with work. This relation between the master weaver and the weavers has taken deep root. The former fears that his trade will go if every weaver obtains through his society a supply of cheap yarns and effects through the same medium the sale of his finished products. Anyhow it is not easy to replace the middleman by the societies. The poor and improvident weaver finds in him a ready asylum in times of want. The middleman has grown fat on his labours. Therefore, he looks with distrust and suspicion upon any movement which aims at liberating the weaver from his hold and is keen on frustrating such attempts.

In Sulurpeta there is a Weavers' Cooperative Sale and Purchase Society called the "Sri Venkataramamurthy Weavers' Cooperative Society," which was started in 1927. As the official annual reports were not available no detailed survey of the working of the society could be attempted. Information was collected after enquiring some members of the society. The byelaws of the society are well drafted and will give one an impression that the society is working smoothly and profitably. But of the several pious objects of the byelaws of the society only

one seems to have been fulfilled, *viz.*, the grant of loans to members. It is evident that the utmost importance is laid on the credit facilities to members rather than the realisation of other aims, like the buying of yarn, appliances, looms etc., retailing them to members, collecting the manufactured fabrics and providing all the marketing facilities for the sale of the products. The board of directors is lethargic and unwilling to carry out the provisions contained in the byelaws by putting them into practice. Never have the supervisors insisted that the board of directors should make at least an attempt in that way. A certain amount of compulsion by the Co-operative Department of the Government might have worked towards the alleviation of the economic condition of the weavers.

The membership of the society is open both to the weavers and non-weavers of the village. This provision restricts those weavers in the neighbouring villages within a radius of five miles from joining the society. The weavers in the hamlets around Sulurpeta suffer from the lack of any organization. If the membership of the society at Sulurpeta is extended to them, not only will the society be strengthened but those weavers also will benefit.

At present the membership comprises of more non-weavers than weavers. Out of a total of 102 members, only 43 are weavers. Placed as it is the society cannot expect to achieve any progress in the way of the improvement of handloom industry and of the economic condition of the weavers. Only a few weavers at Sulurpeta have joined the society with the main object of obtaining loans. If the weavers join the society only to borrow, their indebtedness will be increased and their progress will be impeded. The society should be only for the welfare of the weavers and membership should be exclusively for the weavers. In Sulurpeta there is another cooperative union for persons other than the weavers and it is surprising that the weavers' society should have a provision in the byelaws for including non-weavers also. Though the byelaw lays down that the non-weavers should not exceed weaver members, in actual practice this rule is not observed. If lack of strength of weaver members and a consequent dissolution of the society is feared, the jurisdiction of the society can be extended to other neighbouring villages also. In any case it is better to restrict membership only to weavers. To attract weaver members several facilities may be offered. For example, the share amount may be lowered; the activities of the society may be multiplied. A reorientation of the activities of the society can be brought about by separating different kinds of work of the society. The issue of loans may be in the charge of the credit department of the society.

Another aspect of work of the society is the securing of wholesale orders from the agency companies and buying yarn for distribution among weavers. The profits which go into the pockets of the middlemen may either go to the weavers or may be pooled in a common fund to be made available for their common good. Looms may be bought at cheap rates and stocked by the society. Where weavers want to instal more looms to produce more cloth and consequently augment their income, the society can sell them looms at cheap rates on instalment basis or on hire purchase system. If owners of looms are not weavers, looms can be hired. In that case more labourers also will be employed.

The society can buy the finished products from the members and market them jointly for a higher price. The profits that will go to the middlemen will filter down to the members and will increase their income and raise their standard of living. The marketing of produce can be conducted by a sale department of the society.

A cooperative provisions store can be opened as a branch of the society for providing provisions cheaply. Articles of food, clothing and other necessities can be bought wholesale at Madras and stored by the society. These can be sold at credit to the weavers fixing the maximum limit of credit for each member to the number of shares he holds or limiting credit to the earnings of each weaver. This avoids extravagance and improvident borrowing while the necessities of life are provided at cheaper rates than in the local bazaars. Controlling and limiting credit ensures convenience both to the member and the society. This will go a long way in improving the degenerate position of the weavers.

The sources of finance to the society are the capital raised by shares, fixed deposits of sums of Rs. 5 and its multiples on which a stipulated interest is paid periodically and monthly recurring deposits of a rupee or a multiple of that for periods of 12, 24, 45, 84 and 132 months. At present the share capital of the society amounts to Rs. 2,300. Fixed deposits which have been received from one or two persons amount to Rs. 600. But as for recurring deposits no member has till now saved anything this way. The cause may be attributed to their ignorance and poverty. If the society is modelled on a multi-purpose basis, it will establish a connection with every weaver and this will induce the weavers to take part in every activity of the society. The byelaws provide for various kinds of loans—ready money loans on the pledge of future manufactured products, joint loans and joint purchase and sale of commodities for the aid of weavers. The Government must, in the first place, contribute a portion of the funds to the society. Gradually the weavers can supply some proportion of

the required capital by their small individual contributions, shares and deposits.

As the weavers are, at present, ignorant of the various provisions of the byelaws and the ways of working of such a scheme, details of the byelaws must be translated into vernacular and published. The benefits of the cooperative society must be explained to the weavers.

Much opposition to the proper working of the society will come from the middlemen of Sulturpeta who are holding the weavers with their firm grip. If the society succeeds in taking into its fold the purchase and sale of the products of the weavers, the middlemen will not only lose their trade but also their living. But as the middlemen are only a few persons they can be employed by the society as their agents in negotiating the purchase of yarn for the society and the sale of finished products. Not only will they have an occupation but they will be a good asset to the society. If it is not possible for the society to employ them the middlemen must engage themselves in some business.

The work of the society should not be left to the board of directors entirely. In the present directorate of the society four are non-weavers and one is a weaver. A middleman is the president. He has his personal business to take care of and conducts a good part of the trade in Madras handkerchiefs. He has advanced loans to many weavers and is very influential. This results in the influential few rich of the society capturing for themselves the whole business leaving little to help the weavers. So there must be strict official control and supervision in the initial stages. When the co-operative spirit develops the official hold may be relaxed.

So if the society develops various non-credit activities, if it does not confine itself to credit alone, the services of the middleman can be dispensed with. There will be an appreciable increase in the income of the weavers and controlled expenditure will result in the progress of their general economic condition. Cooperation is the only salvation of the weavers of Sulturpeta.

APPENDIX I

Extract from the Table showing details of families examined, income and expenditure.

1. Number of hand looms	..	90		
2. Workers	..	74		
3. Non-workers	..	176		
4. Total population	..	250		
5. Hired workers	..	18		
6. Weavers output for the year	..	3,029	Jodis	
7. Hired workers output for the year	..	712	Jodis	
		Rs.	A.	P.
8. Income by weaving for the year	..	9,647	0	0
9. Income allowance from hired hand looms		417	0	0
10. Other sources of income	..	512	10	0
11. Total annual income	..	10,576	10	0
12. Expenditure :				
		Rs.	A.	P.
i. Food and maintenance	..	8,416	5	0
ii. Clothing for Men	..	617	0	0
iii. Clothing for Women	..	605	0	0
iv. Clothing for Children	..	190	0	0
v. Total of ii to iv	..	1,412	0	0
vi. Other items of expenditure	..	3,161	12	0
Total Annual Expenditure	..	12,990	1	0

APPENDIX II

Extract from the Table showing indebtedness of the Weavers.

Number of families indebted	..	43		
		Rs.	A.	P.
Total amount of loans on mortgages		4,070	0	0
Interest on mortgage loans		1,395	0	0
Loans on pronotes		2,655	0	0
Interest on such loans		935	0	0
Hand loans		2,335	0	0
Total amount of indebtedness		11,390	0	0
Usual rate of interest charged by the Cooperative Society		9%		
Rate of interest charged by middlemen		12%		

APPENDIX III

Extracts from the by-laws of the Cooperative Society.

Objects :—The object of the Society is the improvement of the hand-loom industry and of the economic condition of the weavers residing in the area of operations so mentioned.

For the purpose of attaining this object the Society shall be competent :

- (i) to raise the money required for the society from weavers and others by issue of shares and by borrowing by way of deposits or otherwise,
- (ii) to purchase such raw materials and appliances as are required for the industry and retail the same either for cash or for credit to the weaver-members residing in those places,
- (iii) to grant loans to the members,
- (iv) to purchase and hold in common or let on hire improved appliances connected with the industry,
- (v) to purchase or receive for sale the finished products of the members' looms and sell the same to the best advantage,
- (vi) to act as the agent for the joint purchase of the domestic and other requirements of the members,
- (vii) to do such other acts as may be conducive to the attainment of the general objects of the society.

Membership. It shall be competent to the Board of Directors to admit as members, persons other than weavers provided the majority of the members of the society are weavers.

Deposits. These can be received from members and non-members.

Other Borrowings. Board of Directors can borrow funds otherwise than by way of deposits, either from members or from persons other than members, or from any institution.

Trade. The Board of Directors shall arrange for the purchase for cash or on credit of raw materials and of necessary appliances for weaving and for sale to members for cash or on reasonable credit those materials.

They shall purchase from members the finished products and try to sell them to the best advantage.

Ready Money Advances. These can be given for weaving purposes. Rs. 5 per loom may be advanced and may be adjusted when the finished products are delivered by the member concerned to the society.

Purposes for which loans can be granted—

- (i) For urgent necessities.
- (ii) For cattle, fodder etc.
- (iii) For purchase of carts.
- (iv) Circular cist.
- (v) For the purchase of the land.
- (vi) Building, buying and repairing houses, cattle sheds etc.
- (vii) Advances to artisans for implements etc.
- (viii) To redeem prior debts.
- (ix) For ceremonial expenses.
- (x) For buying food grains and such other necessities of life.
- (xi) For educational purposes.

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

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AND

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यादिसन्निकर्षे गन्धादौ ; तथैव चाक्षुषज्ञानस्वभावादेव नियतविषयकत्वोपपत्तेस्तदर्थ-
मर्थगततया ज्ञातताख्यधर्मकल्पने मानाभावः । अतो ज्ञातताया एवाप्रामाणिकत्वान्न
ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमितिगम्यो व्यवसायः । न वा स्वयंप्रकाशः । ज्ञानस्य यस्मिन्नर्थे
प्रत्यासत्तिरस्ति, तस्यैव खलु प्रकाशो भवितुमर्हति ज्ञानम् ; यथा घटेन प्रत्यासन्नं घटज्ञान-
मित्युच्यते । न हि स्वस्य स्वयमेव विषयः । तथा सति प्रत्यक्षे विषयस्य कारणतया
स्वस्य स्वजन्यत्वापत्तिः । अतो घटमहं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायप्राप्त्य एवेति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—ज्ञानं स्वयंप्रकाशमेव । यथा दीपस्यान्धकारनिरसनेन घटादीनां
हानादिव्यवहारकारित्वेऽपि स्वस्य हानादिव्यवहारे न दीपान्तरापेक्षा, तद्वज्ज्ञानं घटादौ
व्यवहारजनने येन रूपेणोपकरोति तथा स्वात्मनि व्यवहारजननेऽन्यं प्रकाशं नापेक्षत
इति स्वयंप्रकाशमुच्यते । ज्ञानस्य हि घटादिषु वर्तमानेषु संयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षणः
कार्यकल्प्यः ; अवर्तमानेषु तेषु वर्तमानावस्थद्रव्यसंयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षण एव ; तदाश्रि-
तेषु संयोगाश्रितत्वं च संबन्धोऽङ्गीक्रियते । ज्ञानस्य प्रसरणविभुत्वादिप्रतिपादकशास्त्राह्वयत्वं
संयोगश्चाभ्युपगम्यते । इत्थञ्च तादृशसंबन्धमन्तरेणैव स्वस्मिन् व्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानमिति
स्वप्रकाशत्वमुपपद्यते । ज्ञानं अनन्याधीनप्रकाशम्, अर्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, दीपवत्, इत्य-
नुमानेनापि स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिरिति ।

इति स्वयंप्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः ॥

अथ पञ्चमे ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादे नैयायिकाभिमतमीश्वरानुमानं व्युदस्यते । तन्नि-
रासाभावे हि शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं न प्रतितिष्ठति । तथाहि—ईश्वरस्वरूपस्यानुमानिकत्वे, न
शास्त्रस्य तस्मिन्नंशे प्रामाण्यं सिद्धयति ; ‘अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्’ इति न्यायात् । ईश्वरस्य
परिजनस्थानादिकमनुमानाप्रतिपन्नमिति तदंशे शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यमित्यपि न वक्तुं शक्यम् ।
ईश्वरस्यातिशयाधानार्थं हि परिजनादिकम् । तस्य परिजनादिभिराधेयातिशयत्वे ईश्वरत्वायोग
इति धर्मिग्राहकतयोपजीव्यभूतेनानुमानेन तस्य बाधितत्वात् । एवमुपादानत्वांशेऽपि न तत्प्रा-
माण्यम् । सशरीरस्योपादानत्वे संसारित्वम् । अशरीरस्य तथात्वे शरीरद्वारा उपादान-

त्वायोगः इत्यादिरीत्या सर्व एव वेदान्ता ईश्वरस्य परिजनस्थानोपादनत्वादिप्रतिपादनपरा अनुमानोपजीविनो बाधिता भवेयुः । अतश्शास्त्रप्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थमीश्वरानुमानं निरस्यते ।

नैयायिकाः खल्वेवमाहुः—क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् इत्यनुमानेनास्मदादीनां क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वस्य बाधितत्वात्तत्कर्तृतया ईश्वरस्य सिद्धिः । क्षित्यादीनां कार्यत्वं तावत् प्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रतिपन्नम् । क्षित्यादिकं कार्यं सावयवत्त्वात्, घटवदित्यनुमानेनापि तेषां कार्यत्वं सिद्धम् । न च सकर्तृकस्य सर्वस्य शक्यक्रियत्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वात्, कार्यस्य च क्षित्यादेरशक्यक्रियत्वेन साधनाव्यापकत्वाच्च, शक्यक्रियत्वमत्रानुमान उपाधिरिति शङ्कनीयम् ; तत्तत्कार्यशक्तेरप्रत्यक्षायाः कार्यत्वेहेतुनैवानुमेयत्वेन कार्यत्वव्यापकत्वेन साधनाव्यापकत्वाभावात् । अतो निर्दुष्टमिदमनुमानमिति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—सकर्तृकमित्यत्र कर्तृशब्देन यत्नादिव्यापारनिरपेक्षकेवलात्मनो विवक्षणे दृष्टान्ते घटादौ यत्नादिनिरपेक्षकर्तृजन्यत्वासिद्धिः ; पक्षे तादृशसकर्तृकत्वस्य बाधः ; यत्नवदीश्वरस्यानुमानेनासिद्धिश्च । यदि ज्ञानादिपरिकररहितकेवल्यत्नवानात्मा कर्तृशब्देन विवक्षितः, तदापि किं यत्नस्य यत्नाधिष्ठेयवस्तुक्रियाद्वारा कार्यहेतुत्वम्? उत स्वरूपत इति विकल्पे, स्वरूपतः इति पक्षे पूर्ववदेव दोषाः ; यत्ने सत्यपि क्रियां विना घटादिकार्यादर्शनेन स्वरूपतः यत्नपूर्वकत्वस्य दृष्टान्तेऽभावात् । अतः क्रियाद्वारा कार्यहेतुत्वमिति प्रथमकल्पे, कार्यसामान्यस्य स्वोपयोगिक्रियाद्वारा यत्नपूर्वकत्वमिति नियमादन्यादीनामूर्ध्वगमनादेरदृष्टैककारणकत्वमिति सिद्धान्तव्याहतिः परेषाम् । उक्तं हि ‘ अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनमणुमनसोश्चाद्यं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि ’ इति ।

अपि च विश्वोपादानक्रियाहेतुप्रयत्नवत्पूर्वकत्वसाधनेऽपि उक्तप्रयत्नवत्सर्वज्ञत्वे प्रमाणं नास्ति । लोके चेतनस्यैव यत्नो दृष्ट इति तस्य चैतन्यमात्रकल्पनैव हि लघीयसी ; न तु तस्य चैतन्यस्य सर्वविषयकत्वमेतावता सिद्धयति । यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्थाया ज्ञानाधीनत्वात् सर्वविषयज्ञानं विना सर्वविषयकत्वं यत्नस्य न सेत्स्यतीति च न सुवचम् । यथा सुषुप्तावदृष्टादेव यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्था तद्वज्ज्ञानं विनापि तदुपपत्तेः । अतः उक्तपक्षेऽपि विवक्षितेश्वरासिद्धिः ।

ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवत्पूर्वकत्वस्य सकर्तृकमित्यनेन विवक्षणेऽप्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञानादेर्यत्नं प्रत्यनुपकारकत्वात्साध्याप्रसिद्धिः । ज्ञानयत्नयोस्साहित्यदर्शनमात्रेण ज्ञानसाधनेऽविशेषाद्देहादिकमप्यङ्गीकार्यं स्यात् ।

किञ्च क्षित्यादिकं शरीरिकर्तृकम्, अनित्यज्ञानवत्कर्तृकम्, अस्मदादिकर्तृकम्, असर्वज्ञकर्तृकम्, सकर्तृकत्वाद्धटवदिति प्रत्यनुमानपराहतञ्चैतदनुमानमिति ।

इति ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः

षष्ठे देहाद्यतिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादे प्राधान्येन चार्वाकमतमद्वैतिमतञ्च निरस्य देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणबुद्धिविलक्षणः, परमात्मनः परस्परञ्च भिन्नः, ज्ञाता, कर्ता, अहम्प्रत्ययवेद्यः जीवात्मेति समर्थ्यते । तत्र चार्वाकस्यायं भावः—अहम्प्रत्ययगोचरस्यात्मत्वमिति तावद्विवादम् । अतः देवोऽहं मनुष्योऽहं इति प्रतीतिबलाद्देहस्यैवात्मत्वम् । न हि कश्चित् चक्षुरहं श्रोत्रमहमिति प्रत्येति । अत इन्द्रियाणामनात्मत्वमवसीयते । मनसस्तु ज्ञानकरणत्वमेवेति न तत्कर्तृत्वमिति नात्मत्वम् । नापि प्राणस्यात्मत्वम् ; शरीरे निष्क्रिये सति प्राणे सक्रियेऽपि अहं निष्क्रिय इति प्रतीतेरनुभवसिद्धाया अनुपपत्तेः । बुद्धेस्तु ज्ञाधार्थत्वेन साध्यरूपत्वात् आत्मनश्च सिद्धत्वान्न तथात्वम् । अतो देह एवात्मा । मम शरीरमिति व्यतिरेकधीस्तु भवन्मते ममात्मेतिवदौपचारिकी । पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्यानुपलम्भेऽपि शरीराकारेण परिणतेषु तेषु यथादर्शनं चैतन्याङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावः । बाल्ययुवत्वाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाद्देहस्याभिन्नतया बाल्येऽनुभूतस्य युवत्वादौ प्रति-सन्धानोपपत्तिरिति ।

अद्वैतिनस्त्वेवमाहुः—देहातिरिक्तः प्रत्यगर्थ एवात्मा न ज्ञाता अहमर्थः । प्रत्यक्त्वञ्च स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम् । तत्संविद एव । अतस्संविदेवात्मा । संविदो व्यतिरिच्यमानं परागर्थ एव । अत आत्मनो ज्ञातृत्वाङ्गीकारे संविदपरपर्यायज्ञानव्यतिरेकस्याभ्युपेयत्वात्परागर्थ-

त्वापत्तेः । प्रत्यक्तवस्य संविद्रूपत्व एव निर्वाहात् संविद्रूप एव सः ; न तु ज्ञानाश्रय इति ।

राद्धान्तस्तु — चार्वाकाभिमतदेहात्मवादो न युज्यते । देहस्यावयवसङ्घातरूपत्वेऽतिरेकेऽपि वायव्येषु चैतन्यमवश्यमङ्गीकार्यम् । अतिरेकवादेऽवयवविशेषगुणानां अवयवविशेषगुणैरेवोत्पादाभ्युपगमात् । सङ्घातरूपत्वेऽपि अवयवानाञ्चैतन्यस्य प्रत्येकमभावे देहे चैतन्यानुपपत्तिः । अतोऽवयवेषु चैतन्यमङ्गीक्रियते इत्यपि न वक्तुं शक्यम् ; अवयवानामहमिति प्रतीतिगोचरत्वाभावात् । न हि कश्चिदहं पाणिः अहं पाद इति प्रतिपद्यते । अतोऽहंत्वस्य तेष्वभावाच्चैतन्यस्याप्यभावः । पादे मे सुखमित्याद्युपलम्भात्सुखादेः पादादिवृत्तितया तत्समानाधिकरणं चैतन्यमपि पादादीनामित्यपि न वाच्यम् , मे सुखमिति प्रतीतिबलादहमर्थस्यैव सुखित्वाद्यभ्युपगमावश्यकत्वात् पादादेरनहमर्थस्य तदयोगात् । पादे सुखमित्यादिः प्रत्ययस्तु अहमर्थनिष्ठमेव सुखादिकं प्रति पादादेरवच्छेदकतयोपपद्यते ।

किञ्च एकस्यावयवस्य चैतन्ये तदवयवनाशे चैतन्याभावप्रसङ्गः । सर्वेषां प्रत्येकं तथात्वे स्वप्रयोजनापेक्षिष्वितरपरान्मुखेषु मिश्रस्साभ्यसूयेषु च हस्तपादादिष्ववयवेषु एकग्रामवासिषु पुरुषेष्विव महान्विवादः स्यात् । न हि चैतनस्स्वप्रयोजनमपहायार्थान्तरे प्रयतते ।

चूर्णहरिद्रासंयोगजरागवत् पृथिव्यादिषु भूतेषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि चैतन्यं तत्सङ्घातात्मके शरीरे जायतामित्यनुपपन्नम् । दृष्टान्तेऽपि पाकविशेषेणावयवविगुणसजातीयगुणस्य तत्तदवयवेषूपत्तेरभ्युपगमात् । अतोऽवयवेष्वविद्यमानञ्चैतन्यमवयविनि सम्पद्यतामिति सकलप्रमाणतर्कविरुद्धम् ।

किञ्च बालादेस्तन्यपानादाविष्टसाधनत्वस्मरणात्प्रवृत्तिरेष्टव्या । इदानीं तदनुभवस्याभावात् । तच्च स्मरणं पूर्वानुभवजन्यसंस्कारोन्मेषवशादुत्पद्यत इत्यास्थेयम् । संस्कारोन्मेषकारणञ्चादृष्टम् । तच्चादृष्टं अनुभवः संस्कारश्चास्मिन् देहे बालादेर्न सम्भवतीत्यदृष्टाद्याधारः देहातिरिक्तो नित्य आत्मा सिद्ध्यति । अत एव प्रेक्षावतां पार-

लौकिक्यः प्रवृत्तय उपपद्यन्ते । देहस्यात्मत्वे तन्नाशानन्तरभाविफलानुभवार्थं यागदानादि-
प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरिति ।

एवमद्वैतिनामभिमतस्संविदात्मवादोऽप्यनुपपन्नः, अहं संवेदनीत्यहमर्थधर्मतया
संवेदनप्रतीतेः । न ह्यात्मनः कश्चित्प्रति धर्मत्वं सम्भवति । एवं संवेदनमुत्पन्नमिति
नष्टमिति चोत्पादविनाशयोरनुभवसिद्धत्वान्न तस्य नित्यात्मत्वाङ्गीकारो युक्तः । प्रत्यक्तत्वं
नाम स्वस्मै स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वम् । परस्मा एव भासमानत्वं पराक्तवम् । अतस्संविदो
घटादिवत्पराक्तवमेव, न तु प्रत्यक्तवम् । तत्तु अहमर्थस्यैवेति । यजेतेत्यादिशास्त्राणामर्थव-
त्त्वाय तस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिकमभ्युपेयमिति न केवलसंविन्मात्रत्वमात्मन इति ।

इति देहाद्यतिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादः पष्ठः

सप्तमे सामानाधिकरण्यवादे भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे
वृत्तिस्सामानाधिकरण्यमिति 'सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणस्य पराभिमतार्थनिरसनपूर्वकं यथा-
वस्थितार्थः प्रकाश्यते । तत्र भेदाभेदवादिन आहुः—जातिगुणादीनां स्वाश्रय-
व्यक्त्यादिभिस्सह भेदोऽभेदश्च प्रतीतिसिद्धः । अतो जातिगुणादिरूपभिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्त-
कानां शब्दानां जातिगुणाद्यभिन्नैकविशेष्यबोधकत्वं सामानाधिकरण्यमित्यर्थः । दृश्यते ह्ययं
गौरिति पिण्डाभेदेन जातिः । अयं शुक्ल इति च गुण्यभेदेन गुणः । न ह्यत्र
दण्डीत्यादौ दण्डादिरिव विशेषणतयैव गोत्वादयो भान्तीति सुवचम् ; दण्डादीनां
पुरुषापेक्षया पृथगुपलम्भबलाद्दृष्टान्ते विशेषणविशेष्यभाव उपपन्नः । दार्ष्टान्तिके तु यदेव
व्यक्तिरूपेणावगतम्, तदेव जातिरूपेणाप्यवगम्यत इति वैषम्यम् । न हि निपुणमपि
विस्फारिताक्षः इयं जातिः, इयं व्यक्तिरिति विवेक्तुं शक्नोति । अपि चात्यन्तभेदे
जातिव्यक्त्यादेर्नियमेन पृथगनुपलम्भ इति न घटते । अतस्सहोपलम्भनियमाच्चाभेदः ।
किञ्च अवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशत्वमुपलभ्यते । तथोरत्यन्तभेदे मूर्तयोरत्यन्तभिन्नयोस्स-

मानदेशताविरोधात्तन्नोपपद्यते । अतो भेदाभेद आस्थेय इति उक्त एवार्थस्सामानाधिकरण्य-
लक्षणवाक्यस्येति ।

अद्वैतिनामयमाशयः—समानाधिकरणवाक्यं न विशिष्टैकार्थप्रतिपादकम्, अपि-
त्वखण्डस्वरूपमात्रपरम् । तथा हि—उक्तवाक्यं विशेषणमात्रपरं विशिष्टपरं स्वरूपमात्र-
परं वा ? आद्ये विशेषणानां भेदादेकार्थबोधकत्वं न सम्भवति शब्दानाम् । द्वितीये विशेष-
णभेदेन विशेष्यभेदादुक्तदोष एव । अतः स्वरूपमात्रपरः । भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानामित्य-
स्मिन्वाक्ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽर्थत्वेन न विवक्षितः, अपि तु घटः कलश इत्यादिपर्याय-
पदानां सामानाधिकरण्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकत्वेन व्युत्पन्नानां शब्दानां यत्र एकवि-
शेष्यबोधकत्वं तत्र सामानाधिकरण्यमित्यर्थः । अतो नीलो घट इत्यादावेव तदिति
सिद्ध्यति । अत एव सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादिवेदान्तवाक्येषु निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म सिद्ध्यतीति ॥

सिद्धान्तस्तु—भेदाभेदवादोऽनुपपन्नः । इदमिदं न भवतीति भेदः । इदमिदं
भवतीत्यभेदः । इमौ भावाभावरूपौ भेदाभेदावेकस्मिन्वस्तुनि युगपन्न सम्भवतः । अयं
गौरित्यादौ च इदम्पदार्थे गोत्वादिकं विशेषणतयैव भासते ; यथा दण्डीत्यादौ दण्डा-
दिकम् । पृथक्संस्थानभाजां स्वतन्त्राणामेव वस्तूनां कादाचित्कविशेषणभावः मत्वर्थीय-
प्रत्ययसापेक्षसामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोजकः ; यथा दण्डीत्यादौ । द्रव्यसंस्थानतयैव पदार्थभूतानां
तु द्रव्यविशेषणतयैवावस्थितिः मत्वर्थीयनिरपेक्षसामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोजिका । यथा अयं गौरि-
त्यादौ । नहि गोत्वादिकं दण्डादिकमिव स्वतन्त्रं वस्तु पृथक्संस्थानवद्वा । अतो
मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययसत्त्वे तदसत्त्वे चोभयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्समानः । सहोपलम्भनियमोऽपि
न भेदाभेदसाधकः, अपि त्वत्यन्तभिन्नयोरेव साहित्यदर्शनात् साहित्यनियमस्य भेदनियम-
साधकत्वाच्चाभेदप्रत्यनीक एव । अवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशताविरोधाद्भेदाभेद इति चानुप-
पन्नम् ; अवयवसङ्घातातिरिक्तावयव्यनभ्युपगमात् । अतो न भेदाभेदवाद्यभिमतस्सा-
मानाधिकरण्यलक्षणवाक्यार्थ उपपन्नः ।

तथा अद्वैतिनामाशयोऽप्यत्र नोपपद्यते । तथा हि—समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य स्वरूप-
मात्रपरत्वे नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिपदेषु एकपदप्रतिपन्नात्पदान्तरप्रतिपन्नं वस्तु यदि नातिरि-
च्येत, तदा निष्फलमेव पदान्तरमापद्येत ।

अपि च लक्षणवाक्ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदवतामेव शब्दानामेकार्थवृत्तित्वं प्रतीयते । तत्र एकार्थबोधकत्वस्येव भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकत्वस्यापि संरक्षणमावश्यकम् । अन्यतरपरित्यागे एकार्थतैव हीयताम् ; विनिगमकाभावात् । नियतभिन्नाश्रयतया दृष्टविशेषणानामेव विशेष्य-भेदकत्वं खण्डः मुण्डः पूर्णशृङ्गो गौरित्यादौ दृष्टम् ; न पुनरतथाविधानामपि । देवदत्तः श्यामो युवा लोहिताक्ष इत्यादौ विशेषणभेदेऽपि विशेष्यभेदाभावात् । अतो विशिष्टार्थ-परत्वेऽपि नैकार्थत्वविरोधः । अत एव सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादावपि सत्यत्वादिविशिष्टं सगुण-मेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपन्नम् , न पुनर्निर्गुणम् । अयमत लक्षणवाक्यार्थः—प्रवृत्तिः—अभिधानम् । तस्य निमित्तं—द्वारभूतं जातिगुणादिकं भिन्नं येषां तेषां पदानां, एकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः—एकविशेष्यबोधनं सामानाधिकरण्यमिति । अत्र भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानामिति घटः कलश इत्यादिपर्यायशब्दव्युदासाय । एकस्मिन्नर्थे इति व्यधिकरणानां घटः पट इत्यादीनां सामानाधिकरण्यव्युदासाय इति ।

इति सामानाधिकरण्यवादस्सप्तमः ।

अष्टमे सत्कार्यवादे वैशेषिकाभिमतसत्कार्यवादनिरासपूर्वकं सत्कार्यवादो व्यवस्था-प्यते । वैशेषिकाणामयमाशयः—कारणादन्यदेव हि कार्यमुत्पद्यत इति वक्तव्यम् ; बुद्धि-शब्दादिभेदात् । तथा हि—न हि तन्त्वादिमात्रे पटादिधीः, पटादिषु वा तन्त्वादिधीः । एवं तन्त्वः पटः इति शब्दभेदः । बहवस्तन्त्वः पट एक इति सङ्ख्याभेदः । पटाद्यर्थं तन्त्वादय उपादीयन्ते । पटादयस्त्वाच्छादनार्थमिति कार्यभेदः । वृत्तचतुरश्रत्वादिराकारभेदः । पूर्वभा-विनस्तन्त्वादयः, पटादयस्तु पश्चाद्भाविन इति कालभेदः । अंशुप्रभृतयस्तन्त्वादीनां कार-णभूताः, पटादीनान्तु तन्त्वादय इति नियतः कारणभेदः । अपि च कार्यद्रव्यं यदि प्रागपि सत् , तदा कुलालकुविन्दादिकारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यम् । सर्वेषां सत्त्वाविशेषे नित्यानित्यविभा-गोऽपि न स्यात् । कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यभेदाभावेऽप्यवस्थाभेदादिदं सर्वमुपपद्यत इति न वक्तुं शक्यते । अवस्थाभेदस्य कार्यकारणयोरनुगतत्वे सत्तादिरूपस्य तस्य द्रव्यस्वरूप-वदेव बुद्धिशब्दादिभेदनियामकत्वासंभवात् । अनियतत्वे तु कार्यावस्थायाः कारणे कार-

णावस्थायाः कार्ये च संभवेन सुतरां बुद्धिशब्दादिभेदव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः । नियतत्वमिति तृतीयपक्षाश्रयणे कारणनियतस्यावस्थाभेदस्य कार्ये कार्यनियतस्य च कारणेऽभावात्कार्य-कारणवस्तुभेद आवश्यकः । अन्यथा विरुद्धधर्माध्यासस्यादिति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलादभ्युपेयम् । पश्यामो हि वयं तदेव मृत्तन्वादि द्रव्यमवस्थाभेदमासाद्य घटपटादिभावमनुभवतीति । अतः मृदेवायं घटः, तन्तुरेवायं पटः इति कार्यकारणयोरभेदस्यैव प्रतीयमानत्वाद्बुद्धिभेदोऽसिद्धः । कार्ये पटादौ उपादानभूततन्वादेरनुवृत्तिरेव, न तु कार्यस्य प्रागपि सत्त्वमिति न वक्तुं शक्यते ; न हि उपादानेऽनुवर्तमाने द्रव्यान्तरं समस्तीति कश्चित्प्रत्येति । अत एव तन्तुः पट इति समानाधिकरणप्रत्यय उपपद्यते । बुद्धिभेदशब्दभेदादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽप्य-वस्थाभेदादेवोपपद्यते । स चावस्थाभेदसंयोगादिः । स च नियत एव । अथापि पूर्वो-क्तरीत्या न विरुद्धधर्मान्तरं सः । धर्मिद्वयनिष्ठतया स्वयं स्वाभावश्च यदि प्रतीयेयातां तदा हि विरुद्धत्वं युक्तम् । एकधर्मिण्येव हि कदाचिदसावुत्पद्यते । अतः कालभेदे-नावस्थाभेदोत्पत्तौ विरोधो नास्ति । अत एव बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादय उपपद्यन्ते । अतो न कार्यकारणद्रव्यभेदः ।

किञ्च असमवायिकारणतया संयोगो भवद्विरप्यङ्गीक्रियते । स तन्त्वादिष्वेव नियतः, नार्थान्तरे । स तु स्वविशिष्टे बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिकं धर्मान्तरमपि व्यवस्थापयतीति न विरोधः । सत्कार्यवाद एव श्रुतिसम्मतः—‘येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्’ इत्यादिभिरेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुपदिश्यते । तच्च कथमित्यपेक्षायां ‘यथा-सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात् वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव-सत्यम्’ इत्यादिभिस्तदुपपाद्यते । तदवगच्छामः कारणद्रव्यमेवावस्थान्तरापन्नं कार्य-द्रव्यमिति । कथमन्यथा अन्यज्ञानादन्यस्य विज्ञानं स्यात् । तस्मात्सतएव कार्यत्वमिति ।

इति सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः ।

संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादे नवमे संस्थानातिरिक्तां जातिमभ्युपगच्छतां तार्किकाणां पक्षं निरस्य संस्थानमेव जातिरिति समर्थ्यते । अत्र पूर्वपक्षः—

गवादिष्वेका अनुवृत्ता जातिः प्रत्यक्षमीक्ष्यते । पश्यामो हि वयं खण्डादिष्वनु-
गतं हस्त्यादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तं गोत्वम् । कश्चिच्चादृष्टहस्तिजातीयो दृष्टहस्तिजातीयं प्रति
'अदृष्टपूर्वोऽयमिहास्ति दृश्यताम्' इति ब्रवीति । तत्रेतरो ब्रवीति 'दृष्टपूर्वं एव नापूर्वं
पश्यामि' इति । इदन्त्वेतद्गतहस्तिजातेरेव पूर्वदृष्टत्वादुपपद्यते ; एतस्या व्यक्तेः पूर्वमननु
भूतत्वात् । अयं गौः अयं हस्तीति विलक्षणाकारा यथा व्यवसायाः, नैवमयं गौरयमपि
गौरिति ; उभयोरप्यनुवृत्ताकारसन्दोहादेवायं व्यवसायः, न व्यक्तिशक्तिमात्रानुरोधात् ।
उपाधिः कश्चिदत्र विषय इति न वक्तुं शक्यते, स ह्युपाधिरिति कथ्यते, यः परम्परासम्ब-
न्धेन नानार्थानेकस्सङ्गृह्णाति ; यथा पाचको लावक इत्यादौ पच्यादिजातिः क्रियाव्यक्ति-
तत्सम्बन्धादिव्यवहिता पुरुषादीन्गृह्णाति । अतश्च सामान्यस्यैवापलापे उपाधयोऽपि
न लब्धुं शक्यन्ते । द्रव्यक्रियागुणाश्रया जातय एव हि प्रायश उपाधयः । अतो गवा-
दिशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं सैव जातिः । सदृशसंस्थानं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति तु न भवचम् ।
तस्यैकत्वे जातेरेव शब्दान्तरेणाभिलापात् । अनेकत्वे व्यक्तिवदनन्तत्वाद्व्यभिचाराच्चाव्यु-
त्पत्तिः । अतः प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्छब्दानुमानयोस्सामान्योपनिबद्धत्वाच्चातिरिक्ता जातिरनुगता
अभ्युपगन्तव्येति—

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—सुसदृशसंस्थानमेव जातिः । समानानां भावः किल सामान्यम्
समानानि संस्थानानि तद्वन्ति च वस्तुनि ; तेषां भावः स्वभावः—एकसमुदायानुप्रवेशः ।
स ह्यस्ति कश्चित्समानानाम्, यदेकगोचरतया समुदायानुप्रवेशः । अनेन सुसदृशसंस्थान-
रूपेणोपाधिना साक्षाद्व्यक्तिसमवायिनोदाहृतप्रतिसंधानोपपत्तेर्न तदतिरिक्तजातेः प्रत्यक्ष-
त्वसिद्धिः । इदञ्च संस्थानं परैरप्यभ्युपगतमिति नापूर्वं किमपि कल्प्यत इति
कल्पनालाघवमपि । इदञ्च संस्थानं न स्वरूपेण प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । किन्तु द्वितीया-
दिव्यक्तिदर्शनवेळायां दृश्यमानसंस्थानस्मारितपूर्वपूर्वव्यक्तिसंस्थानानामपि साश्रयाणां
तदेकप्रतिपत्तिविषयत्वरूपधर्मविशिष्टमेव । अतः पूर्वोक्तमानन्त्यं व्यभिचारो वा न भवति ।

गोसंस्थानं गवयसंस्थानं चाल्पसदृशमपि न सुसदृशम् । यस्मिन् वस्तुनि
भवतामेकत्वग्रहो जायते, तस्मिन्नेव सौसादृश्यम् । तच्च साक्षात्सम्बन्धि संस्थानं कचिदु-
ज्वलं कचिच्च मसृणमिति जातिपक्षेऽपि तुल्यम् । स्वासाधारणं रूपमेव तत्संस्थानम्

तदेव च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । तच्च कचिदवयवसंयोगविशेषस्सास्नादिः । अन्यत्र तु निरवयव आत्मादौ ज्ञानादिरिति भाव्यम् । एवं सुसदृशसंस्थानं जातिरित्यभ्युगमे न केवलं लाघवमात्रम् ; अपितु एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिरप्यनुकूला । सत्कार्यवादबलेनाश्रयस्य नित्यत्वे एकद्रव्यत्वे च सिद्धे अनेकाश्रयजात्यभ्युपगमासंभवात् । अतस्सुसदृशसंस्थानमेव जातिरिति । ‘ अन्यवस्थे च सलिले वाय्ववस्थे च तेजसि ’ इति पुराणवचनमपि संस्थानसामान्यपक्षमेव द्रढयति ॥

इति संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादो नवमः ॥

अथ दशमे शक्तिवादे स्वरूपसहकारिव्यतिरिक्तशक्तिपदार्थं दूषयतां नैयायिकानां पक्षप्रतिक्षेपेणातिरिक्तशक्तिपदार्थसद्भावः प्रतिपाद्यते । अत्र नैयायिकाः—यत्र कार्यं न जायते, तत्र सर्वत्र कारणानामन्यतमस्य स्वरूपमेव नास्तीति प्रमाणैरवसीयते । न तु तेषु सत्त्वपि कार्यानुदयः ; येन शक्तिः कल्प्येत । तथाहि—यस्य प्रतिबन्धाभावस्याभावान्मन्त्ररुद्धो दहनो न दहति स एव प्रतिबन्धाभावश्शक्तिः । स च प्रतिबन्धाभावो हेतुरेव ; प्रतिबन्धाभावविशिष्टस्य दहनस्य दाहकत्वात् । भावस्येवाभावस्यापि कारणत्वं युक्तम् । तथा च मण्यादिप्रतिबन्धे सति सामग्रीवैकल्यात्कार्याभावः ; न तु तदतिरिक्तशक्त्युपरोधात् । तत्कल्पनायां गौरवात् ।

किञ्चातिरिक्तशक्तिकल्पनायां प्रतिबन्धकेन तन्नाशे पुनरुत्तम्भकसत्त्वे किं तस्याशक्तेर्जनकमिति वक्तव्यम् । उत्तम्भकमेवेति चेत्, तर्क्षनियतहेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गः ; पूर्वं स्वाश्रयस्वरूपोत्पादकात्, कदाचिदुत्तम्भकाच्च शक्तेरुत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् । उत्तम्भकसत्त्वेऽपि शक्तिर्न जायत इति चेत्, पुनर्दाहकार्यं न स्यात् । अत उत्तम्भकाभावविशिष्टस्य मण्यादिरूपप्रतिबन्धकस्याभाव एव दाहकारणम् । स च विशिष्टाभावः केवलोत्तम्भकसत्त्वे, प्रतिबन्धोत्तम्भकोभयसत्त्वे, तदुभयाभावे च वर्तत इत्यनुगतकारणसिद्धिरिति नातिरिक्तशक्तिकल्पनं युक्तमिति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—भावानामेव हेतुत्वं नाभावानामपि ; भावातिरिक्ताभावस्वरूपस्यैव दुर्निरूपत्वात्तस्य कारणताया दूरनिरस्तत्वात् । यदि च मण्याद्यभावः कारणम्, तर्हि तत्त्व-

योक्तृपुरुषाभावोऽपि कारणं स्यात् ; प्रतिपक्षाभावत्वाविशेषात् । अपि च मण्याद्यभावस्ये-
वोत्तम्भकस्यापि कारणत्वं कुतो नाश्रीयते । उत्तम्भकेन विनापि मण्याद्यभावमात्रेण कचि-
त्कार्यं दृश्यत इति चेत् , तर्हि तृणारणिमणिस्थल इव कार्यवैलक्षण्यं कल्प्यताम् ; न तु
भावरूपं परित्यज्योत्तम्भकाभावविशिष्टमण्याद्यभावात्मना अभावस्य कारणत्वं न्याय्यम् ।
अन्यथा तृणारणिमणीनां तृणारण्यभावविशिष्टमण्यभावाभावात्मना एकरूपेण कारणत्व-
प्रसङ्गः ; तृणाद्यन्यतमस्थल उक्तविशिष्टाभावसत्त्वात् । किञ्च भावस्याप्युत्तरीत्या विशिष्टा-
भावात्मना कारणत्वे अग्न्यादेरप्युक्तविशिष्टाभावात्मना धूमादिकं प्रति कारणत्वं शङ्क्येत ।
इत्थं च यथा उत्तम्भकाभावेऽपि विशेष्याभावप्रयुक्तविशिष्टाभावसत्त्वाद्वाहादिकार्यं जायते,
तद्वदग्न्याद्यभावेऽपि धूमादिर्जायतेति शङ्क्या धूमादग्न्यनुमानं न स्यात् । एवं रीत्या सर्वत्र
कार्याकारणानुमानं न सिद्धयति । अतश्शक्तिमतामेव भावानां हेतुत्वम् । सेयं शक्ति-
नार्थान्तरम् । तदेव हि द्रव्यं दृश्यादृश्यरूपम् । तस्य रूपस्य शक्तिरिति संज्ञा । ‘ शक्त्य-
स्सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ’ इत्यादिकमपि शक्तौ प्रमाणमिति ॥

इति शक्तिवादो दशमः ॥

अथ एकादशे भावान्तराभाववादे भावातिरिक्तमभावं निराकृत्य अभावस्य भाव-
रूपत्वं साधयति—अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणस्तार्किकाः । ते ह्येवमाहुः—नञर्थो ह्यभावः । स च
सप्रतियोगिकः । न तस्य भावरूपत्वम् । भावस्य निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वात् । अत एव भाव-
विशेषो निषेधार्थ इति न सुवचम् । विधिगम्यस्य भावत्वं तावद्विगीतम् । स च सप्रति-
योगिकत्वनिर्बन्धविधुरः । नैवमभावः ; तस्य प्रतियोग्यपेक्षानियमात् । उपाधिरेव नास्ति-
शब्दार्थ इति यदि मतम् ; तत्र विकल्प्यते किं केवलो देश उपाधिः, उत तद्बुद्धिः,
किं वा केवलः कालः, यदि वा देशान्वितः कालः ? आद्ये प्रतियोगिनि सत्यपि केवलदेश-
स्यानपायान्नास्तीति प्रयोगस्स्यात् । प्रतियोग्यसन्निधान एव नास्तीति व्यवहार इति चेत्,
अभावेन विना प्रतियोगित्वं किञ्चूतमिति दुर्वचम् ; अभावमादायैव ह्यस्यायं प्रति-

योगीति व्यवहारः । असन्निहित एव प्रतियोगीति चेत् , तदा सन्निधानस्याभावोऽभ्युपगतः । एवमप्यभावसामान्यस्य न निषेधः । देशान्तरेण सम्बद्धः प्रतियोगीति चेत् , विभुपदार्थानां सर्वदेशसम्बन्धान्निषेधप्रसङ्गः । अभावस्य ज्ञानरूपत्वमिति द्वितीयपक्षे ज्ञानस्य क्षणिकतया अभावरूपत्वानुपपत्तिः । अन्योन्याभावस्य नित्यतायास्सर्वसम्मतत्वात् । कालो नास्तिशब्दार्थ इति तृतीयपक्षोऽपि न युज्यते, यतस्सर्वत्रैव चैकरूपः कालः । कथं तस्य नास्तिबुद्धिबोध्यत्वम् ? देशान्वितः काल इति तुरीयपक्षेऽप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां देशस्यैव नास्तिशब्दाभिधेयत्वम् । इत्थं च प्रथमकल्पोक्तदोषानुद्धारः । अतो रूपादिवत्प्रत्यक्षसिद्धो भावातिरिक्तोऽभाव इति ।

अत्रोच्यते—भावातिरिक्तोऽभावो नास्ति ; कल्पनागौरवात् । रूपादीनामनन्यथासिद्धबुद्धिबोध्यत्ववदभावस्यातथाविधत्वात् । अभावस्य भावविशेषैरेवान्यथासिद्धत्वात् । तत्तत्प्रतियोगिभावस्फुरणसहकृतः देशकालदशाभेद एव नास्तिशब्दार्थः । अपि च अभावाभावो भाव इति भवद्विरप्यभ्युपगम्यते । यथा भावाभावयोः परस्परप्रतिक्षेपात्मकत्वेन अन्योन्याभावरूपत्वम् , तथा भावानामेव परस्परप्रतिक्षेपात्मकत्वेनान्योन्याभावरूपत्वं वयमप्यभ्युपगच्छामः । अतिरिक्ताभाववादिना यद्देशकालाद्युपपृष्ठोऽभावपदार्थोऽङ्गीक्रियते, स एव देशकालादिरभावव्यवहारविषयः ; लाघवात् । यथा भवत्सिद्धान्ते घटध्वंसप्रागभावो नाम घटतत्प्रागभावरूपः, एवं घटप्रागभावध्वंसश्च घटतद्वंसरूप इति द्वेधा अभ्युपगम्यते । एवमेवास्माभिरपि अनादिप्रागवस्थापरम्परा घटस्य प्रागभावः । अनन्त उत्तरावस्थासन्तानः घटस्य ध्वंस इत्यङ्गीक्रियते । एवमनङ्गीकारे ध्वंसप्रागभावस्य प्रागभावध्वंसस्य चातिरिक्ताभावरूपत्वे सत्युत्तरोत्तराभावपारम्पर्याविश्रान्तेरनवस्था स्यात् । यदि कुत्रचिदनवस्थायास्स्वत एवोपरतिस्तर्ह्यादित एवोपरतिस्स्यात् । अतः पूर्वावस्थापरम्परैव प्रागभावः, उत्तरावस्थापरम्परैव ध्वंस इति यथादर्शनं भावान्तरमेवाभावः । ‘ असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ’ इत्यादिका कारणविषया श्रुतिरपि भावान्तरमेवाभाव इति पक्षे मुख्या- र्था भवतीति ॥

इति भावान्तराभाववाद एकादशः ॥

शरीरलक्षणवादे द्वादशे श्रीभाष्यकाराभिमतं शरीरलक्षणं विशोध्यते । ‘ यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यम् तच्छेषतैकस्वभावं च, तत् तस्य शरीरम् ’ इति लक्षणम् । अत्रेदं विचार्यते—किमेतद्वाक्यमेकलक्षणाभिप्रायमुतानैकलक्षणाभिप्रायमिति । यदि ह्येकलक्षणाभिप्रायम्, ततो व्यवच्छेदासिद्धेर्लक्षणत्वासंभवः । अतो लक्षणत्रयमेतदिति युक्तम् । तत्र यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यमित्येतत्सर्वत्र सम्बध्यते । यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं शक्यमित्येकं लक्षणम् । यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना धार्यमित्यपरम् । यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं शेषतैकस्वरूपमित्यन्यत् । चेतनस्येत्यनेन चैतन्यविशिष्टो विवक्षितः । अतः धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य शरीरत्वव्युदासः ; तस्य विशेष्यमात्रनियम्यत्वेऽपि चैतन्यविशिष्टनियम्यत्वाभावात् । यद्द्रव्यमिति शब्दादेर्व्युदासः ; तस्यापि स्वकार्ये चेतनेन विनियुज्यमानत्वात् । सर्वात्मनेत्यस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वेनेत्यर्थः । इदं नियमनधारणयोर्विशेषणम् ; न शेषतायाः ; तत्र एकशब्देनैव तदर्थसिद्धेः । सर्वात्मनेत्यनेन कदाचित्प्रेर्यस्य परशरीरस्य व्यवच्छेदः । स्वार्थ इत्यर्थशब्दो विषयवाची कार्यमाचष्टे । एतेन शक्ये अर्थे इत्युक्तं भवति । स्वशब्दो द्रव्यवचनः । यस्य द्रव्यस्य यत्कार्यं वर्तते तत्स्वकार्यम् । शक्यमित्यसम्भवपरिहारः । न हि किञ्चिदपि द्रव्यं सर्वं कार्यं सर्वदा कुर्वद् दृश्यते । एवं द्वितीयलक्षणे कदाचिद्धार्याणां शिलाकाष्ठादीनां शरीरत्ववारणाय सर्वात्मनेति । तृतीयलक्षणे कदाचिच्छेषभूतानां राजभृत्यादीनां वारणाय सर्वात्मनेत्यर्थकमेकपदम् । एवं च लक्षणत्रयमिति पूर्वपक्षः ॥

सिद्धान्तस्तु—एकलक्षणमिति । तथाहि—प्रथमलक्षणे तावत्कुठारादिष्वतिव्याप्तिः ; चेतनेन हि देवदत्तादिना कुठारादिस्वकार्ये व्यापार्यते । अव्यवधानेन नियमनविवक्षणे न दोषः ; कुठारादीनां शरीरव्यवधानेनैव नियमनादिति चेत्, तर्हि भूतवेतालगरादीनां मान्त्रिकशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः ; अव्यवधानेन तेषां नियमनात् । देवादिसङ्कल्पमात्रप्रवर्त्यानां विमानादीनां तच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गश्च ।

तथा द्वितीयलक्षणे यावदात्मभावित्वेन धार्यत्वस्य विशेष्यद्रव्यापेक्षया विवक्षणे जीवशरीराणामतथात्वादव्याप्तिः । नित्यसंसारिभिर्नित्यध्रियमाणायाः प्रकृतेरपि तच्छरीरत्वं

प्रसज्येत । चैतन्यविशिष्टत्वेन धारणविवक्षणे प्रसुप्तशरीरे अव्याप्तिः । योग्यत्वेन विशेषणेऽपि परशरीरस्य प्रविष्टशरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

‘तृतीयलक्षणेऽपि चेतनस्येत्यनेन स्वरूपमात्रविवक्षणे चैतन्यविशिष्टविवक्षणे च पूर्वोक्त-
एव दोषः । अतः प्रत्येकलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेः विधेयत्वाधेयत्वशेषत्वानि समुचितान्येवैकं
लक्षणमिति । इदं हि लक्षणं श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेवानूद्यते, नापूर्वमुत्प्रेक्ष्यते । अतः व्यवच्छेद-
विशेषापेक्षा नास्ति ; श्रौतत्वात् । बृहदारण्यके ‘यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं
पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः’
इत्युक्तम् । अत्र यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमिति पृथिव्याश्शरीरत्वं निर्दिश्य तत्कथमित्यपेक्षायां
‘यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तर’ इत्याधेयत्वं, ‘यं पृथिवी न वेदेति’ शेषत्वं, ‘यः पृथिवी-
मन्तरो यमयतीति’ विधेयत्वं च लक्षणमभिधीयते । ‘अत्र यं पृथिवी न वेदे’ त्यवेदनाभिधा-
नात्पृथिव्यादेस्त्वोज्जीवनप्रयुक्तस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तयो व्युदस्यन्ते । अतः पारार्थ्यलक्षणं
शेषत्वं सिद्धमिति ।

इति शरीरलक्षणवादो द्वादशः ।

अथ त्रयोदशे वादे आत्मनस्त्वप्रकाशस्यापि संसारोपपत्तिः कैवल्यस्वरूपं च
निरूप्यते । आत्मा चेत्स्वप्रकाशः, स्वाभाविकमुखरूपादिभावात्संसार एव न स्यात् । तस्य
तिरोधानं च न सुवचम् ; स्वप्रकाशस्य तिरोधाने स्वरूपनाशप्रसङ्गस्य परेषामिव सिद्धान्ति-
नामपि तुल्यत्वादिति । परिहारस्तु—निर्विशेषः प्रकाशः परेषाम् । अस्माकं तु सवि-
शेषः । स च विशेष आनुकूल्यम् । तत्र चानुकूल्ये तारतम्यविशेषोऽस्ति मसृणं तीव्रञ्चे-
ति । तत्र मसृणमानुकूल्यं सर्वदा प्रकाशते । तीव्रन्तु विलक्षणमानुकूल्यं शास्त्रेण गम्यं
कर्मणा तिरोधीयते । आत्मविषयकविशदज्ञानेन तिरोधायककर्मणि क्षीणे स्वयं वा धर्मभूत-
ज्ञानविषयभावापेक्षं वा प्रकाशते । इतरतु मसृणमानुकूल्यं मसृणत्वादेव न सांसारिकदुः-
खतिरोधानक्षमम् । आत्मनस्त्वप्रकाशत्वेऽपि तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वेऽपि च धर्मभूतज्ञानविष-
यत्वाभावादप्रकाशः । स्वतस्सर्वगोचरमपि धर्मभूतज्ञानं संसारदशायां कर्मणा यथा सङ्कु-
चितम्, तथा तीव्रानुकूल्यमपि न विषयीकरोतीति कल्पनीयम् । यथा वा स्वरूपे भासमा-
नेऽपि तद्धर्मस्यानुकूल्यस्याप्रकाशः, तथैवान्तर्यामिणोऽपि कैवल्यमोक्षे सुखरूपत्वेनाप्रकाश
उपपद्यते ।

यद्यप्यात्मावलोकनसाधनभूतकर्मयोगज्ञानयोगयोरपि इन्द्रियार्थमनःप्रभृतिवशीकरण-
निष्पाद्यतया तदर्थं भगवत्प्रपत्तिः, शुभाश्रयभूतदिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहस्य ध्यानञ्चोपदि-
श्यते । तथापि राजभक्तिवद्देवतान्तरभक्तिवदैश्वर्यार्थिभक्तिवच्च तस्यापि ध्यानस्य स्वाभि-
लषितफलं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकनिवर्तकत्वनिमित्तत्वादौपाधिकत्वमेव । स्वाभाविकभक्तिविशेषस्य
न तदानीमाविष्कारः ; तस्य परिशुद्धात्मावलोकनेन वा बहुजन्मसञ्चितपुण्यविशेषपरिपाक-
क्रमेण वा विना दुर्लभत्वात् । अत एव वस्तुनि प्रकाशमाने तद्गतभोग्यताया अप्रकाशात्
कैवल्यमोक्षस्य भगवत्प्राप्तिलक्षणमोक्षाद्भेदः । सांसारिकमुखदुःखोपभोगसाधनकर्मणां
निःशेषक्षयात्, स्वाभाविकप्रत्यगात्मगतानुकूल्यविशेषाविर्भावादपुनरावृत्त्या च तत्र मोक्ष-
त्वव्यवदेशः ।

उपासनदशायां भगवति भोग्यत्वस्यानभिलषितत्वादभिलषितस्यैव तत्क्रतुन्यायेन
साध्यत्वाद्भोग्यताया अनाविष्कारः । भगवत्प्राप्तिकामस्य तूपासनदशायामनन्तगुणविभूति-
विस्तारस्य मोक्षदशाभाविनो विशेषरूपेणानुसंहितत्वेऽपि सामान्यतो भगवद्विभूतित्वा-
दिना अनुसन्धानमस्ति । न ह्येवं सामान्यतोऽपि कैवल्यार्थिनोऽनुसन्धानमस्ति । अतो
भगवति भोग्यत्वस्यानाविर्भावः । परं तु अर्चिरादिना मार्गेण गतस्य ‘स एनान् ब्रह्म गम-
यति’ इति श्रुत्या पञ्चाग्निविदो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरपि ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रम् ; न तु ब्रह्मानन्दानुभव
इत्यास्थेयमित्येकेषां पक्षः ॥

भगवद्भाष्यकाराभिमतः पक्षस्तु—कैवल्यमोक्षोऽपि ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवपर्यन्त एव ; न
ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रम् । तथा हि—प्रत्यगात्मस्वरूपं हि भगवच्छेषतैकलक्षणं शास्त्रेण विज्ञा-
तम् ; तथैवावलोकितञ्च । यथाभिलषितं प्राप्तिरावश्यकी । विशेषणभूतस्वात्मानुकूल्यं विशि-
ष्टानुकूल्यस्योपचायकमेव । न तद्विहन्ति । स्वाभाविकज्ञानप्रसरे सति भगवदानुकूल्यति-
रोधानमप्रमाणकम् । ‘ब्रह्म गमयति’ इत्यविशेषेण श्रूयमाणतया कस्यचिद्ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार-
मात्रम्, अन्यस्य ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवोऽपीति वैषम्यकल्पनं न युक्तिमत् । आत्मावलोकनात्प्राक्
श्रीपतौ केवलोपायतामतिः । पश्चात्तु तत्र भोग्यतामतिरपि जायते । तदा तत्किङ्करस्वा-
त्मविधैव परविद्या । अतस्स्वात्मशरीरकब्रह्मोपासनं ब्रह्मशरीरभूतस्वात्मोपासनमिति विशेषण-
विशेष्यभावभेदमादाय भेदेन ब्रह्मप्राप्तिगतिश्रुतिः । उभयोरपि विद्ययोः ब्रह्मोपासनरूपत्वं

ब्रह्मानुभवफलकत्वं चाविशिष्टम् । परन्तु केवलस्य मध्ये स्वात्मानुभवः पश्चात् ब्रह्मानुभवः ।
स्वात्मानुभूत्यन्तराद्यव्यवधानरहितस्त्वन्येषामुपासकानामिति ॥

इति त्रयोदशो वादः ।

इदं तावत्पाठकमहाशयैरवधेयम्, यदत्र ग्रन्थपातः तत्र.....एतादृशं चिह्नं, यत्रो-
पलभ्यमानः पाठोऽन्यथोत्प्रेक्षितस्तत्र () ईदृशं रेखाद्वयं, यत्र च त्रुटितो भागोऽस्मा-
भिरभ्युहितस्तत्रेदं [] विलक्षणं रेखाद्वयं च निवेशितमिति ।

अत्र आदितस्त्रयाणां वादानां शोधने टिप्पण्यादौ त्रुटितभागोल्लेखने चास्माकम-
त्यन्तमुपकृतवतां परमहंसपरिव्राजकानां श्रीमद्रङ्गरामानुजमहादेशिकानां समुचितं किञ्चि-
त्कारमजानन्तो वयं तेषां सन्निधौ ग्रन्थरत्नमिदं समर्प्यास्मदीयां कृतज्ञतां सविनयं
विज्ञापयामः । तथा इतरेषां वादानां परिष्करणे दुरधिगमार्थप्रकाशने विषयसूचीनि-
बन्धने चास्माकमतिशयितं साहाय्यमारचितवतां प्रियसुहृदां श्रीवेङ्कटेशसंस्कृतकलाशा-
लाध्यापकानां तर्काण्वश्रीवीरराघवाचार्याणामुपकारातिशयं सर्वदा वयमनुसन्दध्मः ।
वादार्थसङ्गृहे विषयसूचीपरिष्कारे चास्माकं बहूपकृतवद्भ्यः पञ्चनदस्थराजकीयसंस्कृतक-
लाशालाध्यापकेभ्यश्श्रीवीरराघवाचार्येभ्योऽनन्तान् धन्यवादान्निवेदयामः । पौण्डरीकपुरं
स्वामिन इति प्रसिद्धानां श्रीनिवासमहादेशिकसंयमीन्द्राणामाश्रमात्सम्पादितां परिष्कृतां
मातृकां प्रदायास्मान्मुद्रणे प्रोत्साहितवतां श्रीवेङ्कटेशसंस्कृतकलाशालाप्रधानाध्यक्षाणां
पण्डितराज श्री D. T. ताताचार्याणामुपकारमनवरतं वयं स्मरामः । स्वीयं कार्यगौरव-
मविगणय्यासकृत्तत्रत्र पाठशोधनादावस्माकमत्यन्तमुपकृतवद्भ्यो महामहोपाध्याय विद्यावा-
चस्पति श्रीकुप्पुस्वामिशस्त्रिवर्येभ्यो बहून् धन्यवादान् सप्रश्रयं समर्पयामः ॥

एतद्ग्रन्थमुद्रणं प्रति प्रथमं प्रार्थिता अध्यक्षवर्याः (Vice-chancellor) Rt
Honourable श्रीनिवासशस्त्रिमहाशया अस्मदीयां प्रार्थनामवितथयन्तोऽनुपदमेवान्वम-
न्यन्त । अमुद्रितानामावश्यकानां प्राचीनग्रन्थानां प्रकाशनेऽत्यन्तंबद्धादराणामेतेषां सवि-
धेऽस्मदीयमाधमर्ण्यं सबहुमानमावेदयामः ।

अस्मिंश्च प्रस्तावे न वयमिदं विस्मरामः, यदेतद्विश्वविद्यालयप्रतिष्ठापकाः राजा-
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मुपसंहरामः ॥

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NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

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नैतद्युक्तम् ; ब्रह्मणो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेः । शुक्तिकादावधिष्ठाने केनचिद-
भास्वरत्वाकारेण प्रतिपन्ने शुक्तित्वाद्याकारेण तिरोहिते सति हि रजतादिभ्रमो दृष्टः ।
ब्रह्म तु निर्विशेषतया निराकारं स्वयम्प्रकाशञ्च । अतोऽधिष्ठानभूतस्य प्रतिपन्नत्वादप्रति-
पन्नाकारांशासम्भवाच्च न तस्मिन् जगदध्यासः सम्भवति । अध्यासहेतुभूताया अविद्याया
असम्भवश्च पूर्वमेवोक्तः ।

यदुक्तं शुक्तिकायां दोषवशात्सदसद्विलक्षणं रजतमुत्पन्नमवभासत इति ; तदपि
साहसम् ; सदसद्विलक्षणस्यानुपपत्तेः । एकस्य हि वस्तुनः सदैवलक्षण्यमसदैवलक्षण्यञ्च
विरुद्धत्वाच्च सम्भवति ।

निष्प्रमाणकं चैतत् सदसदनिर्वचनीयत्वम् । यत् ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्तिः प्रमा-
णमित्युक्तम् ; तदपि न ; ख्यातिबाधयोरन्यस्यान्यथाभानादेवोपपत्तेः । दृश्यते हि सम्य-
ग्रजतवदिदं रजतमिति पुरोवर्तिनो रजतात्मकत्वम् ।

ननु कथं रजतेऽवभासमाने तज्ज्ञानस्य शुक्तिका विषयो भवति ? न भासमानत्वं
विषयत्वम् । किन्तर्हि ? तत्संप्रयुक्तचक्षुरिन्द्रिय(यज ?) ज्ञानव्यावर्त्यत्वम् । कथं तर्हि इन्द्रिय-
सम्बन्धरहितस्य रजतस्य भानं सम्भवति । भवत्यक्षे वा कथमिन्द्रियसम्बन्धरहितस्यानिर्वच-
नीयरजतस्यावभासः ? दोषवशादिति चेत् , समानमेतदस्माकमपि । अत एव हि तस्य भ्रम-
वम् । तस्मादेवान्यथाभानान्नेदं रजतमिति प्रसक्तताद्रूप्याकारबाधोऽप्युपपन्नः ।

किञ्च रजतार्थिनः पुरोवर्तिनि प्रवृत्तेरन्यथाख्यातिरेवाङ्गीकरणीया । यदि शुक्तिकैव
रजतात्मना नावभासते, किमिति रजतार्था तत्र प्रवर्तते ? त्वयाप्यनिर्वचनीयरजतस्य
सम्यग्रजततयावभासादेव प्रतीति (प्रवृत्तिः ?) भवतीति वक्तव्यमित्यन्यथाख्यातिरङ्गीकरणीया ।

किञ्च शुक्तिकायामनिर्वचनीयं वस्तु किञ्चिज्जातमिति वदता तस्य रजतबुद्धिशब्द-
योर्निबन्धनं वक्तव्यम् । यदि रजतत्वादिजातियोगः, सा किमनिर्वचनीया ? अनिर्व-
चनीया चेत् , सम्यग्रजतेषु रजतत्वबुद्धिशब्दौ न स्याताम् । सत्या चेदनिर्वचनीयवस्तुनि
न स्याताम् । तस्मात्सदसद्विलक्षणस्य वस्तुनोऽसम्भवान्निर्विशेषस्य ब्रह्मणो जगद्भ्रमाधिष्ठा-
नत्वासम्भवाच्च ब्रह्म जगद्रूपेण विवर्तमानं जगदुपादानं भवतीति नैतदुपपत्तिमत् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां धिवर्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारस्तृतीयः ।

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

चतुर्थाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अपर आहुः—

सम्भृ(संह ?)तौ ब्रह्म निर्मेदं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् ।

भोक्तृभोग्यादिरूपेण सर्गे परिणतं भवेत् ॥

मृदादिपरिणामत्वं घटादेरिव दृश्यते ।

तथा सत्येव वेदान्तवाक्यं सर्वं समञ्जसम् ॥

‘ सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् ’ ‘ एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ’ इत्यादिभिः प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां प्रलीननिखिलविकल्पं सन्मात्रं ब्रह्मावगतम् । तत्सर्वशक्तितया सर्गसमये विचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्र-प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणतमिति ‘ तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय ’ इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैरवगतम् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरिणामतया ब्रह्ममयं जगत् ।

ननु जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वाभ्युपगमे तेन तदन्येन भवितव्यम् । तथाहि—कार्यकारण-यो रूपभेदो नामभेदोऽपि दृश्यते । तथा उदकाहरणकुड्यनिर्माणादिव्यवहारभेदश्च दृश्यते । तस्मात्कारणभूतादन्यत्कार्यं भवितुमर्हति । अपि च कारणादनन्यत्कार्यं चेत्, कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यञ्च स्यात् । एवं कारणात्कार्यस्यान्यत्त्वाज्जगतो ब्रह्मपरिणामत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥

उच्यते । कारणात्कार्यमनन्यत् ; मृदयं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, संस्थानविशेषभाजो मृद्द्रव्यादृते द्रव्यान्तरानुपलब्धेश्च । रूपभेदादयः संस्थानान्तरयोगादेवोपपद्यन्ते । पृथुबुध्नो-दराद्याकारस्य कुलालादिव्यापारभावभावित्वात्कारकव्यापारस्यार्थवत्त्वम् । तस्मात्कारणादनन्य-

त्कार्यमिति ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यज्जगत् । एवं जगतो ब्रह्मपरिणामत्वाभ्युपगमे सत्येव 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'आत्मैवेदं सर्वं' इत्यादीनामद्वैतपराणां 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' 'पतिं विश्वस्य' इत्यादिद्वैतपराणां च वेदान्तवाक्यानां सामञ्जस्यं भवति । 'यथा अग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति, एवमेवात्मनस्सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति । तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यस्समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति' 'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते, अक्षरं तमसि लीयते, तमः परे देव एकीभवति'

‘तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम ।

अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निष्क्रिये सम्प्रलीयते ॥’

इत्यादीनि प्रकृतिपुरुषोत्पत्तिप्रलयवादीनि श्रौतानि स्मार्तानि वाक्यानि समञ्जसानि भवन्ति । तस्मान्निरस्तसमस्तविषयस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामभूतं जगदिति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामित्वश्रुनेश्चानुपपत्तिः ।

जीवस्य नित्यतायाश्च कृतनाशादिदोषतः ॥

मोक्षसाधनवैयर्थ्यान्मुक्तेरत्यर्थहानितः ।

ब्रह्मणः परिणामित्ववादोऽयं नोपपद्यते ॥

ब्रह्म जगद्रूपेण परिणमत इति वदन्तः किमोश्वरादि(द्विः)भिन्नं ब्रह्म वदन्ति ? उत तमेव ? तत्र प्रथमः कल्पो न सम्भवतीत्युपरितनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते । द्वितीयः कल्पोऽप्यनुपपन्नः ; 'अस्थूलमनण्वहस्वम्' इत्याद्यनेकश्रुतिभिस्तस्यापरिणामित्वावगमात् । अनुपपत्तेश्च ; न हि चिद्रूप एवेश्वरोऽचिद्रूपेण परिणमत इति सम्भवति ॥

अथ ईश्वरे उपादानत्वं सर्वात्मकत्वं च सर्वोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धम् ! अतस्तस्य जगदाकारेण परिणामोऽङ्गीकरणीयः । अपरिणामित्वश्रुतिरन्यथा नेया । उपादानत्वसर्वात्मकत्वश्रुतेरेव जगतश्चैतन्यशक्तियोगोऽस्तोत्यवगम्यते । तस्याचित्त्वव्यपदेशश्चैतन्यस्य नित्यतिरोहिततया

वेदितव्य इति मतम् ; तदप्ययुक्तम् ; सर्ववस्तुविरोधात् । अपरिणामित्वश्रुतेरनन्यथासिद्धत्वाच्च । यदुक्तं जगतश्चैतन्यशक्तिरस्तीति न विरोध इति ; तन्न ; चैतन्यस्य नित्यानुपलब्धेस्तच्छक्तेरसद्भावस्यैव^१ निर्णीतत्वात् । तस्योपादानत्वं सर्वात्मकत्वञ्चापरिणामित्वाविरुद्धमिति ब्रह्मस्वरूपाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

अथ स्यात्—उपाधिशक्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म । अतो जगत्परिणाम उपपन्नः । उपादानत्व-सर्वात्मकत्वोपदेशोऽप्युपपन्न इति । तत्र वक्तव्यम्—उपाधिशक्तिरिति कोऽर्थः ? किं सूक्ष्मरूपमुपाधिद्रव्यम् ? किं वोपादानरूपेण ब्रह्मणः परिणामसामर्थ्यम् ? प्रथमे कल्पे द्रव्य-द्वयाङ्गीकारात्सन्मात्रमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति विरुद्धयते । उत्तरस्मिन्पूर्वोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तिः । अथ मतं उपाधिद्रव्यं ब्रह्मणो भिन्नमभिन्नञ्च भवति । तस्मादनैकान्त्यादुभयपक्षोक्तदोषाः परिहृता भवन्तीति ; तदनुपपन्नम् ; भेदाभेदयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वेनैकस्मिन्वस्तुन्यसम्भवात् ।

अथोच्येत सर्वं वस्तु प्रतीत्यैव व्यवस्थाप्यम् । सर्वं च कारणात्मना जात्यात्मना चाभिन्नम् । कार्यात्मना व्यक्त्यात्मना च भिन्नं प्रतीयते ; मृदयं घटः, खण्डो मुण्डो गौरिति । न चानयोर्विरोधः । सहानवस्थानभिन्नाधारत्वयोरभावात् । अभेदशब्दावयवस्य
...(?)त्वाभिधायित्वाच्च । तस्मात्कस्यचिदपि वस्तुनः भिन्नत्वमभिन्नत्वञ्च नैकान्तिकमिति ; तदप्ययुक्तम् ; एकस्मिन्विलक्षणत्वतद्विपरीतयोरसम्भवात् । आकारभेदादविरोधं वदन् यदि कारणजात्याकारयोरभेदाश्रयत्वं कार्यव्यक्तयोर्भेदाश्रयत्वञ्च वदति, तदा नैकस्य द्वयात्मकत्व-सिद्धिः । अथ कार्यकारणयोर्जातिव्यक्तयोश्चैकत्वादेकस्य द्वयात्मकता सिद्धयेत्, तथा सत्या-कारभेदादविरोधो न सिद्धयेत् । जातिव्यक्तयोरेकत्वं चानुपपन्नम् ; अनुवर्तमानव्यावर्तमाना-कारतया तयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वात् ।

स्यादेतत् । अयं गौरिति तादाम्यप्रतीतेस्तयोरैक्यं प्रतीयते । न चानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ति-प्रतीतिः । तत्कथमनयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वम् ? इति । तत्र वक्तव्यम्—किं तादाम्यमिति ? न ताव-त्सम्बन्धविशेषः । तस्य सम्बन्धिद्वयाधारत्वेनैकत्वासिद्धेः । नाप्यैक्यम् ; अनुपलब्धेः । तथा

सत्ययं गौरित्येकस्य द्विरवभासः स्यात् । न च तद्युक्तम् ; न ह्ययमिति वा गौरिति वा अवभासः । किन्तु अयं गौरिति तयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यतया ह्यवभासः । किञ्च व्यक्त्यन्तरे जातिप्रत्यभिज्ञया जातेरनुवर्तमानत्वं व्यक्तेर्व्यावर्तमानत्वञ्च प्रतीयत इति तयोर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वम् । तस्माज्जातिव्यक्तयोरेकत्वनिवन्धनमेकस्य द्व्यात्मकत्वं न सिद्धयति ।

यदुच्यते आकारद्वययोगिवस्त्वाश्रयत्वाद्भेदाभेदयोरेकस्य द्व्यात्मकता सिद्धयतीति ; तदपि न सिद्धयेत् ; भेदाभेदनिर्वाहकाकारद्वयातिरिक्ततदाश्रयवस्तुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् ।

यदुच्यते—खण्डस्य मुण्डाद्व्यावृत्तिरूपं खण्डत्वं मुण्डात्खण्डस्य भेदः, अनुवृत्तिरूपं गोत्वमभेद इत्येकस्य भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमविरुद्धमिति । तदप्यचारु ; गोत्वस्यानुवृत्तिरूपत्वाभावात् । खण्डो गौर्मुण्डो गौरिति खण्डमुण्डयोरनुवर्तमानतया हि गोत्वमवभासते । न त्वनुवृत्तिरूपतया । गोत्वस्यानुवृत्तिरूपत्वे तद्वत्तया खण्डमुण्डव्यक्तयोरनुवृत्तत्वमभ्युपेतव्यम् । अनुवृत्तिर्हि कस्यचित्केषुचिद्भवति । न हि खण्डवृत्तिर्मुण्डव्यक्त्यनुवृत्ता भवति । मुण्डवृत्तिः खण्डव्यक्त्यनुवृत्ता वा । गोत्वं ह्युभयोरनुवर्तते । तथानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्त्योर्भिन्नाश्रयत्वाच्चैकस्य द्व्यात्मकता ।

अथ खण्डताद्यपरसामान्यं भेदः ; गोत्वादिपरसामान्यमभेदः । उभयोरेकनिष्ठत्वेन भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं सम्भवतीति । तदप्यसाधु ; भेदाभेदशब्दयोः पारिभाषिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अस्त्विति चेत्, नास्माकमपि काचित्क्षतिः । कस्यचित्कस्माच्चिद्वैलक्षण्यं भवति । तद्विपरीतं च न भवतीत्येतदेव भिन्नाभिन्नप्रतिपाद्यम् । तस्मादुपाधिब्रह्मणोर्भेदाभेदासम्भवादुक्तदोषोऽवसीयते ।

यच्चोक्तं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरगान्तुकत्वादुपसंहारभेदवेळायां तयोर्विनाश इति ; तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । ‘अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीं प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम् । अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः’ ‘गौरनाद्यन्तवती’ ‘अविनाशो वा अरे अयमात्मा’ ‘नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्’ इत्यादिभिस्तयोरजत्वाविनाशित्वनित्यत्वश्रवणात्तयोरुत्पत्तिप्रलयवादीनि पूर्वोक्तानि वचनानि ब्रह्मणो विभागप्रतिपादनपराणि वेदित-

व्यानि । अत एव 'तम एकीभवति' इत्येकभावमात्रमुच्यते । न तुं लयः । स्मर्यते च तयोर्ब्रह्मणो विभागः । 'विष्णोस्सकाशात्परतोदिते द्वे रूपे प्रधानं पुरुषश्च विप्र' इति । दिते खण्डिते इत्यर्थः ।

किञ्च जीवानामनित्यत्वे कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमदोषौ प्रसज्येयाताम् । पूर्वकल्यावसानेऽपि नष्टैर्जीवैः प्रागनुष्ठितानामभुक्तफलानां कर्मणां निष्फलत्वादुत्तरकल्यादावुत्पद्यमानानामसत्त्वपि कर्मसु तत्फलभूतदेहेन्द्रियादिपरिग्रहाच्च । अपि च तेषामनित्यत्वे मोक्षसाधनभूतोपासनविधयश्च निष्फलाः स्युः । आत्मनाशस्य निःश्रेयसत्वात्तत्साधनभूतोपासनविध्यानर्थक्यं न भवतीति न वाच्यम् ; प्रतिसंहारवेद्यायामात्मनाशरूपनिःश्रेयससिद्धेरवर्जनीयत्वात् ॥

अथ उपासनविधयस्त्वरमाणविषया इति चेत्, तन्न ; त्वराया असम्भवात् । यद्युपासकाः स्वनाशो मोक्ष इत्यवसेयुः, तदा मोक्षकथामपि परिहरेयुः । तस्मादुपासनविध्यानर्थक्यं भवत्येव । आत्मविनाशस्य दुःखनिवृत्तिफलत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीति च हास्यम् ; स्वसत्ताया अनुपमर्देन दुःखनिवृत्तेरर्थ(र्थः)त्वात् । न च सर्वे दुःखनिवृत्तिमर्थयन्ते । वर्तमानदुःखानामेव तन्निवृत्तेरपेक्षितत्वात् । सर्वे सुखमेव प्रार्थयन्ते किञ्च 'रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वा नन्दी भवति' इति मुक्तस्यानन्दप्राप्तिवर्णनात्, 'एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तनावर्तन्त' इत्यपुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेश्च मुक्तस्य सद्भावो मुक्तेः सुखस्वरूपत्वञ्च ज्ञायते । तस्मात्परिणामवादोऽपि न समञ्जसः ॥

इति नीतिमालायां परिणामप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारश्चतुर्थः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

पञ्चमाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अन्ये पुनराहुः—

सद्द्रव्यं स्वप्नं ब्रह्म सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् ।

भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्त्राख्यानित्यव्यूहसमन्वितम् ॥

प्रलये सुप्तकल्पाः स्युर्नियन्ता(न्त्राः)पापवर्णिणः ।

सर्गे तत्रिविधं ब्रह्म नानाव्यूहव्यवस्थितम् ॥

सन् घटः सन् पट इति सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेस्सदत् द्रव्यम् ; घटादयस्तस्यावस्था-
विशेषाः—‘यथा मृदयं घटः शरावः’ इति घटशरावादिषु मृद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेस्तत्र मृदेव द्रव्यम् ।
घटशरावादयो मृदवस्थाविशेषाः । न चेदं सत्त्वं घटत्वादिजातिवद्धर्ममात्रम् ; घटादीनामुप-
मर्देऽपि कपालादिषु सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेः । तस्मात्सर्वात्मकं सद्द्रव्यं ब्रह्म । स्वव्यवहारेऽपि स्व-
सत्तातिरेकेणान्यानपेक्षत्वात्स्वयम्प्रकाशश्च । अस्यैव विविधविचित्रचिदचिदात्मकत्वाद्विचित्र-
शक्तित्वं चावगम्यते ।

भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च व्यवस्थिताः ब्रह्मणोऽशविशेषाः । अत एव च नित्याः । तत्र
भोक्तृत्वशक्तियुक्तो भोक्तृसमष्टिपुरुष एकः । तस्य व्यूहाः प्रतिशरीरमवस्थिता जीवाः ।
ते चाणवोऽनन्ता नित्याः ; ब्रह्मांशत्वेन स्वप्रकाशाश्च । तेषु च ब्रह्मगुणाः केचिदाविर्भूताः ;
केचित्तिरोहिताः ॥

ते जीवास्त्रिविधाः । बद्धा मुक्ता नित्यसिद्धाश्च । प्रकृतिवैकारिकदक्षिणात्मकत्रिविध-
बन्धयुक्ता बद्धाः । मुक्तास्तु त एव तैर्बन्धैर्विमुक्ता आविर्भूतापहतपाप्मत्वादिब्रह्मगुणा

ईश्वरेण समानाः । सिद्धास्तु योगसिद्धाः अणिमाद्यैश्वर्ययुक्ताः । नित्यसिद्धा ईश्वरोपकरण-
भूताः ।

सततपरिणामि प्रकृतिद्रव्यं भोग्यम् , तस्मिन्ब्रह्मगुणाः प्रायेण तिरोहिताः । अत एवा-
चेतनमित्युच्यते । एषा प्रकृतिः कालः परमाकाशोऽव्यक्तमिति त्रिधा भवति । कालो नामा-
नाद्यन्ताजस्रक्षणपरिणामी मुहूर्ताहोरात्रादिविभागयुक्तः सर्वेषां परिणामपरिस्पन्दहेतुर्भवति ।

परमाकाशो नाम प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था ; प्रलयकाले तमश्शब्दवाच्या, परेणात्मना विभागं
गता, तस्मात् पृथग्व्यवहारायोग्या, तत्सलोहसमावर्जितजलवत्संसृज्यमाना तिष्ठति । तादृश्यवस्था
शक्त्यवस्थोच्यते । पुरुषस्य च प्रलयकाले तादृगवस्थानम् । एतामवस्थामधिकृत्य 'सदेव सौम्ये-
दमग्र आसीत्' 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इत्यादिश्रुतयः । सा च तमोवस्थापन्ना प्रकृतिः परस्मादात्मनो
विभागरूपं विकारं प्रतिपद्यते । स विभागः शक्तिविक्षेप इत्युच्यते । स च परमात्मनो
विभक्तस्य शक्तिलक्षणस्याचिद्रव्यस्य नित्यमेकरूपात्परमात्मद्रव्याद्विसर्पणमिव मणेः प्रभायाः ।
तद्विक्षिप्तं द्रव्यं परमाकाशः । स मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च स्थानं भवति । तत्स्थानं शब्दपरिणाम-
शक्तियुक्तत्वाद्वाक् अक्षरं चेत्युच्यते ।

सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिळितानि अव्यक्तम् । तत्सर्गकाले महदादित्रयोविंशतिविभाग-
भाग्भवति ।

नियन्ता नामेश्वरः । स निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दैश्वर्यगुणः ब्रह्मांशत्वात्सर्वशक्तिः स्वयम्प्र-
काशश्च । स च मुक्तसनाथः प्रलयकाले संसारिजीववत्सुकल्पोऽवतिष्ठते । एवं सर्वजगद्ब्रह्म-
द्रव्यत्वाद(व्याद?)भिन्नं भवति । अवस्थारूपेण भिन्नञ्च भवति । अत एव द्वैताद्वैतपराणि
वेदान्तवाक्यानि सर्वाणि समञ्जसानि भवन्तीति ।

अत्राभिधीयते—

घटाः सन्तीति सत्ताया घटधर्मत्वदर्शनात् ।

अस्तीति द्रव्यभावस्य घटादेश्च जडत्वतः ॥

भोगभूमेश्च नित्यत्वान्मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च ।

भोगस्य सार्वकालत्वान्मतमेतदसङ्गतम् ॥

यत्तावदुक्तं मृदयं घटः मृदयं शरावः इति वत् सन् घटः सन् पट इति प्रतीतेः सतो द्रव्यत्वं घटादीनामवस्थात्वं चावगम्यत इति; तद्विपरीतम् ; घटः सन् पटस्सन् इति घटादिद्रव्यधर्मत्वेन सत्ताया उपलब्धेः । न च घटशरावादयो मृदद्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषाः । अपि तर्हि घटत्वशरावत्वाद्यवस्थाविशिष्टमृदद्रव्यांशाः ; घटादीनामुपमर्देऽपि कपालादिषु सन्ति कपालानि इति सद्वुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेः । सत्त्वस्य धर्मत्वमनुपपन्नमित्यसङ्गतम् ; तत्रापि कपालानि सन्तीति कपालद्रव्यधर्मतया सत्त्वस्यावगतेः ।

अस्तु सत्त्वं धर्मः तत्किमिति वक्तव्यम् । उच्यते—सच्छब्दोऽनेकार्थवचनः । क्वचिदसच्छब्दाभिधेयाविद्यमानत्वविरोधिविद्यमानत्ववचनः ; यथा घटो नास्ति पटो नास्ति घटोऽस्ति सन् घट इत्यत्र । अस्ति सच्छब्दो पर्यायो; भवनक्रियाकर्तृवाचित्वात् । क्वचित्पण्डितवचनः ; यथा ‘ अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ’ इति ।

‘ इह सन्तो न वा सन्ति सतो वा नानुवर्तसे ’

‘ सर्वदाभिगतस्सद्भिः ’ इत्यादिषु । क्वचिच्छक्तिमद्वचनः ; यथा औषधविशेषेष्विदमौषधम् सदिति । तत्र निरुपाधकास्तित्वयोगेन सच्छब्दो ब्रह्मवचनः । यथा ‘ सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् ’ इति । उपबृंहितञ्चैतत्

‘ ओं तत्सदिति निर्देशो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधस्मृतः । ’

इति । तस्मात्सतो द्रव्यत्वमनुपपन्नम् ।

यच्च सदद्रव्यस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमुक्तम्, तदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; घटादीनामपि सदद्रव्यत्वेन स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अस्ति च तेषामपि स्वसत्तयैव स्वव्यवहारहेतुत्वं नाम स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति चेन्न; अनुपलब्धेः । सामग्र्यभावात्तस्यानुपलब्धेः (ब्धिः) नासद्भावादिति चेत्, तदपि न ; नित्यानुपलब्धेरसद्भावसाधकत्वात् । अथ तेषु नित्यानुपलब्धस्यापि तस्य सद्भाव उच्येत,

तदा भोग्यभोक्तृनियन्तृष्वन्योन्यस्मिन्नित्यानुपलब्धानां भोग्यत्वभोक्तृत्वनियन्तृत्वशक्तीनाम-
न्योन्यस्मिन् सद्भावः प्रसज्येत । तथा सति तेषां भेदकाकाराभावाद्बैलक्षण्यं न स्यात् ।
तस्मात्सदेकदेशस्य घटादेर्जडत्वेन सतोपि स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वन्न सिद्ध्यति ।

भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्त्रंशं ब्रह्मेति यदुक्तं तदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; नियन्तृव्यतिरिक्ते ब्रह्मणि
प्रमाणाभावात् । तथाहि—‘ यतो वा इमानि ’ इति वाक्यं यज्जगत्कारणं तद्ब्रह्मेत्यवगमयति ।
किं तज्जगत्कारणमित्यपेक्षायां ‘ सदेव साम्येदमग्र आसीत् ’ ‘ एकमेव ’ इत्यादिवाक्यं सतः
कारणत्वमवगमयति । सच्छब्दस्य चेतनाचेतनसाधारणवाचित्वेन विशेषाकाङ्क्षायां ‘ आत्मा वा
इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् ’ इत्यादिवाक्यं चेतनस्य कारणत्वमवगमयति । आत्मशब्दस्यापि सर्व-
साधारणत्वेन चेतनविशेषाकाङ्क्षायां ‘ एको ह वै नारायण ’ इत्यादिवाक्यं नारायणमेव जगत्का-
रणमवगमयति । तस्मान्नारायण एव जगत्कारणभूतं ब्रह्म ।

किञ्च सृष्टिपरेषु तत्तद्विधानपरेषु वेदान्तवाक्येषु यद्वस्तु कारणत्वेन परत्वेन ध्येयत्वेन
च यैश्शब्दैर्निर्दिश्यते, तैश्शब्दैः तद्वस्त्वनूद्य तस्य नारायणत्वं विदधता नारायणानुवाकेन
नारायणस्य परब्रह्मशब्दवाच्यत्वं स्वरूपप्रयुक्तम्, न ब्रह्मांशप्रयुक्तमित्यवगम्यते । अपि च
‘ विष्णोस्सकाशादुद्भूतं जग ’ इति कारणत्वेन प्रस्तुतं परमात्मानं ब्रह्मशब्देनानूद्य तस्य
लोकदृष्टप्रक्रियया कारणत्वानुपपत्तिश्च(त्तिः?) लोकेऽपि पदार्थानां विचित्रशक्तित्वप्रदर्शनेन
तत्परिहारश्चाभिहितः ।

निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मनः ।

कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥

शक्तयस्सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ।

यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः ॥

भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता ॥ इति ।

तदिदं परमात्मन एव ब्रह्मत्वे सङ्गच्छते । तस्मात् तदतिरिक्तं तदंशं ब्रह्म न संभवति ।

यत्त्विदं श्रेताश्वतराणां च वचनं 'एतज्ज्ञेयं नित्यमेवात्मसंस्थं नातः परं वेदितव्यं हि किञ्चित्' 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा सर्वं प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्' इति, न तद्ब्रह्मणः त्रिविधत्वं ब्रूते। अपि तु चिदचिद्विभूतिविशिष्टं परमात्मानमुपासीनस्य ब्रह्मभूयं ब्रूते। अस्यार्थः—प्रेरितारमिति विभक्तिव्यत्ययश्छान्दसः। ब्रह्ममेतदिति लिङ्गव्यत्ययश्च। तथैव 'कालस्वभावो नियतिः' इत्यारभ्य 'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं चे'ति यदेतत्त्रिविधं जगत्प्रोक्तं विभूति-विभूतिमद्रुपेणावस्थितं, एतत्त्रितयं यथा आत्मसंस्थं मनसि प्रतिष्ठितं भवति, तथा नित्य-महर्निशं ज्ञेयमुपासितव्यम्। इतः परमपवर्गार्थं वेदितव्यमुपासितव्यम् किञ्चिदपि नास्ति। एतत्सर्वमविकलं मत्वा साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तमुपास्य ब्रह्म भवति; ब्रह्मसमानाकारो भवतीति। 'प्रथ-गमात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्तस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' 'प्रशासितारं सर्वपामणीयांसमणीयासं' 'रूक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम्' इत्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यादयमेवार्थः। तस्मात्परमात्मव्यति-रिक्तं ब्रह्म निष्प्रमाणकम्।

यदर्पादमुक्तं—चिदचिदीश्वरा ब्रह्मणो नित्यांशाः। तत्राचिद्रूपतमोवस्था प्रलयकाले तस-लोहसमावर्जितजलवत्परमात्मनोऽविभक्ता सर्गकाले मणेरिव प्रभा विसर्पतीति; तत्र वक्त-व्यम्—अयमविभक्तः नित्योऽचिदंशः परमात्मनः किं विलक्षणोऽविलक्षणो वा किं बोभय-स्वभावः? अविलक्षणत्वे परमात्मनोऽचित्त्वं तत्प्रयुक्ताश्च दोषाः प्रसज्येरन्। विलक्षणत्वे तु तयोरेकद्रव्यत्वं न सम्भवति; विलक्षणानां नित्यानामेकद्रव्यत्वानुपलब्धेः। सुवर्णरचितपारश-दानामनित्यतया सत्त्वादिगुणवैषम्यहेतुकपरिणामविशेषायतवैलक्षण्यानामुपपन्नमेकद्रव्यत्वम्।

प्रयोगश्च—प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वराणां नैकद्रव्यत्वम्, नित्यविलक्षणस्वभावत्वात्; येषामेक-द्रव्यत्वं भवति तेषां नित्यवैलक्षण्यं न भवति; यथा पूर्वनिर्दिष्टानाम्। उभयस्वभावत्वं तु पूर्वस्मिन्नधिकारे निरस्तम्। तस्मात्प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वराणां नैकद्रव्यत्वम्।

ननु सन्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषेश्वरा न ब्रह्मद्रव्यांशाः; ईश्वरस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वात्। प्रकृतिपुरुषा-वोश्वरब्रह्मांशाविति किमिति नाभ्युपगम्यते। 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'वासुदेवः सर्वं' इत्यादिशास्त्रैः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरीश्वरद्रव्यत्वं परिदृश्यते। उच्यते—'पतिं विश्वस्य' 'स कारणंकरणाधिपाधिपः' 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' इत्याद्यनेक

श्रुतिभिस्तयोः तस्य च विरुद्धस्वभावत्वावगमात् न तयोरीश्वरद्रव्यांशत्वमुपपद्यते । मित्रद्रव्य-
त्वेऽपि तयोस्तेन तादात्म्यं तयोस्तं प्रत्यंशत्वं चाविरुद्धमित्युपरितनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

यदुक्तं ईश्वरभोगभूमिः परमाकाशः प्रकृतेराद्यवस्थेति, तदपि प्रमाणविरुद्धम् ; ऋचो
अक्षरे परमे व्योमन् , ‘ दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयं ’ ‘ कलामुहूर्तादिमयश्च कालो न यद्विभूतेः
परिणामहेतुः ’ इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिभिस्तस्याप्राकृतत्वापरिणामित्वादिभिर्नित्यत्वावगमात् ।

यत्पुनरुक्तं प्रतिसर्गवेळायामीश्वरस्य मुक्तानां च संसारिवत्त्वापो भवतीति, तदपि
साहसम् । ‘ तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ’ ‘ सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रळये न व्यथन्ति च ’
इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिस्तस्य तेषां च सर्वदा दृष्टत्वदृष्टत्वस्तोतृत्वनिद्राक्षयाद्यवगमन्न तेषां
स्वापस्सम्भवति ; हेत्वभावात् । न तावत्कर्माणि हेतुः, अकर्मवश्यत्वात् । नापि कालः ;
अकालतन्त्रत्वादीश्वरस्य । प्रत्युत काल एवेश्वरतन्त्रः ।

‘ कालं स पचते तत्र न कालस्तत्र वै प्रभुः ।

कालस्य हि च मृत्योश्च जङ्गमस्थावरस्य च ॥

ईश्वरो भगवानेकस्सत्यमेतद्ब्रवीमि वः । ’

इत्यादिशास्त्रात् ॥

नापि ईश्वरसङ्कल्पो हेतुः; असम्भवात् । न हि परमकारुणिक ईश्वरः चिरकालमाध्या-
त्मिकादिदुःखदुःखितान् स्वानुबुभूषया खोपासनं कुर्वाणान् ‘ वासुदेवस्सर्वमिति स
महात्मा सुदुर्लभः ’ इत्यादिप्रक्रियया स्वेनापि चिरकालप्रार्थितान् संसारिणः कथमपि लब्ध्वा
स्वात्मानं प्रापय्य द्विपरार्धकालं निद्रितान् करोति, स्वयमपि तावन्तं निद्रायत इति संभवति ।
तदेवमनेकदोषगर्भत्वादिदमपि मतं न मनोहरम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां शक्तिविक्षेपप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारः पञ्चमः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां षष्ठाधिकार आरभ्यते.

तत्त्वविद एवं वर्णयन्ति—

अनुकूलापरिच्छिन्नतेजोद्रव्यं स्वयंप्रभम् ।

ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्याद्यनन्तगुणभाजनम् ॥

चिदचिद्वस्तुरूपत्वात्तत्तच्छब्दैरुदीरितम् ।

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसकारणं ब्रह्मशब्दितम् ॥

सर्वानुकूलं देशकालवस्तुभिरपरिच्छिन्नं हेयप्रत्यनीकं स्वयंप्रकाशं तेजोद्रव्यं ब्रह्म ; श्रुत्यादिभि-
स्तथावगमात् । ‘एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म’ ‘रसो वै सः’ इत्यादिभिर्भोग्यत्वावगमात् सर्वानुकूल-
मवगम्यते । ‘नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम्’ ‘यतो वाचा निवर्तन्ते’ ‘अप्राप्य मनसा सह’

‘वर्षायुतैर्यस्य गुणा न शक्या वक्तुं समेतैरपि सर्वदेवैः’

इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्देशकालाभ्यामपरिच्छिन्नत्वं गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छिन्न-
त्वञ्चावगम्यते ।

ननु वस्तुनो वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छेदो नाम वस्त्वन्तरासहत्वम् । तद्यदि वस्त्वन्तरं सहेत,
तदा तच्च इदञ्चेति तेन परिगणितत्वात्तेन तस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वं स्यात् । किञ्च वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावे
तद्व्याप्तस्य देशस्य ब्रह्मणा व्याप्तत्वासम्भवेन देशतोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वञ्च सिद्धयेत् । तस्माद्वस्त्वन्तर-
सद्भावोऽङ्गीकृतश्चेद्ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्यं (नः) सम्भवतीति । उच्यते—न वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावो

वस्तुतः परिच्छेदः; येन तदसद्भावस्तदपरिच्छिन्नत्वं स्यात् । सत्यपि तस्मिन् वस्तुतोऽपरिच्छिन्न-
त्वव्यवहारदर्शनात् । सुवर्णशकलस्य रूपमानविशेषेण यावत्तन्निष्कषशिलातुलाभ्यां न परिच्छिद्येत
तावन्तं कालं तस्यापरिच्छिन्नत्वव्यवहारो दृश्यते । अतो वस्तुनो वस्त्वन्तरेण सह परिगणित-
त्वमात्रेण तेन तस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वं न सम्भवति । तस्माद्वस्त्वन्तरसहत्वं न वस्तुपरिच्छेद इति
न तद्विपरीतत्वं वस्तुनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वम् ।

यदुक्तं वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावे ब्रह्मणो देशपरिच्छेदो न सम्भवतीति; तन्न ; वस्त्वन्तरदेश-
योरपि व्यापकत्वाद्वह्मणः । तस्मात्त्रिविधपरिच्छेदरहितं ब्रह्म । ‘अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्यु-
र्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासस्त्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः’ ‘एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा अपहतपाप्मा
दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः’ ‘परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति परावशे ।’ ‘शुद्धे
महाविभूत्याख्ये’ इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्निर्मलत्वञ्च तस्यावगम्यते । नैर्मल्यं च त्रिविधम्—
स्वतःशुद्धत्वं, हेयवस्तुना संसर्गेऽपि तदोषैरस्पृष्टत्वं, श्रवणस्मरणसङ्कीर्तनादिभिरपवित्राणां
पवित्रताहेतुत्वं चेति । ‘विज्ञानं ब्रह्म’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिस्तस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वं चावगम्यते । ‘यदि-
दमस्मिन्नन्तः पुरुषे ज्योतिः परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य’ ‘तं देवा ज्योतिषां ज्योतिः’ इत्यादि श्रुति-
भिस्तस्य तेजस्वरूपत्वञ्चावगम्यते ।

ननु किमिदं ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्? यद(यद्य?)नन्याधीनप्रकाशत्वं, तदापि प्रकाश-
शब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः । यदि प्रभा ; प्रदीपादिषु अव्याप्तम् ; प्रभायाः प्रदीपाधीनत्वात् । न च
प्राकट्यम् ; अनभ्युपगमात् । न च स्वयं संज्ञानम् ; एकस्य कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वविरोधात्त्वकर्तृक-
स्वविषयज्ञानानुपपत्तेः । तस्माद्वक्तव्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम् ।

उच्यते—व्यवहारानुगुण्यं प्रकाशशब्दार्थः । ब्रह्म स्वसत्तया स्वस्मै स्वव्यवहारहेतुर्भव-
तीत्यर्थः । प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि समानमेतत्स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम् । ज्ञानस्य तु स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वं स्वाश्रयं
प्रति स्वसत्तयैव व्यवहारानुगुण्यम् ।

एवंविधं ब्रह्म ज्ञानबलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजःप्रभृत्यसंख्येयमङ्गलगुणसङ्गतञ्च । ‘परास्यशक्तिर्विवि-
धैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च’ ‘तस्य नाम महद्यशः’ ‘तेजोबलैश्वर्यमहाविभूतिस्सुवीर्य-
शक्त्यादिगुणैकराशिः’ इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिः तथात्वावगमात् । न च तासां श्रुतीनां निर्गुण-

श्रुतिविरोधः ; सर्वदा नैर्गुण्यप्रतिपादनासम्भवस्योक्तत्वात् । एतेषां गुणानामुपदेशवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गाच्च । अपि च ‘अपहतपाप्मा’ इत्यादि श्रुतिर्गुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोः विषयव्यवस्थापनं कुर्वन्ती तयोर्विरोधं शमयति ।

एवं विधं ब्रह्म समस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकम् । काण्वमाध्यन्दिनशाखयोरन्तर्यामि-
ब्राह्मणे सुबालोपनिषदि च सर्ववस्तूनां परमात्मशरीरत्वश्रवणात् । ‘जगत्सर्वं शरीरं ते’
‘तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः’ ‘तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः’ इत्यादिस्मरणाच्च । तत्र चित्स्वरूपमुपरि-
तनाधिकारे वक्ष्यते ।

अचिद्वस्तु त्रिविधम्—कालोऽन्यक्तं परमकाशश्चेति । कालोऽनाद्यन्ताजस्रक्षणपरि-
णामी मुहूर्ताहोरात्रादिविभागवान् परिणामपरिस्पन्दहेतुः ।

अन्यक्तं त्रिगुणात्मकम्—तत् प्रलयकाले नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नं परमात्मना
अविभक्तं भवति । सर्गकाले परमात्मसङ्कल्पेन विभक्तं महदादिरूपेण परिणतं नानानाम-
भाग्भवति ।

परमाकाशो नाम शुद्धसत्त्वमयोऽस्पृष्टदोषगन्धः शाश्वतः परमपुरुषस्य मुक्तानां नित्य
सूरिणां भोगभूमिर्भवति । एवंविधचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्म ।

ननु शरीरसम्बन्धस्य कर्मनिमित्तत्वात् ‘यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुश्श्रोत्रं
तदपाणिपादम्’ इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिः परमात्मनोऽशरीरत्वावगमादकर्मवश्यत्वोच्च न ताव-
त्तस्य शरीरत्वमुपपद्यते । चेतनाचेतनयोस्तच्छरीरत्वमनुपपन्नञ्च । इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं भोगायतनत्वं
वा हि शरीरत्वम् । न तदुभयमपि तयोस्सम्भवति । अचेतनेषु केषाञ्चित् उभयस्वभावत्वेऽपि
न तेषां परमात्मशरीरत्वम् ; जीवकर्मनिमित्तत्वेन तेषां तच्छरीरत्वात् । तत्कथं तच्छरीरित्वं
ब्रह्मणः ?

उच्यते—श्रुतयस्तावत्सर्वस्य वस्तुनः परमात्मशरीरत्वमुद्घोषयन्ति । प्रमाणान्तरा-
प्राप्तार्थविषयाणां तासां नान्यपरत्वम् ; प्रमाणाभावात् । न चाशरीरत्वश्रुतिविरोधः ;
कर्मनिमित्तशरीरनिषेधपरत्वात्तासाम् ।

यदुक्तं चेतनानामचेतनानाम् केषाञ्चिदिन्द्रियाश्रयत्वाद्यभावाच्छरीरत्वमनुपपन्नमिति; तदसत्; इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वभोगायतनत्वयोः स्थावरादिषु वेश्मादिषु चाव्याप्तत्वादतिव्याप्तत्वाच्च शरीरलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चान्यदपि विविधविचित्रदेवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरशरीरेष्वनुगतं शरीरशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमेकरूपं किञ्चिदुपपद्यते। तस्मात् यस्य यदाधेयम्, यद्विधेयम्, यच्छेषभूतम्, तत्तस्य शरीरभूतमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। एवमभ्युपगमे परमात्मनस्सर्वाधारतया सर्वनियन्तृतया सर्वशेषितया च सर्वशरीरत्वमुपपन्नम्। अत एव 'अन्तः प्रविष्टश्शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' इत्युच्यते।

ननु च परमात्मनस्सर्वशरीरत्वे तस्याकर्मवश्यत्वेऽपि संसारिवत्प्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषरूपदेहसम्बन्धादपुरुषार्थान्वयो भवत्येव। नैवम्; 'अनश्नन्नन्यः' इति तस्य कर्मफलोपभोगाभावश्रुतेः; सम्बन्धमात्रस्य भोगहेतुत्वाभावाच्च। न केवलं तस्यापुरुषार्थान्वयाभावः, भोक्तृभूतजीवभोगनिर्वर्तकतया निरतिशयदीप्तिर्योगश्च। तदुच्यते 'अभिचाकशीति' इति। एतच्च **भगवता भाष्यकारेण** स्पष्टमभिहितं वेदार्थसङ्गहे; यथा शिष्यशास्त्रोरविशिष्टेऽपि सम्बन्धे शिष्य एव कशया पीड्यते, न शासितेति। तस्मादुपपन्नं हि ब्रह्मणश्चिदचिच्छरीरकत्वम्। एवं चिदचिद्वस्तुनोः शरीरत्वात्परमात्मवस्तुनश्शरीरत्वाच्च भिन्नान्येतानि त्रीणि वस्तूनि।

ननु कोऽयं भेदो नाम? ननु उक्तं जात्यादिर्भेद इति। अस्तु धर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तराज्जात्यादिर्भेदः। जात्यादीनां तु परस्परधर्मिणां च भेदः कीदृशः? तेषां न स्वरूपमेव भेदः धर्मान्तरादर्शनात्। न च धर्मान्तरं कल्प्यम्; रूपादिवत्परत्र व्यवहारहेतुभूतानामेतेषां स्वस्मिन्नपि तथाविधव्यवहारहेतुत्वसम्भवात्। रूपिणश्चाक्षुषत्वमापादयद्रूपं स्वस्य चाक्षुषत्वं स्वयमेवापादयति। तस्मान्न धर्मान्तरं कल्प्यम्।

ननु जातिमेव न विद्मः। न तावत्सास्त्रादिमद्वयक्तिभ्यो विलक्षणमनेकव्यक्तिकृत्स्नपरिसमाप्तं नित्यं किञ्चिद्वस्तु जातिशब्दवाच्यतया अभ्युपगममर्हति; अनुपलम्भादनुपपत्तेश्च। अनुवृत्ताकारावभासिनी बुद्धिर्हि तदभ्युपगमे निबन्धनम्। न हि सूक्ष्ममपि निरीक्षमाणानां सास्त्रादिसंस्थानतद्वद्वस्तुषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणवेळायां तावदनुवृत्तत्वावभासः। नापि द्विती-

यादिपिण्डग्रहणेऽपि तथाविधस्य वस्तुनोऽवभासः; तत्रापि संस्थानस्य वस्तुन एवोपलम्भात् । आश्रयभूतेषु वस्तुषूपत्तिनाशमाक्ष्वपि नित्यनिरंशगमनागमनशक्तं प्रत्येकं कृत्स्नपरिसमाप्तं जातितत्त्वमस्तित्वशङ्कामपि नाधिरोहति । तस्मान्न संस्थानातिरिक्तजातितत्त्वं नाम किञ्चिदस्ति ।

संस्थानमपि न जातिर्भविष्यतीति ; प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेन तस्यैकबुद्धिशब्दयोर्निर्वाहकत्वायोगात् । अनेकत्रैकबुद्धिशब्दौ तु तत्तद्व्यक्तिमाहात्म्यकृतौ । दृश्यते हि भिन्नानामपि चक्षुरूपा लोकमनसां ज्ञानाख्यैककार्यजननम् । तस्माज्जातेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तस्या भेदत्वोपपादनं दूरनिरस्तम् ॥

अत्राभिधीयते—संस्थानमेव जातिः तत्प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेऽपि (नमपि?) द्वितीयादिपिण्डेषु सौसादृश्यात्प्रतिसन्धीयमानं स्वाश्रयेषु वस्तुष्वेकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनं भवति । तदेवं प्रतिसन्धीयमानसंस्थानसौसादृश्यमनुवृत्तिरिति चोच्यते । अत एव **भगवता भाष्यकारेण** संस्थानस्यानुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टत्वं द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणावसेयमित्यभिहितम् । संस्थानातिरिक्तजातिवादिभिरप्येतत्संस्थानसौसादृश्यमनुवृत्तिपर्यायमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ; येन सा जातिर्गोसदृशान् गवयपिण्डान् परिहृत्य सर्वेष्वपि गोपिण्डेषु समवैति । तद्वरमनुपपत्तिशतैकवेषाया अनुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टाया निष्प्रमाणिकाया जातेस्तद्बुद्धिशब्दनिर्वाहकत्वाङ्गीकारादुभयवाद्यभ्युपगतमुसदृशसंस्थानस्यैकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनत्वाश्रयणम् । गोसदृशेषु गवयेषु सौसादृश्याभावादतद्बुद्धिरप्युपपन्ना । तदेवं संस्थानस्यैव जातित्वाज्जात्यादिर्भेद इति सुष्ठूक्तम् । तस्मादत्यन्तभिन्नं विदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्म ।

एवं चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकत्वात्परमात्मनस्तत्तद्वस्तुवाचिनः सर्वे शब्दाः तदात्मभूतपरमात्मपर्यन्ततत्तद्वस्तुवाचकाः । यथा देवो जानाति, मनुष्यो जानाति, ब्राह्मणो यजेत, इत्यादिषु देवादिशरीरवाचकाश्शब्दास्तत्तच्छरीरविशिष्टजीवात्मनो वाचकाः ।

न चास्य देहात्मसामानाधिकरण्यस्य लाक्षणिकत्वं युक्तम् ; देवादिशराणामपि जातिगुणयोरिव प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वाद्विरोधाभावेन लक्षणासमाश्रयणस्यायुक्तत्वाच्च । यदि जातिगुणवच्छरीरस्य प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वमिष्येत, तद्वदेव प्रकारप्रकारिणोः शरीरात्मनोरपि सहोपलम्भनियमो भवेत् । न च तथोपलम्भः । तस्मात्तयोस्समानाधिकरणप्रयोगो लाक्षणिक

इति न वाच्यम् ; प्रमाणवैकल्यादेव तदग्रहणसिद्धेः । जातितद्वतोर्गुणगुणिनोश्च सहोप-
लम्भनियमस्तयोश्चाक्षुषत्वाद्वति । आत्मनस्तु शरीरवदचाक्षुषत्वान्न सहोपलम्भनियमो भवति ।
न पुनः प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वाभावात् । यथा गन्धादिगुणः प्रकारतैकस्वभावोऽपि तदाश्रयभूत-
पृथिव्यादिग्राहकप्रमाणेन न गृह्यते, तथा शरीरात्मनोरिव(रपि?)जातितद्वतारिव प्रकारप्रकारित्वे
समानेऽपि सहोपलम्भाभावोऽपि नानुपपन्नः ।

ननु च द्रव्याणां द्रव्यान्तरप्रकारत्वे दण्डी कुण्डली इति वन्मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययेन भवि-
तव्यमित्यपि न वाच्यम् ; पृथक्स्थितिप्रतिपत्तियोग्यतया दण्डकुण्डलादीनां प्रकारतैकस्वभाव-
त्वाभावाच्छरीरस्य तद्विपरीतत्वाच्च । तस्मात्प्रकारतैकस्वभावस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रकारत्वं सामानाधि-
करण्यावसेयम् । एवं शरीरात्मनोरपि । चिदचिद्वस्तुनोः परमात्मशरीरत्वेन तत्प्रकारतैकस्वभाव-
त्वात्तद्वाचिनां शब्दानां परमात्मनि पर्यवसानात्तेषां शब्दानां परमात्मवाचिना शब्देन सामा-
नाधिकरण्यं मुख्यमेव ।

ननु सर्वशब्दानां लोके वस्त्वन्तरवाचितया व्युत्पन्नानां परमात्मवाचित्वे मुख्यार्थपरि-
त्यागो लक्षणा च प्रसज्येत । नैवम् ; तेषां वस्तुनामभिधेयत्वापरित्यागात् । वेदान्तव्युत्पत्त्या
तेषामेव शब्दानां परमात्मन्यपि शक्त्यवधारणाच्च । ‘हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्वो देवता अनेन जीवेना-
त्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ इति जीवात्मपरमात्मानुप्रवेशात्सर्वेषामचिद्वस्तुनां नाम-
रूपभाक्त्वं ह्यवगतम् । स्मर्यते च — परमात्मनस्सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वम् । ‘वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम्’
‘वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः’ इति । तच्च **भगवता बादरायणेन** ‘चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु
स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तः तद्भावभावित्वात्’ इत्यत्र निरणायि । तस्माच्च चिदचिदीश्वराणां
भिन्नत्वेपि ईश्वरस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया ‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इति
सामानाधिकरण्यं तस्य सर्वात्मत्वं चोपपन्नम् ।

एवं शरीरभूते चिदचिद्वस्तुनी कदाचिन्नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशे भवतः । तदा
तद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणं भवति । तच्च ‘तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय’ इति ‘तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरत्’
इत्यादिभिरीक्षणपूर्वकबहुत्वकरणश्रवणान्निमित्तमुपादानञ्च भवति ।

अत्र केचित्प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते—न तावच्चिदचिन्मिश्रितं ब्रह्मोपादानं भवति ; परिणामा-
श्रयस्यैवोपादानत्वात्, प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपरिणामित्वेनोपादानत्वासम्भवाच्च । नापि शरीरभूत-
स्याचिद्वस्तुन उपादानत्वं वक्तुं शक्यम् ; ब्रह्मोपादानश्रुतिविरोधात् , निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेद-
प्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्माच्चिदचिदीश्वरभेदमङ्गीकृत्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं वदद्भिरचिद्रूपाः परमाणव
उपादानकारणं, ब्रह्म निमित्तकारणमिति वक्तव्यम् । उपपन्नञ्चैतत् ; पटादिकार्यस्य स्वस्मादल्प-
परिमाणैस्तन्वाद्यनेकद्रव्यैरारब्धत्वदर्शनात्, तन्वाद्युपादानानां कुविन्दादिनिमित्तानां भेद-
दर्शनाच्च ।

स्यान्मतं—एकसुवर्णपिण्डादल्पपरिमाणादङ्गुलीयाद्यनेककार्यारम्भदर्शनादल्पपरिमाणै-
रनेकद्रव्यैः स्थूलैककार्यारम्भोऽनेकान्त इति ; तन्न ; तत्रापि सुवर्णपिण्डावयवैरल्पपरि-
माणैः स्थूलकार्यारम्भदर्शनात् ।

अथ स्यात्—असंयुक्तानां परमाणूनां कार्यानारम्भकत्वान्निरवयवानां तेषां संयोगानुप-
पत्तेस्सावयवत्वमाश्रयणीयम् । तदा तेषामपि तत् एव कार्यत्वात्कारणान्तरापेक्षत्वेनानवस्था-
प्रसङ्गान्न परमाणूनां कारणत्वं सम्भवतीति ; तदपि न ; निरवयवयोरात्ममनसोरिव तेषां
संयोगोपपत्तेः । न च निरवयवानां संयोगेऽपि संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशान्तराभावात्प्रथिमा
नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम् ; अनन्यथासिद्धकार्यस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मात्परमाणवो जगदु-
पादानमाश्वरो निमित्तकारणं भवतीति ।

तदयुक्तम् ; परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । यदुक्तमल्पपरिमाणैस्तन्वाद्यनेकद्रव्यैः
स्थूलद्रव्यारम्भदर्शनात्परमकारणभूताः परमाणवस्सिद्धयन्तीति ; तन्न ; अवस्थान्तरापन्नतन्वा-
दिकारणद्रव्यातिरेकेण कार्यद्रव्यान्तरानुपलब्धेः । प्रत्युत तन्तवः पटः, मृदयं घटः, हिरण्य-
मिदं कुण्डलमिति प्रत्ययेन कार्यकारणयोरेकद्रव्यत्वमेव प्रतीयते ।

यदुक्तं निरवयवानां परमाणूनां आत्ममनसोरिव संयोग उपपन्न इति ; तदपि नास्ति ;
हेत्वभावात्संयोगानुपपत्तेः । कर्मजो हि संयोगः । कर्म चादृष्टकारितम् । तच्चादृष्टं परमाणुगतं
क्षेत्रज्ञगतं वा ? उभयथापि तत्कर्मद्वारेण संयोगहेतुर्न भवति ; तस्याकादाचित्कत्वेन संयोगस्या-

प्याकादाचित्कत्वप्रसङ्गात् । विपाकापेक्षत्वेऽपि नानाविधादृष्टानामेकदैव विपाकश्च निष्प्रमाणकः । ईश्वरेच्छयापि नियमो न सम्भवति ; आनुमानिकेश्वरस्य निराकृतत्वात् । शास्त्रसिद्धस्येश्वरस्याङ्गीकारे जगदुत्पत्तिरपि यथाशास्त्रमङ्गीकरणीया स्यात् । निरवयवानां तेषां संयोगेऽपि संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशान्तराभावात्प्रथिमानुपपत्तिश्चापरिहार्या । तेषां सावयवत्वे तदवयवानाञ्च सावयवत्वादनन्तावयवत्वप्रसङ्गेन मेरुसर्पयोर्वैषम्यासिद्धिः । न च कार्यस्यानन्यथासिद्धिः ; ब्रह्मोपादानत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः ॥

यत्तु लोके निमित्तोपादानयोः भेदनियमस्य दृष्टत्वाद्ब्रह्मण उभयकारणत्वन्न सम्भवतीति; तदपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तित्वाल्लौकिकपदार्थानां व्यवस्थितशक्तित्वाच्च समाधेयम् । तस्मान्न परमाणव उपादानकारणम् ।

यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तं सततपरिणामिनी स्वतन्त्रा प्रकृतिः पुरुषसंयोगवशान्महदादिविसदृशपरिणामवती भवति । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सूक्ष्मसदृशपरिणामवती भवति । तस्मात्प्रकृतिरेव जगदुपादानमिति ; तदप्युक्तम् ; सर्गप्रतिसर्गव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः । पुरुषसंयोगश्च न सर्गहेतुर्भवति ; निष्क्रियत्वेन तयोस्संयोगासम्भवात् । सन्निधिमित्रं संयोग इति च न वाच्यम् ; तयोर्नित्यत्वेन सन्निधेरपि त(सः?)दातनत्वात् । न चादृष्टहेतुकः स्पर्शः(सः?); नित्यनिर्विकाराणां पुरुषाणां कर्तृत्वानभ्युपगमेनादृष्टासम्भवात् । सम्भवेऽपि अनन्तैर्जावैः नियतकालमनुष्ठितानां युगपदुपपद्यमानजगत्सदृशफलानां कर्मणां सद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । अतः स्वतन्त्रायाः प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वमपि न युक्तमिति । तस्माच्छ्रुत्यनुसारेण ब्रह्मैव सर्वशक्तियोगाज्जगदुपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणञ्चेत्यास्थेयम् ।

तत्र यदुक्तं मिळितस्योपादानत्वे प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपि कार्यत्वेन परिणामित्वं प्रसज्येतेति; नैतदस्ति ; परिणामरहितस्यापि कार्यत्वसम्भवात् । यथा शरीरस्य पाञ्चभौतिकत्वेनापरिणामिनोऽप्याकाशस्य कार्यत्वमङ्गीक्रियते । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव हि कार्यता । सा प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोरपि विद्यते । सर्गावस्थायां विकसितज्ञानत्वात्प्रत्यगात्मनः; परमात्मनः स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुनोरन्तरात्मतयावस्थानाञ्च । अचिद्वस्तुवत्त्वरूपान्यथाभावस्तु न विद्यते । अत एव तयोः कार्यत्वेऽपि नानित्यत्वम् । न हि विकारभात्त्वमात्रमनित्यतां सम्पादयति ; यथा

करणाधीनज्ञानस्य जीवस्य ज्ञानरूपविकारभाक्त्वेऽपि नित्यत्वं न निरुध्यते । तस्मात्तयोरप्युपादानत्वं कार्यत्वं नित्यत्वं चोपपन्नम् ॥

एवं त्रयाणामुपादानत्वेन कार्यत्वेऽपि शुक्लकृष्णरक्ततन्तूपदानवत्स्वभावासङ्करोऽप्युपपन्नः । ननु च त्रयाणामुपादानत्वे परमात्मन उपादानत्वश्रवणं जगतस्तदात्मकत्वश्रवणञ्च कथमुपपद्यते ? उच्यते—चिदचिद्वस्तुनोर्द्रव्ययोरपि जातिगुणवत्परमात्मप्रकारतैकस्वभावत्वेन शक्तिमत्परमात्मपरतन्त्रत्वात्तद्वतः परमात्मन उपादानत्वव्यपदेशः तादात्म्यवर्णनञ्चाविरुद्धम् । न च तावतोपादानत्वव्यपदेशो गौणः ; देवदत्तो गच्छति, देवदत्तो जानातीतिवन्मुख्यत्वोपपत्तेः । अत्र शरीरात्मनोर्गमनज्ञानाश्रयत्वेऽपि एतौ व्यपदेशौ मुख्यावेव भवतः ।

एवं त्रयाणामुपादानत्वेन कार्यत्वेऽपि स्वभावासाङ्कर्यं ज्ञापयितुं ‘अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः’ ‘मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिस्मूयते सचराचरम्’ इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतयः प्रवृत्ता वेदितव्याः । एवं सति हि ‘सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं’ ‘तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय’ ‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति’ ‘यथोर्णनाभिस्सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयस्सम्भवन्ति । यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्सम्भवतीह विश्वम्’ ‘ब्रह्म वनं ब्रह्म स वृक्ष आसीत् यतो द्यावापृथिवी निष्टतक्षुः । मनीषिणो मनसा विब्रवीमि वः ब्रह्माध्यतिष्ठद् भुवनानि धारयन्’ इत्यादीनां बहूनां श्रुतीनां ऐकार्थ्यं भवति ।

एवं ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामित्ववादिनीनां उपादानत्ववादिनीनां जगतो ब्रह्मात्मकत्ववादिनीनाञ्च श्रुतीनां परिध्वङ्गस्सुखोदको भवति । तत्त्वपरेषु ध्यानपरेषु च प्रदेशेषु चिदचिद्वस्तु-शरीरस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वात्तस्यैव कार्यकारणोभयावस्थत्वाच्छरीरभूतयोश्चिदचिद्वस्तुनोऽशरीरिणः परमात्मनश्च विलक्षणत्वाच्च द्वैताद्वैतवादा स्सुसङ्गता भवन्ति इति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः षष्ठः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां सप्तमाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अथ पुरुषस्वरूपं निरूप्यते । तस्मिन्नानाविधा वादाः । आत्मयाथात्म्यविद् एवं वर्णयन्ति—

देहेन्द्रियादिव्यावृत्तो नित्यज्ञानः स्वयम्प्रभः ।

असङ्ख्येयः परस्यांशः पुंसः कर्ता च पूरुषः ॥

ननु देह एवात्मा भवितुमर्हति, अहम्प्रत्ययवेद्यत्वादात्मनः, स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यादौ स्थौल्यादिविशिष्टस्य देहस्याहमर्थसामानाधिकरण्याच्च । अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेर्देहस्य ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमप्याश्रयणीयम् । न च वाच्यं चेतनस्यात्मनो विशेषगुणवत्त्वात्कार्यद्रव्यवर्तिनो विशेषगुणस्य कारण(कारणगुणः)पूर्वकत्वनियमात्प्रत्येकं परमाणुषु चैतन्यस्याविद्यमानत्वात्तस्य परमाण्वारब्धशरीरविशेषगुणत्वमनुपपन्नम् । परमाणुषु प्रत्येकं चैतन्याभ्युपगमेऽप्येकस्मिन् शरीरे चेतनानन्त्यमापतेदिति । प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वेन कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वाद्धेतोः । अथ चेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वं शरीरे दृश्यमानं सम्प्रतिपन्नादचेतनाद्धटादेरत्यन्तं व्यावर्तमानं शरीरमेव चेतनमवगमयति । तस्माद्देह एवात्मा भवितुमर्हति ॥

नैवम् ; अहं जानामीत्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्त्वेनावभासात्, इदमिति शरीरस्य पराक्त्वेनावभासाच्च । किञ्च अहम्प्रत्ययस्य शरीरगोचरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽवश्यमवयवप्रतिभासेनाप्यविना भवितव्यम् । न ह्यस्ति सम्भवः अवयवो स्थूलः प्रकाशते अवयवास्तु न केचन प्रथन्त इति । न च नियमितबहिरिन्द्रियवृत्तेरवहितमानसस्याहमिति स्वात्मानमनुभवतः करचरणाद्यवयवा भासन्ते । तस्मान्न देहोऽहम्प्रत्ययगोचरः ॥

यत्तु स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमिति शरीरेऽहम्प्रत्ययो दृश्यत इति; नैवम् ; तत्राप्यहम्प्रत्ययस्य चाक्षुषस्य देहप्रत्ययस्य च स्थौल्यकाश्यादियोगे(गेन ?)देहमात्रानवभासकत्वात् । तस्मात्तत्राहम्प्रत्ययोऽन्तश्शरीरं प्रत्यप्रूपं किमपि वस्तु गोचरयति । अत एव ममेदं शरीरमिति भेदव्यवहारः । न ह्यसौ व्यवहारस्साक्षात्प्रतीतिनिमित्तः प्रतीयमानः शिलापुत्रकशरीरव्यवहारवदौपचारिको भवितुमर्हति । तस्माद्देहव्यतिरेकेण चेतनस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्सम्बन्धिनिदेहेऽहंशब्दप्रयोगो लाक्षणिकः ॥

अथवा बाह्यविषयेषु परस्परविरुद्धरूपपरिमाणसङ्घासङ्ग्रहणेन व्यतिरेकस्य स्फुटत्वादात्मनि तादृशरूपान्तराद्यग्रहणेन देहप्रतिभासभ्रमोऽविवेकिनाम् ॥

किञ्च आत्मन इच्छानुविधायिसङ्कल्पाध्यवसायादिव्यापारत्वाच्छरीरस्य च तदिच्छानुविधायिशयनासनोत्थानादिवेष्ट्याच्च शुक्तिरजतादिवदभेदभ्रमो भवत्येव । प्रगिहितमनसस्तु ज्ञातृतया सिद्धयन्तमनवयवमहमर्थमिदमिति परिस्फुरतः स्थूलावयविनः शरीरात्पृथगपरोक्षयन्त्येव ॥

भवति च प्रयोगः—शरीरमहम्प्रत्ययगोचरो न भवति, इदमिति गृह्यमाणत्वात् । घटादिवत् । तथा जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरविषयो न भवति, अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात् । यो नैवंविधः न स शरीरविषयो न भवति, यथा उभयवादिसंमतः शरीरप्रत्यय इति । तस्माद्देहो नात्मा भवितुमर्हति ॥

मा भूच्छरीरमात्मा, इन्द्रियाण्यात्मा सन्तु । न हि तानि इदन्तया प्रथन्ते, येन देहवदात्मत्वं न स्यात् । न च देहवत्तान्युद्भूतरूपादिगुणानि स्थूलानि, येन तत्प्रतिभासे रूपावयवादिप्रतीतिः प्रसज्येत । तद्व्यापारफलञ्च ज्ञानं तद्वामि भवितुं युक्तम्, स्नानाध्ययनयागादिफलवत् । अत एव सत्यतपसा द्रष्टुं चक्षुषा युक्तत्वात् । (द्रष्टृश्चक्षुष इत्युक्तम् ?)

नैवं भवितुमर्हति । न तावत्प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाण्यात्मा, इन्द्रियान्तरदृष्टस्य इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अस्ति च यमहमद्राक्षं, तमहं स्पृशामीति । अत एव न सम्भूयापि । न हि पञ्चेन्द्रियैरेकं वस्त्वनुभूयते । तथा एकैकेन्द्रियापाये तत्तदिन्द्रियानुभूतार्थ-

स्मरणमपि न भवेत् । एकेन्द्रियविगम एवात्मनः प्रायणप्रसङ्गश्च । तस्मान्नेन्द्रियाण्यात्मा । शरणागतपरित्यागस्य नृशंसतामालोच्य सत्यतपसस्तथा वचनम् ॥

अस्तु तर्हि मनश्चेतनः । तथा सति सर्वेन्द्रियानुभवेषु मनसो विद्यमानत्वात्पूर्वोक्त-
दोषा न सम्भवन्ति । तदप्ययुक्तम् ; तस्य चक्षुरादिवत्करणत्वेनात्मत्वासम्भवात् । स हि
कर्ता । प्राणस्याप्यात्मत्वं न सम्भवति ; बाह्यवायुवद्वायुत्वादेव तस्य चैतन्यानुपपत्तेः ॥

अस्तु तर्हि संविदात्मा । अजडत्वात्तस्यात्मत्वमुपपन्नञ्च । अजडत्वञ्च सत्तयैव
प्रकाशमानत्वादुपपद्यते । न हि संविस्सती घटादिवदप्रकाशमाना दृश्यते, येन परायत्त-
प्रकाशा अभ्युपगम्येत ॥

अथ मतम्-उत्पन्नायामपि संविदि विषयमात्रं ह्यवभासते नीलमिदमिति ; न संवित्प्र-
तीतिः । तस्मादिन्द्रियवत्संविदप्यर्थप्रकाशे सत्तयैव करणं भवति । ततोऽर्थगतागन्तुक-
प्रकाशाख्यधर्मदर्शनेन संविदनुमान्य(स्य?)त इति, नैतद्युक्तम् ; ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणार्थधर्मस्य प्रका-
शस्य रूपादिवदनुपलब्धेः । न च व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या स धर्मः कल्प्यः ; उभयाभ्यु-
पेतया संविदैव व्यवहारोपपत्तेः ॥

अपि चानवभासमानायां संविदि विषयावभासश्च नोपपद्यते ; अवभासकत्वात्प्र-
दीपवत् । तस्मान्नीलमिति प्रतीतौ संवित्प्रतीतिश्च विद्यत एव । अत एव हि
घटमहं जानामि, नीलमिदं संवेद्मीति प्रतीतिव्यवहारौ सम्भवतः । अतोऽजडत्वात्संवि-
दात्मेति ॥

नैतदेवम् ; घटमहं वेद्मीति प्रत्यगर्थस्यात्मनो धर्मतया संविदः प्रतीतेः । संविदनुभूति-
ज्ञानादिशब्दास्सम्बन्धिशब्दा इति हि शब्दार्थविदो वदन्ति । अतश्च संविदात्मा न
भवति । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणसंविद्भ्यो व्यावृत्तोऽहं जानामीति ज्ञातृतया प्रतीयमा-
नोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा ॥

किञ्चायमात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरेकः श्रुतिसिद्धः । बृहदारण्यके बालाक्यजातशत्रु-
संवादे 'तौ ह सुप्तं पुरुषमाजम्भतुः' इत्यादिना सुप्तपुरुषगमनयष्टिघातोत्थापनादिभिः देहादि-
व्यतिरिक्तजीवप्रतिबोधनात् ॥

अथ स्यात्—ज्ञानस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वमुभयवादिसिद्धम् । तस्य नीलादिवदिद-
मित्यनवभासात्पराक्त्वाभावेन प्रत्यक्त्वञ्च विद्यते । अहमर्थस्य त्विदन्तयावभासाभावेऽपि
विषयवज्ज्ञानोपलब्धिवेलायामेवोपलब्धेरर्थतः पराक्त्वं भवति । तस्माज्ज्ञानमेवात्मा,
नाहमर्थ इति ॥

तद्विपरीतम् ; अहमर्थस्यैव स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्प्रत्यक्त्वाच्च । स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वं हि
साक्षात्स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वम् । तदहमर्थस्यैव । ज्ञानस्य तु स्येन प्रकाशमानत्वेऽपि स्वस्मै
स्वयम्प्रकाशमानत्वाभावान्न मुख्यम् । तदपि हि विषयवदात्मन एवावभासते । प्रत्यक्त्व-
ञ्चाहमर्थस्यैव ; ज्ञानस्य तु पराक्त्वाभावमात्रमेव, न तु प्रत्यक्त्वम् । तस्य पराक्त्वाभावः
स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वञ्चाहं जानामीत्यात्मधर्मतयावभासादेव भवति । अहमर्थस्य ज्ञानोपलब्धिवेला-
यामेवोपलम्भादर्थतः परात्त्वसिद्धिश्चात एव परास्ता ॥

नन्वहमर्थो यदि(दि न) ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशः स विषयाननुभववेलायां किमिति न प्रकाशते?
भवत्पक्षे वा तदानीं ज्ञानं किमिति न चकास्ति ? तदपि हि नित्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशं
चाभ्युपगम्यते । अथ तदानीमपि विज्ञानं प्रकाशत एव । अहङ्कारविषयाभ्यामनुपपन्नाभावान्न
व्यवहियत इति चेत्समानमिदमितरस्यापि ॥

अथ मतम्—अविक्रियः खल्वात्मा । ज्ञातृत्वं हि ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वम् । तद्विकार-
भूतत्वादात्मनो न सम्भवति । तदभ्युपगमे देहस्येव जडत्वं प्रसज्येत । तस्माज्ज्ञातृत्वं
ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तम् । किञ्च देहात्माभिमानवत एव ज्ञातृत्वोपलम्भादाध्यासिकं ज्ञातृत्वम् ।
तस्मान्नाहमर्थ आत्मा भवितुमर्हतीति ।

एतत्परीक्षकाणां धियं नाधिरोहति । ज्ञानस्य क्रियात्वाभावेन तदाश्रयस्य कर्तृत्वा-
भावात् । तत्प्रभावदच्छद्रव्यं यावदात्मभाविधर्मत्वेन तस्य गुण इत्युच्यते । तस्मादात्मनो देह-
तुल्यत्वं ज्ञातृत्वञ्च ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तमिति च(!) हास्यम्, अदृश्यमानस्याधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः आत्मा-
श्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् । अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वं अविक्रिये ज्ञानेऽध्यस्तमिति नात्माश्रय-
दोष इति चेत्, तदपि न ; तथाविधस्य ज्ञानस्यासिद्धत्वात्, ज्ञानमात्रस्यात्मत्वनिषेधाच्च ।

देहात्माभिमानवतो ज्ञातृत्वोपलम्भात् ज्ञातृत्वस्याध्यस्तत्वमुक्तं ज्ञानस्यापि समानम् । तदपि तद्वत् एव ह्यवभासते ॥

किञ्च ज्ञातुरहमर्थस्य ज्ञानेऽध्यासं वदता(दतो ?) ज्ञानमहमित्यध्यासो भवेत् ; अधिष्ठानभूतायां हि शुक्तिकायां रजताध्यासः । तस्मान्नित्यज्ञानाश्रयः स्वयम्प्रकाशोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा ॥

ननु च ज्ञानं मे जातम्, ज्ञानं मे नष्टमिति तस्य जन्मनाशौ प्रतीयते । नित्यत्वे चक्षुरादिकरणानां वैयर्थ्यं भवेत् । स्वापादिषु संज्ञालोपः श्रुतिसिद्धः । तत्कथं ज्ञानं नित्यमुच्यते ?

उच्यते—‘ जानात्येवायं पुरुषः न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते—’

‘ यथा न क्रियते ज्योत्स्ना मलप्रक्षालनान्मणेः ।

दोषप्रहाणान्न ज्ञानमात्मनः क्रियते तथा ॥

यथोदपानकरणात्क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् ।

सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतस्सम्भवः कुतः? ॥

तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः ।

प्रकाश्यन्ते न जन्यन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते ’ ॥

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिरात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वञ्चावगम्यते । तस्मात्तस्य जन्मनाश-व्यपदेशौ विषयानुषङ्गाननुषङ्गाभिप्रायेण । स्वापादिषु तस्य विलोपश्रुतिश्च तदभिप्राया । न च करणानां वैयर्थ्यम् ; नित्यस्यैव संसारि(सार ?)दशायां कर्मणा सङ्कुचितस्य निष्क्रमण-द्वारतया कृतत्वात्तेषाम् । निष्क्रमणञ्च स्मृतिसिद्धम् ।

‘ इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यद्येकं क्षरतीन्द्रियम् ।

तेनास्य क्षरति प्रज्ञा हतेः पादादिवोदकम् ’ ॥

इति हि मानवं वचः । अस्या निष्क्रमणश्रुतेः ज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तदेवमात्मा नित्यज्ञानः स्वयम्प्रकाशश्च । उक्तैरेव हेतुभिः क्षणिकविज्ञानात्मवादोऽपि निरस्तः ॥

अयं प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नोऽसङ्ख्यश्च । ‘नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्’ इत्यादिश्रुतेः । अजामन्त्रोऽप्यात्मनोऽसङ्ख्यातत्वमनुजानाति । ‘अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां मुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः’ इति मुक्तसंसारिणोर्भेदप्रतिपादनात् । एवं श्रुत्यनुमतौ सत्यां सुखदुःखव्यवस्थाश्च नानात्वमवगमयन्ति । तस्मादसङ्ख्यो जीवः ॥

अणुश्चायमात्मा । ‘तेन प्रद्योतेनैव आत्मा निष्क्रामयति ये वेके चास्माल्लोकात्प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति तस्माल्लोकात्पुनरेत्यस्मै लोकाय कर्मणे’ इत्युक्तान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतेः । ‘एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः यस्मिन्प्राणः पञ्चधा संविवेश’ इति साक्षादणुत्वश्रुतेश्च ।

न चाणुत्वे सकलशरीरव्यापिनी वेदना नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम् ; दीपस्येव प्रभारूपेण ज्ञानेन युगपत्सकलशरीरव्याप्तिसम्भवाद्देदनोपपत्तेः । अपि च विभुत्वे सर्वशरीरेषु सर्वेषां विद्यमानत्वादुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत । न सा कस्यचिदपि । न च शरीराणां स्वकीयपरकीयत्वाभ्यां व्यवस्थासिद्धिः ; नेषामपि साधारण्यात् । न च तत्रादृष्टवशेन व्यवस्थोत्प्रेक्ष्या ; तत्रापि च साधारण्यस्याविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्मादणुपरिमाणोऽयमात्मा ॥

अंशभूतश्चायमात्मा परमात्मनः । ननु नियन्तृत्वनियम्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादभिर्विरुद्धस्वभावत्वात्तयोरेकद्रव्यत्वाभावेन नांशशित्वमुपपन्नम् ॥

उच्यते—न केवलमेकद्रव्यैकदेशत्वमेवांशत्वम् , किन्तु विशिष्टवस्त्वेकदेशत्वमप्यंशत्वम् । विशिष्टस्यापि हि वस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव । दृश्यते हि विशेषणांशोऽयम् , विशेष्यांशोऽयमिति प्रतीतिव्यवहारौ । वर्णित एव प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावः तयोश्शरीरशरीरित्वोपपादनेन । प्रकारान्तरेणांशत्वं च दुरुपपादम् । तथाहि—प्रथमं तावद्राजभृत्ययोरिव पृथग्द्रव्यत्वे अंशत्वं दुर्भणमेव । विवर्तपक्षेऽपि जीवस्यापारमार्थिकत्वादेवांशत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽशित्वं च नोपपद्यते ।

आपाधिकजीववादेऽप्यंशत्वं न शक्यवचनम् ; ब्रह्मण एवोपाधिप्रयुक्तदोषानुषङ्ग-
प्रसङ्गात् । न च घटाकाशादिवदवच्छिन्नप्रदेशानुषक्ता दोषा अनवच्छिन्ने ब्रह्मणि न प्रस-
ज्येरन्निति युक्तम् ; उपाधिना अमूर्तब्रह्मणोऽवच्छेदासम्भवात् । आकाशस्येव सम्भवतीति चेन्न ;
तत्रापि तदभावात् । आकाशस्यापि घटादिसंयोगमात्रमेव ; नावच्छेदः, तदनर्हत्वात्तस्य ।
तस्माद्ब्रह्मण एवोपाधिसंयोगात्तत्प्रयुक्तदोषास्तस्यैव स्युः । ततश्च सर्वं वेदान्तवाक्यं
व्याकुलं स्यात् । अतस्तस्मिन्नपि पक्षे जीवपरमात्मनोरंशांशिभावो नोपपद्यते ॥

शक्तिविक्षेपपक्षेऽपि पूर्वोक्तप्रक्रियया शरीरशरीरिभावेनांशंशित्वमुच्यते । तदस्मा-
कमविरुद्धमेव । नो वेदनन्तरोक्तप्रक्रियया परमात्मनस्सर्वदोषानुषङ्गः । तदेवं परमात्मनोऽंशः
प्रत्यगात्मा ॥

अयं कर्ता चाभ्युपगन्तव्यः । ‘ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत’ ‘आत्मानमेव लोकमु-
पासीत’ इति स्वर्गापवर्गसाधनानुष्ठानविधानशास्त्राणामवैयर्थ्याद्वेदितोः । अपि च ‘एवमेवैष
एनान्प्राणान्गृहीत्वा स्वे शरीरे यथाकामं परिवर्तते’ इत्युपकरणोपादानविहारयोः कर्तृत्वमु-
पदिशति । अतश्चायं कर्ता ॥

अथ स्यात्—‘विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च’ इति ज्ञानपर्यायाया
बुद्धेर्यज्ञादिकर्तृत्वमवगम्यते ।

‘प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।

अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥’

इत्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वं निन्द्यते च । तस्माद् बुद्धेरेव कर्तृत्वं युक्तमिति ॥

नैतदेवम् ; बुद्धेर्नियोज्यत्वासम्भवात् कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । स्वर्गादिफलोपभोगसमर्थं
चेतनमेव हि शास्त्राणि तत्साधके(धने?)नियुञ्जते । न ह्यचेतना बुद्धिर्नियोक्तुं शक्यते । प्रकृतेः
क्रियमाणानीत्यत्रापि नात्मनः कर्तृत्वं निन्द्यते । किन्तर्हि ? अधिष्ठानाद्यनेकहेतुनिर्वर्त्यायां

यदस्य निरपेक्षकर्तृत्वाभिमानादि तदनर्थकमित्युच्यते । ‘अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ते’त्यस्य कर्तृशब्देन व्यपदेशात् । अत एव हि—

‘ तत्रैवं सति कर्तारमात्मानं केवलं तु यः ।

पश्यत्यकृतबुद्धित्वान्न स पश्यति दुर्मतिः ॥ ’

इत्युच्यते । अतो देहेन्द्रियादिविलक्षण उक्तलक्षण एव पुरुषः ॥

इति नीतिमालायां

पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारस्सप्तमः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां अष्टमाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अथ विधिस्वरूपं निर्णयते—

तं शब्दभावनां प्राहुरेके कार्यं तु केचन ।
आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे ॥
भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेवमेवान्वमन्यत ॥

शब्दभावना विधिः ; तस्याः फलभावनायां पुरुषप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् । प्रवर्तको हि विधिर्भवति । ननु केयं शब्दभावना ? उच्यते—सर्वशब्दानामर्थप्रतीत्युन्नेयोऽभिधा-
व्यापारः ; समस्तलिङ्गादीनां त्वसौ व्यापारः तैरेवाभिधीयते । स पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनफलत्वा-
द्भावनेति प्रवर्तनेति च गीयते । न च वाच्यं न शब्दस्य व्यापारत्वं सम्भवति ; गुणत्वाद्भू-
पवत् । अथ स द्रव्यमिष्यते, तथापि न सम्भवति ; विभुत्वादिति । अरुणिमादेर्गुणस्यापि
व्यवच्छेदादिव्यापारसम्भवात् । विभूनां ज्ञानादिव्यापारस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । परिस्पन्दलक्षणस्तु
व्यापारः तस्य न सम्भवत्येव ; न चासावस्माभिरपीष्यते । कस्तर्ह्यसौ व्यापारः ? शब्दविषय-
ज्ञानमेव । तद्योगी हि शब्दोऽर्थप्रतीतिं जनयति ॥ यथोक्तं ‘ शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्नि-
कृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम् ’ इति । यमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्य कार्याय प्रभवति स तस्य व्यापार
इति उच्यते । ज्ञाता हि लिङ्गादयः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयन्ति । तस्माज्ज्ञानस्य शब्दव्यापारत्व-
मुपपन्नम् ॥

न च वाच्यं शब्दस्याभिधाव्यापारवत्त्वमयुक्तम् । शब्दं जानामीति शब्दकर्मकत-
यावगतस्य ज्ञानस्यैव शब्दोऽर्थमभिधत्त इत्यत्र तत्कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् । न ह्येकस्यैवैक-

स्मिन्व्यापारे कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वञ्चोपपद्यते इति । परशुवदुपपत्तेः । परशुर्हि उद्यमननिपातनयाः कर्माणि सन् द्वैधीभावफलावच्छेदलब्धछिनत्तिपदाभिधानयोस्तयोरेव कर्ता भवति । तथा ज्ञानस्य शब्दकर्मकस्यापि अर्थप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणफलावच्छेदलब्धाभिदधातिपदाभिधानस्यार्थः कर्म । शब्दस्तु फलार्थप्रवृत्तेस्तस्मिन्नेव व्यापारे स्वातन्त्र्यविवक्षया कर्तेत्यनवद्यम् ।

अनेनैव न्यायेनार्थकर्मकस्याभिधाव्यापारस्यापि पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनफलावच्छेदलब्धभावनाभिधानस्य पुरुषप्रवृत्तिफलावच्छेदलब्धप्रवर्तनाभिधानस्य च प्रवृत्तिकर्मत्वं पुरुषकर्मत्वञ्च व्याख्यातम् । तेन एक एव व्यापारो यदा जानातिना विषयप्रकाशफलावच्छिन्नोऽभिधीयते, तदा विषयभूतशब्द एव तत्फलभाक् कर्म भवति, शब्दं जानातीति । यदा तु स एवार्थप्रतीतिरूपफलावच्छिन्नोऽभिदधातिनाभिधीयते, तदा प्रतीतिरूपफलभागर्थः कर्म भवति, अर्थमभिदधातीति । यदा तु भावनावच्छिन्नो भावयतिनाभिधीयते, तथा भावनालब्धा प्रतीतिः (प्रवृत्तिः) कर्म भवति, प्रवृत्तिं भावयतीति । यदा तु प्रवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नः प्रवर्तयतिनाभिधीयते, यथा प्रवृत्तिफलभाक्पुरुषः कर्म भवति, पुरुषं प्रवर्तयतीति । न हि व्यापारस्वरूपाक्षिप्तः कर्मभावः । तथा सति हि चलत्यभिहितापि क्रिया गच्छत्यभिहितेव सकर्मिका स्यात् । तस्मादेक एव व्यापारः फलभेदेन बहुधा रूप्यमाणः तत्तत्कर्म(मकोः) भवति ।

अस्त्वभिधाव्यापारशब्दस्य ; नत्वस्य पुरुषप्रवर्तकत्वं लिङाद्यभिधेयत्वञ्च सम्भवति । न हि कस्यचिदपि लिङादेरभिधाव्यापारत्वज्ञानमात्रात्प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते ; समीहितसाधनत्वावगमात्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तेः । न चासावर्थप्रतीतिलक्षणफलोन्नेयशब्दान्तराभिधावत्तदभिधेयो भवितुमर्हति ॥

उच्यते--सत्यं फलसाधनत्वं प्रवर्तकत्वम् । । तत्तु न शब्दस्याभिधेयम् । यजेतेत्यादेशशब्दाद्यागादेस्समीहितसाधनत्वावगतेर्लिङादियुक्तवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनात्प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतोऽभिधाव्यापारः शब्दान्तरव्यापारविलक्षणो लिङादिभिरभिहित इति निश्चीयते । न चाभिधाया अभिधानासम्भवः ; अभिधाशब्दवदुपपत्तेः । तस्माच्छब्दभावना विधिरिति केचिदाचक्षते ॥

तदयुक्तम् ; तत्सद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । न तावल्लिङादिशब्दः प्रमाणम् ; तत्र तस्य व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् । न च लिङादिशब्दश्रवणानन्तरभाविनी प्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणम् ; प्रवृत्ते(वृत्तौ?) तस्य निबन्धनत्वात् । यन्निबन्धना हि स्वात्मप्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा तदेव तां दृष्ट्वा अशक्यानुमानम् । किञ्च शब्दस्य व्यापारो न सम्भवति । स हि द्विधा प्रयत्नलक्षणः परिस्पन्दलक्षणश्चेति ॥ अचेतनत्वान्न तावत्स प्रयत्नस्सम्भवति । न च परिस्पन्दः ; गुणत्वाच्छब्दस्य । यदुक्तमरुणिमादेरिव गुणान्यव्यापारत्वं सम्भवतीति, तदपि न ; तत्रापि व्यापारोसम्भवस्याविशिष्टत्वात् ।

यच्चोक्तं शब्दविषयज्ञानमेव शब्दस्य व्यापार इति, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वोपपादनेन तस्य शब्दव्यापारत्वासम्भवात् । न च शब्दोऽर्थमभिधत्त इत्यभिधाव्यापारस्य शब्दकर्तृकत्वञ्च युक्तम् ; तस्य ज्ञानपर्यायत्वाङ्गीकारात् । ज्ञानस्यात्माश्रयत्वेन शब्दाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

यदपि केनापि प्राकट्यं शब्दस्य व्यापार इत्युक्तम्, तदपि प्राकट्यस्य निरस्तत्वादनुपपन्नम् । अपि च व्यापाररहितस्यापि शब्दस्याभिधाव्यापारबोधकस्य लिङादेरिव बोधकत्वन्नानुपपन्नम् । किञ्च यथा निर्व्यापारं ज्ञानमर्थप्रकाशनसमर्थमङ्गीकृतम्, तथात्रापि स्यात्—यथोक्तं सौत्रं बुद्धिजन्मपदं व्याचक्षाणैः न्यायाचार्यैः ॥

‘ व्यापारः कारकाणां हि दृष्टो जन्मातिरेकतः ।

प्रमाणेऽपि तथा मा भूदिति जन्म विवक्ष्यते ’ ॥ इति ॥

तथा वर्णैरूपयमानोऽभिव्यज्यमानो वा शब्दो बोधहेतुर्भवतीति किमनुपपन्नम् ? अत इदमपि निरस्तम्—पुरुषप्रवृत्तिभवनानुकूला लिङ्ज्ञानकरणिकार्थवादोदितप्राशस्त्यलक्षणेति-कर्तव्यतावती शब्दभावना प्रेरणात्मा कल्प्यत इति । तस्मान्न शब्दभावना नाम काचित्सिद्धयति । यद्यपि सिद्धयेत्तथापि न तस्य विधित्वं सम्भवति ; प्रवर्तनात्वाभावात् । न हि शतकृत्वः कुरुष्वेत्युक्ते कश्चित्प्रवर्तते । तेन.....मरार्तस्याचेतनस्य शब्दस्य प्रवर्तकत्वं(त्वं न ?) सम्भवति । यदि च शब्दः प्रवर्तकः स्यात्, प्रवर्तयेदव्युत्पन्नमपि । अस्तु शब्दः प्रवर्तकः,

तथापि तन्निबन्धनायाः प्रवृत्तेवायाद(तेर्यागा ?)दिप्रवृत्तिवत्पुरुषार्थभावो न सम्भवति । तस्माच्छब्दभावना विधिरिति पक्षो निष्प्रमाणकः ॥

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—कार्यबुद्धिस्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तिहेतुः । तथाहि—यः पुरुषः पुरुषान्तरेणा-
प्रवर्तितः प्रवर्तते, यश्च स्वयं कामात्क्रोधाद्भयाद्वा प्रवर्तते, स सर्वोऽपि ममेदं कार्यमिति
प्रतीत्यैव प्रवर्तते । तस्मात्कार्यमेव लिङाद्यर्थो विधिः ; साक्षात्प्रवृत्त्युपधानादितरेषां
व्यभिचाराच्च । तच्च कार्यं कृत्यधीनात्मलाभम् । तच्च लोके क्रियैव । तत्र क्रियायाः कार्यत्वं
लिङादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यमानं वेदेऽपि स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये प्रतिपत्तुं प्रवृत्तो विरोधं
पश्यति ; कथं स्वर्गकामस्य यागक्रिया कर्तव्या भवेत् ? स्वर्गकामो हि स्वर्गसाधने प्रवर्तते । न
यागस्स्वर्गसाधनं भवति, क्षणिकत्वादिति । एवं विरोधं पश्यन् लिङाद्यर्थ एव नूनं क्रिया-
व्यतिरिक्तः कश्चिदलौकिक इति मन्यते । तस्य कार्यत्वात्तज्ज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिकारणम् ; स्थायित्वात्स्वर्ग-
साधना(नत्वोऽप्युक्तेः) स्वर्गकामस्यानुष्ठेयः ; अलौकिकत्वादपूर्वशब्दवाच्यः ; स्वात्मनि पुरुषं नियु-
ञ्जानो नियोग इति गम्यते । तस्मिंश्च क्रियातिरिक्तकार्यवाच्ये निश्चिते लिङादीनां यो लोक-
प्रयोगः स लाक्षणिको भवति ; अनेकार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वात् । एवञ्च नैमित्तिकनिषेधाधिकार-
योरसत्यपि फलेऽपूर्वमेव वाक्यार्थो भविष्यति ; तस्यैवाभिधेयत्वादिति ॥

एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; कार्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वान्निष्प्रमाणकत्वाच्च । तथाहि—न तावत्कृति-
साध्यं कार्यम् ; यागादेर्धात्वर्थस्य कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च कृत्युद्देश्यं कार्यम् ; स्वर्गादिः
फलस्य तथात्वापातात् ॥ नापि कृतिसाध्यं कृत्युद्देश्यं वा यद् भवति तत्कार्यमित्यपि वक्तुं
शक्यम् ; तस्य कृत्युद्देश्यत्वासम्भवात् । कृतिं प्रति प्रयोजनं कृत्युद्देश्यं भवति । पुरुषस्य
कृत्यारम्भप्रयोजनं कृतेश्च प्रयोजनम् । तच्च सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा । न हि कार्यं
तयोरन्यद(न्यतरदः)पि भवति । तस्मात्तस्य कृत्युद्देश्यत्वासम्भवात् कार्यत्वञ्च न
सिद्ध्येत् । अथ तस्य कृतिप्रयोजनत्वाभावेऽपि प्रयोजनभूतस्य स्वर्गादिः साधनत्वेनार्थ-
त्वात्तत्कृत्युद्देश्यमित्युच्यते, तथा सति इष्टसाधनस्य विधित्वमङ्गीकृतं स्यात् । तस्माद्दुर्निरूपं
कार्यम् ॥

अपि चास्य कार्यस्य न विधेयत्वं(विध्यर्थत्वं ?)सम्भवति ; तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाभावात् । न हि बलवदुद्वाहोऽयं तदभावः(मृद्धारः ?)निपुणविज्ञेयः सुवर्णस्य वर्ण इत्यत्र-कार्यत्वज्ञाने सत्यपि प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते ॥

अथोच्येत—इदं मम कार्यमिति यत्प्रतीयते तत्कृत्युद्देश्यमिति, तदप्ययुक्तम् ; इदं मम कार्यमित्येवंरूपस्यास्य प्रमाणज्ञानत्वाभावात् । किन्तर्हि ? इदं कार्यमिति पुरुषस्य चिकीर्षारूपस्सङ्कल्पः । तस्मान्न वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिदम् । वाक्यं हीदं यागस्य कार्यमिति वदति ; न ममेदं कार्यमिति । अत एव वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि ममेदं कार्यमिति सङ्कल्पानुपपत्तेः विधिमतिक्रामन् दृश्यते ॥

यदुक्तं स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र स्वर्गसाधनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्कल्पनीयमिति, तन्न ; यागादेरि(रेः)व स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । तस्मान्नापूर्वमपि विधिर्भवति ॥

त्रय्यन्तनिष्ठास्त्वेवमातिष्ठन्ते—आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगो विधिः प्रवर्तनेति पर्यायाः । प्रयोक्तृपुरुषधर्मत्वेन तस्य व्युत्पत्तिः । ननु च शक्तिग्रहणं हि व्युत्पत्तिः, कथं पुरुषप्रवर्तनायां सम्भवति ? उच्यते—न हि शक्तिग्रहणं व्युत्पत्तिः । किन्तर्हि ? सहदर्शनम् । तथाहि—बालः शब्दप्रयोगं परेषां प्रवृत्तिं बहुकृत्यः सह पश्यति । तथादृष्ट्या प्रौढसंस्कारस्सन् लोकोत्तरे(कालान्तरे?) यथा(दा?) शब्दं शृणोति, तदा तस्याजिज्ञासमानस्यैवार्थेषु स्मृतिरुपजायते । स्मृताश्चार्थास्स्वयमेव संसर्गप्रतीतिमुपजनयन्ति । तस्मात्सहदर्शनं व्युत्पत्तिः । अत एव लिङादियुक्तेषु वाक्येषु बालः प्रयोज्यपुरुषस्य प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्प्रवृत्तिहेतुविज्ञानमनुमाय तत्र च शब्दसमूहस्य शक्तिमवधारयति । पुनरावापोद्वापाभ्यामर्थविशेषस्य(पे ?) शब्दविशेषस्य शक्तिविशेषं व्यवस्थापयतीत्येतन्न समीचीनम् ; बालस्य तथाविधोहापोहसामर्थ्याभावात् ॥

किञ्च प्रवृत्तेः कार्यज्ञानस्येव भूयोदर्शनेन व्याप्यवगमात्प्रागेव काञ्चिच्छब्दात्प्रवृत्तिं पश्येदपि । कथं कार्यज्ञानमनुमीयते ; कथं वा शब्दस्य लिङ्गत्वमवगच्छेत् । न ह्यनुमानव्युत्प-

त्ति(त्ते ?)रूर्ध्वमेव शब्दानन्तरप्रवृत्तिदर्शनमित्येव स्थापयितुं शक्यम् । तस्माद्यासिग्रहणस्मरणाभ्यां पूर्वं समकालं वा शब्दं प्रवृत्तिं च सह दृष्टवतश्शब्दार्थप्रतीतिर्भवति । स्मृताश्चार्था अनिर्ज्ञातशक्तयस्संसर्गप्रतीतिमुपजनयन्ति । सम्बन्धयोग्येन विभक्त्यर्थकारकादिरूपेण सहैव स्मृता अर्थास्संसर्गप्रतीतिं कुर्वन्ति । यदा चायं बालः प्रौढस्सन्नूहापोहसमर्थो भवति, तदा आत्मनश्शब्देभ्यो ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दानां ज्ञानजनने शक्तिमवगच्छेदपि । तस्माच्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानात्प्रागेव शब्दाज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः ‘शब्दार्थज्ञानमनुमानमेव ; न प्रमाणान्तरम्’ इति बौद्धानां पक्षः प्रत्युक्तः । अवश्यं हि सम्बन्धावगमपूर्विका सम्बन्धिदर्शनेन सम्बन्धन्तरे बुद्धिरनुमानेऽन्तर्भवत्येव । तस्मात्सहदर्शनमेव व्युत्पत्तिः ॥

ननु न हि प्रयोजकस्य पुरुषस्य प्रवर्तना प्रयोज्यपुरुषविषया लिङादिभिस्सह बालेन ज्ञायते ; येन लिङार्थी (डादीन् ?) श्रुत्वा बालस्तस्याः स्मरेत् ॥

अत्रोच्यते—यथा बालस्सहदर्शनेन व्युत्पन्नः परवचनात्परस्य प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन्स्वयमस्मान्प्रवर्तयितुकामो वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते । तदात्मनि प्रत्यक्षेण परप्रवर्तनां पश्यति । तां दृष्ट्वैवमवगच्छति—नृनं सर्वेऽपि पुरुषाः परप्रवृत्त्यर्थं हि लिङादि प्रयुञ्जानाः परोऽस्मिन्नर्थे प्रवर्ततामिति सङ्कल्परूपामाज्ञानुज्ञादिशब्दवाच्यां प्रवर्तनां कृत्वैव प्रयुक्तवन्त इति । तदेवं सर्वमुपपन्नम् ॥

ननु च यदि पुरुषस्य हितप्रवर्तनां लिङादयोऽभिदध्युः, तदा वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि प्रसज्येरन् । पुरुषस्य हितप्रवर्तना लोके स्वकृतादेव वाक्यात्प्रतीयते, स्वप्रयुक्तस्य वा पुरुषस्य वाक्यात् ॥

उच्यते—राजभृत्यानां हि राज्ञः केनापि कारणेन मतं जानतामप्रयुक्तानामपि राजवचनाज्ञापनदैः पुरुषै राजाज्ञायाः प्रतिपत्तिर्दृश्यते ; तथा हि—राजभृत्या राजाज्ञां तेनाबोधिता अप्येवं राजा युष्मानाज्ञापयतीति परेभ्यः कथयन्ति । ततस्तेऽपि राजाज्ञां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । एवं वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषाज्ञां प्रतिपादयिष्यन्ति ।

अथ स्याद्वैदिकान्यपि वाक्यानि राजपुरुषवाक्यवत्पुरुष एवमाज्ञापयतीति प्रतिपादयेयुः ; न पुनरित्थं कुर्यादिति । मैवम् ॥ राजमयतां (राजभयात् ?) कुरु माकार्षीरित्यपि

वचनदर्शनात् । अथवा विधिप्रतिषेधानामित्थमीश्वराज्ञेत्येवंविधेन वाक्येनैकवाक्यतया विधिप्रतिषेधा ईश्वरस्याज्ञाः स्युः । तथा ‘ वेदमनूच्याचार्योऽन्तेवासिनमनुशास्ति ’ इत्यादिकेन वचनेन धर्मान्विधाय ‘ एष आदेशः, एष उपदेशः, एषा वेदोपनिषत्, एतदनुशासनम् ’ इति हि विधीनामाज्ञारूपत्वं श्रूयते । किञ्च ‘ एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि ददतो मनुष्याः प्रशंसन्ति यजमानं देवान्दर्वि पितरोऽन्वायताः ’ इति श्रुतिः पूर्वोक्तमनुशासनं परमपुरुषस्येति ज्ञापयति । किञ्च ‘ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ’ इति वेदानामीश्वरवचनत्वं श्रूयते । न च नित्यत्वेऽपि वेदानामीश्वरनियोगत्वं विधीनामनुपपन्नम् । ‘ अग्नीदमीन्विहर ’ इत्यादिवदुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पुरुषनियोगो विधिः । अत एव स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र भङ्गुरयागस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वानुपपत्त्या क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्कल्प्यमित्येतदपि परास्तम् ; अतीतेऽपि यागे स्वाज्ञाकरणेनाराधितस्य परमपुरुषस्य हविर्भोजनेनाराधितानामिन्द्रादिदेवतानां च फलप्रदातृत्वेन यागस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वोपपत्तेः ॥

ननु चापूर्वस्यानभ्युपगमे प्रयाजादीनामङ्गत्वन्न स्यात् । न हि देवतादि तत्करणशरीरं निष्पादयन्ति । नापि तस्योपकुर्वन्ति । काम्यानां फलसद्भावेऽपि नित्यनैमित्तिकानां फलभावात् यावत्फलमनवस्थानाच्च ॥

उच्यते—तत्रापीश्वराज्ञया प्रवर्तमानस्येश्वरसन्तोषफलं भविष्यति ; लौकिकसेवकस्य सेव्यसन्तोषवत् । न च वाच्यं कर्मणां देवताराधनत्वे देवतां प्रति कर्माण्युपसर्जनानि स्युः । ततः तस्य देवताप्रयुक्तत्वादनुष्ठानस्य देवतानां कर्मानङ्गत्वात् तदभिधायिनां मन्त्राणां कर्माङ्गप्रकाशरूपदृष्टकार्यस्याभावात्फलप्रकाशनस्य प्रोत्साहनस्यान्यस्यैव वाऽभावाददृष्टार्थानां सतां प्रयाजादीनामिव विकृतिषु अनूह एव स्यादिति । आराध्यभूतानां देवतानामेव कर्माणि प्रति कारकत्वरूपेणाङ्गत्वस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । यथा लोके वयस्यैः स्वसेनापतिभिस्सह कन्दुकमृगयादिलीलारसमनुभवतां राज्ञां तत्र तत्र गुणभावः, तत्रैव तेषामपराधदर्शने स्वाभाविकं प्रभुत्वं च विद्यते, तथा देवतानामपि क्रियानिर्वर्तकत्वेन क्रियाङ्गत्वं देवपूजाद्यात्मनो यागादेस्तदाराधनत्वेनाराध्यत्वं ‘ स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति ’ इत्यादिवाक्यत्रयोदितफलप्रदातृत्वेन प्रभुत्वञ्चाविरुद्धम् ॥

ननु च 'इष्टापूर्तं बहुधा जातं जायमानं विश्वं विभर्ति भुवनस्य नाभिः' 'अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च' इत्यादिभिः परमपुरुषस्यैव सर्वेषु यागेषु हविर्भोक्तृत्वं फलप्रदातृत्वञ्चावगम्यते । तत्कथमिदमुपपद्यते । 'अज्ञान्यन्या देवता' इति श्रुतेः परमपुरुषस्य शेषभूतानीतराणि दैवतानि । तस्मात्तेषामाराधनमेव तदाराधनं, भोगश्च तथैवेति कृत्वा तस्य सर्वेषु यागेषु भोक्तृत्वाभिधानं प्रभुत्वाभिधानञ्च भवति । भृत्यपोषणे स्वामिनस्सन्तोषो भवत्येव ॥

एवं यागादिकर्मभिरूपासनेनाराधितस्य परमपुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गरूपफलप्रदातृत्वं श्रूयते—'स वा एष महानज आत्मानादो वमुदानः', 'एष ह्येवानन्दयाति' इति । एवमिन्द्रादिदेवतानां परमपुरुषस्य चाराध्यतया (ध्यता ?) स्वयं (?) उपपद्यते । तासां देवतानां तत्तदैश्वर्यफलप्रदातृत्वशक्त्यादिगुणयोगः परमपुरुषप्रसादलब्ध इति तासां तस्य च फलप्रदातृत्वञ्चोपपन्नम् ॥

तदेवं लोके प्रयोक्तृपुरुषनियोगो विधिः, वेदे तु परमपुरुषनियोग इति सर्वत्र पुरुषनियोगो विधिः । यत्सहदर्शनं व्युत्पत्तिरित्युपपादितम्, यश्च पुरुषनियोगो विधिरिति तदेतद् द्वयमपि 'तैरेव शब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनात्सङ्केतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु शब्दानां प्रयोगो बोधकत्वनिवन्धन इति निश्चिन्वन्ति' इति भाष्यात् 'स्वशासनानुवर्तिनः परमपुरुषोऽनुगृह्णाति, तदतिवर्तिनो निगृह्णाति' इति भाष्याच्च **भगवता भाष्यकारेणाङ्गीकृतमिति** गम्यते । तस्मात्सर्वसमीचीनम् ॥

इति नीतिमालायां

विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारोऽष्टमः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां

नवमाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अथ निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतं वेदनं निर्णयिते—

वेदान्तवाक्यजं ज्ञानमपवर्गस्य साधनम् ।

केचिदाहुरथान्ये तु साङ्ख्ययोगसमुच्चयम् ॥

विवेकाद्यैरनुद्धर्षपर्यन्तैस्सप्तहेतुभिः ।

निष्पन्नं भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं वेदवित्तमाः ॥

‘वेदान्तविज्ञानमुनिश्चितार्थास्सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयद्गुह्यसत्त्वाः । ते ब्रह्मलोके तु परान्त-
काले परामृतात्परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ’ ‘तरति शोकमात्मवित्’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यं
ज्ञानमविद्यानिवृत्तिलक्षणमोक्षसाधनतयावगतम् । तस्माद्वेदान्तवाक्यानि यज्ञादिनिर्वाहितकल्म-
षस्य ब्रह्मविषयकाविद्यानिवर्तकं ज्ञानं जनयति । तज्ज्ञानं यावदन्तःकरणबहिःकरण-
जन्यविपरीतचेष्टा न शाम्यति, तावन्तं कालं प्रतिबद्धफलं तिष्ठति । तत्र श्रवणेन शक्तितात्पर्या-
वधारणे कृते मनननिदिध्यासनाभ्याससम्भावनाविपरीतसम्भावनानिरासे च कृते तदेव शब्द-
जन्यं ज्ञानमपरोक्षरूपं सदशेषाज्ञानं तत्कार्यनिर्लेपं निवर्तयति । न च शब्दस्य परोक्षज्ञानहेतु-
त्वन्न सम्भवतीति वाच्यम् ; प्रमेयवैषम्यादुपपत्तेः । तथाहि—घटाद्यानात्मवस्तु स्वविषयाज्ञान-
निवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण स्वसंसर्ग(र्गि)प्रकाशमपि प्रमाणफलत्वेनापेक्षते ; अस्वयम्प्रकाशरूपत्वात् ।
आत्मवस्तु स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्स्वाज्ञाननिवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण प्रकाशसंसर्गं प्रमाणफलत्वेन नापेक्षते ।
ततश्चावधारितशक्तितात्पर्यनिश्चयशब्दजन्यविज्ञानेन स्वविषयाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ ब्रह्म स्वयमेवापरोक्षं

भवति । न च ध्यानेनाविद्यानिवृत्तिस्सम्भवति ; तस्य प्रमाणज्ञानत्वाभावान्मिथ्याभूतस्य संसारस्य प्रमाणज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वाच्च । तस्माद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति केचिदाहुः ।

तदयुक्तम् ; 'आत्मा वा अरे ज्ञातव्यः' 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यादिभिरात्मध्यानस्य विधेयत्वावगमाद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वाच्च । न च वाक्यजन्यज्ञानेनाविद्यानिवृत्तिर्दृश्यते । यदुक्तं प्रथमं वाक्यार्थज्ञानं प्रतिबद्धफलं तिष्ठति ; तत्र श्रवणादिभिः प्रतिबन्धे निवृत्ते तदेवाविद्यां निवर्तयतीति ॥ तदप्ययुक्तम् ; बाधकज्ञानेन प्रतिबन्धकहेतूनामपि मिथ्यात्वेन बाधितत्वात्प्रतिबन्धासम्भवात् । द्विचन्द्रज्ञानवत्सम्भवतीति चेत्, नैवम् ; तत्र द्विचन्द्रज्ञानहेतोः पारमार्थिकस्य काचादेरौषधविनाशयेन ज्ञानसाध्यत्वाभावात्तत्सम्भव उपपन्नः । तस्माद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य प्रतिबद्धफलत्वमनुपपन्नम् ।

न चासम्भावनाविपरीतसम्भावनानिरसनयोः प्राग्बाधकज्ञानं नोत्पद्यत इति वाच्यम् ; सामग्र्यां सत्यां ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । यच्चोक्तं शब्दोऽपरोक्षज्ञानं जनयतीति, तदप्यसङ्गतम् ; अदृष्टत्वात् ।

यदप्युक्तं प्रमेयवैषम्यात्तदपरोक्षं भवतीति, तदपि न मनोहरम् ; आत्मनः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकरणात् । प्रमाणज्ञानेन तद्ज्ञातज्ञाननिवृत्त्या तस्यापि प्रमेयत्वमौपचारिकं विद्यत इति चेत्, तदपि न सिद्धयेत् ; तस्याज्ञानतदाश्रयत्वादेर्निरस्तत्वात् । यच्चेदमुक्तं संसारस्य मिथ्यात्वेन प्रमाणज्ञानेन निवर्त्यते, न ध्यानेनेति ; तदपि तस्य पारमार्थ्योपपादनान्निरस्तम् । 'वेदान्तविज्ञानमुनिश्चितार्थाः' इति श्रुतिश्च न वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं ब्रूते ; 'सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयश्शुद्धसत्त्वा' इति ज्ञानोत्तरकालभाविनस्सन्न्यासादेरपि परिकरतया प्रतिपादनात् । तस्मान्न वाक्यजन्यज्ञानं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति ॥

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—साङ्ख्ययोगोऽप(गावः)वर्गस्य साधनम् । तत्त्वानामवधारणं साङ्ख्यम् । तद् द्विविधम्, श्रवणं मननञ्चेति । तत्र सविशेषध्यानं सम्भूतिरित्युच्यते । निर्विशेषध्यानं विनाश इत्युच्यते । कर्मयोगस्तु वाक्कायबाह्यार्थजः । तच्च त्रिविधमनुष्ठानम्—ईश्वरार्थानां कर्मणां करणम्, इतरेषाञ्च त्यागः, सर्वफलसन्न्यासश्चेति । एवंविधाभ्यां समुच्चिताभ्यां

साङ्ख्ययोगाभ्यामपवर्गप्राप्तिः। 'तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाधिगम्यम्' इति श्रुतेः। ज्ञानयोग-
कर्मयोगयोस्तु समुच्चयोऽन्यत्र परिव्राजकेभ्यः। तेषां तु ज्ञानयोगः। सम्भूति-
विनाशयोस्तु सर्वत्र समुच्चयो भवति। ज्ञानयोगकर्मयोगयोस्सम्भूतिविनाशयोश्च समुच्चयः
श्रुतिसिद्धः। 'विद्याञ्चाविद्याञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह', 'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते।'।
सम्भूतिञ्च विनाशञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह। विनाशेन मृत्युं तीर्त्वा सम्भूत्यामृतमश्नुते' इति।
यथोक्तं—'समुच्चयांस्त्रीनिह वर्णयन्ति साङ्ख्यस्य योगस्य च वै स पूर्वः। ज्ञानक्रियायोगगतो
द्वितीयस्तथैव सम्भूतिविनाशजोऽन्यः।' इति। तस्मात्साङ्ख्ययोगाभ्यामपवर्ग इति ॥

तदप्यनुपपन्नम्। 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति, नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते' इत्या-
दिभिः श्रुतिभिर्वेदनस्यैवापवर्गसाधनत्वश्रवणात्, तदितरस्य साधनत्वनिषेधाच्च। तत्कारणं
साङ्ख्ययोगाधिगम्यमित्याद्युक्तलक्षणयोस्साङ्ख्ययोगयोरपवर्गफले समुच्चयो न विधीयते। अपि
तर्हि 'ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम्' इति स्मरणात्साङ्ख्ययोगशब्दौ ज्ञानयोग-
कर्मयोगवचनौ। ताभ्यामनुष्ठिताभ्यां परमात्मसाक्षात्कारो भवतीत्युच्यते; अधिगतेर्ज्ञानार्थत्वात्,
पूर्वोक्तश्रुतिविरोधाच्च। विद्यां चाविद्यां चेत्यनेनापि विद्याविद्ययोर्नापवर्गफले समुच्चय उच्यते।
मृत्युतरणामृतत्वप्राप्तिफलभेदस्य तयोः सुव्यक्तत्वात्। अत्राविद्याशब्देन विद्येतरत्वाद्विहितं
वर्णाश्रमप्रयुक्तं कर्मोच्यते। मृत्युशब्देन च विद्योत्पत्तिविरोधि प्राचीनं कर्मोच्यते। सम्भूतिञ्च
विनाशञ्चेत्यस्यापि वाक्यस्यायमेवार्थः—विदुषो विद्यासाध्यस्यापवर्गस्य सम्यगभिवृद्धिरूप-
त्वात्सम्यगभिवृद्धिपर्यायस्सम्भूतिशब्दो लक्षणया तत्साधनभूतविद्यावचनः। कर्मफलस्य विनाश-
गर्भत्वात्फलवचनो विनाशशब्दो लक्षणया तत्साधनकर्मवचनः। अनयोस्सम्भूतिविनाशशब्द-
योस्सविशेषनिर्विशेषध्यानवाचित्वं लक्षणयापि न सिद्धयति। तस्माद्यथोक्त एवार्थः। अत-
स्साङ्ख्ययोगौ समुच्चितावपवर्गसाधनमिति न युक्तम् ॥

त्रयन्तविदग्रेसरास्त्वेवमभिदधति—'ब्रह्मविदामोति परम्' 'रुक्माभं स्वप्नधीगम्यं
विद्यात्तु पुरुषं परम्' इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यार्थज्ञानविलक्षणं तन्मूलं विवेकादिपरिशुद्धमनोजन्यं
ध्यानोपासनध्रुवानुस्मृतिशब्दवाच्यं साक्षात्कारसदृशञ्चेत्यद्भुतपरमपुरुषार्थप्रियत्वेन स्वय-
मप्यत्यर्थप्रियत्वमापन्नं तत एव भक्तिशब्दवाच्यं वेदनमपवर्गसाधनतया विधीयते। कुत इद-

मवगम्यत इति चेत्, 'अनुविद्य विजानाति' 'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' इति श्रुतेः विज्ञानपर्यायस्य वेदनस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानमूलत्वं तत एव तद्वैलक्षण्यं चावगम्यते। 'आहारशुद्धौ सत्त्वशुद्धिः' 'शान्त उपासीत' 'सदा तद्भावभावितः' 'क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः' 'यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन' 'सत्येन लभ्यः' 'नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यः' 'शान्तो दान्तः' इत्यादिशास्त्रैर्विवेकादि-सप्तकसाचिव्यं मनसोऽवगम्यते। विवेकादिभ्यो वेदनलब्धिर्ब्रह्मनन्दिनाभिहिता-तल्लब्धि-विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः' इति। सात्त्विकाहारसेवया शरीरिन्द्रिय-शोधनं विवेकः। कामानभिप्वङ्गो विमोकः। उपास्यसंशीलनमभ्यासः। यथाशक्ति वर्णाश्रम-धर्मानुष्ठानं क्रिया। आर्जवाद्यात्मगुणाः कल्याणानि। शोकहेतुषूपस्थितेष्वपि मनसोऽवसादरा-हित्यमनवसादः। हर्षहेतुषूपस्थितेष्वप्यतिसन्तोषराहित्यमनुद्धर्षः। परिशुद्धं मन एवास्य वेदनस्य साधनमिति च 'मनसैवानुद्वेष्टव्यम्' 'दृश्यते त्वद्गत्या बुद्ध्या' 'न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा' 'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन' इति श्रुतेरवगम्यते। ध्यानोपासनध्रुवानुस्मृतीनां वेदनपर्यायत्वं तत्तच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टानामपवर्गसाधनत्वोपदेशाद्वेदनव्यतिरिक्तस्य साधनत्वनिषेधश्रुते-श्चावगम्यते। 'यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं' 'तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिर्वेदनस्य साक्षात्कारदशापत्तिर्विज्ञायते। 'यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्' 'मद्भक्तिं लभते पराम्' इत्यादिशास्त्रादस्य भक्तिरूपत्वमवगम्यते। तस्माद्भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति निश्चीयते। एवं सति 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति' 'भक्त्या लभ्य-स्त्वनन्यया' 'भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्यः' इति श्रुतिस्मृतयस्सङ्गता भवन्ति ॥

ननु 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः'

'वर्णाश्रमाचारवता पुरुषेण परः पुमान्।

विष्णुराराध्यते पन्था नान्यस्ततोषकारकः॥' इति

कर्मैकसाध्यत्वं निश्श्रेयसस्यावगम्यते। तत्कथं भक्त्यैकसाध्यत्वम्?

उच्यते—'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः' इत्यनेन तावन्निश्श्रेयसस्य न कर्मसाध्यत्वमुच्यते। अपि तर्हि ज्ञाननिष्ठायाः कर्मसाध्यत्वमुच्यते। 'स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः' इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात्। तत्र

सिद्धिं प्राप्नोति यथा ब्रह्म तथा प्राप्नोति बोधमे ।

समासेनैव कौन्तेय निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा ॥

इत्यादिना 'मङ्गलं लभते पराम्'

‘भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यावान्यश्चास्ति तत्त्वतः ।

ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते तदनन्तरम् ॥’

इत्यन्तेन कर्मणां ज्ञाननिष्ठापरपर्यायसिद्धिहेतुत्वप्रतिपादनाद्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य निश्श्रेयसस्य परभक्तिलभ्यत्ववचनाच्च वर्णाश्रमाचारवर्तमानेनापि त्रैवर्णिकैस्त्ववर्णाश्रमधर्मानुष्ठानेन भगवत्सन्तोषः कर्तव्यः (न ?) प्रकारान्तरेणेत्युच्यते ; न तु कर्मणां निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वमिति नात्र कश्चिद्विरोधः ॥

अथ स्यात्—उपासनस्य निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वे

‘क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ’ ।

‘ज्ञानं हि सर्वपापानि नाशयिष्यत्यसंशयम् ’ ॥

‘ज्ञानाग्निस्सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ।

यथाग्निरुद्धतशिखः कक्षं दहति सानिलः ।

तथा चित्तस्थितो विष्णुर्योगिनां सर्वकल्मषम् ॥’

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्यत्तस्य पापक्षयहेतुत्वमवगम्यते, तदनुपपन्नं स्यात् । न चोभयत्र विनियोगात्तस्योभयफलत्वं युक्तम् ; सन्ध्यावन्दनज्योतिष्टोमादीनां कर्मणामुद्गीथाद्युपासनानां चैकफलत्वनियमदर्शनात् ॥

अथ सेतुदर्शनचान्द्रायणादिकर्मणामेकस्यैव पापक्षपणपुत्रादिनानाफलसाधनत्वं दृश्यते इति ; सत्यम् । तत्र प्रयोगभेद उपपद्यते । इह त्वाप्रायणमावर्तमानस्योपासनस्यैकशास्त्रार्थत्वात्फलभेदो नोपपद्यते । तस्माद्विधानस्य पापक्षपणं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिर्वा फलं भवेत् । तत्राप्यक्षीणकल्मषस्य ब्रह्मप्राप्त्यसम्भवात्कल्मषक्षय एवोपासनफलमभ्युपेयमिति नोपासनस्य निश्श्रेयससाधनत्वमिति ॥

नैतदेवम् ; सकृत्प्रयुक्तस्यैकस्यैवानेकफलत्वोपपत्तेः । एकैको हि मणिमन्त्रौषधादिविषं हन्ति । अणिमाद्यैश्वर्यञ्चावहति । परं पीयमानं पयः पित्तमपहन्ति तृषं च वारयति (इति ?) दृश्यते । वैदिकानामपि कर्मणां सकृदनुष्ठितानां नानाफलत्वमवगम्यते । ‘ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्ग-
कामो यजेतैककामस्सर्वकामोऽपि’ इत्यापस्तम्बवचनात् । एकस्मिन्प्रयोगे सर्वान्कामान्कामयीत प्रयोगप्रतीत्यैवैकैकमित्यार्षवचनाच्च । विशेषतो भगवन्माहात्म्यात्तदुपासनस्यानेकफलत्वमुप-
पन्नम् । स्मर्यते च तस्य नानाफलत्वम्—

‘आयासः स्मरणे कोऽस्य स्मृतो यच्छति शोभनम् ।

पापक्षयश्च भवति स्मरतां तमहर्निशम् ॥

भावं मनोरथं यच्च स्वर्गवन्द्यञ्च यत्पदम् ।

ददाति ध्यायतां नित्यमपवर्गप्रदो हरिः ॥

रत्नपर्वतमारुह्य यथा रत्नं नरो मुने ।

सत्त्वानुरूपमादत्ते तदा कृष्णान्मनोरथम्’ ॥ इत्यादिभिः

तस्माद्ब्रह्मोपासनस्य सकलकल्मषक्षपणमर्चिरादिगतिर्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्चेति त्रीण्यपि फलानि स्युः । तदेवं भक्तिपर्यायं वेदनं निश्श्रेयससाधनमिति सिद्धम् ॥

अत्र केचिद्भगवद्गुणप्रवीणा एवं वर्णयन्ति—यतोऽभ्युदयनिश्श्रेयससिद्धिस्स धर्मः । स च द्विविधः सिद्धः साध्यश्चेति । तत्र साध्यो यागदानहोमोपासनादिः । सिद्धो ज्ञानशक्ति-
बलैश्वर्यादिगुणसम्पन्नो भगवान् । ‘कृष्णं धर्मं सनातनम्’ ‘स हि धर्मस्सनातनः’ इत्यादिस्मर-
णात् । तस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं श्रूयते । ‘यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै । तं ह देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये’ इति । स्मर्यते च—

‘शरणं त्वां प्रपन्ना ये ध्यानयोगविवर्जिताः ।

तेऽपि मृत्युमतिक्रम्य यान्ति तद्वैष्णवं पदम् ॥

सोऽहं त्वां शरणमपारमप्रमेयं सम्प्राप्तः परमपदं यतो न किञ्चित् ।

संसारभ्रमपरितापतसचेता निर्वाणे परिणत धाम्नि साभिलाषे ॥’

इत्यादिभिः । तस्माद्भगवानप्युपायतयोपादेयः । तदुपादानं नाम तत्प्रपदनम् । निवेदनं निक्षेपो न्यासः प्रपदनमिति पर्यायाः । तच्च तदेकोपायत्वप्रार्थनलक्षणम् । तत्र ये संसारोद्विग्नमानसाः भगवच्चरणद्वन्द्वभिलाषिण उक्तलक्षणसाध्योपायेऽधिकारशक्तिवाञ्छानिवेशनं न लभन्ते, ते भगवत्प्रसादेन तस्मिन्विस्मम्भशालिनस्तमेवोपाददते । सोऽपि तेषां गुणदोषावविगणय्य योगक्षेमं विदधाति । यत एवमाह—

‘ अहं त्वा सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः । ’

‘ मित्रभावेन सम्प्राप्तं न त्यजेयं कथञ्चन ॥ ’ इति ॥

न चैतदितरोपायोपादानवद्देशकालादिनियमापेक्षम् ; प्रपदनीयमाहात्म्यात् । द्रुपदात्मजावृत्तान्तोऽपि भगवत्प्रपदनस्य नियमानपेक्षत्वं द्योतयति । सा हि स्त्रीधर्मिणी सत्येव परिषदि पर-परिभवापजिहीर्षया भगवन्तं प्रापद्यत । सोऽपि तस्याः परिभवमसन्निधान एवापाचकारेति हि पञ्चमाम्नायप्रसिद्धिः । तत्प्रपदनं प्रपदनीयपुरुषविशेषेषु नियमा(मो?)पेतमपि क्रियते । यथा सागरतरणाभिलाषिणा भगवता दशरथात्मजेन प्राङ्मुखत्वदर्भासनादिनियमोपेतेन वरुणं प्रति । तदपि प्रपदनीयस्य लाघवेन वा प्रपद्यमानस्य वृत्तशालितया हि(वा?) सञ्जातमित्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥

परमपुरुषे प्रपदनीये तु न नियमलेशोऽप्यपेक्षितः । तस्मात्तदनन्यगतिभिस्स एवोपादेयत्वेनोपादेय इति तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन् सिद्धोपाये महाभागधेये महाविस्मम्भशालिनां लोकोत्तराणामेवाधिकारः इति भगवान् **बादरायणः** पूर्वोक्तमुपासनमेवापवर्गसाधनं निरणैषोत् ‘ आवृत्तिसकृदुपदेशात् ’ इत्यादिना । तस्माद्यथाधिकारमुपाय उपादेयः ॥

इति नीतिमालायां

निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारो नवमः ॥

श्रीः

नीतिमालायां दशमाधिकार आरभ्यते.

अथ निश्श्रेयसस्वरूपं निर्णयिते—

अविद्याया निवृत्तिं तु केचिन्मोक्षं प्रचक्षते ।

निवृत्तसकलोपाधिब्रह्मभावमथापरे ॥

अर्चिरादिकया गत्या परञ्ज्योतिरुपेयुषः ।

विदुषः स्वात्मयाथात्म्यप्रादुर्भावपुरस्सरम् ॥

परमव्योमनिष्ठस्य दिव्यमूर्तेः परात्मनः ।

निरङ्कुशं त्वनुभवमाहुस्त्रय्यन्तवित्तमाः ॥

अस्मिन्निश्श्रेयसे वादिनो बाह्या विवदन्ते । तथाहि—बौद्धैकदेशा माध्यमिकाः प्रकृष्टशून्य-
भावनया शून्यभावापत्तिं मोक्षमाचक्षते । योगाचारप्रभृतयस्तु स्वलक्षणभावनया क्षणिकत्व-
भावनया च विषयोपरागविधुरविज्ञानसन्तानम् । आर्हतास्तु सम्यग्दर्शनचारित्रैः प्रक्षीणा-
खिलमलस्याविर्भूतसकलगुणस्य लोकान्तरेऽवस्थानम् । अक्षपादकणादमतानुसारिणो वैशे-
षिका आत्मगुणोच्छेदम् । प्राभाकराश्च तथैव । भाट्टास्तु मनःकरणकेन ज्ञानेनानन्दानुभवम् ।
विवर्तवादिनोऽविद्यानिवृत्तिम् । उपाध्यवच्छिन्नजीववादिनस्तु निर्मुक्तोपाधेस्तस्य ब्रह्मभावम् ।
त्रय्यन्तार्थयथात्म्यविदस्तु उपासनप्रीतपरमपुरुषप्रसादात्प्रक्षीणाखिलपुण्यपापसञ्चयस्यार्चिरा-
दिना मार्गेण परञ्ज्योतिरुपसम्पन्नस्याविर्भूतस्वाभाविकापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणस्य सविभूतिक-
भगवद्विषयो नित्यासङ्कुचितापरोक्षानुभवो मोक्ष इति वदन्ति ॥

तत्र बौद्धपक्षे बन्धमोक्षान्वयिनः स्थायिनो भोक्तुरभावान्मोक्षो दुर्घटः । अर्हन्मतेऽपि चिद्रूपस्य वा अचिद्रूपस्य वा स्वयं परिणामरहितस्य तस्य स्वतोऽप्रतिसङ्गमत्वाच्चेतना(न?)धिष्ठितत्वाच्च गमनानुपपत्तेस्तत्पूर्वकलोकान्तरावस्थानलक्षणं निश्श्रेयसमनुपपन्नम् ॥

ज्ञानसुखादिगुणोच्छेदलक्षणमोक्षपक्षेऽपि संज्ञा(विसंज्ञ ?)त्वात्सुखानुभवाभावात्तत्स्वरूपाव(पो?)च्छेदकल्पत्वं मोक्षस्य स्यात् । अथ तत्र सुखाभावेऽपि दुःखाभावस्य विद्यमानत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वमुच्यते । तत्र ; दुःखाभावस्याप्यननुभाव्यत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् । न हि पाषाणादेर्दुःखाभावः पुरुषार्थतया प्रसिद्धः । भाट्टमतेऽपि संसारदशायां करणाधीनज्ञानस्य विषयाधीनसुखस्य चात्मनो मोक्षदशायामकरणकत्वाच्छब्दादिविषयाधीनत्वाच्च ज्ञानसुखयोरसम्भवादानन्दानुभवो न सम्भवति ॥

अथ तत्रापि मनसो नित्यत्वेन विद्यमानत्वात्स्वरूपस्यानुकुलत्वाच्च ज्ञानानन्दौ सम्भवेताम् । नैवं सम्भवतः ; मनसो नित्यत्वेऽप्यात्ममनसोर्विभुत्वाभ्युपगमेनान्यतरकर्मजस्योभयकर्मजस्य वा संयोगस्यानुपपत्तेः ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् । ज्ञानानन्दयोस्सम्भवेऽपि तयोरुत्पत्तिमत्त्वेनान्तवत्त्वमपि प्रसज्येत ॥

विवर्तवादेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्तेर्दुर्निरूपत्वात्तस्य निश्श्रेयसत्वं दुरुपपादम् । तथाहि— केयमविद्यानिवृत्तिर्नाम ? यद्यविद्यायाः प्रध्वंसः, तदा तस्याभावरूपत्वाङ्गीकाराद्घटादितुल्यत्वेन तत्प्रध्वंस इव निवृत्तिशब्देन तस्यावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिरुक्ता स्यात् । प्रध्वंसप्रागभावौ हि द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषौ । मृदद्रव्यस्य पृथुबुधोदराकारत्वं हि घटत्वम् । तस्मैवोत्तरकालभाविनी कपालत्वावस्था प्रध्वंसः । पूर्वकालभाविनी पिण्डत्वावस्था प्रागभावः । मृदद्रव्यन्तूभयावस्थायामनुवृत्तम् । घट उत्पद्यते नश्यतीति व्यवहारौ तदवस्थानिवन्धनौ ; तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यचिदनुपलम्भात् । एवं सर्वेषु द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्मादविद्यानिवृत्तिरपि तद्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेष इत्यङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । तथा सति तेनैव द्रव्येण ब्रह्म सद्वितीयमापतेत् ॥

अथाविद्या न द्रव्यमित्युच्यते, तथा सति तत्कार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्यापि न द्रव्यत्वं स्यात् । यदि ब्रह्मैवाविद्यानिवृत्तिरिति मतम्, तदा तस्य नित्यत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञानवैयर्थ्यं बन्धाभावश्च प्रसज्येत ।

अस्त्वविद्यानिवृत्तिः, तथापि तस्य पुरुषैरर्थ्यत्वासम्भवान्न निश्श्रेयसत्वं सिद्धयति । तस्याभावरूपत्वेऽपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीत्यपि न वाच्यम् ; दुःखनिवृत्तेः पुरुषार्थत्वासम्भवस्योक्तत्वात् ।

अथ स्यान्नास्माभिरविद्यानिवृत्तिमात्रं निश्श्रेयसमित्युच्यते, किन्तर्हि निवृत्तायामविद्यायां सुखैकतानब्रह्मस्वरूपस्याविर्भावो भवति । स आविर्भावो निश्श्रेयसमिति । तदप्यनुपपन्नम् ; आविर्भावस्यैवासम्भवात् । तत्त्वज्ञानात्पूर्वं ब्रह्मणः तिरोधानसम्भवे हि पश्चात्तस्याविर्भावस्सम्भवति । निर्विशेषस्य स्वयम्प्रकाशस्य ब्रह्मणस्तिरोधानं न सम्भवतीति हि पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । ब्रह्मण एव सुखरूपत्वञ्च निरस्तम् । यद्यपि सुखरूपस्य ब्रह्मण आविर्भावः, तथापि तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वञ्च सिद्धयति ; तत्स्वरूपस्यार्थ्यत्वाभावात् । न हि कश्चिदहं भूयासमित्याशास्ते ; किन्तु सुखी भूयासमिति ॥

स्यान्मतम्—येन सुखसम्बन्ध आशास्यते सुखी भूयासमिति, तेनापि न सुखसम्बन्धोऽर्थ्यते, किन्तर्हि ? सुखापरोक्ष्यम् । तत्रापि तस्य विद्यमानत्वात्पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्भवतीति । तच्च नैवम् ; विवेकहेत्वभावात् ।

अस्तु सुखापरोक्ष्यं पुरुषार्थः; तदपि न सिद्धयति । सुखापरोक्ष्यं हि सुखसाक्षात्कारः । साक्षात्कर्तरि ज्ञातरि विद्यमाने हि साक्षात्कारो भवति । तस्मादविद्यानिवृत्तिर्मोक्ष इत्येतन्मतं न समीचीनम् ॥

यन्निवृत्तोपाधेर्जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो मोक्ष इति, तदपि चिन्त्यम् । कोऽयं जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावः ? यद्युपाधिविगममात्रं, तदुक्तेन न्यायेन निश्श्रेयसं न स्यात् । अथोपाध्यवच्छिन्नस्यानवच्छिन्नब्रह्मैक्यं तदप्ययुक्तम् ; अवच्छेदस्य निरस्तत्वात् । किञ्चायं ब्रह्मभावः उपाधिविच्छेदात्प्रागस्ति न वा ? अस्ति चेदुपाधिविशेषव्यतिरेकेण न साधनानुष्ठानसाध्यं किञ्चिदस्ति । नास्ति चेत्तदानीमविद्यमानस्तत्त्वज्ञानसाध्यस्स कीदृशः ? यदि ब्रह्मसारूप्यम्, जीवब्रह्मणोर्मुक्त्यवस्थायां भेदोऽङ्गीकृतः स्यात् । अथ संसारदशायां ब्रह्मविलक्षणस्य जीवस्य पश्चात्तेनैक्यं ब्रह्मभाव इति मतम्, तदसङ्गतम् ; विलक्षणस्य द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यान्तरभावानुपपत्तेः । स्मर्यते च जीवस्य परमात्मैक्यनिषेधः ।

‘परमात्मात्मनोर्योगः परमार्थ इतीष्यते ।

मिथ्यैतदन्यद्रव्यं हि नैति तद्रव्यतां यतः ॥’ इति ॥

ननु ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’

‘यदा तद्भावमापन्नस्तदासौ परमात्मना ।

भवत्यभेदे भेदश्च तस्माज्ज्ञानकृतो भवेत् ॥’

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिः मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवस्य ब्रह्मत्वमुपपद्यते । कथमुपपद्यते? उच्यते—
‘ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्’ ‘परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम्’ ‘निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति’ ‘मम
साधर्म्यमागताः’ इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवस्य ब्रह्मणो मुक्तस्य च प्राप्यत्वप्राप्त-
त्वसौसादृश्यैर्भेदावगमान्मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेशस्सौसादृश्यनिबन्धन इति विज्ञायते । विलक्षणे-
ष्वपि वस्तुषु सौसादृश्यनिबन्धनस्तद्व्यवहार उपपन्न इति संस्थानजातिनिर्णय एवोपपादितम् ।

अत एव हि मुक्तं प्रस्तुत्यैवमाम्नायते—‘तं तु पञ्चशतान्यप्सरसां प्रति धावन्ति
शतं मालाहस्ताः शतमञ्जनहस्ताः शतं चूर्णहस्ताः शतं वासोहस्ताः शतं भूषाहस्ताः तं ब्रह्मा-
लङ्कारेणालङ्कुर्वन्ति ब्रह्मालङ्कारेणालङ्कृतो ब्रह्म विद्वान्ब्रह्मैवाभ्युपैति’ इति । अपि चास्मिन्पक्षे विवर्त
च ‘परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाण’
इत्यादि श्रुतयः ‘सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात्सङ्कल्पादेव तच्छ्रुतेः’ ‘जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणाद-
सन्निहितत्वाच्च’ इत्यादि सूत्राणि च न सङ्गच्छन्ते । तस्मात् लय्यन्तार्थयाथात्म्यविदां मतमेवो-
पादेयम् । तथा हि—‘तद्यथैषीका तूलमग्नौ प्रोतं प्रदूयेतैवं हास्य सर्वे पाप्मानः प्रदूयन्ते-
तद्यथा पुष्करपलाश आपो न श्लिष्यन्ते, एवमेवं विदि पापं कर्म न श्लिष्यते’ इति विदुषः
कर्मक्षयोऽवगम्यते । ‘शतं चैका च हृदयस्य नाड्यस्तासां मूर्धानमभिनिस्सृतैका । तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृ-
तत्वमेति विष्वङ्डन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति’ इति क्षीणकल्मषस्य विदुषो मूर्धन्यानाड्या
उत्क्रान्तिरवगम्यते । एवमुत्क्रान्तस्य ‘तेऽर्चिषमभिसम्भवन्ति अर्चिषोऽहः’ इत्यादिकया तत्पुरुषो
मानवः स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति’ इत्यन्तया श्रुत्या ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरवगम्यते । ब्रह्मोपसम्पन्नस्य तस्य ‘पर-
ञ्ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्यते’ इति श्रुतेस्संसारदशायां कर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टनतिरोहितस्वरूपस्य स्वाभाविका-
पहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणाविर्भावो विज्ञायते । एवमाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्य तस्य ‘यो वेद निहितं गुहायां
परमे व्योमन्’ ‘सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता’ इति श्रुतेः परमव्योम-

निष्ठनित्यदिव्यविग्रहपरब्रह्मानुभवोऽवगम्यते । एवमनुभवतो मुक्तस्य 'स एकधा भवति द्विधा भवति स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य पितरः समुत्तिष्ठन्ति' 'जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणस्सर्वान् लोकानामोति सर्वोश्च कामान्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः स्वेच्छानिमित्तबहुशरीरग्रहणं स्वसङ्कल्पायत्तपित्रादिसमुत्थानं भगवद्विभूतिभूतसकललोकानुगतिश्चावगम्यते ॥

एवं मुक्तस्य जगद्व्यापारवर्जं भगवदैश्वर्यं समानम् । न च वाच्यमेवंविधमैश्वर्यं सगुणोपासननिष्ठस्य तथाविधं ब्रह्म प्राप्नुवतो मुक्तस्य ; निर्गुणोपासननिष्ठस्य त्वाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्य विदुषः 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति' 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इत्याहैव ब्रह्मप्राप्तिवचना-दिति । 'परञ्ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाण' इति परविद्यानिष्ठस्याविर्भूतस्वरूपस्यैव भोगविहरणादिश्रवणात्परविद्यानिष्ठानामर्चिरादिगति-श्रवणाच्च । न च निर्गुणोपासनं नाम किञ्चिदस्ति; 'आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य' इति सर्वामु विद्या-स्वानन्दादिगुणानामुपसंहारात् । ब्रह्मणस्सगुणत्वनिर्णयाच्च ।

न च मुक्तस्य भोगविहरणादिसम्भवे सति रागादयोऽवर्जनीयाः स्युः । ते च दुःखानुपक्ता भवन्ति । ततश्च पुरुषार्थत्वं मोक्षस्य न स्यात् । उच्यते—सर्वत्र न रागादयो दुःखानुपक्ताः । कर्मनिमित्तानां तेषां दुःखावहत्वात् । ते प्रतिहतकार्याः पुरुषं क्लिश्यन्ति । ये त्वकर्मनिमित्ताः निर्गच्छाः कार्यं कुर्वन्ति, ते सविभूतिकभगवदनुभवानुगुणात्प्राप्त्युत मुखायैव भवन्तीति न किञ्चिदेतत् । अतः परमव्योमनिष्ठदिव्यविग्रहं भगवन्तमनुभवतो मुक्तस्यैश्वर्यं नानुपपन्नम् । न च भगवतो देशविशेषो दिव्यविग्रहश्च नास्तीति वक्तुं शक्यम् ; 'ऋचो अक्षरं परमे व्योमन् यस्मिन् देवा अधिविश्वे निषेदुः' 'विज्ञानमारथिर्यस्तु, मनः प्रग्रह-वान्नरः । सोऽध्वनः पारमामोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्' 'सदापश्यन्ति सूरयः' 'दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयम् ।'

‘वैकुण्ठे तु परे लोके श्रिया सार्धं जगत्पतिः ।

आस्ते विष्णुरचिन्त्यात्मा भक्तैर्भागवतैस्सह ॥’

‘न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिः’ ‘न पञ्चभूतसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः’ इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृति-भिर्विशिष्टदेशदेहाद्यवगतेः । एवंविधब्रह्मानुभवरूपस्य निश्चयेतस्य 'एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते' ।

‘इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।

सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च ॥’

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभिर्नित्यत्वञ्चावगम्यते । तदेवमसङ्कुचितो ब्रह्मानुभवो मोक्षः ॥

किञ्चान्यत्—अयं ब्रह्मानुभवः परिचर्यारसावहश्च भवति; प्रत्यक्परमात्मनोः शेषशेषि-
भावस्य स्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वात् । पारार्थ्यलक्षणं हि शेषत्वम् । अतः शेषभूतो मुक्तः स्वप्रयुक्तेन
केनचिदतिशयेन हि शेषिणं संयोजयति ; अकिञ्चित्करस्य शेषत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

अथ स्यात्—अयमात्मा संसारदशायामध्यात्मिकादिदुःखैरतितप्तः कथमस्मादुत्तीर्णः
सुखी भूयासम्’ इति हि स्वदुःखनिवृत्तिं सुखप्राप्तिञ्चाश्रयमानः मोक्षसाधनमन्वतिष्ठत् । सोऽयमप-
वर्गसमये स्वस्य दुःखमनाहत्य कथं परसन्तोषं कुरुते । एवं सति तत्कतुन्यायोऽपि भज्येत ।
किञ्च लोके सर्वैः स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रशस्यते । पारतन्त्र्यं निन्द्यते । शास्त्रेण पारतन्त्र्यं निन्दापूर्वकं
निषिध्यते । ‘सेवा श्रवृत्तिराख्याता तस्मात्तां परिवर्जयेत्’ इति । तस्मादस्य निश्श्रेयसत्वम-
नुपपन्नमिति ॥

नैतदेवम् ; भगवत्परिचर्याया निरतिशयमुखावहत्वात् । सुखं स्वाधीनं पूर्वमाशासि-
तम् । निवृत्तकल्मषस्यात्मनो भगवानत्यर्थप्रिय इति तत्परिचर्या निरतिशयसुखं भवति ॥
तस्मात्स्वमुखमेव पूर्वमुद्दिष्टं मोक्षदशायां मिदं भवति ।

यदुक्तं लोके स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रशस्यं पारतन्त्र्यं निन्दितञ्चेति ; एतन्न सार्वत्रिकम् ; अप्राप्तषोडश-
वर्षाणां पुत्राणां पितृपारतन्त्र्यस्य, स्त्राणां भर्तृपारतन्त्र्यस्य च श्लाघ्यत्वात् । तेषामेव
स्वातन्त्र्यस्य निन्दितत्वाच्च । सेवा श्रवृत्तिराख्यातं त्यजेनाप्यनर्थहेतुभूतान्यसेवैव निषिध्यन्ते,
न सेवामात्रम् । इतरथा हि अन्तेवातिनामाचार्यमेवाया अशास्त्रीयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माज्ज्ञान-
नन्दाद्यसङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणस्य सर्वस्वामिनः परमपुरुषस्यानुभवः शेषभूतस्य मुक्तस्य परि-
चर्यारसमावहतीति तथाविधो भगवदनुभवः परमनिश्श्रेयसमिति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ॥

इति श्रीनारायणार्यानुगृहीतायां नीतिमालायां निश्श्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकारो दशमः ॥

नीतिमाला सम्पूर्णा ॥

वैदिकाभरणव्याख्या ।

मुकुरः

श्रीमहागणपतये नमः

वाक्चेतोऽतिगच्चरितं करुणाभरितं कटाक्षहतदुरितम् ।
विध्वस्तमदनगर्वं व्यतीतसर्वं भजामि हृदि शर्वम् ॥

अपि च —

कर्माणि स्वहितानि कर्तुमखिलानाज्ञापयत्येष यो
यातानामपथे यथोचिततरं दण्डं विधत्ते च यः ।

यश्चात्मीयशिरस्पदेन सततं तत्त्वं परं श्लाघते
पर्यायप्रभुसम्मिताय वचसे कस्मैचिदस्मै नमः ॥

त्यागराजमखिराजसेवया प्राप्तधीर्गणपतिस्सुधीमणिः ।
वैदिकाभरणतत्त्वदर्शकं व्यातनोति मुकुरं मुदे सताम् ॥

इह खलु यथावदधीतवेदः परिचितपाणिनीयादिशिक्षाग्रन्थः फणिपतिफणितिपरमचतुरः
पण्डितमणिः श्रीमान् गार्ग्यगोपालयज्वा यजुर्वेदीयशाखाविशेषवृत्तिकार्यविशेषविधायकत्वेन
प्रवृत्तं अत एव प्रातिशाख्यनामकमपि लक्षणग्रन्थं व्याचिकीर्षुः आदौ ग्रन्थसमाप्त्यादिप्रति-
बन्धकदुरितविनाशाय विरचितमविगीतशिष्टसमुदाचारानुमितश्रुतिबोधितकर्तव्यताकं मङ्गलं
वेदतदङ्गतदाचार्यनमस्कारात्मकं शिष्यशिक्षार्थमध्येतुश्रोतृणामानुषङ्गिकमङ्गलसिद्धयर्थं च
ग्रन्थतो निबध्नन् चिकीर्षितप्रतिज्ञापूर्वकं विवरणकारत्वात् स्वयं प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिसिद्धये
प्रयोजनं विचारयितुमुपक्रमते—अथ किमर्थमित्यादिना । वक्ष्यतीति । ग्रन्थान्ते इति
शेषः । भाषायामिवेति । व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तोऽयम् । यथा भाषाशब्देषु सर्वे विधयः

सर्वत्र तुल्यं प्रवर्तन्ते नैवं वैदिकशब्देषु प्रवर्तन्ते इत्यर्थः । व्यवतिष्ठन्ते । व्यवस्थिता भवन्तीत्यर्थः । अतश्चावृत्तेति । अतेभ्यः तद्विन्नेभ्यः व्यावृत्तं यद्रूपं तदितरावृत्तित्व-
निशिष्टतद्वृत्तिवर्म इति यावत् । तदनवगतौ । तज्ज्ञानाभावे । तन्निर्णयायोगात् -
तद्विषयकनिश्चयासम्भवादित्यर्थः । अयं भावः—तद्विषयकनिश्चयं प्रति तदसाधारणधर्म
प्रकारकं ज्ञानं हेतुः । यथा ‘अयं घटः’ इति ज्ञाने घटत्वात्मकतदसाधारणधर्मज्ञानं
हेतुः, एवं तत्तत्कार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रति तत्तत्कार्यासाधारणोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकज्ञानं हेतुः इति
वक्तव्यम् । तच्च वैकल्पिकशास्त्रेषु न सम्भवति । तथाहि—‘स्वरितो वानुदात्ते पदादौ’
इत्यादिविकल्पशास्त्रोद्देश्यभूतस्य पदाद्यनुदात्ताव्यवहितपूर्ववृत्त्युदात्तैकारौकारान्यतरादिरूपस्य
स्वरिततदभावोभयादिसाधारणत्वेन अन्यतरनिर्णायकवचनाभावेन वैदिकेषु रूपद्वयस्य
वक्तुमशक्यत्वेन च स्वरिततदभावान्यतरविषयकनिश्चयो न सम्भवति । किञ्च, ‘सर्वे-
विधयश्छन्दसि’ इति वचनेन विधिमात्रस्य छन्दसि वैकल्पिकत्वबोधनेन सर्वत्राप्येवमेव
निर्णयासम्भवः । तस्मादेतादृशविकल्पविधीनां विषयविशेषव्यवस्थापनेन निर्णयार्थमिदमा-
वश्यकमेवेति ॥

ननु वैकल्पिकार्थविधीनां निर्णयार्थं आवश्यकंऽपि अत्र शास्त्रे नित्यत्वेन मूल-
शास्त्रोक्तानां ‘उदस्स्थास्तम्भो पूर्वस्य’ इत्यादीनां केषाञ्चिद्विधीनां ‘उत्पूर्वस्सकारो
व्यञ्जनपरः’ इत्यादिभिः पुनरिह कथनं पिष्टपेषवदयुक्तमेव स्यादिति शङ्कां समाधत्ते—
तन्त्रान्तरीयकतयात्विति । ननु छन्दोविषयाणां विकल्पशास्त्राणां निर्णायकमिदमित्युक्तौ
‘दीधीवेवीटाम्’ इत्यादीनामपि निर्णेतव्यत्वापत्त्या तदनिर्णयात् न्यूनतापत्तिरित्याशङ्कां
पञ्चरूपेण परिहरति नच शाखाविशेषस्थमित्यादिना । पूर्वप्रपञ्चितेऽर्थे पर्यवसितमाह—
तस्मात्तदिति । अखिललौकिकवैदिकशब्दसाधारण्येन प्रवृत्तत्वेन सामान्यशास्त्रभूतानां
शिक्षाव्याकरणानां शाखाविशेषवृत्तिकार्यविशेषप्रतिपादकत्वेन विशेषशास्त्रभूतस्य प्रातिशाख्य-
स्याविरोधेनैव प्रवृत्तिरिति तु फलितार्थः ॥

संज्ञापरिभाषमिति । समाहारद्वन्द्वः । प्रस्तूयतइति । प्रारभ्यतइत्यर्थः । तत्र
हेतुमाह—तस्यविषयतयेति । तस्य संज्ञापरिभाषस्य विषयत्वेन स्वोद्देश्यज्ञानसाधनद्वारा
उपजीव्यत्वेनेत्यर्थः । ‘षोडशादितः स्वराः’ इत्यादिभिर्विधायिष्यमाणानां कासाञ्चित्सं-

ज्ञानां वर्णसमाम्नायघटककतिपयवर्णोद्देश्यकत्वेनैव प्रवर्तिष्यमाणतया उद्देश्यज्ञानाय वर्णसमाम्नायस्यप्रथममपेक्षितत्वेन सएव प्रथममुपदेष्टव्य इति भावः । अधिकारार्थ इति । अधिकारार्थपेक्षेत्यर्थः । तत्रैव हेतुं पृच्छति कुतइति । समाधत्ते परिभाषणादिति । अत्र भावः—‘मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकात्स्न्येप्यथो अथ’ इत्यादिकोशादेव अथादिशब्दानां अधिकारार्थकत्वस्य सिद्धत्वेन पुनरत्रपरिभाषाकरणं नियमार्थं इति वक्तव्यम् । नियमश्च—अथादिशब्दानामत्र शास्त्रे अधिकारादय एव अर्थाः, नत्वानन्तर्याद्याः इति । एतादृशनियमानङ्गीकारे तु अधिकाराद्यर्थस्यापि अत्रानुक्तानामानन्तर्याद्यर्थानामिव लोकादेव उपस्थितौ सिद्धायां सूत्रमेवेदं व्यर्थतामापद्येत । अतस्तत्सार्थक्याय नियमोऽसौ अवश्याङ्गीकरणीयः । सति च नियमे अर्थान्तराणामनुपस्थित्या आनन्तर्याद्यर्थवर्णनं केषाञ्चिदसङ्गतमेवेति ॥

ननु अथशब्दस्य अधिकारएवार्थः, नान्यः इति नियमाङ्गीकारे अथशब्दस्य मङ्गलार्थकत्वे सत्यपि प्रकृते वक्तुमशक्यत्वेन शिष्टपारम्पर्येण ग्रन्थादावनुष्ठायमानस्य मङ्गलस्याकृतत्वापत्त्या न्यूनतापत्तिः । नचानार्थग्रन्थेष्वेवमङ्गलाचरणावश्यकता । ऋषीणां पुनस्तपोमहिम्नैव विघ्ननिवारणस्य मुशकत्वेन तेषां मङ्गलाचरणमनावश्यकम् । अदृष्टचरश्च सूत्रात्मकेषु ग्रन्थेषु मङ्गलाचरणमिति भ्रमितव्यम् । ऋषीणां तपोबलेनैव विघ्ननिवृत्तिसम्भवेऽपि तद्वलरहितानां अवरोषां महर्षिभिरेव मङ्गलस्याचरणान् काकथा अस्माकमिति अवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वबुद्धिसिद्धये तेषामपि तदनुष्ठानस्य आवश्यकत्वात् । दृष्टञ्चैतत् मूलशास्त्रे ‘वृद्धिरादैच्’ इति प्रथमसूत्रे । तत्रहि भाष्ये ‘उद्देश्यवचनं पूर्वं विधेयस्य ततः परम्’ इति न्यायेन सर्वत्रैव व्याकरणे पूर्वोच्चारितः संज्ञी, परोच्चारिता संज्ञा, इति नियममुक्त्वा ‘वृद्धिरादैच्’ इत्यत्र संज्ञां पूर्वं निर्दिशता पाणिनिना कुतोऽसौ नियमो नानुसृतः इत्यभिप्रायेण ‘कथं “वृद्धिरादैच्” इति’ इतिप्रश्नपूर्वकम् ‘एतदेकमाचार्यस्य मङ्गलार्थं मृष्यताम् । माङ्गलिक आचार्यो महतः शास्त्रौघस्य मङ्गलार्थं वृद्धिशब्दमादितः प्रायुङ्क्त’ इत्यादिना कथञ्चिदपि मङ्गलाचरणस्यावश्यकत्वेन तदर्थमेव तादृशनियममतिलङ्घ्यापि वृद्धिपदमादौ प्रयुक्तमिति प्रतिपादितम् । तस्मात् ऋषीणामपि मङ्गलाचरणस्यावश्यकतया अत्र अथशब्दस्य मङ्गलार्थकत्वाभावे तदनाचरणरूपन्यूनतापत्तिरिति चेत्, न ; भवगवतः परमपुरुषस्य स्मारकं अवर्ण आदितः प्रयुञ्जानेन सूत्रकृता लोकोत्तरस्य मङ्गलस्य आचरि-

तत्वात् नात्र अथशब्दस्य मङ्गलार्थकत्ववर्णनावश्यकता । स्पष्टा चेयं रीतिः ‘अथ शब्दानु-
शासनम्’ इति महाभाष्यप्रथमवाक्यव्याख्यावसरे भाष्यप्रदीपोद्घोते । यद्वा अधि-
कारार्थत्वेन प्रयुज्यमानस्याप्यथशब्दस्य श्रवणमात्रेण मङ्गलसिद्धिः, अन्यार्थत्वेन नीय-
मानदधिघटादिदर्शनवत् । ‘ओङ्कारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्त्वा
विनिर्यातौ स्यातां माङ्गलिकावुभौ ।’ इति वचनात् । स्पष्टा चेयं रीतिः—‘अथातो
ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति वैयासिकसूत्रगताथशब्दार्थनिरूपणावसरे भाष्यटीकादौ ।

परेतु कोशादनेकार्थकानामपि अथादिशब्दानां अर्थविशेषप्रत्यायकत्वस्य
प्रकरणादिनैव सिद्धत्वात् ‘त्वथैवेति’ परिभाषाकरणमेव तावद्यर्थम् । अत एव ‘त्वथैव’
इति परिभाषामनारभमाणैरपि महाभाष्यकारैः ‘अथशब्दानुशासनम्’ इत्यारम्भे ‘अथेत्ययं
शब्दोऽधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते’ इति विवरणमकारि । एवञ्च अथशब्दस्यैव प्रकृते मङ्गलार्थ-
कत्ववर्णनमपि योयुज्यतेतराम् । ध्वनितश्चेदं ‘नानन्तर्यार्थः’ इति प्रकृतानुपयोगिनं
आनन्तर्यार्थत्वं परं व्यवच्छिद्य मङ्गलार्थकत्वमव्यवच्छिन्दानेन ग्रन्थकृतैव । न च ‘सकृ-
त्प्रयुक्तः शब्दः सकृदर्थं प्रत्याययति’ इति न्यायसत्त्वेन सकृदुपात्तस्य अथशब्दस्य अर्थ-
द्वयवर्णनमसङ्गतमिति वाच्यम् ; सूत्रेष्वनेकार्थकत्वेन एकशब्दप्रयोगस्यालङ्कारत्वेन
अदोष(त्व)ात् । तस्मान्नात्र काप्यनुपपत्तिः इत्याहुः । व्यक्तमिति । अत्वकत्वादिविशिष्ट
मित्यर्थः । यत्र समुदितानामिति । समाम्नायते अस्मिन्नितिसमाम्नाय इति बाहुलकः
अधिकरणे घञ् इति भावः । समुदितानामाम्नायः अभ्यासः यस्मिन् सः इति बहुव्रीहिर्वा ।
समाम्नायः अस्मिन्नस्तीति अर्शआद्यजन्तो वा । पक्षत्रयेऽपि यावद्वर्णघटितसमुदायोऽर्थः ।
ह्रस्वभूतैकारौकाराभावे महाभाष्योक्तिं प्रमाणयति—तदुक्तमिति । राणायनीया इति ।
तेनान्ये नाधीयत इति भाष्याभिप्रायः । अत एव तत्रैव भाष्ये ‘नैव हि लोके नान्यस्मिन् वेदे
अर्थ एकारः अर्थ ओकारो वा अस्ती’ इत्युक्तम् । परिमाणभेदेति । मात्राभेदेत्यर्थः ।
पञ्चमं नासिक्वमिति । ‘हकारान्नणमपराणासिक्वम्’ इति सूत्रेण इति भावः ।
एकविंशे निराकारिष्याम इति । निराकरणप्रकारश्चैवम्—हकारान्नणमपराइ(दि) त्यत्र
गुणविधिस्तु नैव घटते, गुणगुणिवाचकपदयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यसद्भावस्थले एव तद्विधिस्वी-
कारात् । यथा—‘पूर्वः स्वरोऽनुनासिकः’, ‘समानाक्षराण्यनुनासिकानि’ इति च । अत्र

च 'हकारात्' इति 'नासिक्यम्' इति च स्पष्टमेव विभिन्नविभक्तिकत्वम् । किञ्च नासिक्यशब्दस्य गुणवाचित्वमेव न सम्भवति, तस्य 'तत्र भवः' इत्यर्थक 'शरीरावयवाच्च' इति विहितयत्प्रत्ययान्तत्वात् । नासिक्यस्य भावः इति विग्रहे तु 'योपधादगुरूपोत्तम-द्रवुञ्' इति वुञ् प्रत्यये 'रामणीयकम्' इत्यादिवत् 'नासिक्यकम्' इत्यापत्तिः । कथञ्चिदजादिप्रत्ययकल्पनेन नासिक्यशब्दस्य गुणवाचित्वसमर्थनेऽपि उद्देश्यस्य षष्ठ्यन्तत्वाभावेन अन्वयानुपपत्त्या गुणविधित्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । किञ्च गुणविधित्व-स्वीकारे 'वर्णः कारोत्तरः' इति सूत्रविहितकारशब्दोत्तरसंज्ञायाः 'न विसर्जनीयजिह्वा-मूलीय' इत्यादिसूत्रेण नासिक्येषु प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् 'न हकारः' इति सूत्रस्थहकारशब्देन नासिक्यत्वगुणविशिष्टस्य हवर्णस्य ग्रहणाभावेन तस्य अधोषसंज्ञाप्रतिषेधो न स्यात् । एवञ्च 'अपैवास्मै तदध्रुवते' इत्यादौ दांषः स्यात् । तस्मादकामैरपि वर्णान्तरागमविधिरेव स्वीकरणीय इति ॥

परे तु 'हकारान्' 'नणमपरान्' इति पदच्छेदेन 'नासिक्यम्' इत्यस्य च द्वितीयान्तत्वेन गुणगुणिवाचकयोः सामानाधिकरण्यस्य अव्याहतत्वात्, व्यक्तव्यभिप्रायेण बहुत्वस्य 'घटान् द्रव्यमाचक्षते' इत्यादाविवानुनासिक्यम्' इत्येकवचनस्य च उपपत्तेः, 'लः परस्मैपदम्' 'तडानावात्मनेपदम्' इत्यादिमूलशास्त्रीयसूत्रेष्विव भिन्नवचन-कत्वेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यसम्भवात्, प्रत्युत वर्णान्तरागमविधिमभ्युपगच्छतस्तवैव 'नासि-क्यम्' इति द्वितीयान्तनिर्देशः प्रतिकूलीभवति, 'अःकार आगमविकारि' इति परिभाषाविरोधात् । पूर्वतरसूत्रे निर्दिष्टस्य 'नासिक्याः' इति प्रथमान्तपदस्य इह सूत्रे आगमविधित्वं प्रति प्रयोजनत्वेनाश्रयणन्तु 'पृष्ठताडनेन दन्तभङ्गापत्तिः' इति न्याय-मेवानुसरति । किञ्च 'नासिक्याः' इति कचित्प्रथमान्तनिर्देशः तत्प्रकरणस्यैव वर्णान्तराग-मविधायकत्वं बोधयतीति कथनं अत्यन्तमसङ्गतमेव, उत्तरसूत्रस्याप्यागमविधायकत्वापत्तेः । अपिच गुणविधित्वेन भवदभिमतोत्तरसूत्रसाहचर्यात् अस्यापि गुणविधित्वमेव न्याय्यम् । नासिक्यशब्दस्य गुणवाचित्वं न सम्भवतीत्यादिकथनन्तु न प्रकृतार्थप्रतिकूलम्, 'समानाक्षराण्यनुनासिकानि' इतिवत् सामानाधिकरण्येनैव उपपत्तेर्दर्शितत्वात् । यत्तु गुणविधित्वस्वीकारे नासिक्येषु कारशब्दोत्तरसंज्ञायाः न विसर्जनीय' इत्यादिना

प्रतिषेधात् ‘न हकारः’ इतिसूत्रस्थहकारशब्देन अस्यग्रहणानापत्तिरिति तत्रैव सूत्रे ‘अपैवासौ तद्भ्रुवते’ इत्यत्र दूषणमुद्धाटितम्, तत्र पृच्छामः, नविसर्जनीयादिसूत्रस्थ-
नासिक्यपदेन नासिकास्थानोत्पन्नानामखिलानामपि ग्रहणमभिमतम् ? उताहो केषाञ्चिदेव ?
नाद्यः, नकारो णकारः इत्यादावपि कारशब्दप्रतिषेधापत्तेः । किञ्च नविसर्जनीयादिसूत्रे
विसर्जनीयादीनाम् ‘अकारो व्यञ्जनानाम्’ इति विहिताकारोऽपि न भवतीति भवत्सिद्धान-
न्तात् ‘ङः’, ‘नः’ इत्यादेरप्यनापत्तेः । अनुस्वारस्यापि नासिक्यत्वात् सिद्धे पृथग्रहण-
वैयर्थ्याच्च । नद्वितीयः, ‘तद्भ्रुवते’ इत्यत्रदूषणकथनस्य निर्मूलत्वापत्तेः । तस्मात्
नविसर्जनीयादिसूत्रस्थनासिक्यपदार्थस्तावदित्थं निर्णेतव्यः—नासिक्यपदेन सामान्यवाचि-
ना तद्विशेषाणां यमानामेव ग्रहणम् नान्येषाम् इत्यवश्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अन्यथा
पूर्वोक्तासाङ्गत्यापत्तेः । अत्रचार्थे तत्र सूत्रे पृथगनुस्वारग्रहणं लिङ्गम् । अन्यथा नासिक्य-
त्वादेव सिद्धे किं पृथग्रहणेन ? किञ्च मूलशास्त्रे अयोगवाहपदार्थत्वेन भाष्योक्तानां
अनुस्वारविसर्गजिह्वामूलीयोपध्मानीयमानां मध्ये यमव्यतिरिक्तानां अखिलानामपि
स्पष्टमुपात्तत्वात् नासिक्यपदेनापि तत्रोक्तानां यमानामेव ग्रहणावश्यम्भावात् त एवनासिक्य-
पदार्थः । एवञ्च सत्येव मकारः णकारः इत्याद्युपपद्यते, अनुस्वारग्रहणञ्च सार्थकं भवति ।
तथाच नासिक्यत्वविशिष्टस्य हकारस्य कारशब्दोत्तरसंज्ञायाः सुसंपादत्वेन ‘नहकारः’
इत्यत्र तस्य ग्रहणस्य पितामहेनापि दुर्निवारत्वेन ‘तद्भ्रुवते’ इत्यादौ दूषणोक्तिर्दूरापास्तैव ।
एवञ्च गुणविधित्वे न कोऽप्यनुपपत्तिलेशः । किञ्च अत्रापि वर्णान्तरत्वस्वीकारे नासिक्यानां
पञ्चत्वापत्त्या ‘चत्वारश्च यमास्तथा’ इति पाणिनीयशिक्षाविरोधः । ‘हकारान्नणमपराच्च’
इत्येतावति सूत्रे कृतेऽपि पूर्वसूत्रान्नासिक्यपदमनुवर्तते, एकवचनान्तत्वेनविपरिणामेनैव
इष्टसिद्ध्या पुनर्नासिक्यग्रहणं पूर्वविहितनासिक्यापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यं द्योतयितुमेव ।
तच्च गुणविधित्वरूपमेवेति सूत्रकृतोऽपि गुणविधिरेवाभिमतः । अन्यथा तु नासिक्यग्रहणं
न कुर्यादेव । आस्तां नाम आगमविधित्वम्, तथापि हकार एव तादृश आगमः नतु
वर्णान्तरमिति सर्वथापि वर्णान्तरत्वं व्याहतमेव । किञ्च नहि एवंविधवर्णान्तरविधाय-
कत्वस्वीकारे किमपि फलमुपलभामहे ऋते शिक्षाविरोधात् । तस्माद्गुणविधित्वमेव न्या-
य्यमित्याहुः ॥

जातीनामेवसंख्योक्तेति । ननु अत्वादिरूपाया जातेरेकत्वात् आकारादीनामेकत्वेनैव परिगणयितव्यत्वेन षोडशत्वहान्या ' षोडशादितः स्वराः ' इति संख्यानानुपपत्तिः । व्यक्तिपक्षे तु व्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात् नतरां षोडशत्वोपपत्तिः । तस्मात् कतरं पञ्चमाश्रित्य षोडशत्वमत्रोच्यत इति चेत्, अत्रोच्यते—जातिपक्षमाश्रित्यैव षोडशत्वोपपत्तिः, अत्वादिरूपाया जातेरेकत्वेऽपि ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वप्लुतत्वानां परस्परभिन्नत्वात् तत्समानाधिकरणतत्तज्जातेरपि भेदाभ्युपगमेन एकाप्यत्वादिः त्रिधा भिद्यते । इत्थञ्च षोडशत्वोपपत्तिः । न च एवमुदात्तत्वानुदात्तत्वादीनामपि भिन्नत्वात् तत्समानाधिकरणतत्तज्जातेरपि भेदस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यतया षोडशत्वानुपपत्तितादवस्थ्यमिति वाच्यम्, षोडशत्वेन परिगणयितुः सूत्रकारस्य उदात्तत्वादिसमानाधिकरणजातिभेदस्यानभिमतत्वात् । न च उदात्तत्वादिसमानाधिकरणजातेरेव भेदः सूत्रकृतसंमतइत्यस्तु, तावतापि षोडशत्वोपपत्तेरिति वाच्यम् । उदात्तत्वादीनां गुणत्वेन गुणानाञ्च स्वसमानाधिकरणजातिभेदकत्वस्य गवादावदृष्टत्वेन ' अभेदका गुणा इत्येव न्याय्यम् ' इति मूलशास्त्रे सिद्धान्तितत्वेन च तत्समानाधिकरणजातिभेदस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । तस्मान्नानुपपत्तिरिति बोध्यम् ॥

अथ नवादितः समानाक्षराणि । षष्ठ्यन्ततया विपरिणम्यत इति । आदितः इत्यनेन कस्यादौ इति षष्ठ्यन्तस्यैवाकांक्षितत्वादिति भावः । महासंज्ञाकिमर्थमिति । ' संज्ञा च नाम यतो न लघीयः ' इति महाभाष्येण सर्वेभ्योऽपि लघुभूतस्यैव शब्दस्य संज्ञात्वौचित्यात् किमर्थमुत्संज्ञाकरणमिति भावः ॥

द्वेद्वेसवर्णे ह्रस्वदीर्घे । त्रीन् गणान् समाश्रित्येति । अत्रवीफ्सावचनं महासंज्ञाकरणञ्च लिङ्गम् । सजातीयो वर्णः सवर्णः इति व्युत्पत्त्या सवर्णपदस्य सजातीयवर्णवाचितयाभिन्नजातीयह्रस्वदीर्घयोःसवर्णत्वात् । अथ वा सवर्णपदमावर्त्य एकेन ह्रस्वदीर्घयोर्विशेषणेन सजातीयह्रस्वदीर्घेत्याद्यर्थलाभेन नानुपपत्तिः । यथावा मूलशास्त्रे ' सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि ' इति सूत्रेऽपि संज्ञाभूतसर्वादिशब्दानां संज्ञावारणाय ' सर्वनामानि ' इत्यस्य आवृत्त्या एकस्य सर्वादिविशेषणत्वं अपरस्य संज्ञाबोधकत्वं कैयटशेखरादौ ' संज्ञोपसर्जनीभूताः ' इति वार्तिके उक्तम्, तथा अत्राप्याश्रयणे विरोधाभावात् । समम्यन्तस्येदंरूपमिति । अत्रापि व्याख्याने यथा ' ब्राह्मणाभ्यां कृतं देहि ' इत्यत्र

वाक्ये सकृदुपात्तस्यापि ब्राह्मणाभ्यामित्यस्य कृतशब्दप्रयोगे तृतीयान्तता, देहिशब्द-
 प्रयोगे चतुर्थ्यन्तता च, एवं सवर्णे इत्यस्य ह्रस्वदीर्घविशेषणत्वे सप्तम्यन्तत्वम्, विधेय-
 बोधकत्वे तु प्रथमान्तत्वम्, इति सङ्गतमेवोभयार्थकत्वं सवर्णपदस्य । स्पष्टा चेयं रीतिः
 ‘सरूपाणामेकशेषः’ इति सूत्रे शब्दन्दुशेखरे तद्व्याख्यादिषु ॥ ननु यथा संज्ञाकरणा-
 भावेऽपि ‘अन्तस्थापरश्च सवर्णमनुनासिकम्’ इत्यादौ प्रयुक्तस्य सवर्णपदस्य
 सारूप्यार्थकत्वमाश्रित्य उपपत्तिः दृश्यते, एवमेवात्रापि सिद्ध्या संज्ञाप्रणयनस्यैव तावत्
 वैयर्थ्यमापद्यते इति शङ्कते—यद्येवमित्यादिना । ह्रस्वदीर्घयोरसरूपत्वादिति । एवञ्च
 ‘सवर्णमनुनासिकम्’ इत्यादाविव सारूप्यार्थकत्वेनैव सिद्ध्या सूत्रस्य वैयर्थ्यमिति
 शङ्कैव नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थः, ह्रस्वदीर्घयोः सावर्ण्यानापत्तेः । उक्तमर्थमुपसंहरति—
 तस्माद्यथोक्त इत्यादिना । परेतु सूत्रमिदं स्पष्टार्थमेव । समानो वर्णः सवर्णः इति
 विग्रहे समानशब्दस्य ‘ज्योतिर्जनपदरात्रिनाभिनामगोत्ररूपस्थानवर्णवयोवचनबन्धुषु’
 इति सूत्रेण सभावे सवर्णशब्दस्य निष्पत्त्या तस्य सदृशवर्णार्थकत्वेन, सादृश्यस्य च एक-
 जातीयत्वप्रयुक्तस्य ग्रहणेन सर्वत्र इष्टसिद्धिः । प्रसिद्धञ्च लोके सवर्णावर्णपदयोः
 सजातीयविजातीयबोधकत्वम् ‘अणुदित्’ सूत्रस्थशब्दन्दुशेखरग्रन्थे प्रतिपादितम् ।
 स्पष्टीकृतञ्चैतत् “वर्णाश्रमाचारवान्” इत्यादौ सवर्णशब्दवाच्यत्वं जातेरिवात्रापि
 इत्यादिना सदाशिवभट्टीये । सूत्रारम्भेऽपि ‘नान्तस्थापरमसवर्णम्’ इत्यत्र अन्तस्थात्व-
 रूपसमानधर्मवतो वर्णस्यैव सवर्णपदेन ग्रहणमवश्यमङ्गीकरणीयम् । एवमन्यत्रावश्या-
 श्रयणीयस्य सजातीयवर्णार्थकत्वस्य ग्रहणेनैवात्रापि इष्टसिद्ध्या सूत्रस्य स्पष्टार्थत्वमेव । न
 च सूत्राभावे ‘नान्तस्थापरमसवर्णम्’ इत्यत्र अन्तस्थात्वेन साजात्यम्, समानाक्षर-
 विषये तु अत्वादिना साजात्यमित्यत्र किं विनिगमकम् इति वाच्यम् । व्याख्यानेनैव
 निर्णयसंभवात् । तवापि ‘अन्तस्थापरश्च सवर्णमनुनासिकम्’ इत्यत्र ‘संय्यताः’
 ‘सर्व्वत्सरः’ इत्यादौ यकारवकारादिसिद्धये यत्वादिना साजात्यम्, ‘नान्तस्था-
 परमसवर्णम्’ इत्यत्र ‘सूनर्यसि’ ‘अथर्वणः’ इत्यादौ पूर्वाङ्गत्वसिद्धये अन्तस्थात्वेन
 साजात्यमित्यत्र व्याख्यानस्यैवशरणीकरणीयत्वात् । ‘नाकारपरौ’ इति सूत्रे ‘अकारपरौ’
 इत्येव पदच्छेदः, नतु ‘आकारपरौ’ इत्यत्र व्याख्यानमेव निर्णायकमिति भवतैव वक्ष्य-

माणत्वाच्च । किञ्च 'दीर्घं समानाक्षरे' इति सूत्रे 'समानाक्षरे इति किम्' इत्याशङ्क्य
 'एत एतान् ग्रहानपश्यन्' 'भूत्याऐन्ध' इति भवतैव प्रत्युदाहारि । तत्र यन्निमित्तवै-
 कल्यप्रयुक्तोपदेशाप्रवृत्तिः तन्निमित्तातिरिक्तसर्वनिमित्तकत्वस्य प्रत्युदाहरणेषु अवश्यभावेन
 प्रकृते 'दीर्घं समानाक्षरे' इति शास्त्राप्रवृत्तेः समानाक्षरत्वरूपनिमित्तवैकल्यप्रयुक्तत्वेन
 तदतिरिक्तसवर्णत्वरूपनिमित्तस्य 'एतएतान्' इति प्रत्युदाहरणेषु सद्भावावश्यकतया
 एकारादीनामपि परस्परं सावर्ण्यमभ्युपेयमेव । तच्च सावर्ण्यं न संज्ञारूपम्, विध्यभावात् ।
 किन्तु सजातीयवर्णत्वरूपमेवेति त्वयापि मदुक्तार्थकत्वमङ्गीकृतमेव । एवञ्च अनेनैव
 समानाक्षरेष्वपि सिद्ध्या सवर्णसंज्ञाकरणं निरर्थकमेव । न च केवलयोगिकत्वस्वीकारे
 प्लुतपूर्वेऽपि सावर्ण्यापत्त्या दीर्घापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ; 'न प्लुतपूर्वम्' इति निषेधसूत्रस्य
 'दीर्घं समानाक्षरे' इति सूत्रात्परत्र करणेन तेनैव दीर्घस्य प्रतिषेधेन अदोषात् ।
 तस्मात्संज्ञाकरणं स्पष्टार्थमेवेति दिक् इत्याहुः ॥

इदमेवेति । इदमपीत्यर्थः । तेन फलान्तरमपि पूर्वसूत्रोक्तं ग्रहीतव्यम् ।
 तत्कार्यमेव प्रतिषिध्यत इति । संज्ञाकरणस्य कार्यार्थत्वेन तत्प्रतिषेधस्य कार्यप्रतिषेध
 एव पर्यवसानादिति भावः । नियतलिङ्गसंख्यावन्त इति । तथा च अमरः 'विंशत्याद्याः
 सदैकत्वे संख्याः संख्येयसंख्ययोः' इति । अन्तैर्जन्यत्वादिति । परेतु अन्तः
 स्पर्शोष्मणोर्मध्ये तिष्ठन्तीत्यपि निवृत्ते । शक्त्यवच्छेदेनेति । समूहसामान्यविषयिकाया
 वर्गपदनिष्ठशक्तेः वर्णविशेषभूतस्पर्शावान्तरगणमात्रविषयकत्वेन सङ्कोचेनेत्यर्थः । स्पर्श-
 मात्रसमूहस्य । यावत्स्पर्शात्मकसमूहस्य ॥

येतिवति । एतत्तत्त्वं प्रागेवावोचाम । णकारो वेतिप्रयुञ्जानैरिति । 'वृद्धि-
 रादैच्' इति सूत्रे इति शेषः । वैयाकरणैः । भाष्यकारैरित्यर्थः । उपध्मानेन जन्य-
 त्वादिति । उश्च पश्च उपौ उकारपकारै इत्यर्थः । तौ ध्मायते उच्चार्येते अनेनेति उपध्मानं
 ओष्ठस्थानं तेन जन्यत्वादित्यर्थः । रूढत्वाच्च न वर्णान्तरेष्वतिप्रसक्तिः । नासिकायां
 भ्रंवांइति । 'स्पर्शादनुत्तमात्' इति सूत्रविहिता यमाः इत्यर्थः । प्रात्प्यभावादिति ।
 नच 'वर्णः कारोत्तरः' इत्यस्य वर्णबोधकः 'अ' इत्यादिः कारशब्दोत्तरः सन् वर्णस्य

आख्या भवति इत्यर्थेन विसर्जनीयादिपदानामपि वर्णबोधकत्वात् कथं प्राप्त्यभावः इति वाच्यम् ; वर्णशब्दवाच्यः ‘अ’ इत्यादिः कारशब्दोत्तरः सन् तस्य आख्या भवति इत्यर्थेन विसर्जनीयादिपदानां वर्णशब्दवाच्यत्वाभावादप्राप्तेः । वर्णसमुदायादिपीत । ‘चकारः’ ‘एवकारः’ इत्यादाविवेति भावः । हकारान्नणमपरान्नासिक्यामितीति । वस्तुतस्तु चिन्त्यमिदम् , ‘नासिक्यम्’ इत्यस्य द्वितीयान्तत्वेन प्रथमान्तत्वाभावात् ॥

आसन्नं सन्देहे । न व्यवहितैरिति । ‘पूर्वश्च’ इत्यादौ नियमेन जायमानायाः कस्मादित्यवध्याकांक्षायाः अव्यवहितपूर्ववृत्तिपदोपस्थित्यैव शान्तत्वेन व्यवहितपदान्तरस्य उपस्थितिर्नास्ति इत्यर्थः । एवं उत्तरसूत्रविषयेऽपि । ‘लपरौ’ इत्यादौ नियताया विशेष्यद्वयविषयकांक्षाया अपि अव्यवहितसमीपस्थपदद्वयविषयकज्ञानेनैव उपक्षीणत्वेन पदान्तरोपस्थितिर्नास्तीति भावः । इत्थञ्च सन्निहितपदपरित्यागपूर्वकासन्निहितपदग्रहणे प्रमाणाभावमूलकप्रत्यासत्तिन्यायसिद्धार्थानुवादकं इदं सूत्रद्वयमिति तात्पर्यम् । वस्तुतस्तु अस्य सूत्रस्य फलान्तरं ‘पूर्वजेप्रभृति’ इति सूत्रे वदिष्यामः । कस्यवर्ग इति । तद्धटितो वर्ग इत्यर्थः । नतु स्वरूपोपलक्षणत्वमाश्रित्येति । अयं भावः—लोके हि पूर्वत्वपरत्वादीनां प्रायोणोपलक्षणत्वेनैव प्रतीत्यनुभवः । यथा ‘एतत्पूर्वो ब्राह्मणो भोज्यताम्’ इत्यादौ तत्पूर्वदेशस्थ एव भोजयितव्य इति न नियम्यते, किन्तु तमाहूय स्थलान्तरेऽपि तस्य भोजनं कियते, एवमिहाप्याश्रयणे ‘द्यावापृथिवी’ ‘पूर्वश्च’ इत्यनेन द्यावापृथिवीशब्दपूर्वदेशस्थस्यैव तत् कार्यमिति न स्यात् । तथाच सति तत्पूर्वत्वोपलक्षितस्य यावती शब्दस्य ‘यावती पूर्णमासी’ इत्यत्रापि प्रग्रहत्वं स्यात् , तन्मा भूत् इति इदमारभ्यते । एवमुत्तरसूत्रेऽपि बोध्यम् । ननु अस्तु पूर्वत्वादीनामुपलक्षणत्वेनैव लोके प्रतीत्यनुभवः । तथापि इह शास्त्रे तदाश्रयणमशक्यमिति ब्रूमहे । तथाहि—यद्यत्र पूर्वत्वादीनामुपलक्षणत्वमुर्यकारिष्यत. तर्हि सर्वेषामपि यावतीशब्दादीनां प्रग्रहत्वादिप्राप्त्या सामान्येन ‘यावती च’ इत्यादिरूपेण सूत्राणां कर्तव्यत्वापत्त्या ‘द्यावापृथिवी’ ‘पूर्वश्च’ इत्यादिसूत्रकरणमेव नैरर्थक्यमवाप्स्यत् । अत एव एतादृशपरिभाषारम्भाभावेऽपि ‘इको यणचि’ इत्यादौ मूलशास्त्रे पूर्वत्वपरत्वादीनां विशेषणविधयैव निवेशो दृश्यते । उपलक्षणतया तु न कुत्रचिदपि दृश्यते । किञ्च सत्यपि परिभाषारम्भे परिभाषाघटकपूर्वा-

त्तरपदार्थविषये विशेषणत्वं वा उपलक्षणत्वं वा इति संशये परिभाषारम्भसामर्थ्येन विशेषण, त्वमेव, नतु उपलक्षणत्वमिति तत्रापि सूत्रारम्भसामर्थ्यमेव शरणीकरणीयम् । तस्मात्तत्र तत्र तत्तद्वचनसामर्थ्यादेव उपलक्षणत्वस्य अप्रसक्तौ किमर्थमिदं सूत्रद्वयमिति चेत् ; साधुपृष्टमायुष्मता शास्त्रार्थयाथातथ्यवेदिना तथापि वचनसामर्थ्याश्रयणे प्रतिपत्तिगौरवापत्त्या मध्यमाधिकारिणः तादृशधीकौशल्यभावेन तेषां स्पष्टप्रतिपत्तये सूत्रद्वयमित्यभिप्रायान्नात्र वैयर्थ्यशङ्का ॥

तेनच समानकालइति । अत्र तेन इत्यस्य अकारोच्चारणाधिकरणकालेनेत्यर्थः । अकारोणेतिविवरणस्यापि अयमेवार्थः । सादृश्यञ्च अत्र अन्यूनानतिरिक्तपरिमाणवत्त्वेन बोध्यम् । तेन दीर्घादौ नातिप्रसक्तिः, अतिरिक्तकालत्वान् ।

द्विस्तावानिति । द्विगुणिततावत्कालवानित्यर्थः । द्विमात्राकालविशिष्ट इति फलितम् । एवमुत्तरसूत्रे त्रिगुणिततावत्कालविशिष्ट इत्यर्थो बोध्यः ॥

मण्डूकप्लुतिन्यायेनेति । यथा मण्डूका उत्प्लुत्योत्प्लुत्य गच्छन्ति तद्वदधिकारा इति भावः ॥

समाहारइति । समाह्रियते अस्मिन् उदात्तानुदात्तत्वे इति समाहारः । बाहुलकोऽधिकरणे घञ्प्रत्ययः । अथवा समाहारः अस्मिन्नस्तीतिसमाहारः इति अर्शआद्यजन्तत्वेन व्युत्पादनीयम् ॥

नानापदविद्वद्भ्रमसंख्याने । ‘अप्यकारादि’ इति वचनसामर्थ्यादिति । तद्धि ‘देवाशोका’ इत्यादिना श्वाशब्दस्य विधीयमानो ह्रस्वः ‘अश्रावन्तम्’ इत्यत्रापि प्रवर्ततामित्येतदर्थं आरभ्यते । यदि तु व्याकरणसिद्धस्यापि पदत्वेन ग्रहणं स्यात् तदा ‘अश्रावन्तम्’ इत्यत्र अइति नञः श्वा इत्यस्य च पृथक्पदत्वादेव सिद्धे ह्रस्वे तत् व्यर्थस्यादिति नात्र व्याकरणसिद्धस्य पदत्वेन ग्रहणमिति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु चिन्त्यमिदम् । ‘अश्रावन्तम्’ इत्यत्र अश्वशब्दात् मतुप्रत्यये सति ‘मन्त्रे सोमाश्चेन्द्रियविश्वदेव्यस्य मतौ’ इति सूत्रेण दीर्घं सति निष्पत्त्या व्याकरणरीत्यापि अइत्यस्य च पृथक्पदत्वाभावेन तदर्थं ‘अप्यकारादि’ इति वचनस्यावश्यकत्वेन तस्य ज्ञापकत्वासम्भवात् । तस्मात् ‘अप्यकारादीत्यादि वचनसामर्थ्यात्’ इत्यत्रापि पदोपादानेन ‘अन् कारादिच’ इति सूत्रग्रहणेन तस्य ज्ञापकत्वं कथञ्चिदुपपाद्यमित्यभिप्रायो वर्णनीयः । अतएव आदिग्रहणं सार्थिकम् ।

University Notes

AGRICULTURAL COLONISATION SCHEME

Two years ago, to consider the question of colonising by unemployed graduates a part of the land owned by the University, the Syndicate appointed a committee consisting of Nawabzada Sadaatullakhan, Deputy Director of Agriculture, Madras ; Rao Bahadur M. R. Ramaswami Sivan, Retired Principal, Agricultural College, Coimbatore ; Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, Professor of Economics, Annamalai University ; Mr. N. Viswanatha Ayyar, Registrar, Annamalai University ; and Mr. Sundaram, the then Assistant Director of Agriculture, Cuddalore. On the report of this Committee the Syndicate decided to introduce an agricultural colonisation scheme which was inaugurated on the 2nd May, 1938 by the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, Vice-Chancellor. In pursuance of this scheme ten acres each were allotted to the graduates who presented themselves on the opening day.

RESEARCH DEGREES

The following students were awarded M.Sc. Degree at the Convocation held in December, 1937 :—

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|----|--|
| Mr. S. Sriraman | .. | Magnetic Susceptibilities of solutions of certain salt in water. |
| Mr. V. Pasupati | .. | Studies in Naphthalene series :
Synthesis of polyhydroxy-derivative of Naphthalene. |
| Mr. P. Lakshminarasimha Rao | .. | Synthetical experiments on the group of Alkaloids. |

The following research degrees were awarded during the year :—

M.LITT.

- | | | |
|--------------------------|----|----------------------------------|
| C. Jagannathachari, M.A. | .. | Thesis : Foreign Trade of India. |
|--------------------------|----|----------------------------------|

M.Sc.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|----|--|
| P. R. Venkataraman, B.Sc. | .. | |
|---------------------------|----|--|

PROHIBITION IN SALEM DISTRICT

Mr. C. Jagannathachari, M.A., M.LITT., Research Student in Economics has been deputed by the Syndicate to study the working of Prohibition in the Salem District. He is working under the direction of Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, Professor of Economics. The report will be published in due course.

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Mr. S. K. Ekambaram, B.A., B.Sc. (Hons.), who took his Honours Degree in Mathematics from this University has been awarded a Government of India Scholarship for further studies in Cambridge.

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Mr. A. V. Venkateswaran, B.A.(Hons.), who took his Honours Degree in English Language and Literature from this University has come out successful in the recent Audit and Accounts Service Competitive Examination.

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UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS

The following books are in the press and will be published shortly :—

1. Jagannatha Pandita by V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, M.A.
2. Trimsacchloki, Edited by K. Rama Pisharoti, M.A.
3. A Text Book of Chemistry in Tamil by N. Anantavaidyanathan, M.A.
4. History of Gingee and Its Rulers by C. S. Srinivasachariar, M.A.
5. "Experimental Chemistry for Intermediate Students" by M. L. Sitaraman, M.Sc.
6. Distributive Co-operation by V. G. Ramakrishna Ayyar, M.A.

Reviews

The brochure entitled "the *Meḷarāgha mālika* of Mahavaidyanatha Sivan," edited by Pandit S. Subramanya Sastri, F.T.S., is sure to be welcomed by all the true lovers of Karnataka music. It serves to introduce to the wider India and even to the west one of the most intriguing intricacies of the highly advanced science and art of the South Indian Music . The general outlines are written in English, the present day lingua franca of the civilised world, while the notations are given in Nagari Characters. The latter aspect has its own advantages in that it is likely to reach a far wider Indian audience than the use of English notations would enable it to do.

Mahavaidyanatha Aiyar was the McCormack of South India. And he was also a perfect Beethoven without any of Beethoven's native defects. And the brief life-sketch of this human land-lark would help the readers to understand the real soul of Mahavaidyanatha Aiyar that thrilled his listeners to ecstasy and that still stir his countrymen to reverent admiration.

The introduction furnishes the requisite keys to unravel the wondrous intricacies of the *Rāgha Mālīka*, this marvel of music. It lucidly explains the principles and methods that form the basis and supply the keys for this rare and elaborate but superb castle in the wonderland of music. It gives all the naively ingenious and yet natural manipulations of the seven notes or swaras that lead to this miracle of melody, and the scientific *Katapayādhī* formulae, and the artistic permutations in well-arranged tables and *chakras* which luminously explain and tersely elucidate the formation, structure and sweet sound-functions of the *Melakarta Ragas* with their exquisite blend and harmony.

Of course the controversy as regards the reckoning of 16 instead of 12 notes or fret places, and the practicability of singing only 32 and not the 72 raghas is not referred to, as perhaps it has no place in this monograph which aims only to give to the readers in a nutshell a brief but clear outline of the *Rāghamālīka* of Mahavaidyanatha Aiyar. Many modern musicians however declare that the system of evolving 72 *Karta Ragas* is a purely artificial mathematical device utterly unrelated to the practical art of music, and unadapted to the framework of the gamut or the normal places of the really recognisable natural notes or swaras. Whether the *Mēlakarta-rāgha-mālīka* in 'its plenary phase is capable of being sung by any musician is a question which we laymen

must leave to the musical experts to decide. The present brochure serves its purpose splendidly. It completely elucidates how the Rāgha-mālika is conceived and developed with the normal swaras and anuswaras adapted and manipulated on clear scientific lines. I commend it cordially to all lovers of music in the hope that it will receive their sympathy and support.

BHARATI.

L. A. R. I. 75.

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